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WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE WORLD? 





































WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE WORLD? 
RHETORICAL AND ARGUMENTATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
Edited by Gabrijela Kišiček (University of Zagreb) & Igor Ž. Žagar 







Windsor Studies in Argumentation 
 
Open Monograph Press 
 
 
Editors in Chief 
Leo Groarke (University of Windsor) 
Christopher Tindale (University of Windsor) 
 
Board of Editors 
Mark Battersby (Capilano University) 
Camille Cameron (University of Windsor) 
Emmanuelle Danblon (Université libre de Bruxelles)  
Ian Dove (University of Nevada Las Vegas) 
Bart Garssen (University of Amsterdam) 
Michael Gilbert (York University) 
David Godden  (Old Dominion University) 
Jean Goodwin (Iowa State University) 
Hans Hansen (University of Windsor)  
Gabrijela Kišiček (University of Zagreb) 
Marcin Koszowy (University of Białystok) 
Marcin Lewiński (New University of Lisbon)  
Catherine H. Palczewski (University of Northern Iowa) 
Steven Patterson (Marygrove College) 
Chris Reed (University of Dundee) 
Andrea Rocci (University of Lugano) 
Paul van den Hoven (Tilburg University) 
Cristián Santibáñez Yáñez (Diego Portales University) 
Igor Ž. Žagar (University of Maribor & University of Primorska) 
















© Individual authors and WSIA 2013. 






























                                                                               
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. 1 
PROLOGUE ............................................................................................................................... 3 
Gordana Varošanec-Škarić, University of Zagreb 
I. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ........................................................................................ 5 
The Elements of Argument: Six Steps To A Thick Theory ................................................... 6 
Leo Groarke, University of Windsor 
Argumentation as poliphony: one speaker, several voices................................................... 29 
Igor Ž. Žagar, Educational Research Institute & University of Primorska 
The linguistic-discursive creation of the speaker’s ethos for the sake of persuasion: a key 
aspect of rhetoric and argumentation ................................................................................... 64 
Paul Danler, University of Innsbruck 
The Sokal affair and beyond: on the strategic use of parody in the “science wars” ............ 84 
Ana Dimiškovska, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje 
The acts and strategies of defining ..................................................................................... 115 
Fabrizio Macagno, Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
Intolerance and the Zero Tolerance Fallacy ....................................................................... 143 
Sheldon Wein, Saint Mary’s University 
II POLITICAL DISCOURSE ................................................................................................ 162 
Political Discourse and Argumentation Profiles ................................................................ 163 
Hans V. Hansen, University of Windsor 
Rhetoric of the Crisis. Polish parliamentarian debates on the future of the EU ................ 178 
Agnieszka Kampka, Warsaw University of Life Sciences - SGGW 
The Political Discourse on Croatia’s EU Accession: a Rhetorical Analysis of the 
Presentation of the European Union among Supporters and Opponents of the EU ........... 204 
Gabrijela Kišiček, University of Zagreb 
Rhetoric ― Martial Art or the Art of Winning the Soul by Discourse? ............................ 234 
  Language of Politicians vs. Ethos, Pathos and Logos.......................................................... 234 
Joanna Szczepańska-Włoch, Jagiellonian University 
The Analysis of Insulting Practices - Sticks and Stones in the Croatian Parliament ......... 262 
Alma Vančura, University of Osijek & Diana Tomić, University of Zagreb 
III. LEGAL DISCOURSE ...................................................................................................... 293 
Taking Judges Seriously ..................................................................................................... 294 
Argumentation and Rhetoric in Legal Decisions ............................................................... 294 
Maurizio Manzin, Research Centre on Legal Methodology (CERMEG), University of Trento 
IV. EDUCATION .................................................................................................................. 320 
Debate as an Educational Tool: Is Polarization a Debate side effect? ............................... 321 
Manuele De Conti, University of Padua 
Teaching the writing of argumentative genre through imitatio: A solid basis for the 
‘beginner’ writers ............................................................................................................... 354 
Fotini Egglezou, Athens 
V. MEDIA .............................................................................................................................. 384 
Challenges of Rhetoric in the Era of ‘Bytes and Likes’ ..................................................... 385 
Petra Aczél, Corvinus University of Budapest 
The Cowboys, the Poets, the Professor... – Antonomasia in Croatian Sports Discourse ... 408 
Ana Grgić & Davor Nikolić, University of Zagreb 
Stakeholders in promotional genres. A rhetorical perspective on marketing communication
 ............................................................................................................................................ 430 
Sabrina Mazzali-Lurati & Chiara Pollaroli, University of Lugano 
The Representation and Reception of Paraphrase in Newspaper Headlines ...................... 459 
Anita Runjić-Stoilova & Josip Galić, University of Split 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS ..................................................................................................... 484 







What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and Argumentative Perspectives is a 
book trying to answer the title question by contributing to rhetorical and argumentative 
studies. It consists of papers presented at the “First International Conference on Rhetoric in 
Croatia: the Days of Ivo Škarić”. The Conference was organized with the intent of paying 
respect to the Croatian rhetorician and professor emeritus Ivo Škarić who was the first to 
introduce rhetoric at the Department of Phonetics at the Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, University of Zagreb.  
As a phonetician, professor Škarić was interested in all aspects of speech and therefore 
revealed natural connections between phonetics and rhetoric. As a founder of the School of 
Rhetoric, he trained many of his students to become teachers of rhetoric and to get involved 
with rhetorical and argumentation analysis. This conference was a sign of gratitude from his 
students.   





 2012, and it gathered 60 rhetoricians and argumentation scholars from 10 
European countries as well as North America. The papers presented at the conference are 
distributed into six chapters of the book: Theoretical Perspectives discussing argumentation 
theory, relations between philosophy and rhetoric, and visual argumentation; Political 
Discourse presents papers interested in rhetorical strategies and argumentation analysis in 
various types of pubic discourse, i.e. parliamentary debates, persuasion in political speeches 
etc; The Media chapter presents papers containing rhetorical analyses of the media discourse, 
especially those interested in figures of speech and the New Media; the Legal Discourse 
discusses argumentation and rhetorical strategies in legal discourse; while Education presents 
a chapter involved in the importance of the rhetoric in education system, i.e. implementation 
of debate in education, writings of the argumentative genre, etc. The final chapter Other 
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Approaches shows different approaches to rhetoric illustrating the multidisciplinarity of the 
conference.  
The common feature of all the papers in the book is the attempt to understand the role 
of rhetoric and argumentation in various types of public discourse and to present 
interdisciplinary work connecting linguists, phoneticians, philosophers, law experts and 








The Significance of Ivo Škarić for the Academic Development of Rhetoric/Public 
Speaking in Croatia 
 
Gordana Varošanec-Škarić, University of Zagreb 
 
 
Professor Emeritus Ivo Škarić was born on 19 April 1933 here in Postira, on the island 
of Brač and he left us on 29 January 2009. Professor Škarić was an actual authority in the 
field of public speaking in Croatia. He authored seven books and about hundred and fifty 
scientific papers and he was also well-known to the Croatian public for his many newspaper 
articles and interviews on television.  
He published three books on rhetoric, U potrazi za izgubljenim govorom (In Search of 
for Lost Speech, 1
st
 edition 1982), Temeljci suvremenog govorništva (Cornerstones of 
Contemporary Rhetoric, 2000, 2
nd
 edition 2003) and Argumentacija (Argumentation, 2011). 
The last one – Argumentacija – was published posthumously at the end of 2011. During the 
last years of his life, rethinking the meaning of science, and possible truth in rhetoric, he 
returned to the values of Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger, shaping his understanding of 
argumentation, by respecting the past and incorporating it into present, consciously 
contemplating possible thematic fields of argumentation, including the one about decisions 
having future consequences. 
He published many articles in the field of public speaking, for example Culture of 
Public Speaking Programme, Culture and Speaking, Culture of Speaking - Quality and 
Quantity, Measuring the Culture of Speaking,  Culture of Speaking or by Speaking, Speech 
Universals, Euphony, Logic, Attentive Speech Listening, Identification Through Speech,  
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Speaking Technique, Speech Volume, Time of Speaking, Speech Cognition, Speech – Cold 
Medium, Poetics in Speech, Conventional Speech, Rhetoric, Speech Preparation. 
His passion for rhetoric culminated in his work with young enthusiasts resulting in his 
ultimate masterpiece – founding of The School of Rhetoric with the Department of Phonetics 
of the Croatian Philological Society and the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport of the 
Republic of Croatia. The School started amidst the Croatian War for Independence in 1992 in 
Mali Lošinj, and Professor Škarić supervised it for 17 years. His precious work continues to 
live on under the name: The School of Rhetoric “Ivo Škarić”. His ideas are revived twice a 
year through young secondary school students who are developing critical thinking and are 
taught how to face future endeavours by acquiring speaking skills.   
He believed that democracy is a spoken culture, and so for youth to be prepared for 
life they needed to be good speakers. He relied on logos, since the main goal of rhetorical 
education is rational speaking and young people should be taught to think argumentatively, 
focussing on thinking as a prerequisite for well-structured speaking.   
We should always remember the legacy he left to his students – that critical discourse 
is passionate and ethical, and not cold (that is, a cunning and deceitful discourse), and that 
although it is in our nature to understand the world around us in terms of cause and effect, it 
does not imply that we should not fight for what is truly important, defendable and ethical, 











The Elements of Argument: Six Steps To A Thick Theory 
 
Leo Groarke, University of Windsor 
 
Summary 
In the last quarter-century, the emergence of argumentation theory has spurred the development of an extensive 
literature on the study of argument. It encompasses empirical and theoretical investigations that often have their 
roots in the different traditions that have studied argument since ancient times – most notably, logic, rhetoric, 
and dialectics. Against this background, I advocate a “thick” theory of argument that merges traditional theories, 
weaving together their sometimes discordant approaches to provide an overarching framework for the 
assessment of arguments in a broad range of contexts. In sketching such a theory, I propose six steps that can 
“thicken” traditional approaches to argument in the interests of a comprehensive theory. 
 
Key words: the future of argumentation theory, thick theory of arguments, thin theory of 
arguments 
1. Introduction 
International scholarship over the last quarter-century has been characterized by an 
explosive growth of interest in argument as a topic of inquiry. An impressive range of 
disciplines and sub-disciplines have been involved. They include philosophy, rhetoric, 
dialectics (notably pragma-dialectics), informal (and formal) logic, linguistics, discourse 
analysis, computational modeling, artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. The results 
are evident in burgeoning scholarship on competing theories of argument; in pedagogical 
research that explores different ways of teaching and testing reasoning and argument; in case 
studies of particular kinds of argument; in formal systems of reasoning and “assisted” 
reasoning; and in historical studies of the theories of argument that characterize different 
thinkers, times and places. 
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I propose a view of these developments that understands them as steps toward a 
general (“umbrella”) theory of argument that can be used to analyze, assess and explain 
arguments as they occur in a broad range of contexts. I describe the theory this implies as a 
“thick theory of argument.” Its goals might be contrasted with the goals of many thin theories 
that have a narrower scope and focus. The latter may provide a detailed account of one kind 
of argument: say arguments by analogy or the sorites argument. In other cases, they attempt to 
explain some specific aspect of argument (e.g., the role that questions or quantifiers play in 
argument) or the arguments that occur within a specific kind of context (as instances of 
“negotiation dialogue,” for example, or a specific variant of such dialogue like family 
mediation). 
Like its physical counterpart, theoretical thickness and thinness is a matter of degree. 
A theory of ad hominem argument is thicker than an account of guilt by association 
arguments, which can be understood as a subspecies of ad hominem, but thinner than a 
comprehensive account of fallacies. A theory of argument schemes and their role in argument 
analysis is thicker than a theory of causal or deductive schemes, but thinner than a theory 
which features schemes as one of a series of conceptual tools (fallacies, dialogical 
considerations, etc.) proposed for argument analysis. My interest is the construction of a 
theory that is thick enough to be the basis of argument analysis and assessment in as broad a 
range of contexts as possible. I shall present a way of accomplishing such a theory which 
proceeds by broadening and enriching (by “thickening”) traditional and contemporary 
accounts of argument. 
 In sketching a thick theory, I do not mean to diminish the significance of thinner 
theories. One misunderstands the thick/thin distinction if one understands it as a distinction 
between better and worse accounts of argument. If we imagine argumentation as one kind of 
communication, then we can think of a thick theory as a general account of such 
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communication. While it attempts to provide a unifying account of all arguments that can 
explain their elements and how they work, it cannot encompass a detailed account of every 
aspect of every kind of argument. When analyzing an argument in law, parliamentary debate 
or physics, this may mean that one needs to supplement a thick theory with a thinner one that 
elaborates its general principles in this specific context. To the extent that it is possible, a fully 
complete account of argument analysis and evaluation would have to combine a thick theory 
with thin theories that provide a more detailed account of the kinds (and aspects) of argument 
it identifies. 
In this essay, my interest is a thick theory. To that end, I propose six steps that 
culminate in such a theory. I think the time is ripe for such development, primarily because of 
the emergence of “argumentation theory,” a contemporary amalgam of disciplines that aims to 
better understand argument as it naturally occurs in a great variety of contexts. I shall argue 
that the standard approaches to argument that characterize different branches of 
argumentation theory successfully illuminate key components of argument, but fall short 
when they are proposed as a general account of argument. I will try to thicken them by 
weaving together some of the disparate and contrary threads that they contain. In sketching 
six steps to a thick theory I aim to push the development of argumentation theory in this 
direction. 
 
2. Step One: Beginning with Logic 
One could root a thick theory in the approaches to argument that characterize logic, 
rhetoric or dialectics. I begin with classical logic’s account of argument for autobiographical 
reasons – because my own interest in argument is rooted in philosophy and logic. Logic 
understands an argument as a set of propositions (a set of claims about what is true) which 
contains a proposition which is proposed as a conclusion and others which function as 
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premises that offer evidence in support of it. A standard (if hackneyed) example is the 
Barbara syllogism: “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. So Socrates is mortal.” 
Traditionally, a good argument is understood as a “sound” argument which has true premises 
and a conclusion that necessarily (deductively) follows from them. 
Aristotle offers an account of demonstration along these lines in his Prior Analytics, 
where he defines a syllogism, the basis of demonstration, as a “discourse (logos) in which, 
certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their 
being so.” (2000a, 1.2). Here each of the “certain things being stated” is a premise (protasis) 
of the argument, and the “something other than what is stated” which “follows of necessity” is 
its conclusion (sumperasma). 
Logic’s premise/conclusion account of argument is a common one that has been 
featured in thousands of introductions to logic and philosophy. One of its strengths is its 
normative dimension – its commitment to techniques that can be used to assess the arguments 
it considers. This side of formal logic is elaborated and used to analyze, construct, and assess 
particular instances of argument. In systems of formal logic they incorporate truth tables and 
trees as methods for testing valid inferences, and rules of inference (modus ponens, the “Rule 
of Necessitation”, etc.) which allow the step by step construction of proofs which lead from 
given premises to conclusions that follow from them. The development of formal systems has 
given rise to sophisticated accounts of argument which play a practical role in computing and 
computational modeling. 
“Informal” logic is an offshoot of classical logic that has focused on the informal 
arguments that characterize day to day contexts (in social and political controversy, personal 
exchange, public discourse, news coverage, advocacy and advertising, and so on). Because 
judgments of truth and falsity may be difficult to make in such contexts, it may assess 
premises in terms of their plausibility, probability, or “acceptability.” The latter leaves open 
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the possibility of truth understood as one kind of acceptability but introduces the possibility of 
others. In judging the mechanics of argument, one might compare formal logic’s rules of 
inference to informal logic’s attempt to identify and elaborate different kinds of argument 
schemes (argument by authority, causal generalizations, arguments by analogy, etc.) which 
infer particular kinds of conclusions from premises that answer “critical questions” in each 
case. An alternative method of judging arguments is fallacy theory, which diagnoses the 
problems with weak arguments by identifying common mistakes that they commit. 
Traditional lists of fallacies include problems with deductive reasoning (e.g., affirming the 
consequent), issues with premises (as in false dilemma and begging the question) and weak 
inferences (e.g., ad populum, ad baculum, and ad misercordiam). 
In the present context, it is notable that informal logic is an attempt to create a thicker 
theory of argument than that which characterizes classical logic. In its attempt to encompass a 
broader range of argument, it proposes more broadly applicable accounts of premise 
acceptability and valid (and invalid) inference. In the process, it provides a general theory of 
argument that can be applied to everyday arguments that are not easily analyzed or assessed 
using formal logic’s classical account of argument. This expands the scope of logic, but 
informal logic (at least as it was initially conceived) still has shortcomings when it is 
proposed as a thick theory. To better understand these limits and how they can be overcome 
we need to turn to key aspects of argument that are better recognized by the disciplines of 
rhetoric and dialectics. 
 
3. Step Two: Argument in its Rhetorical Context 
Following O’Keefe, 1977, many studies of argument have distinguished two meanings 
of the word “argument” that he labels “argument1” and “argument2.” Both meanings have 
their roots in ordinary English, where the observation that someone argued may mean that 
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they offered premises in favour of some conclusion (argument1) or, more simply, that they 
strongly disagreed with someone (argument2). The latter notion underscores the interactions 
in which arguments in the logician’s sense (instances of argument1) are embedded. More 
generally, premise/conclusion arguments are embedded in uncertainty, which can arise from 
too much opinion (when arguers disagree) or too little (when arguers do not know what to 
think).  
We can visually represent the relationship between arguments and their contexts of 
uncertainty as I have below. Above all else, this highlights the extent to which real arguments 
are not abstract entities, but tools with a concrete purpose: to resolve the uncertainty (and 
disagreement) that gives rise to them. In attempts to analyze and assess arguments as 
successful and unsuccessful, this means that we need to ask whether they successfully resolve 
the uncertainty they respond to. As this uncertainty resides in a group of people, a successful 











Historically, this aspect of argument has been better recognized by rhetoric than logic. 
It understands an argument as a vehicle of persuasion, and a strong argument as a successful 
Conditions of Uncertainty 
 
 




attempt to persuade an intended audience of some point of view. Logic suggests that a good 
arguer constructs an argument by assembling premises they know (or think they know) to be 
true. Rhetoric proposes a fundamentally different approach, suggesting that an arguer begin 
by analyzing the audience to which their argument is directed, and by looking for premises 
that this audience finds acceptable. In real life circumstances, this has always been the 
strategy of adept arguers, who tailor their arguments to the audiences they address. Among 
other things, this implies that an arguer should use different premises when they address 
different audiences. If one wishes to argue that nationalism is an evil (or a boon), this suggests 
that one should use different arguments when one addresses Croatians, Mexican Americans, 
Indigenous people in Canada, Swedes, the United Nations, conservatives, libertarians, the so 
called “universal audience,” and so on. 
In the attempt to create a truly general theory of argument, these considerations make 
audience a key component of argumentation which is missing logic’s account of argument. 
The easiest way to rectify this shortcoming is as Aristotle suggests in his Rhetoric: by 
understanding a successful argument as one that is logically impeccable and constructed in a 
manner that successfully addresses its audience’s beliefs and convictions (their pathos). If one 
wishes to be a successful arguer, this means that it is not enough to employ premises one 
believes to be acceptable; one must go further and find premises that are acceptable to the 
audience one addresses. Creating a thick theory that recognizes this can dissipate some of the 
tension between logical and rhetorical conceptions of argument, accommodating key 
components of both in a “rhetorically enhanced” theory that recognizes audience as an 
element of successful argument. In the present context, I will treat this view of argument as a 
second step towards a thick theory that allows us to analyze and judge an argument from the 
point of view of logic (the acceptability of the premises, the strength of an inference, etc.) 




4. Step Three: Argument in its Dialectical Context 
 Insofar as rhetoric highlights the role of audience in argument, it identifies one facet of 
an argument’s context which must be recognized by a thick theory. One finds another in an 
argument’s relationship to opposing points of view. Considered from this perspective, 
arguments are embedded in a context which typically includes an exchange between opposing 
points of view and the opposing arguments they produce. The construction of opposing 
arguments is an iterative process, making one argument a move in a broader dialectical 
exchange between arguers and their opponents (in some cases, arguers may be their own 
opponent, arguing ‘with themselves,’ defending opposing points of view). The dialectical 
view of argument this implies has an impressive lineage that is evident in Plato’s dialogues, 
where interlocutors (usually Socrates and his antagonists) develop arguments and 
counterarguments for opposing points of view. 
Like rhetoric, dialectics underscores the extent to which logic has traditionally treated 
arguments in a manner that removes them from the contexts in which they are embedded. In 
contrast, dialectics analyzes an argument by asking whether it is a reasonable move in an 
exchange between the proponents and opponents of the view that it defends. This approach 
suggests that a good argument must, among other things, successfully answer (and anticipate) 
opposing points of view. Johnson, 2000, endorses a dialectical approach when he maintains 
that arguments have a “dialectical tier” beyond the “illiative” core that logic recognizes; and 
that arguers have “dialectical obligations” requiring them to address competing arguments and 
points of view. A good argument for the conclusion that homosexual marriage is a right must, 
this suggests, include acceptable premises, a strong inference and an answer to the objections 
of those who think otherwise. 
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Johnson concludes that the conception of argument that characterizes the history of 
logic — the giving of premises for a conclusion – is, without elaboration, only a “proto-
argument.” In the building of a thick theory, the dialectical view suggests that a complete 
account of premise and conclusion arguments needs to be a “dialectically enhanced” version 
of logic’s account of argument. The resulting theory must recognize dialectical considerations 
as a key component of argument analysis. Doing so adds a fourth element to our thick theory 
of argument: which must recognize premises, conclusions, audience and dialectical context as 
central ingredients of successful argument. I shall take this rhetorically and dialectically 
enhanced account of argument as our third step in the development of a thick theory. 
 
5. Step Four: Argument in its Dialogical Context 
Yet another approach to argument which emphasizes the context in which arguments 
occur is dialogue theory. It suggests that we understand an argument as an element in a 
“dialogue” which establishes parameters that dictate those moves that are acceptable and 
unacceptable in argument. In their classic account of pragma-dialectics, van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst, 1992, situate argumentation within a form of dialogue they call a “critical 
discussion.” The theory of argument they develop distinguishes different stages of critical 
discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, closing) and elaborates rules that regulate 
the discussion at each stage. Good arguments are arguments that abide by the rules; poor 
arguments are arguments that fail to do so. In the process, fallacies are explained as violations 
of these rules. 
In the building of a thick theory of argument pragma-dialectics tells us that arguments 
must be understood as elements of a form of dialogue which implies normative rules that 
delineate right and wrong ways to argue. From a pragma-dialectical point of view, we can 
15 
 
diagram the general structure of premise/conclusion arguments as I have below. I will 











establish a dialogical frame of reference (or, more simply, “a frame”) in which arguments 
occur (in passing it bears mention that Entman, 1993, and others use the word “frame” in a 
different way). Analyzing and evaluating arguments that occur within this frame must be done 
in accordance with the rules the frame implies. 
In the evolution of argumentation theory, the pragma-dialectical account of critical 
discussions is a game-changing move because it recognizes dialogical frames as a previously 
neglected element of argument. The significance of this move is even more evident in 
subsequent discussions in argumentation theory, which identify other kinds of dialogue which 
are characterized by different frames – and the different goals, structures, and rules of 
engagement they incorporate. In his work, Walton has proposed seven different kinds of 
dialogue which have as their purpose: persuasion, inquiry, discovery, negotiation, information, 
deliberation and eristic exchange (see 2007). The distinction between these different kinds of 
dialogue has significant implications for the analysis of specific instances of argument, as 
Conditions of Uncertainty 
 
 





each is characterized by a distinct frame which implies unique procedural rules and unique 
standards for success. 
In an inquiry dialogue, arguments are exchanged to establish what is true. The 
dialogue is characterized by strict standards that determine what counts as evidence and 
counter-evidence for a particular conclusion. In contrast, a negotiation dialogue does not 
attempt to establish truth, but to bargain in a way that reconciles the competing interests of the 
parties who negotiate. In the case of collective bargaining, one species of negotiation dialogue, 
arguing is unacceptable it is “bargaining in bad faith” – by, for example, bargaining directly 
with the members of the union or the executive of the corporation rather than the team that 
represents them. This procedural rule has no obvious analogue in an inquiry dialogue. Neither 
do the standards for good argument. Threats have, for example, no legitimate role to play in 
inquiry dialogue (where they can be rejected as instances of the fallacy ad baculum), but play 
an essential place in collective bargaining, which is ultimately founded on the threat of a 
strike or a lock out. 
Within argumentation, there are many instances in which dialogical frames are 
themselves matters of dispute and argument. Strategic arguers may move to ensure that the 
arguments they present occur within the frame in which they are most likely to be successful. 
The standards of evidence in tort law are, for example, looser than those that apply in criminal 
law. In view of this, the parents of O.J. Simpson’s apparent victims sued him in civil court 
after he was found not guilty at his famous criminal trial. By moving the arguments to this 
new frame they were successful in securing substantial damages. In other situations, 
mediation would introduce yet another frame of reference. 
In the development of a thick theory of argument, the role that frames play in 
determining standards of argument means that a theory which aims to provide a truly general 
account of argument must be dialogically (as well as dialectically and rhetorically) enhanced. 
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I will therefore propose the recognition of dialogues and the frames that accompany them as a 
fourth step in our development of a thick theory. 
 
6. Step Five: Multi-Modal Argument 
 Steps 2, 3 and 4 in our thick theory all extend logic’s traditional account of argument 
so that it recognizes the role that context plays in instances of argument. The final two steps I 
want to propose as a route to a thick theory move in a different direction, broadening the 
scope of what logic (and most argumentation traditions) counts as argument. Step 5 is a 
broadening of the notion of argument beyond the assumption that arguments are conveyed 
verbally, as collections of sentences. In response to this assumption, many commentators have 
now argued that arguments can be expressed and communicated in non-verbal ways (see, e.g., 
Birdsell and Groarke, 2008; Blair, 1996; Dove, 2012; Groarke, 1996; Roque, 2008; Shelley, 
1996; Slade, 2002; van den Hoven, 2011). Even textbooks have extended their accounts of 
argument to make room for non-verbal instances of argument (see Groarke and Tindale, 2013; 
and Lunsford et. al., 2010). While some sceptics remain (notably Fleming, 1996 and Johnson, 
2005), the thick theory I propose – which aims for as broad a theory of argument as possible –
explicitly includes “multi-modal” arguments which have non-verbal elements. 
The fundamental reason for accepting multi-modal arguments is the root notion that an 
argument is an attempt to support a conclusion by presenting evidence for it – something that 
can clearly be done in ways that extend beyond premises and conclusions understood as 
declarative sentences. To take only a few examples, I may try to convince you of some claim 
by presenting photographs, drawing a map, pointing to something, telling a story (fiction or 
non-fiction), showing a film, painting a picture, and so on and so forth. Our lives are replete 
with situations in which evidence for some point of view is presented in these and other ways 
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that do not neatly correspond to the verbal paradigm that was always stressed in traditional 
accounts of argument. 
In this essay, I will confine myself to one personal example. Consider a debate spurred 
by an unusual fruit I discovered during a kayak ride on the Detroit River. When my 
description (“nothing I recognize; a bumpy, yellow skin”) initiated a debate and competing 
hypotheses on the identity of the fruit, I went back and took the photographs reproduced 





The argument that established this conclusion compared my photographs to similar 
photographs found in encyclopedia accounts of breadfruit. One might summarize the 
reasoning as: “The fruit is breadfruit, for these photographs are like standard photographs of 
breadfruit.” But this is just a verbal paraphrase. The actual reasoning – what convinces one of 
the conclusion is the seeing of the sets of photographs in question. Using a variant of standard 
diagram techniques for argument analysis, we might map the structure of the argument as: 
 
    I
1




      C 
 
where C is the conclusion that the fruit is a piece of breadfruit, I
1
 is the set of photographs I 
took, and I
2
 is the iconic photographs of breadfruit to which they were compared. 
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 One might compare many other instances of reasoning – identifying a criminal by 
looking at their “mug shot”; identifying an insect by comparing it to a preserved specimen; 
and so on. These are instances of “visual demonstration” – arguments which prove something 
by visually demonstrating that it is so (for a discussion, see Groarke and Tindale, 2013; 
Birdsell and Groarke, 2008). Other kinds of visual argument operate in different ways, by 
invoking visual symbols, metaphors, and so on. At a time when the development of digital 
communication is making it easier to transmit images, sounds, and even physical sensations, it 
is not surprising that arguments increasingly incorporate non-verbal elements that can be 
communicated in this way. Especially in such a  context, recognizing multi-modal arguments 
is one way to broaden the scope of our general account of argument, taking us one step further 
in the development of a thick theory. 
 
7. Step Six:  Argument and Emotion 
 The last step I propose to take in developing a thick theory may be the most 
controversial. In some ways it is anticipated by Hample, who has criticized “the absence of 
emotions in argumentation theory,” remarking that “our culture has inherited a persistent and 
bad idea, namely that rationality and emotionality are opposites. Arguing is identified with 
reason, which is held to be the opponent and discipline to passion.” (2005, 126-127) The split 
between reason and emotion this refers to is especially common in logic and philosophy. It is 
tied to an influential view of argument that can be called “the cognitive account.” This 
account sees argument as an attempt to judge truth and establish knowledge in a manner that 
eschews the emotions and the passions. 
One might maintain the plausibility of the cognitive account in some contexts – e.g., 
mathematics and science. In other contexts which are highly charged with emotion, it may 
usefully explain what goes wrong in arguing. In judging who is right and who is wrong in 
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contentious divorce proceedings, the cognitive account tells us that the ideal arguer proceeds 
by dispassionately marshalling evidence for and against particular conclusions. This implies 
an unemotional approach to argument that is not unduly influenced by loyalty, sympathy or 
antipathy toward one of the principals in question, or by hopes and desires about the outcome. 
In this and other contexts which naturally engage the emotions, the tendency to draw 
conclusions on the basis of emotional reactions rather than evidence may be prevalent and 
pronounced. 
In such cases, the cognitive account usefully points out that emotion interferes with 
cogent reasoning. But we should not make too much of this. Concluding that emotions have 
no place in the realm of argument is like concluding that appeals to authority have no place in 
argument because they often go amiss. In a great many situations, emotions have a legitimate 
role to play in our decision to accept or reject particular conclusions: because these 
conclusions resonate with our ideals, our dislike of particular actions, our affection for our 
loved ones, and so on. Compassion for the victims of an earthquake or tsunami is appropriate, 
not inappropriate, when deciding whether one should contribute to a charity that aims to 
support them. Loving or fearing someone may give one strong reasons to conclude that they 
should be treated or viewed in certain ways. A prevalent lack of empathy is not a positive trait 
in thinking, but a defining feature of psychopathy, which is a mental disorder. 
In the real world of argument, many arguments are explicitly designed to foster our 
emotions. Such arguments may rouse a team before a soccer game, generate public concern 
about an invasive species, or foster support for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals. While specific examples of such arguments may go too far, it makes little sense to 
say that they are in principle illegitimate, or that excitement, fear, anger, disgust, hope, 
sympathy, and happiness should never play a role supporting some conclusions and 
mitigating against others. In a poll of scholars of American public address, Martin Luther 
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King’s “I have a dream” speech (American Rhetoric, 2012) has been ranked as the most 
significant political speech of the 20th century. Delivered to over two hundred thousand civil 
rights marchers at the Lincoln Memorial on August 28
th
 1963, it was a defining moment in the 
American Civil Rights Movement. The speech presents a powerful argument for civil rights 
which cannot be understood apart from King’s success stirring the emotional convictions of 
his audience. 
The influence of the cognitive account of argument on argumentation theory is seen in 
the history of fallacy theory, which has treated appeals to emotion as mistakes in argument. 
The standard list of fallacies thus includes appeal to pity (ad misercordiam), appeal to flattery, 
attacking the person (ad hominem), appeal to force (ad baculum) and, more generally, appeal 
to emotion. Recent work on argument has made it increasingly evident that this is too simple: 
that we cannot easily relegate all appeals to emotion to the realm of fallacies, and that many 
such appeals provide reasonable grounds for belief and action. To take one example, 
Wreen,1988a and 1988b, has argued that appeal to force (ad baculum) is an argument scheme 
that has rationally compelling instances. One cannot dismiss all instances of the scheme on 
the basis of the claim that it is predicated on an appeal to fear, for fear may be reasonable and 
may be a legitimate consideration in the drawing of conclusions. If you tell me that I should 
give you my wallet because you will shoot me with a gun in your hand if I don’t, then I would 
be acting unreasonably if I did not accept this conclusion (telling someone with a gun that 
they are committing the fallacy ad baculum is not a recommended course of action). A 
number of other commentators have argued for a rethinking of the fallacies that treats ad 
hominem and other fallacies associated with emotions as legitimate forms of argument (see, 
e.g., Govier, 1983; Groarke and Tindale, 1986; Hitchcock, 2006). 
The role of emotion in argument is particularly salient if one’s goal is a thick theory of 
argument, for such a theory must provide an overarching account of argument that is 
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applicable in a broad range of contexts. Such a theory must, in particular, be able to provide 
an account of argument that can analyze and assess arguments in a variety of contexts which 
are inherently emotional: in political, moral, social and aesthetic debate; in interpersonal 
exchange; in mediation and conflict resolution; in bargaining; and so on. In the realm of 
evaluation, this means that a thick theory must be able to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate (and more and less legitimate) emotional appeals. For though it is clear that 
emotion can play a legitimate role in such contexts, it is equally clear that arguers may treat 
them as opportunities to manipulate emotions and illegitimately establish their conclusions. 
Arguments in sales and advertising, with their very consciously designed appeals to our 
desires and hopes and fears (about sex, health, material possessions, etc.) are notorious for 
such appeals. 
This is not the place for the development of a detailed account of how to analyze and 
assess emotion in arguments, but it behooves us to say something in this regard. To begin 
with, it may be said that there are important ancient precedents for recognizing the extent to 
which emotions influence argument (and vice-versa). In sharp contrast to the cognitive 
approach to argument, they view emotion’s association with argument as an opportunity that 
adept arguers should explore, cultivate and exploit. 
Such an attitude is an essential component of ancient sophism and ancient rhetoric, 
which are key instances of argumentation theory (for a recent attempt to rehabilitate the 
sophists as theorists, see Tindale, 2010). Gorgias, famous for his ability to argue anything, 
unabashedly champions the ability of argumentative discourse to provoke emotion, claiming 
that it accomplishes “miraculous works; for it can stop fear and assuage pain and produce joy 
and make mercy abound,” producing “fearful shuddering and tearful pity and sorrowful 
longing” (1999, 9). Emphasizing the emotional power of words, he compares them to drugs, 
“For just as different drugs draw off different humors from the body, and some put an end to 
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disease and others to life, so too of discourses: some give pain, others delight, others terrify, 
others rouse the hearers to courage, and yet others by a certain vile persuasion drug and trick 
the soul” (1999, 14). 
Aristotle is impatient with Gorgias and the sophists, but the rhetorical tradition he 
initiates also recognizes emotion as a key component of argument, emphasizing the role that 
pathos plays in persuasive arguments. Literally, the word pathos means “feeling” or 
“affection”, making the attempt to speak to an audience’s pathē an attempt to appeal, not 
merely to what they believe, but to their feelings and their emotional attachments. In 
constructing arguments this means that we need to consider the emotional as well as the 
cognitive commitments of our audience. 
In contemporary argumentation theory, the most direct call for a recognition of 
emotional argument is found in Gilbert, 1997; 2004. He expands the standard account of 
argument so that it includes an “emotional mode” which may employ emotion as a reason for 
a conclusion or an expression of emotion as a means of conveying an argument. On this 
account, a lover’s outpouring of emotion may function as a good reason for accepting an 
entreaty to do what they desire. According to Gilbert, the strength of an emotional argument 
depends upon “such elements as degree of commitment, depth, and the extent of feeling, 
sincerity and the degree of resistance" (1997, 83-84; Carozza 2009 further develops this 
account). One way to incorporate this into a theory of argument is by broadening the notion of 
premise and conclusion acceptability one employs so that it incorporates some notion of 
emotional acceptability. Whichever way one goes, recognizing emotion as a legitimate 
component of argument thickens one’s account of argument dramatically, taking us one step 
further in the development of a thick theory. 
 
8. Conclusion: The Elements of Argument 
25 
 
In this essay, I have tried to sketch the outlines of a thick theory of argument. We 
might summarize the theory I have suggested by saying that it recognizes seven elements of 
argument which need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of argument. We might 
describe these elements as: premises, conclusions, audience, dialectical exchange, dialogical 
frames, multi-modal discourse, and emotional content. While this list significantly thickens 
traditional accounts of argument, I do not offer it as definitive. Argumentation theory is, in a 
number of ways, engaged in working out a comprehensive list. In the final analysis, there may 
be other elements of argument that it should recognize. Hample, 1985, has, for example, 
suggested a notion of argument defined in terms of its cognitive dimensions (the mental 
processes by which argument occurs within individual arguers) that he calls argument0. This 
may point to another dimension of argument that needs to be considered. I leave a discussion 
of this and other possibilities for elsewhere, though it bears mention that the ultimate elements 
of argument must be elements that are not reducible to other elements. 
This is not the place for an elaboration of what a recognition of the elements of 
argument imply for the analysis and evaluation of argument (much less specific arguments 
and specific instances of argument). It must nonetheless be said that the importance of the 
different elements of argument differs depending on the argument in question. If we think of 
one dimension of argument corresponding to each element, then it may be said that different 
arguments are situated at different places within these seven dimensions. As an object may be 
two rather than three dimensional, an argument may be two or three or four or seven 
dimensional. The assessment of some arguments will be heavily determined by dialogical 
frames, others not. Some, but not others, will be packed with emotional content. And so on. 
 In the context of argument evaluation it might be said that different kinds of argument 
evaluation address the different dimensions of argument. In judging an argument we may 
decide to judge the extent to which its premises are acceptable; the extent to which its 
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conclusion follows from its premises; the extent to which it successfully addresses its 
audience; the extent to which it is dialectically or dialogically appropriate; the extent to which 
it is well expressed in multi-modal terms; and/or the extent to which it is emotionally 
successful. It goes without saying that each of these assessments warrants an extended 
discussion of its own. For the moment it must suffice to say that the theories that this requires 
can be seen as further components of the thick theory I propose.  
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Argumentation as poliphony: one speaker, several voices 




For almost 40 years a French linguist Oswald Ducrot has been developing a new theory of argumentation, a theory of 
"argumentation in the language-system" (TAL), a theory that explores the argumentative potential of language as a 
system. TAL tries to show how certain argumentative features and argumentative orientation(s) are already written in 
the lexical and syntactical constructions; how, on certain levels, language seems to argue by and for itself; and how it 
can (and does) impose restrictions on our own (dialogical and interactive) argumentation. 
This paper will show how Bakhtin's concepts of reported speech and dialogism were "borrowed" by Ducrot and 
elaborated into one of the key concepts of TAL, the concept of polyphony. The shaping and transformations of 
Ducrot's theory will be presented, why and how the concept of polyphony was (and had to be) introduced, how it was 
expanded and supplemented with the concept of topoi, as well as how these two concepts are used within TAL.  
 




 For almost 40 years a French linguist Oswald Ducrot (1972, 1973, 1980, 1983 (with J. 
C. Anscombre), 1984, 1996, 2009) has been trying to develop his own theory of 
argumentation – a theory very different from the “mainstream” argumentation theories –, a 
theory of “argumentation in the language-system” (TAL from now on). 
 In this paper, I will try to shed some light on the shaping and the development of this 
theory, the transformation of its conceptual apparatus and its analytical scope, and try to point 
at some possible problems at the same time. My main point of interest will be the concept of 
polyphony, therefore I shall have neither time (n)or space to discuss all the problems and 
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transformations Ducrot's theory is currently undergoing (e.g. theory of semantic blocks). Also, 
because of its general character, this overview will have to be more or less schematic. 
 In the second part of the eighties
1
, Ducrot used to distinguish four phases in the 
development of his theory of argumentation: 
 
- the strong informativistic version 
- the weak informativistic version 
- the weak version of argumentation in language, and 
- the strong version of argumentation in language. 
 
The latter is (still) in a critical stage of formation and transformation.  
 
1.1. Informativeness and argumentativeness 
 
 The basic supposition of the first, i.e. “strong informativistic” version – which Ducrot 
never really advocated, but used as a (presupposed) theory in opposition to which he 
constructed his own theory instead – is the postulate that every conclusion or, more accurately, 
every instance of putting forward an argument towards a conclusion, is based solely on “facts” 
conveyed (represented) by an utterance-argument. If it is possible to draw a C(onclusion) 
from an A(rgument), this is the case because the utterance A “factually” supports the 
utterance C: by quoting or presenting or referring to some “facts” that speak in favour of the 
utterance C. A different kind of support (if only subsidiary), for example a structural linguistic 
support (i.e. making use of special language particles, argumentative connectives or 
argumentative indicators), is not considered as a serious theoretical option.  
                                                 
1
 Lectures at Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1986 - 1989. 
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 Therefore, if the utterance 
 
(1) Janez studied for only an hour or so  
 
can be used as an argument or can serve as an argument supporting the conclusion 
 
(2) He won't pass the exam 
 
then – in accordance with the “strong informativistic” thesis – this can be done only on the 
basis of the “fact(s)” that Janez (in fact) studied for only an hour or so, and that an hour of 
studying is (usually, i.e. according to "average" experience) not enough to pass an exam. 
Within the framework of the "strong informativistic" version such a conclusion is not (co)-
supported by the argumentative orientation of the particle only, the orientation, which is the 
domain of language as a system
2
, and does not pertain to extra-linguistic “factuality.” In 
example (1) we see the type of argumentation that is (supposed to be) entirely non-linguistic, 
or, it is linguistic only to the extent that it uses language as a conventional, standard means of 
communication, as a “medium,” which does not affect the “message” that it conveys. 
 Of course, this spontaneous and common sense “theory” is immediately confronted 
with counter-examples. Let us assume (for the sake of the argument) that we are working on a 
seminar paper about frictions between Yugoslav nations in post-Titoist Yugoslavia, and that 
we are especially interested in the war in Bosnia; we ask our friends working in the social 
                                                 
2
 That some linguistic entity is argumentatively oriented means that its presence in the given discourse segment 
imposes or represents some restriction(s) affecting the continuation of the discourse. In other words, even if the 
particle only were followed by “twenty hours” and not “an hour or so,” the utterance would still be represented 
as leading to a negative conclusion. This, of course, challenges the “factuality” of “the fact, that one hour of 
studying is (usually) not enough to pass the exam.” Namely, how many hours are enough to pass the exam, 
especially if we take into account the restricting role of the particle “only”? More on this subject later in the text. 
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sciences to refer us to somebody who might know something about our object of interest, and 
we get the following two answers: 
 
(3) Janez did not read all the UN resolutions (Argument) > 




(4) Marko read some of the UN resolutions (Argument) > 
      He may be able to advise you (Conclusion). 
 
 Utterances (3) and (4) display an obvious discrepancy between informative and 
argumentative values. The “fact” that Janez did not read all the UN resolutions could on the 
“factual,” informative level also mean that he read all the UN resolutions except maybe one. 
And the “fact” that Marko read some of the UN resolutions could on the “factual,” 
informative level mean that he, perhaps, read only one or two. Janez could thus be an 
incomparably more suitable “informant” than Marko, but language simply doesn't allow 
argumentative strings (3') and (4'). 
 
(3') * Janez did not read all the UN resolutions (Argument) > 
         He may be able to advise you (Conclusion) 
 
(4') * Marko read some of the UN resolutions (Argument) > 




 In order to be able to remove asterisks from utterances (3') and (4') (i.e. make them 
discursively and argumentatively acceptable), we would have to bring in argumentatively 
oriented modifiers, for example but nevertheless in (3') = (But nevertheless, he might be able 
to advise you), or only in (4') = (Marko read only some of the UN resolutions).  
 
1.2. To propose an argument, to demonstrate, to deduce 
 
 We said that it was language (as a system) that didn't permit argumentative strings (3') 
and (4'). What precisely does this mean? 
 Above all it means that to propose an argument is not to demonstrate or infer 
something in a logical manner, and that argumentation in general (and TAL in particular) is 
not based on the rules of logical deduction.
3
 The mechanism to arrive at a conclusion in 
examples (3) and (4) is not the same as the one involved in (5). 
 
(5)  a.  All Slovenians are nationalists 
       b. Janez is Slovenian 
       --------------------------------------- 
       c. Janez is a nationalist 
 
 While example (5) represents a logically (deductively) supported conclusion, a 
syllogism, where the conclusion c is a necessary consequence of the premises a and b, the 
conclusions in examples (3) and (4) are in no way necessary consequences of the arguments 
that actually introduce them. Someone could use the utterance Janez did not read all the UN 
resolutions as an argument for a completely different conclusions, for example, Janez is a 
                                                 
3
 We are, of course, referring to the (so called) “classical,” bivalent logic. 
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very wise person, or Janez is an asshole, and these (conclusions) would, obviously, represent 
completely different argumentation frames from the one actually employed in argumentative 
string (3). However, these hypothetical conclusions would be no less grounded or justified. In 
contrast to (logical) demonstration or deduction, which is based on the laws of logic, 
argumentation in everyday life and conversation is based on (our) knowledge and judgment 
of the world, reality, and the concrete situation of the speaker and the addressee. And 
especially on the assessment of the position that an utterance has (or can have) in a concrete 
situation, and an assessment of (possible) conclusions an utterance-argument might lead to.  
 
1.3. Argumentative orientation 
 
 An argumentative relation  (i.e., a relation between an utterance-argument and an 
utterance-conclusion) is thus completely different from a logical (deductive) relation (between 
premises and conclusion). A claim that is clearly supported by the “fact” that some 
conclusions, discursively completely acceptable, logically make no sense at all. 
 Let us consider the following conversational fragment (which I borrowed from 
Moeschler (1985: 14)): 
 
(6) A: Is dinner ready by now? 
      B: Yes, almost 
 
 In terms of (classical) logic, this dialogue makes no sense. Dinner can be either ready 
by now, or not ready yet. It can be almost ready, but this, logically taken, means that it is not 
ready yet. Therefore, Yes, almost, is in no way a logically acceptable answer to the question Is 
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dinner ready by now? because it would represent a contradictory utterance, namely: Yes, 
dinner is not yet ready.  
 By contrast, this dialogue is discursively, pragmatically completely acceptable, and it 
owes this acceptability – paradoxically as it may seem – exactly to the  (problematical) 
particle almost. The (utterance) Dinner is almost ready could be represented as an argument 
in favour of some implicit conclusion, such as, Hurry up! Such a conclusion is also supported 
by the (logically “purer”) argument Dinner is ready (by now), the argument Dinner is ready 
(by now) being stronger (in view of the conclusion Hurry up!) than Dinner is almost ready - 
but still with the same argumentative orientation. In other words, this means that on the 




the argument Dinner is almost ready occurs as a weaker one, but it supports the same 
conclusion as does the strongest argument on the scale. An argumentative orientation must 
thus be, regardless of the context, inherent to the very particle almost, which means that every 
utterance-argument containing the particle almost represents a specific restriction affecting 
the continuation of the discourse (i.e. utterance-conclusion): the utterance-conclusion 
following it (i.e. following almost...) must  argumentatively pursue and conform to the course 
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mapped out, or delimited by the use of the particle almost, contained in the utterance-
argument. In other words, from Dinner is almost ready it is impossible to conclude (in the 
direction of) There is still time, you don't have to hurry (unless we preface it by a concessive 
but, nevertheless...) 
 That explains, at least partially, why in the examples (3) and (4) we had to adopt the 
conclusions we had actually adopted. But let us step back for a moment, just to be able to see 
more clearly what really was the problem (for Ducrot). 
 
 
1.4. Posited and presupposed  
 
 Examples (3) and (4), which we used to demonstrate the difference between 
informativeness and argumentativeness may seem rather illustrative, but they are certainly not 
the most appropriate ones because they use two (lexically and semantically) different 
morphemes: not … all and some. The difference between informativeness and 
argumentativeness becomes much clearer when we have to deal with (lexically and 
semantically) synonymous morphemes, but with (very) different argumentative values. 
Ducrot's favourite example is the difference between the French adverbs peu and un peu 
(which could be translated into English as little and a little). Informatively/factually, there 
seems to be no difference between the two: both of them denote a “small quantity” of 
something. But argumentatively, if we use them in discourse, there is a rather big difference: 
little seems to be argumentatively oriented towards nothing, not at all, whereas a little seems 
to be argumentatively oriented towards a lot. How is that? 




(7) Janez worked little. > He may not pass the exam. 
(8) Janez worked a little. > He may pass the exam. 
 
 Here we have two examples that on the “factual,” informational level, deal with the 
same small quantities of something, but which argumentatively allow for very different 
conclusions. How can we explain that? 
In his “weak informativistic” phase Ducrot tried to solve the problem by distinguishing 




 was a great poet 
 
could thus be analyzed into what is (explicitly) posited: 
 
(p): Prešeren's poetry was extraordinary, 
 
and into what is (implicitly) presupposed: 
 
(pp): Prešeren was a poet. 
 
 In linguistics, it is often taken as a test for distinguishing what is posited from what is 
presupposed in a given utterance that the utterance's presupposition must not change if we 
  
a) negate the utterance,  
b) put it into an interrogative form, or  
                                                 
4
 Prešeren is a nationally glorified poet in Slovenia. 
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c) embed it in a subordinate clause. 
  
 If we apply these three criteria to our example (9), we can see that, in this respect, our 
analysis was correct. Utterances 
 
(9') Prešeren wasn't a great poet 
(9'') Was Prešeren a great poet? 
(9''') Slovenians are convinced that Prešeren was a great poet, 
 
in principle retain the same presupposition: Prešeren was a poet. We have to say 'in principle', 
because the range of the negation in (9') could easily be the whole phrase great poet, and not 
only the adjective great, which means that the presupposition (Prešeren was a poet) would be 
negated too. That being the case, we could easily use (9') as an argument for a conclusion 
such as:  He was an impostor, namely Prešeren wasn't a great poet (Argument), he was an 
impostor  (Conclusion). 
 That is why Ducrot introduced a new, stronger and decisive criterion for 
distinguishing between what is posited and what is presupposed: an utterance-conclusion can 
only be drawn from what is (explicitly) posited, but not from what is (implicitly) presupposed. 
Only after applying this criterion can we be sure that our distinction between what is posited 
and what is presupposed in (9) was correct. From Prešeren was a great poet (Prešeren's 
poetry was extraordinary) we can easily conclude, We built him a monument, whereas the 
presupposition  Prešeren was a poet  doesn't allow for such a conclusion (at least not in 
Slovenia; which doesn't mean, of course, that there could not be a country where they build 
monuments for every poet they have). 
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This criterion is crucial for explaining and understanding the different argumentative 
orientation of utterances (7) and (8). Utterance (7) could be analyzed into: 
 
 
p:    the quantity of Janez's work is small 
pp:  Janez worked 
 
and the utterance (8) into: 
 
p:    Janez worked 
pp:  the quantity of Janez's work is small. 
 
 By doing that, we retain the informative component of both utterances (the quantity of 
Janez's work is small), and explain their different argumentative orientations (and conclusions 
that follow from them), but the problem of informativeness returns through the back door. 
How and why? 
 It should be understandable by now that little is argumentatively oriented in the same 
direction as nothing, not at all, and that a little is argumentatively oriented in the same 
direction as a lot. To the effect that both Janez worked a little and Janez worked a lot could be 
put forward as arguments toward a conclusion He may pass the exam. And, mutatis mutandis, 
we could say the same for Janez worked little and Janez didn't work at all, which could be put 
forward as arguments toward a conclusion He may not pass the exam. The difference is only 
in the force of the arguments, so that we can easily paraphrase and reinforce the argument 
Janez worked little by Janez worked little, even not at all, and the argument Janez worked a 
little by Janez worked a little, even a lot.  
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 But by doing that, we reestablish the discrepancy on the “factual”, informative level: 
little is nevertheless something and not nothing, and a little is only a little and not a lot. It was 
that very problem that forced Ducrot into constructing his “weak version” of the theory of 
argumentation in language. 
 
1.5. Argumentative scales 
 
 An important distinction that Ducrot introduces in this phase is the distinction between 
a sentence (phrase) and an utterance (énoncé) on the one hand, and meaning (signification) 
and sense (sens) on the other. Ducrot regards a sentence as a schematic, abstract construction, 
and thus as a matter of language (la langue) (in the Saussurean sense), and the utterance as its 
respective realization, i.e. a matter of speech (la parole). This means that every utterance of 
the same sentence is unique and always new. Therefore, there are no identical utterances even 
though sequences of uttered sounds and words may appear identical. Each utterance is the 
result of some concrete, individual act of uttering in a specific, constantly changing context 
that has to be reconstructed for each and every interpretation.  
 The conceptual pair meaning/sense is related to the pair sentence/utterance: meaning is 
the semantic value of a sentence, whereas sense is the semantic value of an utterance. 
However, Ducrot does not define (and this represents one of his innovations) the meaning (of 
a sentence) as part of its sense (as is commonly done in the formula: “sense = meaning + 
context”), but rather as a set of instructions that should help us in disentangling the sense of  
utterances that are (or could be) possible realizations of the given sentence. The sentence-
meaning thus guides our correct interpretation of an utterance, i.e. it guides our search for 
information, which must be, in order for our interpretation to be plausible, sought in the 




(6) A: Is dinner ready by now? 
      B: Yes, almost. 
 
 We have already said that the utterance Dinner is almost ready provides an argument 
in favour of some implicit conclusion that is oriented in the direction of lateness, e.g. Hurry 
up! The same conclusion is also supported by the argument Dinner is ready by now, but the 
latter is stronger (affirming that the dinner is ready, not just almost ready) than the former, yet 
both of them have identical argumentative orientations.  
 To be able to interpret an utterance of Dinner is almost ready, the construction of a 
sentence meaning would therefore have to consist of  
 
a) informative (descriptive) instruction(s)  
and  
b) argumentative instruction(s).  
 
 Consequently, the utterances of the sentence Dinner is almost ready can be correctly 
interpreted only if we follow the instructions for its (sentence) meaning as stated below: 
 
informative instruction: 
 some small quantity of time µ has to be defined or agreed upon; the utterance is true if 
dinner is not yet ready, and if the time difference between the utterance Dinner is almost 





 some conclusion C has to be found, which can also be supported by the utterance  
Dinner is ready by now, e.g. Hurry up! 
 
Our examples with little (7) and a little (8) could thus be interpreted as follows: 
 
(7) Janez worked little. >  He may not succeed (in passing the exam).  
 
informative instruction: 
 some quantity of work  µ  has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be  regarded or 




 some conclusion C has to be found, which would also be supported by the  (stronger) 
utterance  Janez did not work (at all), e.g.  He may not succeed  (in passing the exam). 
 
Utterances (8) and (7) would thus share the informative, but not the argumentative instruction: 
 
(8) Janez worked a little. > He may succeed (in passing the exam). 
 
informative instruction: 
 some quantity of work  µ  has to be defined or agreed upon, which can be  regarded or 






 some conclusion C has to be found, which could also be supported by the  argument  
Janez worked a lot, e.g.  He may succeed (in passing the exam). 
 
 With this conceptual innovation Ducrot still bases argumentation on the informative 
and the “factual,” but at the same time he enables the regulation of the informative with what 
is completely argumentative in language. The expression “argumentation in the language-
system” points precisely to this, i.e. to the “fact” that the argumentative orientation is inherent 
to the language as a system (language as an abstract structure, as defined by de Saussure), and 
that it is not (only) the result of the working of the context (on the contrary, it even 
creates/presupposes its own basic context). Despite this compromising solution two things 
immediately become obvious: 
 
1. Descriptive, informative instructions are not really important for the course of 
argumentation itself, i.e. for the transition from an argument to a conclusion. In other 
words, the “factuality” or the truth of an utterance-argument (its congruence with the 
state of the so called “objective reality”) is not decisive for the orientation of an 
argument, and it therefore becomes dominated by argumentative instructions. 
 
2. The nature of an argument seems to be scalar or gradual. Several arguments support 
the same conclusion, but some of them (more) weakly than some others (almost ready, 
ready by now). That is why Ducrot (sometimes) calls almost and some other 
operators/connectives/indicators (e.g. already and yet) argumentative variables. They 
do belong to/act on the same argumentative scales, but they occupy/point to different 




 The dominance of argumentativeness over informativeness and the exposition of the 
gradual nature of arguments already provide all expedients for the transition into the latest, 
“strong version” of the theory of argumentation in language, in which the fundamental 




 The transition into the strong theory of argumentation in the language-system 
represents a radical break with former phases of the theory, not only terminologically, but 
above all conceptually. This break becomes evident from the two theoretical hypotheses 
characterizing this phase: 
 
1. The transition from A(rgument) to C(onclusion) is based on topoi, which are general, 
common (within a given community), and scalar structures of the type 
 
The more P, the more Q 
            or 
   The less P, the less Q 
 
2. Argumentative values of utterances take complete dominance over their informative 





 In the “weak” phase of argumentation in the language-system, argumentation is still 
based on “facts,” but it is controlled by argumentative instructions related to the meaning of 
the sentence. In the “strong” phase, however, the argumentative no longer simply controls the 
informative, but supersedes it: the informative becomes not only entirely subordinated to the 
argumentative, it is even derived from it. If argumentation (i.e. argumentative orientation) is 
(at least to some extent) inherent to language, then utterances merely describing reality or 
reporting about it are linguistically marginal: they use language only as the medium of 
transmission. Consequently, if argumentation is inherent to language, this medium can in no 
way be (argumentatively) neutral: argumentative variables (even accumulation or 
juxtaposition of variables if necessary) guide discourse in a quite specific direction, 
regardless of the representative or informative content conveyed in and by the discourse. 
 If we turn to Ducrot's conceptualization of topoi now, what does it mean that some 
topos is a) general, b) common and c) scalar? 
It means that it is a) a general (and, at the same time, very abstract) scheme or matrix allowing 
a multitude of particular conclusions, which are not obligatory or binding in a way syllogism 
or logical deduction is. Topos (i.e. referring to a topos or applying it) can allow some 
conclusion, but it does not bind the speaker to that conclusion. Therefore, our addressee (and 
with this we have arrived at b)) can recognize the validity or appropriateness of the topos 
employed in our conclusion, without necessarily agreeing with it. He/she may find some other 
topos more appropriate to the situation, and may use it to support a different conclusion 
instead. 
 The assumption that topoi are common (within a specific community, ranging from 
small cultural or political sub-groups to the nation as a whole) only means that some 
community recognizes their validity, or validity and justifiability of the conclusions based on 
those topoi. It does not imply that every member of the community would necessarily use the 
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same topoi in identical (or similar) situations. The application of some topos, or a conclusion 
stipulated by this topos, can always be refuted by applying some other topos to support a 
different conclusion. 
 If we try to apply such conceptualization of topoi to our examples (7) and (8) 
 
(7) Janez worked little. > He may not succeed (in passing the exam) 
(8) Janez worked a little. > He may succeed (in passing the exam) 
 
we can see that the argumentative string (7) applies or refers to some topos
5
 such as 
 
T1 The less we work, the smaller the likelihood of success, 
 
and that (7) applies this topos weakly. Whereas the argumentative string in (8) applies (also 
weakly) some topos such as 
 
T2 The more we work, the greater the likelihood of success. 
 
 Why do we say that argumentative strings (7) and (8) apply topoi T1 and T2 weakly? 
Or more precisely, how do we define “weakly” and its antipode “strongly”? That is where 
Ducrot's third concept, the concept of scalarity (c) comes in. 
 Ducrot initially defined “strongly” and “weakly” as more or less heuristic devices: 
 
- to apply a topos strongly means that there are only few arguments that could be 
stronger than the one used; 
                                                 
5
 In other words, the argumentative string in question is constructed on a topos or, by the very transition from the 
argument to the conclusion (re)constructs a topos. 
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- to apply a topos weakly means that there are only few arguments that could be weaker 
than the one used. 
 
However, is it possible to define the values 'weak' and 'strong' in a conceptually more strict 
linguistic manner? 
 Let us assume, for the sake of the demonstration, that we operate with a two-part 
argument: let us label the first part of the argument A, and the second B. We shall say that in 
this case the following two definitions apply: 
 
1. Argument A is stronger than B, if: "B, and even A" holds true. 
2. Argument A is weaker than B, if: "B, and at best/at worst A" holds true. 
 
Now we should test these definitions on two examples: 
 
    A            B 
(10) This is a cold, or at worst a flu. > Don't worry! 
 
     A                  B 
(11) This is pneumonia, or at best a flu. > Take care! 
 
Utterance (10) obviously applies some topos such as: 
 
T3 The less we are ill, the less reason to worry 
 




T4 The more we are ill, the more reason to worry. 
 
 The A arguments are, in the light of our definition, stronger than the B arguments, 
which means that, if the given conclusion proceeds from B, it must also proceed (and with 
greater probability) from A. In other words, both utterances apply “their” topoi strongly. With 
regard to argumentative scales that could be constructed in accordance with our knowledge of 










we can say that both utterances apply their topoi in the direction of argumentative scales; 
therefore, they strive toward the stronger application of topoi. 
 Let us now change the argumentative variables in (10) and (11). Instead of at best/at 
worst, we shall use even in (10') and (11'), which results in: 
 
                   A                  B 
(10') This is a cold, even a flu. > Take care! 
 
                       A                      B 
(11') *This is pneumonia, even a flu. > Take care! 
  
 In accordance with our (i.e. Ducrot's) definitions of the weak and strong application of 
topoi, the introduction of the argumentative variable even changes (inverses) the force of the 
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arguments (B is now represented as stronger than A), and with this also the argumentative 
orientation itself! From the argument This is a cold, even a flu, we can no longer conclude 
Don't worry, but only Take care. Which entirely complies with the negative argumentative 
scale of worry (-) - as well as with our general knowledge of the world - where flu occupies a 
lower position than a cold, thus being closer to the cause of worry since the scale is negative. 
 That our claim about the decisive role (of the choice) of the argumentative variable is 
not exaggerated is demonstrated by the “transformation” of example (11). What happens to 
example (11) after we change the variable? To a “flu” (which occupies a lower position than 
pneumonia on the positive argumentative scale of worry (+)) the mere presence of even in the 
utterance, i.e. the argumentative orientation inherent to even, assigns the value of the stronger 
argument, thus leading to the conclusion Take care. Namely, the argumentative orientation 
inherent to even does not allow the argument following it to be weaker than the one preceding 
it; on the contrary, the argument introduced by even  (i.e. the argument following the 
(argumentative) variable even), is represented as expected to enhance the force of the 
preceding argument. In Žagar (2010: 133-162), I described this mechanism triggered by 
(some) argumentative indicators (connectives, particles or operators) as creating certain 
argumentative expectation (and respective argumentative indicators as triggers of 
argumentative expectation).   
 Therefore, if we want to avoid the application of some topos T3' The less we are ill, 
the more reason to worry (which could be general, but hardly common), and thus recover the 
argumentative balance, we must introduce an additional argumentative variable in example 
(11'), for example: 
 




or even (!) 
 
(11''') This is pneumonia, maybe even only a flu. > Don't worry! 
 
 We could say that if only mitigates and modifies the argumentative orientation of even, 
then maybe (argumentatively) mitigates a potential logical disparity between coordinately 
related "propositional elements". Namely, if an illness is pneumonia, then it is not a flu, and 
vice versa; however, if we mitigate both assertions with maybe, we place them "between the 
brackets" and outside the logical system where they can be either true or false. 
 A few more words about conceptual bases of topoi. What really is a topos? How does 
it function? Topos functions as a warrant (in Toulmin's terms) authorizing the move from 
A(rgument) to C(onclusion) by indicating a link between two general properties, P and Q, 
connected with A and C respectively. Let us take another one of Ducrot's favourite examples: 
 
(12) It's warm (Argument). Let's go for a walk (Conclusion). 
 
According to Ducrot, the topos that authorizes the move from A to C (in that particular case) 
could be reconstructed as 
 
T5 The more it is warm, the more pleasant it is to go for a walk, 
 
and relates two qualities, P (“the warmth”), connected to A, and Q (“the pleasantness of a 
walk”), connected to C. 
 These two qualities are gradual or scalar (i.e., could be represented as scales), which 
means that the more we go up one scale (P), the more we go up the other (Q): the more it is 
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warm, the more pleasant it is to go for a walk. But is that true? Isn't there a point where the 
warmth (an excessive warmth, for example) makes it unpleasant to go for a walk? Which 
means that from such a critical point the topos T5 couldn't be applied any more. Doesn't that 
make it non-valid? Not necessarily (topoi are general, not universal), it just means that from a 
certain point (yet) another topos (or even several topoi) may start to apply 
 




T7 The less it is warm, the more pleasant it is to go for a walk. 
 
 Which, again, doesn't (necessarily) mean that T5 doesn't apply any more (at all), it just 
means that from a certain point it stops to be generally and commonly shared by a certain 




 The other crucial concept for Ducrot's strong version of argumentation in language is 
polyphony, a concept he borrowed from Bakhtin, and generalised to the language-system as a 
whole. 
 As you already know, Bakhtin distinguishes between dialogism and polyphony. 
“Polyphony”, he says, in his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language6 (1973: 116), “is 
distinctly and fundamentally different from dialogue. In dialogue, the lines of the individual 
                                                 
6
 It is still disputed whether Marxism and Philosophy of Language was in fact writen by Bakhtin and only 
attributed to Voloshinov, or whether it was Voloshinov's original work. 
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participants are grammatically disconnected: they are not integrated into one context.” 
Dialogues, therefore, are produced by two or more speakers, while polyphony is a 
monological structure. He found examples of polyphonic structures (utterances) mostly in 
novels, and in his book on Dostoevsky (1984: 304) he gives this (now famous) definition of 
the polyphonic phenomenon: 
 
 “An author may utilize the speech of another in pursuit of his own aims and in 
 such a way as to impose a new intention on the utterance, which nevertheless 
 retains his own proper referential intention. Under these circumstances and in 
 keeping with the author’s purpose, such an utterance must be recognised as 
 originating from another addresser. Thus, within a single utterance, there may 
 occur two intentions, two voices”. 
 
 So, for Bakhtin, a polyphonic construction belongs to a single speaker, but actually 
contains (mixed within it) “two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two languages, 
two semantic and axiological belief systems” (1984: 304).  
 
 Bakhtin’s study of polyphony was mostly confined to novels, while Ducrot 
generalised the phenomenon as far as language as a system. How does Ducrot define 
polyphony? 
 Ducrot thinks that what traditional linguistics refers to as a speaker is in fact a very 
complex (and confused) notion that covers a number of wholly different ideas. So he proposes 
that we distinguish between a producer, a speaker and an utterer of an utterance. 
 Who is the producer of an utterance? The producer of an utterance is the one whose 
activity results in the production of an utterance, i.e. the producer is the one who carries out 
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(at least) the intellectual activity necessary for the production of the utterance. That may seem 
very obvious but there are cases where it becomes rather puzzling. 
 Think of yourself as a pupil, for example (once more, I borrowed this example from 
Ducrot): the school organizes a walk in the countryside and for you to be able to go on that 
trip you must have your parents' permission. Your teacher therefore gives you a form for your 
mother/father to sign. So you bring to your mother/father a form that says something like: “I 
allow my son/daughter to take part in the excursion”, and at the bottom of the form there is a 
word “signature.” What your mother/father has to do is to put her/his signature under the 
word “signature.” Now, who is the producer of that form saying “I allow my son/daughter …”? 
The one who signed it? The teacher who gave it to you? The secretary who typed it? The 
principal who dictated it to her? The Ministry of Education that sent it to all the principals? It 
is hard to say (isn't it?). It seems that producer is a very unclear notion. That is why we need 
the speaker and the utterer. The speaker would be the one who is responsible for the utterance, 
the one who is held responsible for the utterance itself or, at least, responsible for the act of 
uttering the utterance. 
 In the case of our pupil and his/her mother/father, there is no problem: the utterance 
contains a pronoun “I” that clearly points to the speaker (regardless of who actually produced 
it). But, what happens if the utterance contains no explicit devices such as pronouns? And 
even if they do, do we really have to hold the speaker responsible for everything that is said 
(and/or implied, conventionally or conversationally) in the utterance? Must everything that is 
said and/or heard in the utterance be taken as speaker's own point(s) of view? 
 That is where and why the utterers
7
 come in. According to Ducrot, there are several 
utterers or more correctly uttering positions within an utterance, which is another way of 
saying that several different viewpoints may be expressed through one utterance. Ducrot's 
                                                 
7
 The term Ducrot and his French folowers use is  énonciateur(s).  I think that utterer may be a better translation 
than  enunciator; we  enunciate  something on rather formal, solemn occasions, while we  utter  this and that all 
the time in everyday conversation. And that is exactly how the term énonciateur  is used in Ducrot's theory. 
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position is even more radical; according to him every utterance could be analyzed in at least 
two uttering positions. For example, let us take the utterance 
 
(13) This fence is not red. 
 
The speaker of this utterance presents, roughly speaking, two utterers: 
- the first one (U1) who affirms that the fence is red, and 
- the second one (U2) opposing his/her affirmation. 
The speaker, as the one who is responsible for the utterance, merges with U2. 
 
 But then, what makes it possible to proceed in this fashion? What gives us the right to 
distinguish between several uttering positions within a single utterance? In the case of (13), for 
example, the very fact that there are no fences that are non-red, non-yellow, and non-brown. Of 
course, a fence could be described as non-red, non-yellow, or non-brown, but such a description 
wouldn't give us any idea of the real colour of the fence. Therefore, if somebody is affirming 
that, X is not... he must be objecting to somebody who is affirming the contrary, namely that, X 
is ... (which, of course, does not mean that affirmations cannot be polyphonic: when one says, 
"This fence is red", one could well be affirming something that someone else has denied). 
 This may be too "ontological" an argument, so let me give you another example, this 
time from the philosophy of language. Some time ago (Žagar 1991a), I tried to analyse 
explicit performatives in terms of polyphonic analysis. Namely, I thought that performative 
utterances like: 
 




were extremely strange. You could of course object that such an isolated expression was taken 
out of the context, so let us examine the utterance (14) in one of its possible "contextualised" 
forms: 
 
(14’) I promise to come. 
 
Unfortunately the utterance still seems very strange as well. I can hardly imagine someone 
saying (14’) just like that, out of the blue. Again, you could object - and with good reason - that 
the utterance has been taken out of context, and that the locutor is probably responding to a 
question such as: 
 
(15) Are you coming? 
 
OK, now we have the minimal immediate context, but I still have a lot of trouble digesting 
dialogical linkages like: 
 
(16) A: Are you coming? 
             B: I promise to come. 
 
Perhaps in some Greek tragedy, but not in everyday conversation. There is something not quite 
right; either there is too much of something, or else something is missing. What is my point, 
then? 
 The most common answer to question (15) - if we remain in the affirmative register - 






(14’’) I am coming, 
 
but hardly (14’). If we answer by (14’) there is, in its relation to the question, a dissymmetry, a 
surplus in our answer, a surplus which indicates that something may be missing in the 
conversation string. Let us compare the following two bits of conversation: 
 
                                       I              II 
 
 (16’)  A: Are you coming? (16)  A: Are you coming? 
  B: I am coming.  B: I promise to come. 
 
 What is the difference between the two? In the first version, B gives a straightforward 
answer to A's question, confirming his/her arrival. In the second version, B does not give a 
straightforward answer to A's question, but performs an act of promise, thus solemnly obliging 
him/herself to come. What does this (difference) mean? 
 If one observes more closely B's answer in the second version, one notices that B does 
not answer A's question at all. A did not ask him/her to promise to come, but only whether s/he 
was coming or not. It thus becomes obvious that in the second version, B is answering some 
other question, that B is reacting to some other (previous) intervention in the conversation, which 
is absent from the given fragment of conversation, but is interpretatively presupposed by the 
presence, by the very utterance (the very use) of the performative prefix. 
 The "basic structure" of the second version of the dialogue should have therefore been 




 (16’’)  A: We are throwing a surprise party tomorrow evening. Are you        
 coming? 
  B: Yes, I am. 
  C: That would be a surprise! You never come!  
  B: I promise to come. 
 
 However, one cannot, of course, present the viewpoints of different discursively 
reconstructed and implicit utterers in the way I have just done it: as fully-fledged utterances, as if 
somebody actually uttered them. They are just a reconstruction of the context. Consequently, it is 
not possible to assign to the viewpoints of different implicit utterers, which have been 
reconstructed within an utterance, a status that is equal to the status of the explicit utterance, 
which was taken as the starting point of the analysis, because they are nothing but products of the 
same analysis and therefore have only a theoretical status. The viewpoints of different utterers 
should only be presented in terms of attitudes, positions and orientations, so that one could end 
up by analysing example (16’’) as having a locutor (speaker) and (at least?) three utterers: 
 
- U1 presents a fact F (the surprise party tomorrow evening), and words its presentation in the 
form of an invitation; 
- U2 recognises the presentation of U1 by accepting the invitation; 
- U3 doubts the sincerity of U2 and therefore presents its consent (the consent of U2) as doubtful; 
- U2 opposes U3 and confirms its consent by a solemn turn of phrase. 
 
 One of Ducrot's most famous analyses is the pragmatic use of the French adverb toujours 




 (18) Allons au bistro. On y sera toujours au chaud. 
                 Let's go to a bistro. At least we'll be warm there.’ 
 
According to Ducrot, we can distinguish at least five utterers within (18): 
 
- U1 presents a fact F, in our case a property P (warmth) of the object O (bistro) - "it is warm in 
the bistro" -, and presents that property as an advantage of the object O; 
- U2 uses that favourable property P as an argument for the conclusion C (C = "Let's go to a 
bistro"); 
- U3 presents the property P as a merely weak advantage; 
- U4 points out that weakness (of the property P) as a weakness that takes away every 
argumentative value from the fact F - which results in rejecting the viewpoint of U2; 
- U5, on the other hand, thinks that property P, though a weak advantage, is still a possible 
argument for the conclusion C ("It is a weak advantage, but it is nevertheless something"), 
thus rejecting the viewpoint of U4. 
 
 One particle, five utterers, and a crucial question: is there a limit to the number of utterers 
we can have within a single utterance or argumentative string? Ducrot's answer is: no, in 
principle there could be an unlimited number of utterers. My opinion is: we should be careful, 
and not multiply utterers beyond the point that the analysis (still) allows for. In the given 
example, I don't see any justification for distinguishing between U3 and U4. Such a distinction 
could only be made hypothetically, ideally; nevertheless, it is not supported by the given data. 
The use of the particle toujours (at least) only tells us that the argument is weak (thus supporting 
the viewpoint of U3), but there is no indication that the argument is considered so weak that it 
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loses every argumentative value. In other words, if the polyphonic analysis is to be taken 
seriously (and as we saw, it can be a very useful tool for pragmatic analysis), we should stick to 
the given empirical data, not to the could-be "data". 
 
 With that in mind, let us have another look at example (12): 
 
 (12) It's warm (Argument). > But I'm tired (Conclusion), 
 
a string used to answer, and reject, a suggestion for a walk. 
 According to Ducrot (1996/2009), there are at least four utterers in that argumentative 
string: U1 and U2 are related to, "It's warm" (argument), and U3 and U4 to, "I'm tired" 
(conclusion). U1 describes the weather by saying, "It's warm". "It's warm" is thus - don't forget 
that somebody suggested a walk - represented as an argument in favour of a walk, and U1 is 
supporting its argumentation by summoning a topos like:  
 
 T8 The warmer it is, the more pleasant it is to go for a walk. 
 
Then another utterer, U2, comes in, and from U1's point of view concludes with the walk. U3, 
whose voice can be heard in the segment "I'm tired", by the very fact of introducing his/her 
(counter)argument by but, agrees with T8, namely that in warm weather it is pleasant to go for a 
walk. But s/he is building her/his (counter)argument on a different topos, a topos we could 
reconstruct like: 
 




So, in giving "I'm tired" as an argument for not going for a walk, the physical state is being 
represented as a property making a walk unpleasant. And finally, Ducrot concludes his analysis, 
there is a U4 who concludes from U3's point of view not to walk. 
 In Žagar (1997) I criticised such an analysis by saying: if U2 concludes something from 
U1's point of view, and U4 concludes something from U3's point of view, why do we need U2 
and U4 at all? They could have well made their conclusions by themselves. But, as I have 
pointed out in relation to the example (16''), this is another attitude we have to avoid if we want 
to take the polyphonic analysis seriously (i.e. as a useful analytical tool): utterers aren't persons 
who can listen to each other and make their own conclusions - utterers are really just different 
uttering positions, different points of view, distinguishable within a single argumentative string. 
Utterers aren't real beings that talk to each other; they are just theoretical (and analytical) entities 
that help us reconstruct the course of argumentation. From that perspective, if we want to 
account for all the viewpoints within a single argumentative string, for all the (implicit) nuances, 
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The linguistic-discursive creation of the speaker’s ethos for the sake of persuasion: a key 
aspect of rhetoric and argumentation 
Paul Danler, University of Innsbruck  
 
Summary 
The central topic of this brief study is the linguistic-discursive creation of ethos in rhetorical and argumentative 
texts. In order to understand why ethos plays a fundamental role in those text types it seems necessary to first 
discuss the very notions of rhetoric and argumentation. The main goal of rhetorical and/or argumentative texts is 
persuasion. For this reason it also has to be clarified how persuasion works in those text types. After that we will 
look at the topic of ethos from various points of view: ethos beside pathos and logos as one of the key elements 
of rhetoric; Aristotle’s classification of the constituents of ethos into phronesis, eunoia, and arétè; ethos seen 
almost as a mask in the Jungian sense; the distinction between ethos as a discursive phenomenon and ethos as a 
prediscursive phenomenon; the role of topoi and doxa in the construction of ethos and finally the differentiation 
between rhetorical argumentation and linguistic argumentation, the latter of which being of particular interest for 
our applied analysis. In that final part we will eventually analyze a few exemplary morphosyntactic structures 
which in a way create the speaker’s ethical portrait or, to put it differently, which discursively construct the 
speaker’s ethos. The speeches we will draw upon were delivered by Mussolini between 1921 and 1941.  





 is the objective both of rhetoric and argumentation. The overall goal of 
persuasion is to make the listener or interlocutor change or give up his or her attitude in 
favour of the one represented by the sender (Breton 2008: 9; Danblon 2005: 13). The process 
of persuasion is multi-layered and occurs in a series of steps. The starting point and 
prerequisite for successful persuasion is the creation of a persuasive and/or convincing ethos 
on the part of the sender at the beginning of the rhetorical/argumentative commitment. In 
                                                 
8
 In this study we treat persuasion as a synonym of conviction without discussing any possible semantic 
differences between the two concepts.  
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order to see the question of the creation of ethos in a more comprehensive context, we should 
like to first deal with the question concerning the possible differences between rhetoric and 
argumentation; second, with the phenomenon of persuasion; third, with the role of ethos in 
rhetorical and argumentative discourse; and fourth, with the multi-layered phenomenon of the 
linguistic-discursive creation of ethos in rhetoric and argumentation. After the theoretical 
introduction there will be an applied part to illustrate how the linguistic-discursive creation 
works in concrete political speeches. The four speeches which will serve as corpus for our 
analyses were given by Mussolini between 1921 and 1941. The first of them was delivered on 
April 3
rd
 1921 during the inaugural ceremony at the first encounter of the Fasci dell’Emilia e 
della Romagna (Mussolini 1921: 239, footnote). The second speech was given at the Teatro 
Sociale in Udine on September 20
th
 1922 on the occasion of the encounter of the Fasci 
Friulani di Combattimento (Mussolini 1922: 411, footnote). On September 18
th
 1938 
Mussolini talked to the Triestines in the Piazza dell’Unità of their city Trieste (Mussolini 
1938: 144, footnote). And with the last of the four speeches, which serve us as corpus here, 
Mussolini addressed the hierarchies of the Roman Fascists at the Teatro Adriano in Rome on 
February 23
rd
 1941 (Mussolini 1941: 49, footnote). The topics Mussolini dealt with in the 
quotations of these four speeches concern Fascist convictions, policies and ideological 
principles as we will see in part three. 
Rhetoric and argumentation are occasionally used as synonyms, yet sometimes as 
quite distinct disciplines or approaches to discourse. We will have a quick glance at this 
ambiguity from a historical point of view. Concerning the issue of persuasion we will briefly 
retrace the etymological path of the term and then try to grasp the very nature of the 
phenomenon. The question of the nature of ethos on the one hand and the function of ethos in 
discourse on the other hand is our third topic. As is commonly known, the concepts of ethos, 
pathos and logos stem from one of Aristotle’s magna opera Rhetoric (Aristoteles 2010) from 
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the fourth century B.C. in which rhetoric is treated as τέχνη, téchnē, which means art. This 
suggests that Aristotle already conceptualised the emergence of ethos in discourse as the 
result of an artful strategy. When talking about ethos nowadays it has to be verified whether it 
still and always stands for what Aristotle understood by it. If, however, we follow Aristotle’s 
concept of ethos, which we will do, it will be interesting to find out how ethos comes about in 
discourse in general and in political speeches in particular and this is what we will analyse in 
the applied part of this brief study.  
 
2.1 Argumentation vs. rhetoric 
One of the more recent definitions of argumentation which has almost become a 
modern classic at least in the francophone world is the one by Anscombre/Ducrot (
3
1997) 
according to which a speaker argues for or against something when he or she makes an 
utterance or various utterances which are meant to admit another one.
9
 The resulting chains or 
argumentative concatenations become an essential means for creating coherence (Ducrot, 
1995: 85; Maingueneau 1991: 228) and coherence as well as cohesion as fundamental textual 
criteria are indispensable for successful argumentation. The overall pragmatic goal of 
argumentation, however, for which the textual criteria of coherence and cohesion are 
prerequisites, is making the addressee or listener adopt a conclusion which originally was not 
his or hers (Danblon 2002: 13). What is important is that the sender skilfully presents one, 
two or more premises which ideally make the addressee draw his or her own conclusions. In 
this case it is not the sender who directly suggests or tries to impose his or her own 
conclusions but he or she manages to make the addressee come to the conclusion which has 
been the sender’s from the beginning. What is more, it is not only the specific premises that 
make for the respective conclusion. In one way or another it is the whole text which 
                                                 
9
 “Un locuteur fait une argumentation lorsqu’il présente un énoncé E1 (ou un ensemble d’énoncés) comme 
destiné à en faire admettre un autre (ou un ensemble d’autres) E2. Notre thèse est qu’il y a dans la langue des 





contributes to the resulting conclusions (Vignaux 2004: 113) as it shapes concepts and 
attributes specific meanings to words, syntagmas and textual building blocks, the intrinsic 
semantic content of isolated words being minimal. However, usually the textual surface is not 
complete which means that either one or more of the premises or the conclusion are not 
explicated. Aristotle himself pointed out that common premises and shared knowledge should 
not be explicitly stated (Amossy 
2
2006: 164). What is left implicit, however, is far from being 
a textual blank without any function (Maingueneau 1991: 234). On the contrary, it is the 
addressee’s task to activate his or her knowledge to make the seemingly fragmentary 
argumentation coherent and complete. Upon adding the missing links and thereby completing 
the argumentation structure, the addressee adopts a highly creative role (Eco 1983: 50 ff.). 
When doing that, he or she even becomes the co-author of the argumentation at stake 
(Maingueneau 2002: 40; Walton 2007: 186) which considerably contributes to the process of 
persuasion. As co-author the addressee is much more likely to fully identify with the 
indirectly suggested conclusion.  
Argumentation is usually seen as opposed to demonstration (Boniolo/Vidali 2011: 7; 
Maingueneau 1991: 228). Demonstration, based on true premises, is part of formal logic 
whereas argumentation, based on probable and plausible premises, is the analogon in 
informal logic. What is relevant in discourse analysis, text linguistics and mainly in linguistic 
pragmatics is obviously argumentation rather than demonstration, where implicit premises, 
different kinds of implicatures, presuppositions and various kinds of inferential processes are 
at stake. The question which now arises is the one concerning the relationship between 
argumentation as informal logic and rhetoric. Ducrot understands by argumentation 
rhétorique (Ducrot 2004: 18) the verbal activity of making somebody believe something. 
Making somebody believe something seems to be the overall goal of rhetoric as well as of 
argumentation. Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, who have written history in 
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argumentation theory with their Traité de l’argumentation, don’t distinguish between rhetoric 
and argumentation as the subtitle of their work La Nouvelle Rhétorique (Perelman/Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1992) suggests. Interestingly enough though, this was also Aristotle’s concept as in his 
work the terms rhetoric and argumentation, to which he still referred as rhetoric and 
dialectics, were interchangeable as well (Amossy 
2
2006: 4; Meyer 2008: 12).  
At any rate, even if certain differences between argumentation and rhetoric have 
occasionally been worked out, the concept of ethos has turned out to be equally important 
both for argumentation and rhetoric. It has for example been argued that in argumentation the 
language is at the centre of interest, whereas in rhetoric it is man himself. It has been claimed 
that argumentation tackles questions, whereas rhetoric tries to avoid them. Argumentation has 
been seen more closely related to reason, whereas rhetoric has even been treated as a 
discourse figure (Meyer 2008: 11 ff.; Breton/Gauthier 2000: 38). However, to conclude this 
short and panoramic overview we would like to recall Meyer’s metaphorical and quite 
expressive definition of rhetoric according to which rhetoric is the negotiation of the distance 
between individuals concerning a question (Meyer 2008: 11).
10
 When taking this into account, 
it is perfectly coherent to consider argumentation as part of rhetoric as the overall goal of 
argumentation is also to reduce the distance between individuals concerning a question 
(Meyer 2008: 16). No matter whether rhetoric and argumentation are considered different, 
similar or the same domains, ethos is a key factor for both of them, and as a matter of fact it 
constitutes the starting point for argumentative and/or rhetorical strategies. However, before 
dealing with the very issue of ethos, its nature and its function, we will briefly touch upon the 
matter of persuasion as the main objective of argumentative and/or rhetorical strategies.  
 
2.2 The question of persuasion 
                                                 
10
 “La rhétorique est la négociation de la distance entre les individus à propos d’une question” (Meyer 2008: 11). 
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Persuade derives from Latin PERSUADERE, PER indicating the accomplishment of 
something and SUADERE, SUASUS from Sanskrit SVADUS, to instigate someone to do something 
(cf. TLIO; Pianigiani). Persuasion as opposed to orders or proposals operates indirectly, as the 
addressee is not explicitly asked to do or to believe something (Maingueneau 1991: 228). It is 
the addressee himself or herself who draws the respective conclusions without mostly 
realizing that he or she has been prepared to do so by being familiarized with the premises 
leading him or her to draw that conclusion. However, it is not only the premises leading to a 
certain conclusion which constitute the persuasive part of a text. Every word as part of an 
utterance is argumentative as every utterance instigates the addressee to see, believe and act 
differently than before being addressed (Plantin 1996). The addressee integrates the new piece 
of information into his or her stock of information and then interrelates it with other pieces of 
pertinent information and thus eventually gains new insights. Hence, merely by being 
informed of no matter what, the addressee’s cognitive state changes. Some new information is 
added, some old belief is cancelled, or some existing attitudes are modified and all of this 
brings about a change in the addressee’s cognitive state.
11
 Perception is selective and the 
transmission of information is necessarily selective as well. For this simple reason every 
speech act is latently or potentially persuasive. It is only persuasive though, if the information 
is intentionally transmitted for the sake of bringing about a change in the addressee’s attitude. 
Otherwise we’d rather speak of unconscious influence. In practice it is obviously difficult to 
clearly separate one from the other as this kind of unconscious influence can serve as an ideal 
mask for manipulation without the sending manipulator having to assume any responsibility 
for what he or she is saying and thereby suggesting. We have already described the objective 
of persuasion as such that the addressee should give up his or her own point of view in favour 
of the sender’s. As to the nature of persuasion we have pointed out that not only 
                                                 
11
 In Relevance Theory these are the so-called positive cognitive effects (cf. Sperber/Wilson 1986) 
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argumentative structures consisting of premises and conclusions are inherently persuasive but 
that any speech act potentially contributes to it. What is at the heart of persuasion according to 
Danblon (2006: 145) is the strategy of doing as if things were evident when they are not at all. 
Whenever something is presented as obvious, it turns out to be difficult to question, let alone 
refuse it. The creation of a credible and reliable ethos of the sender is indispensable to achieve 
persuasion based right on that premise within the framework of rhetoric and argumentation. In 
the following paragraph we would like to develop that idea a little further.  
 
2.3 The role of ethos in rhetoric and argumentation 
Aristotle distinguished between three modes of persuasion which are pathos, logos and 
ethos. Nowadays one tends to overlook that to his mind the three devices were equally 
important. Pathos refers to the emotional state of the audience which the speaker has to strive 
for in order to make the listeners receptive and sensitive to his or her concerns. Logos is the 
capacity of reasoning put into practice in argumentative discourse mainly in the form of 
enthymemes and examples. As far as ethos is concerned, it is often translated as the speaker’s 
character (Danblon 2002: 69 ff; 2005: 34 ff.). The speaker’s character or personality has to be 
trustworthy and reliable otherwise the addressee won’t follow his or her argumentation line. 
Groarke/Tindale (
3
2004: 359) point out the importance of ethos for practical reasons when 
saying that “ethotic considerations often play an important role in reasoning. They can arise in 
circumstances in which we do not have the time, the means or the ability to investigate a 
question in sufficient detail to decide the proper answer to it.” In other words, the addressee 
follows the sender out of confidence. According to the principle of ethè in antique rhetoric the 
orator attributed a number of positive characteristics to himself in order to make his 
personality appear pleasant and trustworthy. As to the variety of desirable characteristics to be 
striven for, Aristotle himself made up a typology in which he distinguished between phronesis, 
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practical wisdom, eunoia, benevolence (or goodwill, cf. Žmavc 2012: 183), and arétè, virtue 
(Maingueneau 1991: 183).
12
 However, according to Aristotle the discursive construction of 
ethos does not happen explicitly by the orator’s speaking about himself or by the author’s 
praising his own virtue but it is built up implicitly by the speaker’s way of giving the speech 
(Maingueneau 1987: 31). The orator thereby elaborates a kind of mask which is socially 
acceptable and even desirable, a mask almost in the Jungian sense (Jung 1964: 311 ff.). 
However, ethos has also had a different meaning ever since Greek antiquity. For the Greek 
philosopher Isocrates as well as later on for the Roman philosophers Quintilian and Cicero for 
example, ethos was not to be made up discursively, it was not supposed to be a linguistic 
mask, but it should reflect the orator’s truly virtuous personality (Amossy 1999: 19). To do 
justice to the concepts of both, Aristotle and Isocrates, Amossy distinguishes between 
discursive ethos and prediscursive ethos, ethos discursif versus ethos prédiscursif or ethos 
préalable (Amossy 
2
2006: 79), the former referring to the constructed ethical picture arising 
from discourse, the latter referring to the speaker’s true personality. Anyways, ethos is usually 
seen as a “multifaceted rhetorical concept” (Žmavc 2012: 181), especially when dealt with 
from a historical perspective. Žmavc (2012: 184-185) distinguishes between three ancient 
traditions of rhetorical ethos: In the first conception which stems from Plato and Isocrates 
ethos discloses the speaker’s moral character, “which pre-exists discourse and should be 
reflected in the discourse.” The second conception of rhetorical ethos derives from sophistic 
and textbook rhetoric. It is about practical examples and rules which are used and observed, 
respectively for the construction of speeches, often in connection with argumentative 
strategies which is typical of various sophists. The third conception of rhetorical ethos would 
be the merging of the “Greek rhetorical system” and the “Roman traditional oratory.” 
However, maybe in order to simplify the rather complex conceptions of rhetorical ethos, 
                                                 
12
 Žmavc (2012: 183) points out, though that these notions are not Aristotle’s but can be traced back even to 
Homer’s Iliad.  
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Žmavc (2012: 187) argues that generally speaking Greek rhetoric can be seen as a rhetoric of 
quarrel, whereas especially early Roman rhetoric used to be a rhetoric of consensus. 
In any case, when we talk about the role of ethos in discourse nowadays, it still refers 
to the orator’s personality which arises from his or her way of speaking (Maingueneau 2002: 
79) and not from “extra-discursive” knowledge the audience has about the orator 
(Maingueneau 1999: 75). Orators have addressed audiences at all times and in all places. 
Consequently ethos cannot possibly be understood as one fixed set of traits which can be 
demonstrated and sold to any audience at any time in order to gain its confidence. The 
concept of ethos doesn’t have anything to do with permanent and timeless values. On the 
contrary, it depends on ideology, religion, culture, current philosophical trends, the zeitgeist 
as well as the respective historical epoch. For this reason a very pragmatic and practical 
question has to be answered, namely which kind of ethos should be elaborated in the concrete 
speech. The orator’s first main goal being to please the listeners in order to conquer them 
emotionally, which is indispensable for persuading them of his or her ideas in the course of 
argumentation, the central guideline for the elaboration of ethos can be seen in doxa, which 
again depends on all the variables listed above. For Aristotle the term doxa designated the 
opinion of all, of the majority or of competent and wise men (Amossy 2002a: 11). Seen in a 
somewhat simplified or even reduced way doxa can therefore be understood as common 
opinion (Maingueneau 1991: 233). The specific contents of the thus displayed common 
opinion are facts, truths, assumptions, and values (Maingueneau 1991: 232; 
Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca 
5
1992) which constitute the respective culture- and time-
dependent topoi. As opposed to Aristotle’s and Perelman/Olbrecht-Tyteca’s concept of topoi 
as empty schemes which allow the concatenation of utterances, topos is here to be understood 
as pragmatic topos which can be equated with commonplace (Amossy 2002a: 15 ff.; 2002b: 
166 ff.). To cut a long story short, the pragmatic topoi as the backbone of doxa constitute the 
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common basis of shared values for sender and addressee from which the sender can very well 
start his or her argumentation.  
A final distinction between rhetorical argumentation and linguistic argumentation 
seems useful for our purpose. Ducrot generally understands by rhetorical argumentation the 
verbal activity which aims to make somebody believe something whereas linguistic 
argumentation refers to the different means of linguistically connecting propositions (Ducrot 
2004: 18). The concrete linguistic issues which are of interest under the aspect of linguistic 
argumentation are for example the functions of the different syntactic structures such as 
question and negation, the function of adverbs of quantity, the role of interjections and, first 
and foremost, the function of the different syntactic connectors (Maingueneau 1991: 234 ff.). 
When going back to ethos now, we would like to recall that it comes about procedurally 
(Amossy 
2
2006: 71) as a result of linguistic-discursive construction and this is what we would 




3. The linguistic-discursive creation of the speaker’s ethos 
In the following section, which is the applied part of the study, we will analyse six 
exemplary quotations from speeches given by Mussolini. Each of them will first be discussed 
under the aspect of the morphosyntactic criteria which in our opinion make for the 
construction of ethos. After that we will think about how that particular linguistic structure 
contributes to the improvement of ethos, provided ethos is understood as the result of a 
linguistic-discursive construction, which is obviously the case here. 
In the first example we are shedding light on the function of morphosyntactic zero-




(I) I popoli diventano grandi osando, rischiando, soffrendo, non mettendosi ai margini 
della strada in una attesa parassitaria e vile. (Mussolini 1941: 57) 
 
Peoples become great through daring, risking, suffering, and not standing on the 
roadside in parasitic and vile expectancy  
 
On the level of semantic valence it is obvious that the verbal functors osare, rischiare, 
soffrire, i.e. dare, risk and suffer take more than one argument as one always dares do 
something, risks something and suffers something or from something. However, when used 
generically, the materially realized verbs osare, rischiare, soffrire do not necessarily require 
another actant (Danler 2007). This means that the speaker doesn’t have to explicitly state what 
peoples have to dare, risk and suffer to become great. If in that speech the speaker had 
explicitly said that he expected his people to dare kill others, to risk their lives for him and his 
policy and to suffer the deprivations of a war he himself was in favor of, he would have 
explicitly created a different image or ethos of himself. If he had done so, the speaker would 
probably have been reproached with selfishness, ruthlessness and irresponsibility. For this 
reason it was wise of him to use the verbs dare, risk and suffer generically without actantially 
specifying the second arguments. 
In the second passage we see in a certain sense the opposite of the first example. In this 
case an argument wouldn’t have to be morphosyntactically realized to fulfill the criterion of 
the well-formedness of the sentence and yet it is:  
 
(II) Noi non facciamo della violenza una scuola, un sistema o, peggio ancora, una 
estetica. Noi siamo violenti tutte le volte che è necessario esserlo. Ma vi dico subito che 
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bisogna conservare alla violenza necessaria del fascismo una linea, uno stile nettamente 
aristocratico o, se meglio vi piace, nettamente chirurgico. (Mussolini 1921: 241) 
 
We (ourselves) don’t make a school out of violence, a system or, even worse, some kind 
of aesthetics. We (ourselves) are violent any time it is necessary to be so. But let me tell 
you right now: it is indispensable to stick to a line, a clear, aristocratic style or, if you 
prefer, a clear, surgical line, for the violence necessary for fascism. 
 
In Italian as in the other Romance languages which are pro-drop languages the 
first argument of the verb doesn’t have to be realized if the referent can be gathered 
from the context which is the case in quotation number II. The unmarked and neutral 
realization would be non facciamo della violenza una scuola and siamo violenti tutte le 
volte che è necessario, we don’t make … we are violent, without realizing the first 
argument of fare/to make and essere/to be which in this case is the first person plural 
noi/we. By morphologically realizing it Mussolini skillfully starts his argumentation 
from a supposed preliminary agreement with the audience which he even points out by 
the marked realization of the first argument. It is as if he acted and spoke in the name of 
the audience. The preliminary agreement won’t even be questioned as it is not the topic 
of the discussion and Mussolini will therefore get away with it. What is more, when 
saying we (ourselves) don’t make a school out of violence, it is as if his spontaneous and 
natural reaction to violence were negative. The morphosyntactic negation entails a 
negative orientation. The resulting peace-loving image remains to a certain extent even 
though he afterwards says point-blank we (ourselves) are violent any time it is 
necessary to be so. Concerning the creation of ethos it is as if the speaker identified 
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himself with the audience and as if he were speaking in their name. He portrays himself 
as a non-violent person in principle, full of sympathy and empathy. 
In number III Mussolini uses a passive construction which allows him not to 
specify the agent:  
 
(III) La disciplina deve essere accettata. Quando non è accettata, deve essere imposta. 
Noi respingiamo il dogma democratico che si debba procedere eternamente per sermoni, 
per prediche e predicozzi di natura più o meno liberale. (Mussolini 1922: 413) 
 
Discipline has to be accepted. When it is not accepted, it has to be imposed. We reject 
the democratic dogma according to which one must eternally proceed by means of 
sermonizing, preaching and lectures of the more or less liberal kind.  
 
The direct object of the corresponding active structure turns into the subject of the 
passive construction after the passive transformation whereas its subject turns into the 
agentive case which need not be specified syntactically any longer. By not having to 
explicitly state who would have to accept discipline and by whom it would otherwise be 
imposed, Mussolini appears much more harmless, responsible and maybe even paternal 
than if he said I will impose and enforce discipline and you’d better accept it. It is 
obviously only thanks to this morphosyntactic construction that the audience doesn’t 
feel intimidated and threatened by the speaker. The speaker’s ethos thus remains free of 
authoritarian or totalitarian claim despite the fact that certain democratic principles are 
even ridiculed.  
In the excerpt number IV we see a passive construction with agent. Yet, as we have just 
pointed out, in the passive construction the realization of the agentive case is not required for 
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the morphosyntactic well-formedness. From the functional sentence perspective this means 
that once it is realized, it has acquired special communicative weight, though. The reason for 
that is the fact that anything that goes beyond the realization of the minimal argumentative 
structure is syntactically superfluous but precisely because of that communicatively even 
more important.  
 
(IV) Le privazioni, le sofferenze, i sacrifizî che dalla quasi unanimità degli italiani e 
delle italiane vengono affrontati con coraggio e con dignità che può dirsi veramente 
esemplare, avranno il loro compenso [...]. (Mussolini 1941: 58) 
 
The deprivation, the sufferings, the sacrifices, which are faced by almost all Italians 
with courage and dignity, which can be described as exemplary, will have their 
compensation [...]. 
 
The Italians who suffer the deprivations of war with courage and dignity are portrayed 
as heroes by Mussolini. This should prove his respect for them as well as his ethical integrity 
but it should also put pressure on the audience to follow him in his policy. Respect and moral 
integrity are the new facets of the speaker’s ethos. 
In quotation number V it is a diathetical change from causative to recessive or anti-causative 
that allows the speaker to appear less aggressive and dangerous than he probably is: 
 
(V) Un milione e 850.000 elettori misero nell’urna la scheda con la falce ed il martello: 
156 deputati alla Camera. Pareva imminente la catastrofe. […] Io, tutto orgoglioso dei 
miei quattromila voti, e chi mi ha visto in quei giorni sa con quanta disinvoltura 




One million and 850,000 electors put the ballot paper with the sickle and the hammer 
into the ballot box: 156 delegates to the Chamber. The catastrophe seemed imminent. 
[…] I myself, all proud of my 4,000 votes, and whoever saw me in those days knows 
with how much composure I accepted that electoral verdict, and I said: the battle 
continues! 
 
The verb continuare/continue can be used either as a causative verb as in Peter 
continues the argument or as a recessive or anti-causative verb as in The argument (between 
the two of them) continues. By resorting to the anti-causative version it is again possible to 
keep the agent secret. So The battle continues once more appears to be less aggressive and 
less dangerous than We continue to fight and thereby Mussolini is more likely to get the 
people’s support than by showing his fanaticism and preference for fighting. Peacefulness and 
responsibility for the country should characterize the speaker’s ethos.  
Another particularity of the Italian language but also of other Romance languages is the 
SI-diathesis which implies a different way of looking at a given constellation of actants and 
circumstantials. When we say in English you know or one knows or even we know in order to 
depersonalize an action or a process, in Italian we would say si sa which is impersonal, si just 
being some kind of clitic tag. The other SI-diathesis is the passivizing one like in si fanno 
delle guerre/wars are waged, where le guerre/wars becomes the subject. Number VI 
illustrates the pragmatic consequence of the use the SI-diathesis: 
 
(VI) […] gli ebrei di cittadinanza italiana, i quali abbiano indiscutibili meriti militari o 
civili nei confronti dell’Italia e del regime, troveranno comprensione e giustizia; quanto 
agli altri, si seguirà nei loro confronti una politica di separazione. Alla fine il mondo 
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dovrà forse stupirsi più della nostra generosità che del nostro rigore […]; (Mussolini 
1938: 146) 
 
[…] the Jews of Italian citizenship, who have undeniable military or civil merits for 
Italy and the regime, will find comprehension and justice; as for the others, a policy of 
separation will be pursued. At the end, the world will perhaps be more surprised by our 
generosity than by our rigor […];  
 
Mussolini says that a policy of segregation will be pursued. Due to the 
morphosyntactic structure, it seems as if he didn’t have anything to do with it. As if that 
wasn’t hypocritical enough, he claims that the world will be surprised at his or their 
generosity. Again, Mussolini seems understanding, well-meaning and responsible and 
all that makes for the speaker’s ethos which makes him appear a blameless, caring and 
sympathetic political leading figure.  
 
 
4. Concluding remark 
Due to skilfully used morphosyntactic constructions such as the zero-realization of 
arguments (I), the specification of syntactically unnecessary actants (II), the passive voice 
(III), the marked use of syntactically unnecessary circumstantials (IV), the recessive rather 
than the causative diathesis (V) as well as the use of the SI-diathesis (VI) allow the speaker to 
build up an extremely favourable ethos of himself. From these few quotations Mussolini 
emerges as disinterested and altruistic (I), non-violent, sympathetic and empathetic (II), 
politically farsighted (III), full of respect and integrity (IV), peaceful and responsible (V), 
understanding, well-meaning and caring (VI). According to the doxa of those times and under 
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the circumstances of those days the portrait of the speaker which arose from his speeches, 
which is in other words the linguistic-discursively constructed ethos, was by all means 
positive. On the basis of this positive ethos as a first implicit premise the speaker has a 
promising starting point for his argumentation.  
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The Sokal affair and beyond: on the strategic use of parody in the “science wars”
13
 




This paper analyses the argumentative aspects of the Sokal affair, a publishing hoax performed by Alan Sokal in 
1996 when he successfully submitted a parodic, nonsensical paper masquerading as a highly scientific article to 
the academic journal Social Text. The analysis presented here of Sokal’s hoax is carried out within the 
framework of a more comprehensive research project related to subversion in argumentative discourse and 
different strategies for tackling such subversion. The main point of this paper is to propose that the 
argumentative use of parody of Sokal’s type can be seen as an instance of a strategy of “fighting fire with fire”, 
the goal of which is to ridicule the intellectually abusive participants in rational communication and make them 
feel for themselves the negative and destructive effects of the subversion of intellectual standards. However, this 
paper will also show that the conditions for the successful application of this strategy are highly specific and that, 
under particular circumstances, such a strategy can easily turn against its own users.  
 
Key words: Sokal affair, ‘science wars’, parody, subversion in argumentative discourse, 
argumentative strategies 
 
Introduction: the origin of the Sokal affair 
In 1996, Alan Sokal, a professor of physics at New York University, published an 
article in the special spring/summer issue of the journal Social Text (no.
 
46/47). This highly 
reputed academic journal of “postmodern cultural studies” devoted the special issue in 
question to the phenomenon of the “science wars”. The expression “science wars” referred to 
intellectual exchanges taking place in American academic circles in the 1990s, focusing on 
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questions about the nature of science, scientific methodology and scientific knowledge. The 
main “war camps” in this intellectual confrontation were represented on one side by adherents 
of scientific realism and on the other by their postmodernist critics.   
In one of the opening paragraphs of Sokal’s article, entitled “Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”, Sokal stated the 
following: 
 
It has thus become increasingly apparent that physical “reality”, no less than social 
“reality”, is at bottom a social and linguistic construct; that scientific “knowledge”, far 
from being objective, reflects and encodes the dominant ideologies and power 
relations of the culture that produced it; that the truth claims of science are inherently 
theory-laden and self-referential; and consequently, that the discourse of the scientific 
community, for all its undeniable value, cannot assert a privileged epistemological 
status with respect to counter-hegemonic narratives emanating from dissident or 
marginalized communities. (Sokal, 1996; reprinted in the annotated version in Sokal, 
2010: 9) 
 
By arguing in favour of the thesis that social and physical “reality”, together with 
purported objective knowledge of that reality, is in fact a social and linguistic construct 
dependent on the power relations prevailing in the framework of the culture which produces 
that construct, Sokal apparently allied himself with postmodernist critics of the concept of 
scientific objectivity. 
In an article for Lingua Franca of May–June 1996, however, Sokal revealed that the 
paper published in Social Text, ‘Transgressing the Boundaries…’, was actually a hoax—a 
parody whose purpose was “to test the prevailing intellectual standards” in “certain precincts 
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of the American academic humanities” (Sokal, 1996a). Concerned by an apparent decline in 
standards of intellectual rigour in these areas of education and research, Sokal offered the 
following explanation of his motive in perpetrating the hoax:  
 
(…) I decided to try a modest (though admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: Would a 
leading North American journal of cultural studies (…) publish an article liberally 
salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological 
preconceptions? (ibid.) 
 
Sokal’s hoax and its subsequent revelation caused a huge succès de scandale. The 
Sokal affair received extensive media coverage not only in the United States but also in 
Europe and Latin America, provoking lively debates in both academic and non-academic 
circles. Amongst many different issues raised in these debates, the following were particularly 
controversial: the (ir)relevance of postmodern critiques of science; the relation of the 
humanities and social sciences to the ‘hard’ sciences; academic ethics and the consequences 
of undermining the professional trust of the community of one’s scientific peers; and the 
acceptable standards of intellectual rigour in scientific and academic contexts. Apparently 
these questions have still not lost their relevance even today.
14
  
The complexity of the Sokal affair allows examination from many different 
perspectives and to study it with different theoretical goals in mind. In this paper an attempt is 
made to analyze several argumentative aspects of the debate pertaining to the Sokal affair. 
This will be done in the framework of a more comprehensive theoretical outlook related to the 
phenomenon of subversion in argumentative discourse and different strategies for dealing 
with such subversion. After an elaboration of the general theoretical platform, the emphasis 
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will be placed on the use of parody as a strategic device for countering a specific form of 
argumentative subversion, analysed through Sokal’s example.   
 




The term “subversion in argumentative discourse” is proposed here as an umbrella 
term encompassing various forms of deviation from and violations of norms, standards and 
canons of rational communication and argumentation. The term thus comprises a wide and 
diversified range of phenomena, from employing intentional sophistic and eristic manoeuvres 
to merely neglecting to offer evidence and rational arguments in appropriate contexts.  
In many cases the subversive quality of an argumentative act can be obfuscated by 
more or less developed argumentative manoeuvres intended to create an impression of logical 
and argumentative correctness. Although the terms “abuse” or “manipulation” could also be 
used to describe such phenomena, denoting them with the term “subversion” places the 
emphasis on the destructive effects they have on the very idea and practice of rational 
discussion and communication. 
The possibility that one or more participants in rational communication may act in a 
subversive manner raises the question of what the other participants can do to prevent the 
negative effects of this kind of argumentative subversion. One possible answer would be to 
use what may be described as “anti-subversive strategies”—i.e. the employment of various 
devices to fight against the perceived disrespect of the canons of rationality and misuse of 
argumentative techniques.  
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These devices are treated as “strategies” for two main reasons. First, the situations in 
which they are practiced possess an explicit or implicit agonistic flavour, because rational 
discussions are often perceived as different kinds of battles which can be won or lost 
depending on the verbal and argumentative skilfulness of the parties. This sense of “strategy” 
is clearly related to the confrontational aspect of argumentative activity. Second, the blocking 
of argumentative subversion imposes the need to choose an optimal, context-bound plan of 
action in order to be effective. This need originates from the character of argumentation as a 
goal-directed and rule-governed activity in which the desired end of justifying and refuting 
opinions must be reached by respecting the rules of use of reason and speech. Consequently, 
anti-subversive strategies must be adapted to the particular context, the specific profile of the 
opponent and the concrete type of breach of rules and principles of rational communication in 
the given situation.  
Because of this need to adapt strategies to specific conditions, any attempt to study 
strategies for tackling argumentative subversion should include an attempt to capture the 
inherent diversity of their types and manner of application. This paper proposes a tentative 
typology of anti-subversive strategies intended to serve as an initial approximation to 





2. A typology of anti-subversive strategies 
The proposed typology comprises the following four kinds: the “appeal to norm” 
strategy; the “appeal to institutional authority” strategy; the strategy of “ignoring the sophist”; 
and the “fighting fire with fire” strategy. An attempt is made in this section to formulate 
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criteria for identifying each of these anti-subversive strategies, the conditions of their 
successful use and the potential risks involved in their application.  
 
2.1. Appeal to norm  
The “appeal to norm” strategy consists in showing that the other party in the 
argumentative interaction is employing an argument that violates one or more norms of 
logical and argumentative discourse and is consequently fallacious. The goal of employing 
this strategy is to restore the argumentative correctness of the dialogue by forcing the other 
party to retract or modify the contested argument and all the propositions or arguments that 
depend on that argument.  
Successful application of this “appeal to norm” strategy is dependent, however, on 
there being a consensus amongst the participants in the rational interaction as to the regulative 
status of the norm being invoked. In this sense, the formal logical validity of an argument is 
one of the strongest and most unquestionable criteria for its rational acceptance. For example, 
if the contested argument is shown to be logically invalid, withdrawing from it should follow 
immediately since the formal invalidity of an argument eliminates the necessity of accepting 
the conclusion even in cases when its premises are accepted.  
It may be argued, however, that the norm of formal deductive validity is not the one 
and only norm to be taken into consideration when assessing the rational acceptability of 
argumentation. A number of supplementary criteria of argumentative correctness have been 
formulated in many contemporary approaches that address the dialogical aspects of rational 
communication and argumentation (Alexy, 1989; Barth and Krabbe, 1982; Grice, 1975/1989; 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984; Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995; Eemeren and Houtlosser, 
2009; Rescher, 1977; Walton, 1992; Walton and Krabbe, 1995,  etc.; cf. Eemeren and 
Grootendorst’s rules for a critical discussion, Alexy’s rules for general practical discourse, 
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Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational maxims, etc.). Despite many differences 
between these approaches, they all share a fundamental common feature, i.e., an attempt to 
elaborate wider complexes of norms and rules—besides strictly logical ones—that must be 
observed to bring the verbal interaction as close as possible to the ideal of rational and critical 
dialogue.  
The models developed in the aforementioned approaches reveal their potential 
vulnerability, however, when they are adopted in a strategic manner to detect a possible 
violation of an argumentative norm by other participant(s) in the discussion. This 
vulnerability consists mainly in the fact that the normative force of these models is seriously 
affected by the still open problem of their justification. If the objection is raised that an 
opponent in a discussion is violating Alexy’s rules of general practical discourse, for example, 
or Eemeren and Grootendorst’s rules for critical discussion, the opponent could legitimately 
question the normative status of these rules. This is because such rules obviously do not have 
the same logical and argumentative power as, say, the norm of the formal validity of 
conditional arguments. As a matter of fact, because of the lack of a single comprehensive and 
canonical theory of argumentative discourse comparable to the theory of formal deductive 
logic, the justification for those rules usually takes the pragmatic form of a consensus among 
the participants of the discussion.
17
 
There is therefore a need to elaborate different kinds of norms and criteria, besides the 
criterion of formal logical validity, with which to determine the rational acceptability of 
argumentation—especially in dialogically structured rational interactions. However, the 
justificatory force of these argumentative norms will still depend upon the particular system in 
which they are formulated and on the shared acceptance of their normative authority.  
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2.2. Appeal to institutional authority 
 While the “appeal to norm” strategy concerned violations of the rules for constructing 
arguments, the “appeal to institutional authority” strategy is applied in cases of violation or 
abuse of established procedural rules of discussion (although the possibility is not excluded 
that such cases may also include violations of the rules for the construction of arguments). For 
example, a kind of argumentative practice that misuses the established procedural rules of 
discussion is the practice of filibustering which occurs in the framework of parliamentary 
procedures. This consists in using the unlimited right of speech to delay or prevent the making 
of a decision on a legislative or other type of proposal.  
  The “appeal to institutional authority” strategy consists in invoking the institutionally 
given role and authority to block the argumentative subversion. It is obvious that this is 
applicable within institutionally structured and defined argumentative contexts such as the 
legal context of adjudication and the context of parliamentary debates. The goal of employing 
this strategy is to restore the procedural correctness of the argumentative exchange. Returning 
to the example of filibustering, there is also an institutional form of response to this kind of 
subversion: the “cloture” procedure (used in the US senate, for example) which imposes 
restrictions on the filibuster’s unlimited right to speech and which is also initiated and applied 
in accordance with strict procedural rules.   
 In legal contexts, especially in litigation, the institutional authority to which one party 
can appeal in order to protect himself or herself from the subversive intentions of the other 
party is represented by the judge. Given the highly adversarial nature of paradigmatic legal 
litigation, in which each party is driven by his/her own interest, it is obvious that there is a 
need for some form of external guarantee—or even coercion—to ensure that the rules of 
rational argumentation are respected. Indeed, the procedural aspect of law includes numerous 
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rules that regulate the argumentative and dialogical side of legal proceedings, including the 




The successful application of this strategy clearly presupposes the existence of fair 
procedure and the functionality of the institution whose authority is being invoked. If the 
procedure in whose framework the argumentative exchange takes place is essentially unfair or 
biased, and/or if the institutional authority that should guarantee procedural correctness is 
dysfunctional or partial, then the appeal to institutional authority as an anti-subversive 
strategy will be ineffective if not directly counterproductive.  
 
2.3. Ignoring the sophist  
 Unlike the previous two strategies, both of which are intended to restore 
argumentative and procedural correctness in cases when rational interaction deviates from its 
optimal course, the strategy of “ignoring the sophist” consists in strictly refraining from 
engagement in argumentative discussion with the other party. Its application is triggered in 
contexts in which it is estimated that the very possibility of rational discussion is undermined 
by the other party, whose profile and intellectual habits render futile any effort to comply with 
standards of rationality in argumentation. The goal of this strategy is obviously to disqualify 
the other party as a valid participant in rational discussion.  
 One particularly illuminative example of the application of this strategy can be found 
in Derrida’s description of the way in which an audience of analytical philosophers in Oxford 
responded to the lecture he delivered on différance in 1967: “On that occasion the silence 
which followed was obviously eloquent. Eloquently saying: ‘There is no arguing here and 
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there is no prospect of arguing with this man, or with this discourse.’.” (cited from 
Badarevski, 2004: 264)  
 The application of this kind of strategy was recommended in Aristotle’s writings as 
the ultimate resort in situations where rational communication has become impossible due to 
the intellectual habitus of the collocutor. In the eighth book of Topics, Aristotle thus suggests 
the following:  
 
You ought not to discuss with everybody (…) for against some people argument is 
sure to deteriorate; for with a man who tries every means to seem to avoid defeat you 
are justified in using every means to obtain your conclusion, but this is not a seemly 
proceeding. (Topica, 164 b 9-10) 
 
However, this strategy also suffers certain weak points and potential risks, mainly 
related to the possibility of its abuse. For example, a participant in rational interaction  
applying this strategy might significantly underestimate the capacity of the other party for 
reasoned discussion and argumentation. Moreover, one might (mis)use this strategy to 
compensate for one’s inability to match the adversary in intellectual terms by calling him or 
her a “sophist” and meta-subversively evading rational discussion. This is why the “ignoring 
the sophist” strategy should be applied with caution and only in specific, adequately assessed 
circumstances.  
 
2.4. Fighting fire with fire 
 The fourth strategy of “fighting fire with fire” is perhaps more complex than those 
previously elaborated as it represents an indirect way of attacking the argumentative 
subversion, i.e., by imitating it with critical and polemic intention. The use of parody, satire or 
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 The name suggested for this strategy derives from the French expression “contre-
feux”, denoting a fire deliberately set in front of another fire so as to create a vacuum and 
prevent its spreading. In the same sense as this metaphor, the goal of “fighting fire with fire” 
is to overcome adversaries in argumentative encounters by using their own means. More 
specifically, the main point of its application is to ridicule the other, intellectually abusive 
party and to make them feel for themselves the negative and destructive effects of the 
subversion of intellectual standards. 
 The successful application of this strategy presupposes that the targeted audience 
possesses sufficient knowledge of the phenomena which constitute the object of parody or 
satire and that the audience shares the same negative value attitude towards this object. These 
conditions are necessary to ensure that the parodic intention of the author is understood and 
that the argumentative impact is fully realised. Otherwise this strategy could either miss its 
target or have a self-defeating effect—increasing rather than decreasing the intellectual appeal 
and popularity of the parodied works.  
 The application of the “fighting fire with fire” strategy raises serious issues concerning 
communicational ethics. This is due to the lack of genuine commitment on the part of the 
person using this strategy to the opinions which they advance in the discursive interaction, 
potentially involving an element of deceptiveness in the communication process. In order to 
avoid the danger of producing “meta-level” subversion, this strategy should also be applied 
with great caution. 
 
3. The strategic aspects of Sokal’s use of parody 
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95 
 
 The central idea of this paper, as mentioned in the introduction, is the proposal that 
Sokal’s parody may be treated as a representative example of the application of a “fighting 
fire with fire” strategy. This idea will be elaborated using the following elements—triggers, 
goals, conditions of successful application and weak points of the strategy—as key parameters 
for the analysis, contextualised in the particular circumstances of the Sokal affair. At the same 
time, occasional comparisons with other strategies will make it possible to better perceive the 
specificities of its nature and application. 
 
3.1. Triggers for the activation of the strategy 
 In the earlier section on theoretical analysis (2.4), it was suggested that the main 
trigger for the application of a “fighting fire with fire” strategy is the identification of some 
form of argumentative subversion followed by the impression that its direct, immediate 
blocking is either impossible or implausible.  
 
 In Sokal’s case, as he says himself, it was his reading of Higher Superstition (1994) by 
Paul Gross and Norman Levitt that first led him to pursue the identification of subversive 
tendencies in the discourse in vogue in the field of humanities in the 1990s. According to 
Sokal, the focus of this influential book was “the analysis of a curious historical volte-face” 
concerning one of the fundamental tenets of the Enlightenment legacy—the belief that 
“rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are 
incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful – not to mention 
being desirable human ends in their own right” (Sokal, 2010: 116).  
 




[O]ver the past two decades, a large number of “progressive” or “leftist” academic 
humanists and social scientists (…) have turned away from this Enlightenment legacy 
and – bolstered by French imports such as deconstruction as well as by home-grown 
doctrines like feminist standpoint epistemology – have embraced one or another 
version of epistemic relativism. Moreover, a small but growing subset of these 
scholars have turned their critiques on the natural sciences, questioning not only the 
political and economic organisation of scientific research but also the alleged “cultural 
prejudices inscribed in the very epistemology of scientific inquiry” (…). Gross and 
Levitt contend that these latter scholars, combining an inadequate philosophy of 
science with an utter ignorance of the science they purport to criticize, have made 
fools of themselves and subverted the standard of scholarship. (ibid.) 
 
In Sokal’s view, the subversive quality of the criticised aspects of the work of “some 
of the most prominent French and American intellectuals” (Sokal, 2010:153), whom he 
describes as “pontificating on science and its philosophy and making a complete bungle of 
both” (Sokal, 2010: xiii) included the following features: the advancing of “meaningless or 
absurd statements”, “name-dropping”, the display of  “false erudition”, “sloppy thinking and 
poor philosophy” (Sokal, 2010: 153). 
Categorising the reasons for his resorting to parody as “pragmatic”, Sokal gives the 
following explanation of his choice of strategy for attacking the targeted forms of discourse as 
well as their protagonists: 
 
The targets of my critique have by now become a self-perpetuating academic 
subculture that typically ignores (or disdains) reasoned criticism from the outside. In 
such a situation, a more direct demonstration of the subculture's intellectual standards 
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was required. But how can one show that the emperor has no clothes? Satire is by far 
the best weapon (…) (Sokal 1996a) 
  
 In terms of the proposed classification of anti-subversive strategies, the “reasoned 
criticism from the outside” would probably represent a kind of application of the “appeal to 
norm” strategy with the intention of demonstrating that the kind of discourse in question fails 
to comply with the rules and norms of rational argumentation. However, this approach would 
not work in this situation; such a step would clearly presuppose the existence of a normative 
consensus between the intellectual “war camps” involved concerning the standards that 
guarantee the argumentative legitimacy of their discursive practices. And yet the very lack of 
such a consensus is obviously the factor which initially created the gap between the two 
academic subcultures, the “scientific” and the “postmodernist”. The “appeal to norm” strategy 
also seems more plausible on the micro-argumentative level, in which there is a violation of a 
single argumentative rule (or several of them) that can be clearly identified and isolated from 
the totality of the discourse. However, the form of subversion identified by Sokal in this case 
concerns rather the macro-argumentative level, for it stems from objections to the discourse as 
a whole, i.e. from the integral way of thinking and communicating in the framework of the 
criticised intellectual community. This is why the most plausible way to deal with it was to 
mimic the totality of the targeted discourse by producing its parodied form, i.e. applying the 
“fighting fire with fire” strategy.  
 As far as the other strategies are concerned, i.e., the “appeal to institutional authority” 
and the “ignoring the sophist” strategy, neither of these would be adequate in Sokal’s 
situation. The application of the first one would be impossible because of the fact that the 
controversy in question is not placed in an institutional context, which implies that there is no 
institutional authority (judge, arbiter etc.) to be invoked in order to block the subversion 
according to pre-established procedural rules. The application of the second one would be 
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implausible because of the fact that the ignoring of the opinions advanced by the intellectual 
adversaries would boil down to self-exclusion from the argumentative space and letting the 
subversion stay unexposed and unblocked. And that is precisely the opposite of Sokal’s 
intention in that case. In sum, it can be concluded that his application of the “fighting fire with 
fire strategy” was dictated by the specific circumstances of the concrete argumentative 
situation and that, in those circumstances, it could be treated as a strategically adequate 
choice.
20
    
 
3.2. The goal of the “fighting fire with fire” strategy 
 Commenting on the analysis presented in Gross and Levitt’s book, Sokal observes that 
“some of the writings they examine are so silly that they almost demand ridicule along with 
refutation” (Sokal, 2010: 136-137). In this sense, the writing of his parody fits in with the 
general goal of the use of the “fighting fire with fire” approach, which was defined above (in 
section 2.4) as ridiculing the other, intellectually abusive party by making them experience the 
negative and destructive effects of their own subverting of intellectual standards. Indeed, in 
his paper “Transgressing the boundaries: An afterword”, published in Dissent, Sokal 
explicitly stated that in his parodic, nonsensical article he used the very same means of 
argumentative subversion which could be identified in the criticised texts: 
 
Like the genre it is meant to satirize (…) my article is a mélange of truths, half-truths, 
quarter-truths, falsehoods, non sequiturs, and syntactically correct sentences that have 
no meaning whatsoever. (…) I also employed some other strategies that are well-
established (albeit sometimes inadvertently) in the genre: appeals to authority in lieu 
of logic; speculative theories passed off as established science; strained and even 
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 The ethical implications of this choice will be discussed later, in section 3.4.  
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absurd analogies; rhetoric that sounds good but whose meaning is ambiguous; and 
confusion between the technical and everyday senses of English words. (Sokal, 1996b; 
also in Sokal, 2010: 93–94) 
 
 Speaking of his intentions to turn the subversion of intellectual standards against its 
main perpetrators, Sokal remarks: “(…) the blow that can't be brushed off is the one that's 
self-inflicted. I offered the Social Text editors an opportunity to demonstrate their intellectual 
rigor. Did they meet the test? I don't think so.” (Sokal, 1996a)  
 It is easy to see that the test to which the editors of Social Texts were subjected by 
Sokal’s submission of the article reveals a kind of tactical ingenuity—a tactic that can be 
compared to the tactic of a fork or double-attack in chess, whereby the attacker stands to 
benefit from any possible response on the part of the adversary.  
 This phenomenon was nicely described by Michel Rio, one of the participants in the 
debate surrounding the Sokal affair. According to Rio, Sokal falsified the targeted form of 
discourse in order to test the criteria for recognizing its validity. Thus, if the adherents of this 
type of discourse (in this case the editors of Social Text) had identified the falsification—in 
which case they would not have published the text—they would have demonstrated the 
importance of the criteria of intellectual rigour, which were clearly not met in the falsified 
(parodic) form of discourse. If, on the other hand, they failed to recognise the falsification and 
went ahead and published the text, as actually happened, this would expose a fundamental 
flaw in their standards of academic and scientific rigour, implying that these standards are 
either inadequate or, worse, non-existent (Rio, 1997). In both cases, Sokal’s point about the 
necessity of adequate, rigorous standards of acceptability of scientific and philosophical 
discourses and their implications would be made in a convincing way.  ‘ 
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 In order to understand the goal of using the “fighting fire with fire” strategy in the 
argumentative situation created by the Sokal affair, it may be useful to explore Sokal’s own 
opinion of the probative force and range of his “experiment”. Thus, distancing himself from 
his “over-enthusiastic supporters” who “have claimed too much” in his text “What the Social 
Text affair proves and does not prove”, Sokal writes:  
 
From the mere publication of my parody I think that not much can be deduced. It 
doesn’t prove that the whole field of cultural studies or cultural studies of science – 
much less sociology of science – is nonsense. Nor does it prove that the intellectual 
standards in these fields are generally lax. (…) It proves only that the editors of one 
rather marginal journal were derelict in their intellectual duty (…) (Sokal, 2010: 152–
153; see also http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/noretta.html).  
 
 According to Sokal, much more important than the conclusions which can be deduced 
from the fact of the publication of the parodic article are the conclusions that can be deduced 
from its content. Thus he points to the fact that “the most hilarious parts” of his “screamingly 
funny” article were not written by himself but were “direct quotes from the postmodern 
Masters” (ibid.). 
 The real targets of Sokal’s critique are the “sloppy thinking” and “glib relativism” 
allegedly prevailing “in many parts of Science Studies (albeit not, by and large, among 
serious philosophers of science)” (Sokal, 2010: 155–156). Consequently, the main goal of 
applying the “fighting fire with fire” strategy in this case consisted not in ridiculing a handful 
of trendy intellectuals or intellectually lazy editors but in undermining the epistemological 
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credibility of the criticised form of discourse by practically demonstrating (what Sokal 
perceives as) its absurdity
21
 and unsoundness. 
 
3.3. Conditions for the successful application of this strategy 
 As mentioned above (section 2.4.), success in using parody as a form of the “fighting 
fire with fire” strategy is dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions mainly related to 
the audience that is targeted by the parody. First, it is necessary that the audience possesses 
sufficient knowledge of the parodied genre; otherwise, it would not be able to identify the 
elements of content and style that imitate the original work that is the object of the parody. 
Second, the audience should correctly identify the author’s critical intention; otherwise, it 
could interpret his/her work in a standard, “serious” manner and completely ignore the 
parodic element. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the audience should share the negative 
value attitude towards the criticised/parodied phenomena. If the audience is strongly attached 
to the parodied phenomena, the intended parody could serve to affirm and praise its targets 
rather than undermine them. 
 This is precisely the kind of situation which occurred with the reception of Sokal’s 
article by the editors of Social Text. Because of their firm adherence to the discourse which 
was the object of the parody and their attaching of a positive intellectual and ethical value to 
it, the editors were not only unable to recognise the parody but did not change their opinion 
even after Sokal had revealed his intent (Robbins, 1996). Consequently, independently of the 
intention of the author of the parody, the arguments in the submitted article were interpreted 
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 Perhaps, as Leo Groarke suggested in an informal discussion during the “Days of Ivo Škarić” conference, 
Sokal’s approach could be treated as an instance of reductio ad absurdum proof of the unsoundness of the 
criticised form of discourse. However, my choice to describe it with the metaphorical expression “fighting fire 
with fire” is motivated by the need to take into consideration not only the logical but also the rhetorical and 









3.4. The weak points and controversial aspects of the argumentative use of parody  
 The above-described phenomenon leads to the fourth and final point to be made in 
relation to Sokal’s parody as an instance of the “fighting fire with fire” strategy. This 
concerns the potential dangers of applying this strategy, i.e., the possibility of its being turned 
against those employing it and their original purpose, as well as the possibility of creating the 
effect of a higher-level subversion—a kind of “meta-subversion”.   
 Below, in sections 3.4.1 – 3.4.5, I examine five potential weak points and 
controversial aspects of the argumentative use of parody. 
 
 3.4.1. Popularisation of parodied phenomena  
 As the example of Sokal’s use of parody shows, besides the already mentioned risk of 
parody being taken seriously and thus undermining its critical effect, there is also a risk of 
popularising the parodied phenomena to such an extent that they attract new adherents. Thus, 
the intensive public debate related to the Sokal affair leaves the impression that there has been 
a corresponding increase in the number of members of both confronted intellectual camps. If 
so, this would mean that Sokal’s parody has indirectly contributed to an enlargement of public 
support not only for his own cause but also for the criticised one. In this sense, it could be said 
that the “fighting fire with fire” strategy here has produced the opposite effect of the strategy 
of “ignoring the sophist”. For in the latter case, not entering into any kind of argumentative 
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 On this point, compare the question raised by Johnson and del Rio in their paper “Interpretation and 
Evaluation of Satirical Arguments”: “If a speaker or author makes a purposefully bad argument meant to 
illustrate the folly of someone or something, but that argument is interpreted by audiences in a serious way, then 
is the argument satirical or serious?” (Johnson and del Rio, 2011: 891) 
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interaction with the adversary also prevents the spread of interest and possible public support 
for his/her stance. 
 
 3.4.2. Deepening the gap between the adherents and the critics of the object of parody 
 By deeply dividing public opinion as to the legitimacy of the content as well as the 
method of Sokal’s critique through parody, the Sokal affair also contributed to the 
mobilization of over-defensive attitudes on the part of the parodied authors and their allies, 
thereby ‘heating up’ the debate to an undesirable extent. This, in turn, has deepened the gap 
between the “natural sciences” and the “social sciences and humanities” camps, which was 
presumably not the original intent of the author of the parody. In this way the parody has 




 The fierce confrontations which broke out within intellectual circles as a result of the 
Sokal affair created a situation, moreover, which could serve the interests of those political 
forces in society that feel threatened by the prospect of a strong, unified and critically oriented 
academy. Worried by this possibility, Ellen Schrecker, although basically siding with Sokal in 
his plea for strengthening the traditional academy by maintaining the highest standards of 
intellectual rigour, concludes her letter to Lingua Franca by expressing the following 
concern: “I am afraid that Sokal may not realize how potentially damaging his discursive 
booby trap may be. (…) I worry that Sokal's merry prank may well backfire and provide 
further ammunition for the forces that have damaged the academic community far more than a 
few trendy theorists” (Schrecker, 1996). Although the author of a parody cannot anticipate all 
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 The concern inspired by this situation is clearly formulated in the letter of Terry Reynolds to Lingua Franca 
(see http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/mstsokal.html) in the framework of the discussion concerning the Sokal 
affair. Revolted by the form of the debate which “has taken the form of mutual accusation” of “scientists” and 
“cultural theorists”, Reynolds writes: “I resent Sokal's piece because he used his command of a powerful and 
fascinating discourse to fortify the boundaries between disciplines, and I resent the editors of Social Text because 
they let him”. (Reynolds, 1996)  
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the effects the parody will have in the wider intellectual context, it is useful to bear in mind 
the possibility that this kind of argumentative use of parody may have a strong confrontational 
impact on the adherents and the critics of the forms of discourse being parodied.  
 
 3.4.3. Deliberate deception and undermining the trust of the audience 
 Besides the potential “backfiring” effects of the argumentative use of parody, it seems 
that the most controversial aspects of Sokal’s use of parody are related to its ethical 
dimension, in the sense that his “unorthodox experiment” entailed his being deliberately 
deceptive and undermining the trust of the professional community of academics and 
intellectuals. One of the most serious objections raised in relation to Sokal’s submission of the 
parodic article is that by doing so he violated the principles of sincerity and veracity—the 
fundamental principles of rational communication and inquiry. Consequently, he produced a 
kind of “meta-subversion” not so different from that which was the target of his critique.  
 Having anticipated this objection, Sokal gave his response in “A Physicist’s 
Experiment with Cultural Studies”. While acknowledging that he was not oblivious to the 
ethical controversies involved in his “experiment”, Sokal insisted on the fact that his article 
was based on publicly available sources, using authentic, rigorously accurate citations, thus 
allowing readers to judge the validity and interest of these ideas independently of their 
provenance or of the intimate relation of the author towards them (Sokal 1996a).
24
 Thus it 
transpires that one of the many points of Sokal’s paper is to show that the demand for 
authorial sincerity, in the sense of an author’s believing in their own arguments, must be 
subordinated to the demand for logical and evidential support for the theses advanced. This is 
especially important to bear in mind in situations when the professed general theoretical 
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 The same basic point was made by Paul Boghossian and Thomas Nagel who, in their letter to Lingua Franca, 
remark that “[i]n the context of a purely philosophical/theoretical paper, it is not the business of an editorial 
board to judge the sincerity of its authors, but only the cogency of their arguments. In the case of Sokal's paper, 
that cogency was fully open to view.” (Boghossian and Nagel, 1996) 
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attitude of the author “flatters the  ideological preconceptions” (ibid.) of the readers and could 
easily lead them astray into neglecting their intellectual duties by loosening the standards of 
argument evaluation, as was the case with the editors of Social Text.       
 
 3.4.4. Using non-rational means for argumentative purposes 
 A particularly important objection related to the deceptive aspect of Sokal’s strategy 
concerns the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of using parody and satire in the context of 
rational discourse. This objection boils down to the claim that nonsense, deception and the  
communicative phenomena dependent on them are contrary to the very nature of rational 
discourse and cannot be a part of it, let alone be used as a means of restoring the rational 
mood of argumentation. As Johnson and del Rio remark: “Satire and argument are a 
dangerous mix. What makes satire pleasurable is often how it differs from more rational 
argument. Satirical texts exaggerate and distort for comic effect resulting in sometimes little 
more than an ad hominem attack. Satire asks us to laugh first and think second.” (Johnson and 
del Rio, 2011: 890)
25
 
 In the formulation of this kind of objection, deception and parody are apparently 
treated in a similar way as being assimilated within the category of non-rational 
communicative devices. However, it seems that the soundness of this categorisation could be 
questioned by recalling Grice’s theory of conversational implicature (cf. Grice, 1975/1989). 
Following the basic tenets of this theory, it could be admitted that the mechanism of ironic 
and parodic discourse
26
 is indeed based on violation of one of the fundamental conversational 
maxims—that of quality, i.e., the ‘rule’ that says “Do not say what you believe to be false”. 
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 On this point, an even more radical opinion is advanced by Lee D. Carlson: commenting on the negative 
aspects of the Sokal affair, Carlson advocates the excluding of parody and related phenomena from the area of 
rational discourse: “Deception, sarcasm, parodies, and ridicule have no place in rational discourse, even though 
they may sometimes have an amusing quality to them.” (Carlson, 2008) 
26
 The inclusion of parody in this perspective represents an extension of Grice’s original position, which 
mentions irony, metaphor, meiosis and hyperbole as examples of flouting the maxim of quality. However, it 
seems that this extension is faithful at least to the spirit of Grice’s theory, if not to its letter.   
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Yet one of the main points of Grice’s theory is the idea that violation of that maxim is not 
incompatible with respecting the general rational principle of conversational cooperation. 
Thus, if a participant in the communication adheres to the principle of cooperation but still 
openly and deliberately violates the maxim of quality, he or she, in fact, communicates an 
implicit message which, in the case of figures of style like irony and, mutatis mutandis, 
sarcasm and parody, is precisely the opposite from the explicit content of the utterance (or of 
a larger discursive unit). In fact the phenomena of what is called implicature or “pragmatic 
consequence” are based on the functioning of the above-described mechanism, the steps of 
which allow for a more or less precise rational reconstruction.  
 Bearing this in mind, I adhere to the view that parody is neither irrational nor 
deceptive in itself and that the general exclusion of its argumentative use would be too 
restrictive. The structure of a paradigmatic parody includes, indeed, a deviation from the 
principle of sincerity and truthfulness. However, the main intention of the author of a parody 
is that this deviation be recognised and identified as such by the audience. Indeed, the 
recognition of this intention is what makes the parody successful, because it gives the 
audience the indicators that its content should be interpreted in the “opposite” way, i.e. that 
the implicit message the author wants to communicate by parodying a piece of discourse 
contradicts the explicit meaning of his/her words when interpreted in a standard way.  
 Of course, the issue of the (ir)rational and deceptive character of parody and the 
legitimacy of its argumentative use is far more complicated than is possible to present here. In 
this particular context of analysis of the Sokal example, I will confine myself only to 
advancing the thesis that what prevents the assimilation of parody and deception in one and 
the same category is the essential difference in their conditions of success. Namely, a parody 
is successful when the intention of its author, i.e. the clue for interpreting his/her work in a 
critical—not in a standard—way, has been rightly recognised and understood by the audience. 
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Conversely, a deception is successful when the real intention of its author stays hidden from 
the audience, i.e., when his/her discourse is not interpreted as it is really intended (which is, in 
fact, the essence of lying). This fundamental difference in conditions of success lends an 
initial plausibility to the use of parody in a broader context of rational discourse, although the 
plausibility of the final result of this use will depend on many other contextual aspects and the 
specific circumstances of the particular communicative and argumentative situation.   
 3.4.5. Confusing “parody” and “hoax”  
 Starting from this differentiation between paradigmatic parody and paradigmatic 
deception, based on the criterion of the transparency of the author’s intention, one final 
question concerning the argumentative aspects of the Sokal affair may be raised: Can the 
words “hoax” and “parody” be used in a synonymous way (as they often are) in describing the 
nature of  Sokal’s original article?  
 If we stick to the standard meaning of “hoax” as a “deliberately fabricated falsehood 
made to masquerade as truth”
27
, the answer should be negative. Rather, it could be said that 
the manoeuvre performed by Sokal was not simply to create a parody but to use his parodic 
article in order to perform a successful hoax. But if we accept the thesis that deceptiveness, 
notwithstanding appearances, is not an inherent feature of parody, this kind of use of parody 
necessitates a subtle but essential deviation from the standard manner of its creation. This 
deviation would consist in concealing the real intention of the author, because if it stays 
transparent the parody would be identified as parody and the hoax would not be successful. 
Indeed, Sokal did make explicit moves in order to hide the parodic nature of his article, 
including the rewriting of passages which worried him by their potential “to betray the hoax” 
(Sokal, 2010: 36, # 93).  
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  However, from the distinction between the fundamental nature of a hoax and that of a 
parody it follows that both cannot be successful simultaneously. In order for a hoax to be 
successful, the parody as such must fail. Thus Sokal in fact “sacrificed” parody by 
deliberately trying to ensure that it was not recognised by the editors of Social Text, thus 
performing a kind of “denaturation” of the parody and subordinating it to a deceptive goal. 
 Of course, as Boghossian and Nagel remark: “Sokal sought to conceal his own 
disbelief in the nonsense he had so ingeniously cooked up; the experiment would not have 
worked otherwise.” (Boghossian and Nagel, 1996) Still, in the context of analysing forms of 
argumentative subversion and strategies for tackling such subversion, this can be seen as a 
step into the grey area of meta-level subversion. From this point of view, what is controversial 
in Sokal’s approach is not the fact that he used parody for an argumentative purpose but the 
way in which he did so. First he denatured his parody into a hoax (or an element of hoax) and 
then almost triumphantly announced that the parody had not been recognised as such by the 
editors of Social Text. Later, revealing the hoax, he still sought to benefit from the virtues of 
the parodic genre as if it had been used in its pure form in which cooperativeness with the 
audience is presupposed. 
  To this kind of objection to Sokal’s manoeuver, an advocate of Sokal’s approach may 
reply that the audience of Sokal’s parody, like that of any other parody, is in effect, naturally 
differentiated between those who are sensitive to the parodic content and those who are not. 
Consequently, it is argued, there is nothing objectionable in the fact that some of the audience 
recognised Sokal’s parody as such while another part did not (primarily the editors of Social 
Text). Blinded by their ideological preconceptions and the fervour of the “science wars”, so 
the argument goes, the editors of Social Text simply excluded themselves from the first 
category of audience, missing the chance to identify the parody through their own fault, not 
Sokal’s fault.  
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 In response to this line of argumentation, it may be observed that while in “normal” 
cases this differentiation of audience is a spontaneous effect of parody, it seems in Sokal’s 
case that such differentiation was one of the main goals of its construction. That is to say, the 
parody was deliberately calibrated in such a way that the members of the targeted group 
would fall into the category of an audience “insensitive to the parody”—with all the 
unpleasant consequences that entails.  
 Perhaps, however, as was suggested in the previous analysis, some kind of similar 
meta-subversive manoeuvre is an inevitable element of the “fighting fire with fire” strategy. 
In order to attain its goal, this strategy often necessitates some kind of “transgressing the 
boundaries” of normal and unquestionably legitimate way of using  argumentative techniques. 
But in assessing the implications of this transgression—probably different in nature and 
degree in each case of application of this strategy—it is useful to bear in mind that two 
(argumentative) wrongs do not always make a right.   
Conclusion 
 An attempt has been made in this paper to analyse some argumentative aspects of the 
Sokal affair by focusing attention on the phenomenon of argumentative subversion and 
different strategies for tackling such subversion. It was suggested that the way in which Sokal 
employed parody for argumentative purposes may be treated as an instance of the application 
of the strategy of “fighting fire with fire”—a device for countering argumentative subversion 
when blocking such subversion directly and immediately is either impossible or ineffective. 
By means of parody, the intellectually abusive party is supposed to be ridiculed and forced to 
experience the negative and destructive effects of their own subversion of intellectual 
standards.  
 Sokal’s use of parody as a means of combating argumentative subversion is an 
example of a rare strategic inventiveness that enabled him to make his general point in a 
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persuasive way. However, his approach involved several controversial aspects which were 
revealed in numerous discussions related to the Sokal affair. These aspects concerned, on the 
one hand, the legitimacy of employing non-rational means to attain rational argumentative 
goals and, on the other hand, the backfiring effects of his strategy, i.e., the unintended effect 
of increasing the popularity of the parodied phenomena and deepening the already existing 
gap between the two intellectual “camps” in “the science wars”, thereby dividing the 
academic community even further. A particularly serious objection addressed at Sokal 
concerned the deceptive, trust-undermining aspect of his submission of a nonsensical paper to 
a scholarly journal, thereby violating the principle of sincerity and veracity in academic work. 
 In his replies, Sokal met at least some of these objections with plausible arguments. In  
future research, these arguments may serve as the starting point for elaborating more general 
forms of conditions and directions for the successful application of the “fighting fire with 
fire” strategy in combating argumentative subversion.  
 In this article I have suggested that, from a theoretical and conceptual point of view, 
the most controversial, albeit very subtle, manoeuvre performed by Sokal in applying his 
strategy was his (ab)use of the parodic genre in order to hoax his targeted audience. The very 
need to “reveal” the parody suggests that it was deliberately “concealed”, implying that it was 
not employed in the natural, standard way that presupposes giving contextual clues to the 
audience for rightly recognising the critical intention of the author of the parody. The question 
as to whether there are good reasons to qualify this manoeuvre as a kind of “meta-subversive” 
act, as well as the implications which would arise from such a qualification, remain open for 
further exploration.  
 Analysis of the relevant aspects of the Sokal affair from an argumentative point of 
view has shown the complexity and the multi-dimensionality of the use of parody as a 
strategic device in argumentation. In order to succeed, this strategy demands highly specific 
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conditions and careful application to ensure it achieves its goal and does not backfire on its 
users. By extending this kind of analysis to other practical examples of the argumentative use 
of parody we will hopefully be able to gain a deeper insight into its positive and negative 
argumentative effects and to take a step forward towards elaborating more general criteria for 
its appropriateness in different contexts of rational communication.    
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The acts and strategies of defining 
Fabrizio Macagno, Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
 
Summary 
Definitions are not simply descriptions of meaning. They are acts that have different purposes and conditions. 
They can be dialogical tools for altering and sometimes manipulating the hearers’ commitments. They can be 
rhetorical instruments that can lead the interlocutor to a specific decision. The concept of persuasive definition 
captures the rhetorical dimension of the definitions of specific words, called “emotive”. By modifying their 
meaning or the hierarchy of values that they are associated with, the speaker can redirect the interlocutor’s 
attitudes towards a situation. From a pragmatic perspective, the meaning of a word can be described in different 
fashions, and be the content of different types of speech acts. Not only can the speaker remind the audience of a 
shared meaning, or stipulate or advance a new one; he can also perform definitional acts by omitting definitions, 
or taking them for granted. These silent acts are potentially mischievous, as they can be used to manipulate what 
the interlocutors are dialogically bound to, altering the burden of proof. The implicit redefinition represents the 
most powerful tactic for committing the interlocutor to a meaning that he has not agreed upon, nor that can he 
accept. 
Key words: Definition; Emotive language; Persuasion strategies; Speech act;  
Implicit definition 
 
1. Introduction  
Aristotle defined the notion of definition (horismos) as a discourse, or an expression (logos) 
signifying what a thing is, or rather, its essence (Topics, 101b 31; Chiba, 2010) by indicating 
its genus and its difference. However, he then pointed out that there can be other types of 
“discourses” (apart from the genus-difference one) that fall under the same branch of inquiry 
as definitions, as they are aimed at tackling questions of sameness and difference, and they 
can be referred to as “definitory”. Such expressions describe the concept by setting out some 
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of its accidents or properties that can uniquely (absolutely or in a given context) identify the 
definiendum.  
In addition to their role as propositions that can establish a true or false (or rather an 
acceptable or unacceptable) equivalence between definiens and definiendum, the definitory 
expressions have a pragmatic and dialogical dimension. Definitions are moves in a dialogue, 
aimed at achieving specific dialogical purposes. We can use definitions to inform the 
interlocutor of what a word means, or to stipulate or impose a new meaning of a term. We can 
propose a definition and support it with arguments, or we can commit ourselves to use a word 
with a specific signification. We can also omit definitions, and use words with different, 
unaccepted or unacceptable meanings. When we define we perform an action. The semantic 
equivalence that we express is always directed to a pragmatic goal. Defining is always a form 
of action.  
This pragmatic dimension is strictly related with a strategic, or rather argumentative 
one. Words can be extremely powerful instruments. Terms like “war” or “peace”, “security” 
or “terrorism” can trigger evaluative conclusions, support implicit or explicit decisions, and 
arouse emotions (Stevenson, 1937). These words are implicit arguments and tacit rhetorical 
strategies. However, they have a potentially fallacious dimension, essentially connected with 
their definition, or rather their commonly accepted meaning. When wars become “acts of 
freedom” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006: 1) and bombings pacific operations, when 
dictatorships are named “democracies” and torture is referred to as a civil offense, the 
boundaries of semantic vagueness and definitional freedom are somehow exceeded, and 
words are used not to describe reality, but to distort it. The distinction between a reasonable 
and acceptable use of a word and manipulation lies in the notion of definition and the 
conditions of defining or redefining.  
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If the idea of an essential, immutable definition cannot be embraced (Sager, 2000: 217; 
Walton, 2005: 169-173), the alternative seems to be a relativistic approach (Schiappa, 2003). 
The impossibility of determining an immutable meaning leads to the impossibility of 
verifying any definitory discourse, and therefore to the equivalence between any definition. 
How is it possible to identify when words are used as weapons of deceit? Is it always possible 
to define any word, anyhow?  
 The purpose of this paper is to tackle the problem of the conditions of defining from a 
pragmatic perspective, starting not from the propositional aspect of the definitional logos, but 
from its role as a move in a discourse, as a speech act. If definitional statements cannot be 
verified, definitional acts can be assessed taking into consideration their conditions and their 
limits.   
  
 2. Definitions as argumentative instruments 
 
The first crucial aspect of definitions is the argumentative role of the definiendum. Words 
have the power of affecting our emotions and influencing our decisions. Terms such as war or 
terrorism are usually judged negatively, and can be used to arouse negative emotions or elicit 
negative judgments concerning the state of affairs they are used to refer to. For this reason, 
the act of naming a fragment of reality can be considered as a form of condensed argument 
made of two reasoning dimensions: a classification of reality and a value judgment.  
Stevenson first underlined this twofold aspect of the use of a word when he 
investigated the terms that he called “ethical” or emotive. He noted that some words, such as 
“peace” or “war”, are not simply used to describe reality, namely to modify the cognitive 
reaction of the interlocutor. They have also the power of directing the interlocutors’ attitudes 
and suggesting a course of action. For this reason, they evoke a different kind of reaction, 
118 
 
emotive in nature. As Stevenson put it (Stevenson, 1937: 18-19), “Instead of merely 
describing people's interests, they change or intensify them. They recommend an interest in an 
object, rather than state that the interest already exists.” These words have the tendency to 
encourage future actions (Stevenson 1937: 23; Stevenson, 1938a: 334-335; Stevenson, 1938b: 
49-50), to lead the hearer towards a decision by affecting his system of interests (Stevenson, 
1944: 210). Stevenson distinguished these two types of correlation between the use of a word 
(a stimulus) and its possible psychological effects on the addressee (the cognitive and the 
emotive reaction) by labeling them as “descriptive meaning” and “emotive meaning” 
(Stevenson, 1944: 54). Because of this twofold dimension, the redefinition of ethical words 
becomes an instrument of persuasion, a tool for redirecting preferences and emotions 
(Stevenson, 1944: 210):   
 
Ethical definitions involve a wedding of descriptive and emotive meaning, and accordingly have 
a frequent use in redirecting and intensifying attitudes. To choose a definition is to plead a cause, 
so long as the word defined is strongly emotive.  
 
The two crucial strategies for “redirecting and intensifying” attitudes are the persuasive 
definition and the quasi-definition. Quasi-definitions consist in the modification of the 
emotive meaning of a word without altering the descriptive one. The speaker can quasi-define 
a word by qualifying the definiendum (or rather describing its referent) without setting forth 
what actually the term means. The definitions provided by the famous Devil’s dictionary 
mostly consist in this tactic. For instance, we can consider the following account of “peace” 
(Bierce, 2000: 179):  
 




Here, the speaker is not describing the meaning of “peace”, but how a peaceful period of time 
should be considered. The outcome is that a concept usually evaluated positively is turned 
into one bound to the negative idea of deception.   
The other tactic of redefinition of ethical words is called persuasive definition. The 
emotive meaning, namely the evaluative component associated with a concept, is left 
unaltered while the descriptive meaning, which determines its extension, is modified. In this 
fashion, imprisonment can become “true freedom” (Huxley, 1955: 122), and massacres 
“pacification” (Orwell, 1946). Persuasive definitions can change or distort the meaning while 
keeping the original evaluations that the use of a word evokes. A famous example is the 
following redefinition of “peace”, or rather, “true peace” (Barack Obama, Nobel Peace Prize 
Acceptance Address Oslo, Norway December 10, 2009):   
 
Peace is not merely the absence of visible conflict. Only a just peace based on the inherent 
rights and dignity of every individual can truly be lasting. Peace is unstable where citizens are 
denied the right to speak freely or worship as they please; choose their own leaders or 
assemble without fear. A just peace includes not only civil and political rights -- it must 
encompass economic security and opportunity. For true peace is not just freedom from fear, 
but freedom from want. 
 
While retaining its original positive emotive meaning, “peace” is not referring anymore to 
absence of conflict, but also to specific war operations. However, how can these two 
dimensions be described? How is it possible to analyze these two different types of meaning? 






3. Arguments in words 
The relationship between descriptive and emotive meaning and the role of definition in 
redirecting attitudes can be analyzed from an argumentative perspective. The concept of 
meaning can be accounted for as a form of reasoning that proceeds from a definition to a 
classification of an entity, or from values and properties to a value judgment. The emotive and 
the descriptive meaning can be seen as two different steps of reasoning, aimed at attributing to 
objects, individuals or state of affairs a name or an evaluation.  
 
3.1. Describing reality  
     
Descriptive meaning was investigated by Stevenson in terms of effects on the hearer. The 
cognitive effect, or rather the information that the interlocutor can obtain from the use of a 
word, can be explained in terms of reasoning, and in particular through the process of 
attributing a predicate to a subject. The most generic form of reasoning describing this 
mechanism is an abstract structure of argument combining the semantic relation of 
“classification” (Crothers, 1979; Hobbs, 1979: 68; Hobbs, 1985) with the logical rule of 
defeasible modus ponens (Walton, 1996: 54):  
 
MAJOR PREMISE:  For all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having 
property G. 
MINOR PREMISE:  a has property F. 
CONCLUSION:  a has property G. 
 
The generic semantic relation needs to be specified by taking into consideration some of the 
ancient maxims related to the topics of definition (Stump, 1989; Green-Pedersen, 1984). The 
passage from the predicate stated in the antecedent to the one attributed in the consequent 
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needs to be grounded on a definitional semantic relation (Walton and Macagno, 2008), which 
concerns any issue of identity and difference between two predicates (Aristotle, Topics 102a, 
5-9). This type of argument can be represented as follows (Walton and Macagno, 2010: 39):  
    
MAJOR PREMISE:  For all x, if x fits definition D, and D is the definition of G, then x 
can be classified as G. 
MINOR PREMISE:  a fits definition D. 
CONCLUSION:  a has property G. 
 
As pointed out by Aristotle, the concept of definitional discourse includes different types of 
equivalences, of which the strongest and most famous is the definition by genus and 
difference. However, the same concept can be defined using other definitory statements. For 
instance, “peace” can be defined by its absolute or relative properties (“the state of well-being 
that is characterized by trust, compassion, and justice”), by parts (“the union of hot peace and 
cold peace”), or by its cause (“a pattern of cooperation and integration between major human 
groups”). There are also other types of definition that are not used to explain the meaning of 
the concept defined, but especially to communicate a judgment on it, such as the definition by 
metaphor (“peace is a gentle breeze”).  
Argument from classification and the different types of definitions that can be used for 
different purposes can provide an explanation from an argumentative perspective to the 
phenomenon of descriptive meaning. The other dimension of meaning, the emotive one, can 
be accounted for by considering another form of classification, not aimed at naming reality, 
but rather at evaluating it. This pattern of reasoning proceeds from a different type of 
classificatory principles: values.   
 




According to Stevenson, emotive meaning is the propensity of a word to encourage actions. 
However, this type of “meaning” is connected with a specific form of reasoning that is based 
on propositions forming the grounds of our value judgments. This relationship emerges when 
it is attacked through the use of quasi-definitions. Using a quasi-definition, the speaker can 
undermine the implicit and automatic association between a concept and its evaluation. He 
needs to provide an argument rejecting the grounds of a shared value judgment; for this 
reason, he describes the referent appealing to values contrary to the ones commonly 
associated with such a concept. For instance, we can consider the following quasi-definition 
taken from Casanova’s Fuga dai Piombi. The speaker, Mr. Soradaci, tries to convince his 




I have always despised the prejudice that attaches to the name “spy” a hateful meaning: this 
name sounds bad only to the ears of who hates the Government. A sneak is just a friend of the 
good of the State, the plague of the crooks, the faithful servant of his Prince.    
 
This quasi-definition underscores a fundamental dimension of the “emotive” meaning of a 
word, its relationship with the shared values, which are attacked as “prejudices”. This account 
given by the spy shows how the emotive meaning can be modified by describing the referent 
based on a different hierarchy of values. The value of trust is not denied, but simply placed in 
a hierarchy where the highest worth is given to the State.    
The relationship between the use of a word, its meaning and the hierarchies of values 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1951) can provide an explanation from a rhetorical 
perspective of the reason why words can lead to value judgments and decisions. Values can 
                                                 
28
 “Ho sempre disprezzato il pregiudizio che conferisce un odioso significato al nome di spia: questo nome non 
suona male che alle orecchie di chi non ama il Governo: uno spione non è altro che un amico del bene dello 
stato, il flagello dei delinquenti, il fedel suddito del suo Principe”.  
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be thought of as the reasons for classifying something as desirable or not, and, therefore, for 
judging the action aimed at achieving it as worthy or not. By describing an entity or a state of 
affairs as valuable, namely indicating the values that can be used to assess it, the speaker can 
provide the interlocutor with a reason to act in a specific fashion. Values represent the 
criterion for establishing the desirability of a course of action, and the generic form of 
reasoning based on them can be represented as follows (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008: 
321):  
 
PREMISE 1:  Value V is positive (negative) as judged by agent A (judgment value). 
PREMISE 2:  The fact that value V is positive (negative) affects the interpretation and 
therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (If value V is good (bad), 
it supports (does not support) commitment to goal G). 
CONCLUSION:  V is a reason for retaining commitment to goal G. 
 
For instance, the action of spying, or the quality of being a “sneak” can be classified as 
contemptible or hateful based on the classifying principle (value) that can be expressed as 
follows: “Who betrays the trust of another is a bad (contemptible…) person.” On the contrary, 
Soradaci rejects such a principle and advances a different hierarchy of values: supporting the 
good of the State is the supreme good; therefore, whoever betrays another for the good of the 
State is a good person.  
This type of reasoning is grounded on a judgment, which becomes a reason to carry 
out a specific action. Values represent the different ways and principles that are used to 
establish what is good or bad. In its turn, the moral judgment becomes a reason to act. The 
relationship between will, and desire, and action is underscored in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics. What is good, or appear as such, is maintained to be the goal of a decision to act 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a15), as “everything aims at the good” (Topics, 116a 18). For 
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instance, an “act of war” is usually regarded as negative, and naming an operation as such can 
become a reason for criticizing it. On the other hand, an “act of peace”, or a humanitarian 
intervention leads to an opposite judgment, and suggests a different course of action. 
Similarly, in the case above, a “sneak” is not only despised, but cannot be trusted. Despite 
Soradaci’s strenuous defence of the spies, Casanova cannot ignore his previous hierarchy of 
values, and for this reason he cannot trust him. On the contrary, he lies to him all the time.  
The decision-making process can be thought of as a pattern of reasoning connecting an 
action, or rather a “declaration of intention” or commitment (von Wright, 1972: 41) with its 
grounds (Anscombe, 1998: 11). The grounds can be provided by the simple positivity or 
negativity of a course of action, or the presumption of continuity of a person’s negative or 
positive behavior (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1951). Depending on whether the speaker is 
assessing a specific course of action or considering a goal, the type of reasoning can have 
different forms. The first and simpler form of argument is the argument from consequences 
(Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008: 332)  
 
PREMISE 1:  If A is brought about, good (bad) consequences will plausibly occur. 
PREMISE 2:  What leads to good (bad) consequences shall be (not) brought about.  
CONCLUSION:  Therefore A should be brought about. 
 
For instance, if a sneak usually betrays friends, trusting a sneak can probably lead to betrayal. 
Since betrayal is a negative outcome, a sneak should not be trusted. Similarly, the 
classification of an operation as humanitarian or an act of peace underscores its peaceful 
consequences, suggesting to the interlocutor to support it.  
The other form of reasoning, called practical reasoning, is more complex, as it 
proceeds from a value to the means that can possibly bring it about (Walton, Reed & 




PREMISE 1:  I (an agent) have a goal G. 
PREMISE 2:  Carrying out this action A is a means to realize G. 
CONCLUSION:  Therefore, I ought to (practically speaking) carry out this action A. 
 
This argument is frequently used to justify a potentially objectionable decision by 
highlighting a hierarchy of values. For instance, war is despicable, but when it is the only 
means to free people from a dictatorship it can be seen as positive. Similarly, lying is 
contemptible, but if it is the only way to avoid betrayal, it becomes a justified course of action.   
 
4. The acts of defining 
 
Redefinitions can be extremely powerful and sometimes dangerous instruments. By 
modifying the definition of a word, the speaker can alter the interlocutor’s perception and 
evaluation of reality. He can distort reality and the appraisal thereof. However, definitions and 
redefinitions are extremely common moves, often necessary for clarifying new or obscure 
concepts or highlighting some of their dimensions. The crucial problem lies in the 
identification of a criterion for distinguishing deceitful definitional moves from the non-
fallacious or simply persuasive ones. As noticed above, not only are there several definitions 
for the same definiendum, but there are also different ways of defining the same concept. In 
order to analyze the boundaries of definitions and redefinitions, it is necessary to shift from a 
propositional to a pragmatic level. Definitions can be fallacious or acceptable because they 
are acts, moves in a discourse. Definitions can have different purposes: they can be 
instruments for informing, imposing a meaning, or advancing a viewpoint. Accordingly, they 




4.1. Definitions as reminders   
 
In his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address, Obama needed to argue in favor of an 
extremely complex position: the president of a state engaged in different wars all over the 
world should be considered as the clearest champion of peace. In order to support this claim, 
at the beginning of his speech he underscores a fundamental principle that his audience should 
be acquainted with: wars can be justified. For this purpose, he reminds his audience of the 
concept and meaning of “just war” (Barack Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address 
Oslo, Norway December 10, 2009):  
 
Definition as a piece of information or a reminder: “peace” 
The concept of a "just war" emerged, suggesting that war is justified only when it meets 
certain preconditions: if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force used is 
proportional, and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence. […]What I do 
know is that meeting these challenges will require the same vision, hard work, and persistence 
of those men and women who acted so boldly decades ago. And it will require us to think in 
new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.  
 
Obama is not advancing a new claim, but bringing to light a commitment that is or should be 
shared by his interlocutors. Definitions of basic cultural concepts need to be known by a 
community of speakers. By underscoring the ancient origin of “just war”, Obama is making 
sure that its definition is part of the audience’s common ground. In this fashion, he reinforces 
the hearer’s commitment to such a concept, or rather he undermines the objectionability 
thereof. He reminds and informs the audience that the idea that wars (and in particular the 
ones waged or fought by the United States) can be justified cannot be considered as 
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controversial. We can represent the structure of this act of defining as follows (Searle and 









Effects on the 
speaker





p represents a state 
of affairs / 
judgment / 
decision.
S has grounds 
supporting that H 
is/should be 
committed to / 
knows p. 
· H is / should be 
committed to p.  
· H knows / 
should know p. 
S is committed to 
H’s Comm. to p. 
·  Acknowledge 
Comm. to p).
· Reject (Comm. 
to p) based on 
reasons.
Just war is a war 




Meaning of “just 
war.”
People are 
presumed to know 
what is generally 
shared. 
Authorities in the 
past defined it. 
The interlocutors 
cannot ignore the 
definition.
The interlocutors 
need to accept it or 
show that it is not 
shared.   
 
 
Table 1: Defining for reminding - Dialectical profile 
 
By reminding the audience of a definition, the speaker can take advantage of the presumption 
that the definition is, or should be, already part of the interlocutors’ commitments. The burden 
of proof is shifted onto the hearers, who need to show that such a definition cannot be 
considered as part of the common ground.  
 
4.2. Definitions as standpoints 
    
Definitions can be used to advance a new meaning for a concept, or simply propose the 
existence of a new or more specific one. In this case, the speaker is not presuming that the 
meaning described is shared. On the contrary, he acknowledges that it is not part of the 
interlocutors’ common ground, and for this reason he accepts the burden of proving it, or 
supporting it with arguments. A clear example can be found in the same Nobel Peace Prize 
Acceptance Address mentioned above. Obama splits the notion of peace into two concepts, a 
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“true peace”, amounting to a status characterized by the “inherent rights and dignity of every 
individual” and a “false” one, which corresponds only to the commonly shared definition of 
“absence of visible conflict”. In order to support his standpoint, Obama underscores that only 
the first one can be lasting (Barack Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address Oslo, 
Norway December 10, 2009):   
 
Definition as a standpoint: “peace” 
For peace is not merely the absence of visible conflict. Only a just peace based upon the 
inherent rights and dignity of every individual can truly be lasting. […]  
 
This type of move can be described as a kind of a speech act of assertion, which commits the 
speaker to defending it if requested to do so (Houtlosser, 2001: 32). This condition can be 
shown in the following dialectical profile, pointing out its different components and 








Effects on the 
speaker
Effects on the 
hearer
Advancing as a 
standpoint (p).
p represents a 
judgment / 
proposal.  
· S believes that 
H does not 




· S believes that 
he can justify p 
for H with the 
help of 
arguments.
H is not committed 
to p (already, at 
face value, 
completely).  
· S is committed 
to p. 
· S is committed 
to defend p. 
· S is committed 
to the fact p may 






peace is not merely 
the absence of 
visible conflict. 
[…]
true peace is based 




(Obama takes for 
granted that the 
shared definition 
of peace is 
“absence of visible 
conflict.”)
(H is committed to 
the definition of 




the definition with 
an argument (it is 
the only peace that 
is truly lasting).
 




In his discourse, Obama encourages his audience to replace the definition they are committed 
to with the new one. He provides reasons to believe that the ordinary account of peace is not 
sufficient, and proposes a different view whose positivity he highlights by marking it as the 
“true” one.  
 
4.3. Definitions as commitments 
 
As seen above, the definition-reminder represents a previous or presumptive commitment of 
the interlocutor, while a definition advanced as a standpoint presupposes that such an account 
of meaning is, or can be, not shared. Definitions can be also used to bind the speaker to a 
commitment, playing the role of a commissive, a type of promise that he makes to his 
interlocutor. A clear example can be found in Obama’s Inaugural Address (In a Dark Valley: 
Barack Obama's Inaugural Address), where the U.S. President does not explain nor propose a 
new meaning, but commits himself to a specific use of a crucial term
29
:    
 
Definition as a commitment: “We-ness” 
We -- and in this presidency, when I use that word, I will mean you and me, not the royal "we" 
to which American presidents have become far too attached -- we can, I think, hope to 
accomplish much, but only if we're honest with ourselves. 
 
Obama uses the definition of the pronoun “we” to commit himself to using it with a specific, 
strategic meaning. He distinguishes two uses, corresponding to two classes of people: the 
pluralis maiestatis, used by his predecessors, and the ordinary meaning, which he commits 
himself to. The definition constitutes a promise of refusing the “royal we”, and mirrors and 
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 Prelude to an Inaugural. (Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/KA15Aa02.html on 26 
August 2012).  
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shows a political attitude where the people become an active part of the President’s decisions 
and choices. The definition becomes a metaphor of his political behavior, to which he 




Table 3: Defining for committing - Dialectical profile 
 
The committing definition inserts the obligation to use a word with a certain meaning into the 
speaker’s commitment store, not affecting the interlocutor’s one. This type of definition is 
extremely strategic, as it imposes a language use commitment onto the speaker, but at the 
same time binds the interlocutor to a specific interpretation of the word. Without imposing the 
meaning of a term, the speaker imposes how it shall be interpreted in his discourse.  
 
4.4. Stipulative definitions   
Definitions can be used for imposing a new meaning. The speaker can stipulate (Robinson, 
1950: 59; Leonard, 1967: 286; see also Viskil, 1995) what a word means, so that a 
commitment is inserted into the speaker’s and the hearer’s commitment stores. He is binding 
the interlocutor to a specific word use. In order to perform this act, the definer needs to have 
the authority to do so. For instance, this definitional move is characteristic of lawmakers, as 
they have the authority of deciding what the words in the laws mean. Stipulative definitions 
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can be used to alter the meaning of a commonly shared word, so that the implications of the 
old use are associated with new referents (Schiappa, 1998: 31). For instance, the concept of 
“homeland security” was first introduced and defined in 2002 to refer to measures against 
terroristic attacks. However, in 2007 and 2010 it was redefined to ensure that the same 
exceptional measures were used also to prevent other types of threats. In order to deal with 
some emergencies, among which was the hurricane Katrina, proposals for a definitional 
change were advanced to include “man-made and natural hazards” (see Bellavita, 2008), 
until in 2011 a new definition was stipulated (Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 




Imposing a redefinition “homeland security” 
Homeland security is meant to connote a concerted, shared effort to ensure a homeland that is 
safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, 
aspirations, and way of life can thrive.  
 
The implications of the old concept were kept (if something threatens homeland security, 
exceptional measures shall be taken), but the category of threats to homeland security was 
enlarged to include also cyber-terrorism. In this fashion, a prompt response to new types of 
dangers was guaranteed. We can represent the speech act of imposing a definition as follows:   
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Effects on the 
speaker




· p represents a 
state of affairs 
(SoA). 
· The SoA 
represented by p 
is not an actual or 
past one. 
· The SoA can be 
the case. 
· S knows that H 
is not committed 
to p. 
· S holds the 
authority to 
impose a new 
state of affairs.
H is not committed 
to p.  
· S is committed to 
p. 
· H is committed 
to p. 
Homeland security 
is a concerted 
national effort to 
prevent terrorist 













·  The Office of 
Homeland 
Security and the 
President have 
the authority to 
define. 
· The definition 
of “homeland 
security” is new. 





The Office of 
Homeland Security 
shall deal with 
environmental 
problems. 
The offices and 
responsible for the 
environmental 
disasters shall refer 




Table 4: Stipulative definitions - Dialectical profile 
 
The act of stipulating a new definition can be carried out in order to introduce ambiguities. 
For instance, the concept of security triggers specific inferences because of its old military 
meaning. The redefinition creates a coexistence of meanings, so that the conclusions usually 
supported by the old one are also drawn when the newly defined word is used.   
 
5. The acts of non-defining 
 
Usually actions are associated with the “state or process of doing something”. As seen above, 
verbal actions are performed in order to bring about specific conversational effects. However, 
the agent can cause intentionally some effects also by failing to perform a specific activity. 
For instance, the so called “code of silence” results in criminals being not prosecuted. In law, 
omissions are defined in terms of the duties to act, as breaches of an affirmative duty to 
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perform the omitted actions (Glanville, 1983: 148-149; Fusco, 2008: 86). However, outside 
the codified domain of law the concept of omission can become more complex to define. 
Omission can be regarded as an act of a kind where the agent decides not to perform an action 
that was sufficient for the occurrence of a specific consequence at a later time (Aqvist, 1974; 
Chisholm, 1976; Walton, 1980: 317). In this sense, an omission is characterized by a 
deliberate decision to leave open the possibility of the occurrence of a specific state of affairs. 
For instance, the omission to report a crime does not prevent the authorities from being 
informed of prosecuting it. However, such a non-action leaves this possibility open by a 
deliberate choice.  
 Definitions can represent the propositional content of two different types of non-acts: 
the act of omitting a definition and the act of taking it for granted. While in the first case the 
speaker fails to provide a needed definition, in the second case he uses a word with a specific 
meaning, but omits the act of putting it forward. By deciding not to advance or to impose the 
definition he is using, he takes it for granted, performing a specific tacit act.   
 
5.1. Omitted definitions  
 
Definitions set out the conditions for the classification of a concept. The crucial importance of 
a definition emerges especially in the case in which it is lacking. The speaker may decide not 
to define a concept, so that he is not committed to any specific account of its meaning. For 
instance, with the amendment 1034 to the US Code, a new meaning of “armed conflict” was 
stipulated, in which the boundaries of this concept set out by the Geneva Conventions (Article 
1 of Additional Protocol II – Geneva Convention 1949) were extended to include also 
operations against terrorists and the supporters thereof. However, this amendment mentions 




Omitting definitions: “Belligerent and Hostilities” 
(4) the President's authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public 
Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority to detain belligerents, including 
persons described in paragraph (3), until the termination of hostilities. 
     
In this definition the words “belligerent” and “hostilities” are not defined, even though their 
meaning cannot correspond to the ordinary one after the extended definition of “armed 
conflict”. In 2009 “hostilities” was first defined as “any conflict subject to the laws of war.” 
(10 U.S.C. § 948a 9). However, in the aforementioned stipulative redefinition of “armed 
conflict” the idea of “hostilities” could not be governed by the laws of war, as armed conflicts 
against terrorists cannot fall within the definition that is shared all over the world. Similarly, 
“belligerents” cannot be simply limited to soldiers, as the new category of “war” encompasses 
also terrorism and non-ordinary conflicts. The legislators omitted to define such terms, and 
the result was that a classificatory freedom was introduced, which could allow the extension 
of security measures, such as interrogation and detention, also to suspected terrorists
31
.  
As mentioned above, omissions are deliberate non-actions, where the agent decides 
not to provide what is requested or needed in order to achieve a specific effect. The definition 
that is deliberately not mentioned is known not to be shared, and the effects of such an 
omission are known by the (non-) speaker. One of the clearest cases of this relationship 
between omission and its effects is the lack of the definition of “torture” in the Russian and 
Armenian Criminal Codes. The Russian and Armenian governments were requested to define 
such a crucial term in order to curb the violence denounced by Amnesty International and 
other international Authorities (CAT/C/34/Add.15, 15 October 2001, art. 1 (4), p. 3; 
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 See for instance the proposal of introducing the “enemy belligerent act in Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, 




CAT/C/SR.246, 1996; EUR 54/02/00, April 2000, par. 2). Such governments knew the effects 
of the absence of a definition, which allowed them to avoid prosecuting crimes of torture by 
categorizing them as “violations of professional discipline.”
32
 Moreover, they had any power 
to comply with the request of the United Nations. The structure of the act of omitting a 









Effects on the 
speaker
Effects on the 
hearer
Omitting (a speech 
act - Fp)
· Fp represents a 
dialogical move. 
· Fp can be 
performed by S.




· CFp results 
from an 
institutional or 
social obligation.  
· S knows that 
non- Fp causes 
effect E. 
· S knows that Fp 
is necessary to 
avoid E. 
· S is not 
committed to Fp. 
· S is not 
committed to 
refuse(Fp). 
· S is not 
committed to E. 
· H’s dialogical 
situation has been 
altered (E). 










requested to define 
“torture” and 
blamed for not 
doing it. 
Russia (Armenia) 
are not committed 
to a specific 
meaning of 
“torture”. 
The category of 
“torture” can be 
applied arbitrarily. 
 
Table 5: Omitted definitions – Dialectical profile 
 
The omission of the definition of “torture” clearly differs from the non-definition of “hostility” 
and “belligerent”. In the first case the speaker’s commitment to the speech act of defining (or 
refusing to do it) results from an explicit act (request). In other cases, the commitment can 
derive from an institutional (legal) or a communicative rule, “avoid ambiguity.” In both cases, 
the speaker is aware of the requirement (or expectation) and deliberately refuses to comply 
with it, knowing its effects. The omission of a definition leads to a specific effect: the 
                                                 
32
 Torture in Russia: "This man-made hell". AI Index: EUR 46/04/97. Amnesty International April 1997 (pp. 28-
29). (Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/004/1997/en on 21 September 2011) 
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possibility of implicitly redefining the definiendum, or rather using it with new unshared 
meanings. This latter move can be considered as a distinct act of a kind, the act of implicitly 
defining. 
 
5.2. Implicit definitions 
 
The omissions of definitions are strategic moves as they do not prevent vagueness or 
ambiguity; on the contrary, they can introduce them. The absence of a definition leaves open 
the possibility of defining or redefining a concept. More importantly, the lack of an explicit 
description of a word meaning allows the speaker to stipulate it implicitly. The speaker can 
take advantage of a controversial concept, not explicitly defined, and use it with a new, 
unshared definition. In this fashion he simply takes its definition for granted; and treats it as it 
were already part of the community’s common knowledge.     
One of the most famous cases is the implicit redefinition of “hostility” used by Obama 
to classify the American intervention in Libya. In order to avoid requesting the Congress’ 
authorization to continue the hostilities (War Powers Resolution, sec. 5b, Public Law 93-148), 
the President needed to exclude the bombings in Libya from the boundaries of the concept of 
“hostilities.” He took advantage of the absence of its definition in the War Powers Resolution 
Act (US Code 1541). The vagueness of the boundaries of “hostilities” allowed Obama to 
redefine it to exclude the American strikes in Libya. He did not advance or impose any new 
meaning. He simply used the term claiming that it could only refer to ground troop 
intervention, sustained fighting and exchanges of fire. He presupposed a tacit definition from 
which airstrikes were excluded, let alone when carried out by unmanned aircraft (Obama 
Administration letter to Congress justifying Libya engagement, June 15
th
, 2011, p. 25)
33
: 
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 Retrieved from http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/204673/united-states-activities-in-libya-6-15-11.pdf 




Implicit redefinition: “Hostilities” 
The President is of the view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent 
with the War Powers Resolution and do not under that law require further congressional 
authorization, because U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities” 
contemplated by the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision. […] U.S. operations do not 
involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve 
the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any 
significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors. 
 
Here Obama is not performing any explicit act of defining, nor is he rejecting or attacking the 
shared one. He is just taking such definition for granted (Macagno 2012). He presupposes that 
“hostility” means only “active fighting by ground troops”, contrary to any accepted definition 
of the term under the US laws or military dictionaries.  
 Through his implicit act, Obama imposes a new meaning without being committed to 
any stipulation or any definitional standpoint. His tacit act binds the speaker and the audience 
to a specific commitment, i.e., that “hostility” meant only “active fighting by ground troops”. 
Searle and Vanderveken provided a generic rule from indirect speech acts that can be used to 
describe this kind of implicit speech act performed through the use of the presupposed 
definition for classifying the bombings in Libya (Searle and Vanderveken, 2005: 130). On 
their view, the assertion of a classification (F1(p1)) commits the speaker to its sincerity 
conditions, namely that he believes the “hostility” has the proposed meaning. However, the 
assertion is possible only if another act is performed (F(p)), consisting in the stipulation of a 
new meaning of such a concept. The classification commits the speaker to the illocutionary 
point of an implicit act, imposing that “hostility only means active fighting by ground troops”. 
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performing F1p1.   
· Fp represents a 
dialogical move. 
· Fp can be 
performed by S.   
· The 
performance of 




(depend on the 
nature of F1p1).
(depend on the 
nature of F1p1).
· S is committed 
to F1p1.    
· S is not 
committed to the 
performance of 
Fp. 








The war in Libya 
is not hostility 
(F1p1), as it does 
not involve 
sustained fighting 
by ground forces 
(F2p2).
Obama is 






fighting by ground 
forces”. 
· S believes that 
H does not 
(already, at face 
value, 
completely) 
accept p1.  
· S believes that 
he can justify p1 
for H with the 
help of p2  and p. 
· S believes that 
H accepts 
(knows) p and p2. 
· H is not 
committed to p1 
(already, at face 
value, 
completely).  
· H is committed 
to p2 and p.
Obama needs to 
support p1 if 
requested. 
H needs to attack/
challenge/question 
p1 or accept it.
 
Table 6: Implicit definitions – Dialectical profile 
 
Obama performs this move to commit himself and the interlocutors to the redefinition of 
“hostility”. In this case, Obama could not have stipulated explicitly such a definition, as he 
has not the authority to do so, nor could he have advanced it, as the nature of his act of 
defending a standpoint requires the previous acceptance of the definition.  
Obama’s move is extremely powerful from a dialogical perspective. He is inserting 
into the interlocutors’ commitment store a proposition that they could not possibly have 
shared (and we know this because Obama stipulated the new meaning). Moreover, contrary to 
the act of advancing a definition, he did not have the burden of proof here. The dialogical 
outcome of his move is to shift the burden of proof. The interlocutors become committed to a 
proposition they never accepted, and they carry the burden of rejecting this commitment. 
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They need to prove that the definition is not part of their common ground. In this case, the 
Members of Congress had to prove that the definition was not the accepted one, which 
became extremely difficult, as there is not a legal definition of the concept in the act. Obama, 
instead of advancing arguments to support an extremely controversial point of view, played 
the defensive role, consisting in assessing the acceptability of the rebuttals. The implicit 
redefinition changes the dialogical roles of the participants to the discussion, shifting onto the 




Definitions are not simply descriptions of meaning. They are not only equivalences between a 
word and a phrase. They are rhetorical instruments that can lead the interlocutor to a specific 
decision. They are acts that have different purposes and conditions. They are dialogical tools 
for altering and manipulating the hearers’ commitments. The concept of persuasive definition 
underscores the rhetorical dimension of the definitions of specific words, called “emotive”. 
By modifying their meaning or the values that they are associated with, the speaker can 
redirect the interlocutor’s attitudes towards a situation. A war can become an act of peace, and 
thus it can be justified and praised; a felony can be presented as an act of loyalty, and thus it 
can be positively regarded. The meaning of a word can be described in different fashions, and 
be the content of different types of speech acts. The speaker can use a definition to stipulate a 
new meaning, or remind the audience of the shared one. However, he can perform definitional 
acts also by omitting definitions, or taking them for granted. These silent acts are the most 
dangerous and potentially mischievous ones, as they can be used to manipulate what the 
interlocutors are dialogically bound to, altering the burden of proof. The implicit redefinition 
represents the most powerful tactic for committing the interlocutor to a meaning that he has 
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not agreed upon, nor that he can accept. The speaker thereby eludes the burden of proving an 
otherwise unacceptable proposition and shifts the burden of disproving it onto the interlocutor.  
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Intolerance and the Zero Tolerance Fallacy 
Sheldon Wein, Saint Mary’s University 
 
Summary 
When an activity is unwanted, administrators often adopt a zero tolerance policy towards that activity. 
The background assumption is that, by adopting a zero tolerance policy, one is doing everything that one can to 
reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy best serves to reduce an unwanted behavior is 
always an empirical question. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy towards some behavior without first 
investigating and finding that they are in a set of circumstances where that policy is the most cost-effective way 
of reducing or eliminating the undesirable behavior are committing the zero tolerance fallacy.  




This short paper has two goals. The first is to convince people that, when people 
advocate or adopt a zero tolerance policy, they are frequently committing a fallacy. The 
second is to stimulate people who suspect such a fallacy is being committed to accuse those 
they think are committing the fallacy of committing the zero tolerance fallacy. What I am 
suggesting, then, is that we add something to the rhetorician’s arsenal: a newly named fallacy 
to hurl at opponents. I am aware of the downsides of suggesting this. As Quine observed, 
“[r]hetoric is the literary technology of persuasion, for good or ill” and it holds “the goal of 
persuasion above the goal of truth” (1987: 183). I must therefore make at least a prima facia 
case that, in this instance, more good than ill is likely to result from introducing the rhetorical 
device of the zero tolerance fallacy into our conversations about public policy.
34
 
                                                 
34
 I recognize that not all accounts of rhetoric (or all rhetoraticians) accept Quine’s view that the discipline holds 
persuasion above truth. Though I note that Aristotle, the founder of the discipline, held this view. 
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When an activity meets with widespread public disapproval and politicians or 
administrators feel the need to react, they often adopt the rhetoric of “zero tolerance”.  The 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) message is that, by adopting a zero tolerance policy towards 
an activity, one is doing all that one can—at least all that one can qua policy adoption—to 
reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy or policies should be adopted to 
reduce or eliminate an unwanted behavior is always an empirical question, the answer to 
which will vary with the particular circumstances. And in many circumstances (indeed, in 
most circumstances), adopting a zero tolerance policy (whether alone or in concert with other 
policies and actions) is not the best way to combat unwanted behaviors. Thus, those who 
adopt a zero tolerance policy towards some behavior without first investigating and finding 
that they are in a set of circumstances where that policy is the most cost-effective way of 
reducing or eliminating the undesirable behavior are committing the zero tolerance fallacy. Or 
so I will argue. 
I begin with a quick overview of the nature of fallacies, and I argue, in this case at 
least, for a fairly narrow conception of what sorts of arguments should even be considered as 
candidates to become named fallacies. I then say a few things about when we should name a 
fallacious argument. I then characterize the zero tolerance fallacy and argue that it is 
sufficiently common and sufficiently dangerous to warrant being included among those 
fallacies we name (and I argue for the name “zero tolerance fallacy”). I follow this with a few 
remarks concerning why people commit this fallacy (and in the course of doing so seek to 
justify the first word in my title—“intolerance”). I then turn to various objections and 
problems. I close with a summary of the benefits that would accrue were the term “zero 
tolerance fallacy” to become widely adopted. 
 




2. The Nature of Fallacies 
There is a long tradition among those who study rhetoric and critical thinking to find 
and name particular fallacies. Aristotle observed that “some reasonings are genuine while 
others seem to be so but are not,” and he used the term “fallacies” for those instances of 
reasoning that appear to be acceptable but in fact are not. 
35
 Aristotle, and especially his 
followers, went on to name several, thus turning fallacy identification and naming into 
something of an intellectual cottage industry. Galileo, who in general was not a friend of the 
Aristotelians, offered a more liberal account of what a fallacy is, holding that any unsound 
argument—any argument that fails to be both valid and have only true premises—was 
fallacious.
 
Thus, he writes:  
 
Either those who are to be persuaded are capable of understanding the 
reasons of Copernicus and others who follow him, or they are not; 
moreover, either these reasons are true and demonstrative, or they are 
fallacious. If those who are to be persuaded are incapable, then they will 
never be persuaded by the true or by the false reasons; those who are 
capable of understanding the strength of the demonstrations will likewise 
never be persuaded if these demonstrations are fallacious; so neither those 
who do nor those who do not understand will be persuaded by fallacious 
reasons. Therefore, given that absolutely no one can be dissuaded from the 
first idea by fallacious reasons, it follows as a necessary consequence that, 
if anyone is persuaded of the contrary of what he previously believed, the 
reasons are persuasive and true. But as a matter of fact there are many who 
are already persuaded by Copernican reasons. Therefore, it is true both that 
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 On Sophistical Refutations 164a22. 
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these reasons are effective and that the opinion does not deserve the label of 
ridiculous but the label of worthy of being very carefully considered and 
pondered (1615: 70).  
 
An even broader use of  “fallacy” occurs in a report of an incident between the 
Greenpeace ship Sea Shepherd and a Costa Rican shark-fishing boat. The Sea Shepherd 
Society, responding to a claim that the Sea Shepherd had endangered the crew of the Costa 
Rican fishing boat, wrote, “the video evidence proves this to be a fallacy”. Here “fallacy” 
simply seems to mean “false claim”.
36
 
The contemporary literature on fallacies sides with Aristotle against Galileo, 
restricting fallacies to a subset of invalid arguments.
37
 (The Greenpeace use is—rightly in my 
view—just ignored by contemporary critical thinking theorists as a case of overblown 
rhetoric.) Thus Gregory Bassham, William Irwin, Henry Nardone, and James M. Wallace, in 
their popular textbook, write that some “arguments are sound and convincing but many are 
fallacious. An argument is fallacious when it contains one or more logical fallacies. A logical 
fallacy—or fallacy, for short—is an argument that contains a mistake in reasoning” (Bassham 
et al, 2011: 119, emphasis in original).
38
  So a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning—not just the 
acceptance of a false premise—and a mistake that is unlikely to be noticed and hence is likely 
                                                 
36
 See http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/2012/05/13/captain-paul-watson-arrested-in-frankfurt-
germany-on-warrant-issued-by-costa-rica-1374 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18066901 (19. 
August 2012). 
37
 Some logically valid arguments—for example, petitio principii—are fallacious. For simplicity I will ignore 
such cases here. A valid argument is one where, if all the premises were true, the conclusion could not possibly 
be false. 
38
 Galileo’s position remains attractive. In a note to the above, the authors describe this as a “narrow definition” 
because it excludes arguments with false premises.  
147 
 
to be convincing. Joseph Heath puts the same point as follows: “Strictly speaking, a fallacy is 
simply an argument that takes you from true premises to a false conclusion. What makes it a 
fallacy, though, as opposed to simply a mistake is that a fallacy sounds right when you first 
hear it. In fact, it often requires considerable subtlety to see why a fallacious inference is, in 
fact, invalid” (2009: 309). Unfortunately, Heath’s way of putting it obscures the fact that even 
an argument with false premises may be fallacious. What he should have claimed—and from 
the context it is clear that this was his intention—is that a fallacious argument is one such that, 
were the premises true, it still could lead you to a false conclusion, and where, despite this 
fatal flaw, the argument seems to be a good one.
39
 So, we may say that an argument is 
fallacious when it is invalid but appears to be valid. And the better the fallacy (qua fallacy), 
the more difficult it is to see that the appearance of validity does not correspond to the 
invalidity of the argument.  
 Trudy Govier adds another feature, saying that a fallacy is “a common mistake in 
arguing. It is a mistake in the reasoning that underlies an argument. The mistake can be quite 
deceptive by seeming to many people to be just like correct reasoning” (105, emphasis added). 
So fallacious arguments that are common are called fallacies.  
 We now have three conditions for an argument being an instance of a fallacy: it 
must be invalid, it must appear to be valid, and it must occur frequently. But not every type of 
common, deceptive, invalid argument becomes a named fallacy. For that to occur, the type of 
argument has to be plausible enough to appear to not be fallacious; it has to be plausible 
enough that it can pass as an instance of some type of good argument. An argument that is so 
obviously bad that no sane person would accept it does not get to be called an instance of a 
fallacy. Second, the argument has to be one that is used sufficiently often that it is worthwhile 
naming it as a fallacy. This seems to be the standard used by the authors of most critical 
                                                 
39
 Heath rightly ignores cases such as begging the question that are both fallacious and logically valid. 
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thinking textbooks. For example, in the very popular Oxford University Press textbook, The 
Power of Critical Thinking (Canadian Edition), by Lewis Vaughan and Chris MacDonald, we 
find this:  
 
There are certain types of defective arguments that recur so frequently that 
they have names (given to them, in many cases, by ancient philosophers or 
medieval scholars) and are usually gathered into critical thinking texts so 
students can become aware of them. Such common, flawed arguments are 
known as fallacies, and they are therefore said to be fallacious. Fallacies are 
often beguiling; they can seem plausible. Time and again they are 
psychologically persuasive, though logically impotent. The primary motivation 
for studying fallacies, then, is to be able to detect them so you’re not taken in 
by them (2008:170-171, emphasis in original). 
 
A rarely used argument which seems to be genuine but which is not really so might count 
as a fallacious argument, but we would not call it a fallacy. This is because fallacies are 
commonly used fallacious arguments—indeed, those common enough to warrant naming them 
as fallacies. This use is employed even when one is not writing on argumentation theory, or 
rhetoric, or in core areas of critical thinking. Thus, Chris MacDonald, in “Critical Thinking for 
Business Ethics”, says that fallacies are “errors in reasoning [that] are so common that, over 
the years, they’ve been given names” (2012: 33). In sum, uncommon errors do not get to be 
named fallacies.  
To be fully accurate, one should say that named fallacies are arguments that would be 
frequently used in the absence of a name for the fallacy. This is because, in naming a fallacy, 
the hope of argumentation theorists, rhetoricians, and critical thinking scholars is to reduce the 
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frequency of that type of reasoning. (That is also my reason for suggesting that “the zero 
tolerance fallacy” be added to our collection of named fallacies.) But, if our standard were that 
something is properly a named fallacy only if its use is sufficiently frequent to warrant giving 
the fallacy a special name, and if doing that were to substantially reduce the frequency with 
which people commit the fallacy, then by our standard we would have to drop the fallacy from 
our list of named fallacies (because, subsequent to naming it, its use would become infrequent). 
Sadly there is no reason to fear that this worry is one worth holding. People have been naming 
fallacies since Aristotle’s time and, so far as I know, there has never been a case where naming 
a fallacy has been so effective in changing people’s patterns of argumentation as to actually 
make the fallacy extinct. The best that argumentation theorists can hope for in pointing out a 
certain form of reasoning as fallacious is a modest decline in the use of that type of reasoning. 
Consequently, I will not worry that, by filling our critical thinking and argumentation texts 
with warnings against using the zero tolerance fallacy, instances of that fallacy will become so 
rare that the fallacy is not one worth bringing to people’s attention. 
Despite the foregoing standard for something becoming a named fallacy, I will use an 
even narrower standard. I will hold that we should add an argument form to our list of 
recognized fallacies if, and only if, the argument is invalid, distinctive, plausible (in 
Aristotle’s sense of one that could easily be mistaken for a good argument), frequently used 
(or would be frequently used), and, finally, if its use frequently has significant harmful 
consequences. By the last condition I am suggesting harm that goes beyond just that of having 
people participate in erroneous reasoning. We already have a lot of named fallacies, and there 
is little reason for adding to our list if the form of fallacious reasoning causes little or no 
social harm. But use of common fallacious reasoning—fallacious in that it meets the first 
three conditions discussed above—that does cause serious social harm warrants being given a 
name. We need to be able to briefly identify instances of reasoning which are not just 
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substandard but which also lead to significant social harms when people are taken in by them. 
My claim is that arguments of the type I am suggesting we call zero tolerance fallacies do 
meet all five of these individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for warranting 
becoming a new named fallacy.  
To review, my conditions for adding a new fallacy to our collection of named fallacies 
are: 
- the argument type is invalid 
- it is a distinctive type of argument 
- arguments of this type are often plausible (or seem to be valid) 
- the argument type is frequently used 
- the argument type is one whose use causes significant harm. 
The above constitutes a rigorous standard for adding a new named fallacy to our 
collection. I will now characterize the fallacy I think we should name, showing that it 
meets the first three conditions above. I will not, in this paper, defend the position that 
arguments that I think should be called instances of the zero tolerance fallacy meet the last 
two conditions. I take the facts here to be sufficiently obvious for the reader to discern this 
for herself.  
 
3. Characterizing the Zero Tolerance Fallacy 
A zero tolerance policy is one that automatically imposes a punishment for any 
violation of a given social rule. Once such a policy is in place, those charged with enforcing 
the policy are forbidden from using discretion as to whether observed violations of the policy 
are to be brought to the attention of those charged with punishing violators; and there is no 
provision for the punishment to be lessened or altered to fit particular circumstances. The only 
issue that may legitimately be entertained is whether the rule was violated. If it was, then the 
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fixed punishment is to be imposed. Almost always when zero tolerance policies are adopted—
though this is not essential—the offences are strict liability offences. Indeed, from here on I 
will assume that the offences are strict liability ones. In addition, the penalty attached is 
usually thought to be severe relative to the offence that was committed. 
Sometimes people adopt a zero tolerance policy for good reasons. They may judge that 
some activity or behavior has harmful consequences (or is itself harmful) and that the best or 
most cost-effective way to eliminate or minimize the behavior is to adopt a policy of zero 
tolerance towards that behavior. Reasonable people may well disagree about whether the 
behavior is such that steps ought to be taken to reduce its occurrence, or they may think that 
having zero tolerance for such behavior is draconian. (For example, someone might advocate 
a zero tolerance policy towards the possession of a drug. Others might think there should be 
no penalty attached to possession or consumption of that drug. Still others might think that 
people ought to be discouraged from possessing and consuming the drug in question but hold 
that a zero tolerance policy is simply too extreme a tool for dealing with the matter.) But we 
can hardly hold that if such behavior is to be eliminated or reduced as much as possible, then 
advocating the best or most cost-effective means of reducing that behavior necessarily 
involves the advocate in a fallacy. Nor am I interested in considering here those cases where 
people disagree about whether a particular behavior is one we want to discourage. Our interest 
is in whether having a zero tolerance policy is an appropriate means to a social end, not 
whether that end is one the society should seek to attain. 
Rather, I am concerned with cases where a zero tolerance policy is adopted because, 
while it may seriously be believed that adopting such a policy is a good way to reduce the 
behavior in question, there is no evidence, or there is inadequate evidence, to support this 
belief (or those advocating the policy do not know of such evidence). In general, then, we can 
say that one commits the zero tolerance fallacy when one advocates or imposes a zero 
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tolerance policy towards some activity while lacking evidence for supposing that having zero 





4. Motivation for Committing the Fallacy 
The normal motivation for committing the zero tolerance fallacy is that officials think 
they need to appear to be doing something to address a supposed problem. If some behavior is 
unwanted and nothing is being done by those responsible for regulating behavior in that area, 
there is the concern that those responsible will be seen to be irresponsible. But adopting a zero 
tolerance policy against the unwanted behavior is an easy way to be seen to be doing 
something forceful to eliminate the problem. This is because the policy is simple and applies 
in an on-off way, with no need to weigh the details of particular cases. Furthermore, the stiff 
penalties attached to violations give the appearance that authorities are taking the matter 
seriously and doing something about it. 
But a zero tolerance policy may turn out to be counter-productive. For instance, those 
charged with carrying out the policy—that is, with enforcing it—may simply not enforce it, or 
it may be the case that their enforcement of it will be much more lax than it would have been 
had some more reasonable policy been adopted. Suppose that, for some reason, parents come 
to fear that their children will be endangered if things that might be used as weapons are 
allowed at their children’s school. (This is a perfectly natural and strong fear and one that 
                                                 
40
 Here I assume that evidence can, in principle, be obtained. Of course, I allow that the methods of providing 
such evidence—statistical analysis, precedent, arguments by analogy, et cetera—are likely to be quite varied. I 
am not sure what we should say about cases where evidence cannot be obtained, either because obtaining such 
evidence is impossible (as it might well be in some instances about the distant past) or because obtaining the 
evidence would violate serious ethical or legal protections of privacy needed to ensure that individuals can 
pursue lives free from undue interference. 
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sometimes hinders clear reasoning.) Suppose further that the school board or the school 
principal responds to these concerns by adopting the zero tolerance policy of forbidding 
students from bringing to school items that might be used as weapons. If those charged with 
enforcing the policy see the penalty attached as being overly severe, they may well not 
enforce the policy. They may simply pretend not to observe relevant violations of the rule, 
and in the end this practice may result in even less deterrence than there would be if a non-
zero tolerance rule was in place to discourage such behavior.  
In the case imagined above, if expulsion from the school is the penalty attached to 
violation of the new rule and a child is discovered to have accidentally violated the policy, 
teachers or playground supervisors might just look the other way. Or they might enforce the 
rule differentially, based on some prejudice they have. Either way, their actions (or lack 
thereof) may serve to undermine the very purpose or aim for which the zero tolerance policy 
was originally adopted. Things become much more complicated if children seize the 
opportunity to report on other children as a way of settling playground quarrels.  
 
5. Problems 
I now turn to several problems that arise from the idea that we should have a new 
named fallacy, the zero tolerance fallacy. First, and most obviously, the fallacy in a zero 
tolerance argument is often hard to identify because the fallacious argument is implicit. Most 
arguments (at least as they are first presented) include implicit assumptions or hidden 
premises. Indeed, fallacious arguments are less likely to be explicit than fully developed 
arguments are, for the simple reason that, once an argument is made explicit, it is often easier 
to determine whether it is fallacious (and, typically at least, those who employ fallacious 
arguments either do not realize they are doing so or, when they are aware of this, they 
certainly do not want their audience to know it). The typical argument for a zero tolerance 
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policy is an enthymeme—an argument with a missing or suppressed premise. And it is 
typically this premise that lacks adequate support.  
We might break this problem down as follows: 
1. Fallacies are arguments, and rarely is a full argument provided for adopting a zero 
tolerance policy. 
2. Such arguments as are provided for adopting a zero tolerance policy are almost always 
enthymemes. 
3. Enthymemes pose increased difficulties in interpretation. 
4. There are cases where there are valid—indeed sound—arguments for zero tolerance 
policies. (And these have the same logical form as the fallacious arguments.) 
5. Sometimes we want policies or rules that are (in some sense) overly strict, and these 
cases are sometimes difficult to distinguish from others. 
But we should note the following considerations that collectively weaken the objection. (The 
numbers below respond to each of the numbered points above.) 
1. This is a standard problem with social rules—rarely is a full justification offered. (This 
is so even in so-called hard cases of law where, typically, experts go to great lengths to justify 
their favored interpretation of a social policy or principle.
41
) 
2. The enthymeme is almost always filled in along the following lines: (i) we have this 
unwanted behavior; (ii) having zero tolerance for the behavior is the best way to 
reduce/eliminate the behavior; (iii) we have adopted (and put into place) a zero tolerance 
policy regarding the behavior; (iv) therefore we are doing the best we can to eliminate/reduce 
the behavior. 
                                                 
41
 Ronald Dworkin (1978: Chapter 4) distinguishes hard cases from clear ones operationally. A legal case is a 
hard case when reasonable people knowing all the relevant facts, including all the facts of institutional history, 
disagree on the proper disposition of the case.  
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3. Premise (ii) (or something like it) is almost always the one in need of evidential 
support. And it is almost always the one that lacks such support. 
4. Sometimes people have support for premise (ii) (or such support is easily available), 
and in those cases the fallacy has not been committed (or the charge that it has been can easily 
be countered). Simply pointing out the existence of such evidence to those who object to the 
zero tolerance policy is generally a social good. 
5. In circumstances where we want simple absolutist rules, we also want flexibility in 
enforcing those rules—precisely those circumstances where we do not want zero tolerance 
policies. 
It is, of course, an empirical matter how often there is a more effective approach 
available to us to rid ourselves of a social ill than the adoption of a zero tolerance policy.  At 
present we often lack good empirical data regarding how frequently this occurs.
42
 Indeed, we 
do not even know roughly what percentage of times zero tolerance policies are more or less 
effective than other options in even a limited area. (The articles by Wilson and Kelling (1982) 
and by Marshall (1999) are good places to start in reviewing the available data.) But this fact 
should not be seen to be an undue hindrance to adopting the language I propose.  For consider 
the circumstances under which one is likely to claim that someone else has committed the 
                                                 
42
 Marshall (1999) contains a good discussion. Lacking solid data forces us to rely on the wisdom collected by 
others. Perhaps most relevant here is Montaigne’s observations about having zero tolerance for ending a 
marriage. He observes that, “We have thought to tie the knot of our marriages more firmly by taking away all 
means of dissolving them; but the knot of will and affection has become loosened and undone as much as that of 
constraint has tightened. And on the contrary, what kept marriages in Rome so long in honour and security was 
everyone’s freedom to break them off at will. They loved their wives the better because they might lose them; 
and, with full liberty of divorce, five hundred years and more passed before anyone took advantage of it” (1580, 




zero tolerance fallacy (or to worry that one is committing it oneself). It is quite likely that 
someone will have either proposed or already have put in place a zero tolerance policy about 
some activity or behavior. The opponent of this policy may object for roughly two types of 
reasons. First, of course, she may think that the behavior in question does not need to be 
restricted, that there is nothing wrong with the behavior in itself and that it will not lead to 
negative consequences (or, at least, not consequences that are serious enough to warrant 
restricting someone’s liberty). Second, she may agree that the behavior in question ought to 
be reduced and simply think either that having a zero tolerance policy is likely to be 
ineffective or that it is overly harsh (most likely because, in practice, it is almost certain to 
result in punishing too many of those who, for one reason or another, ought not to be 
punished).  
If the objection is really of the first type, the challenge is easily responded to simply by 
pointing out that the objector disagrees with the end the policy seeks to reach, not with the 
means to that end. Advocates and opponents of the end in question can then get on with the 
matter of debating that issue. If the objection is of the second type, the defender of the policy 
has several options. She can offer data supporting the idea that, in this case, a zero tolerance 
policy is more likely to work than other policies. This need not include sophisticated 
statistical analysis, for such may not be available. Something as simple as “We have looked at 
[or have tried] other options and none of them seem to work as well as zero tolerance” is 
sometimes all one needs to defend against the charge that one has committed the zero 
tolerance fallacy. But if the defender cannot offer such data or a compelling reason for 
thinking that in this sort of case the data is unlikely to be available, she and her supporters 
will doubtless be prompted to look for such data. If, on the other hand, she does have such 
data, then she has not committed the fallacy. Finally, in those cases where someone has 
adopted a zero tolerance policy without having supporting data that such a policy is more 
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effective than other alternatives but she is able to quickly find such data—so that the fallacy 
has been committed—then the finding and reporting of such data in response to the challenge 
that she committed the fallacy shows that, in this case, committing the fallacy itself did little 
harm. Furthermore, the charge that the fallacy had been committed will have had the virtue of 
bringing to light relevant data about what modifies behavior in this type of situation. 
So, in general, it seems that making the claim that someone who has adopted or 
advocated a zero tolerance policy has committed a fallacy—viz., the zero tolerance fallacy—is 
likely to have positive results. Either the disagreement will be seen to be about ends rather 
than means, or if the end is agreed upon and the means are what is disputed, then both sides 
will turn to the issue of finding evidence to support their positions. And, we can hope, the side 
with the strongest evidential support is the one that will win that debate. Thus, we will be 
more likely to have zero tolerance policies confined to those situations where they are 
somewhat likely to accomplish what people hope they will.  
 
 
6. Good Zero Tolerance Arguments
43
 
I have been arguing that we need a new named fallacy, the zero tolerance fallacy. And I 
have been seeking to characterize that fallacy. But one might think that I should have 
proceeded in a different way. Given that there are cases where there is good reason to adopt 
zero tolerance policies and given that there can be good arguments for adopting such policies, 
it would, in those cases, seem that the logical way to proceed would be to characterize the 
structure of good or acceptable zero tolerance arguments, and then to characterize zero 
                                                 
43
 I am grateful to Leo Groake both for suggesting this approach and for pointing out the analogy that I consider 
here. His “Logic: Informal” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a very useful place to start 
thinking about these matters. (See in particular the sections titled “Fallacy Theory” and “An Example: Ad 
Hominem,” as well as the literature Groake cites there.)  
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tolerance fallacies as cases that simply fail in some respect to live up to the standard of a good 
zero tolerance argument. An analogy is with ad hominem arguments. For years, indeed 
centuries, logicians have treated these simply as fallacies. But since there are obviously 
perfectly good ad hominem arguments, some have recently suggested that we should seek to 
establish what makes good ad hominem arguments good while identifying those ad hominem 
arguments which fail to live up to this (as yet not fully developed) standard as instances of the 
ad hominem fallacy. This approach strikes me as potentially quite fruitful. My reason for not 
using it here is that it will almost certainly involve more than can be accomplished in a single 
short paper. On this very point, the analogy with ad hominem arguments is again helpful: 
while we have many accounts of ad hominem fallacies, we are still working towards a full 
account of what makes a successful ad hominem argument a good one. (For an interesting 
attempt along these lines, see Dahlman et al, 2011.) I would be extremely pleased if, in 
addition to making the idea of a zero tolerance fallacy a popular one, my work were to 
stimulate critical thinking theorists to work on the development of standards for successful 
zero tolerance arguments. That is a worthy goal, for then we could characterize arguments 
which commit the zero tolerance fallacy as simply those arguments which attempt to defend 
zero tolerance policies but which fail to live up to the proper standards (whatever those might 
be) for being a good zero tolerance argument. However, it is important to note that we should 
not tolerate bad zero tolerance arguments while we wait for argumentation theorists to provide 
us with an account of what constitutes a good argument for zero tolerance policies.  
 
7. Conclusion 
I am aware that “to label the view of your philosophical opponent a ‘fallacy’ is, much 
more often than not, a cheap rhetorical trick” (Joyce, 2006: 152). Nonetheless, I hope I have 
demonstrated that having something called “the zero tolerance fallacy” as part of our social 
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and political rhetoric would be, on balance, a good thing. In those cases where zero tolerance 
policies are inappropriate, having a named fallacy would serve as a useful rhetorical device to 
make this fact known in a simple and accessible manner. And in cases where one might allege 
that the zero tolerance fallacy has been committed, defenders of the policy could easily 
respond, and their responses would serve to move the discussion to just those areas that are 
most likely to be productive of improved critical thinking about what social rules or policies 
we should endorse. In the end, were we lucky, all of this might help reduce the unwarranted 
use of zero tolerance policies and nudge the level of intolerance slightly closer to zero.
44
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in Postira, Brač, Croatia (2012 April 20
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Political Discourse and Argumentation Profiles 
Hans V. Hansen, University of Windsor 
  
Summary 
A way in which argumentation workers can be of value to society and have their field of study and expertise 
recognized is proposed: it is to make profiles of the argumentation behaviour of political parties during election 
campaigns.  The profiles are to be made in terms of concepts unique to the study of argumentation: 
argumentation schemes and dialectical roles, for example.  The argumentation profiles will be of value to 
members of the voting public, as well as the political parties.  Moreover, undertaking such empirical research 
affords an opportunity for argumentation workers to test the efficiency and adequacy of their concepts. 
 
Key words: argumentation worker, argumentation agent, argumentation profile, dialectical 
role, dialogical role, dialogical position. 
 
1. Introduction 
Can we argumentation workers
1
 be of any use to society?  Yes, we teach many students to 
write, analyse and evaluate argumentation, and this undoubtedly makes them better at dealing 
with arguments and ideas, and maybe even makes them better citizens.  Still, our contribution 
overlaps with, and tends to be fused and confused with, the work done by our colleagues who 
teach history, civics, economics, grammar, politics, philosophy, psychology, and sociology, 
etc.   There is nothing wrong with that: education is about the integration of knowledge and 
harmonizing of skills.   But that the original work of the argumentation worker gets put in the 
mix with that of so many other fields, all of which have a better known history and higher 
recognition value, makes it hard for the public, and education programmers and 
                                                 
     
1
 ‘Argumentation worker’ is my term for those who work with arguments and 
argumentation (qua arguments and argumentation).  Calling ourselves ‘scholars’ or ‘theorists’ 
may be saying too much; ‘analysts’ too little. 
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administrators, to appreciate the fact that argumentation work constitutes a unique and 
important field of research and teaching.  We need to show both the academic and the non-
academic worlds that we have an original and valuable contribution to make.   I expect there 
will be a number of different ways we can make our presence felt and appreciated.  This paper 
outlines the suggestion that we promote ourselves through the development of what may 
(tentatively) be called argumentation profiles. 
 
2. Argumentation profiles 
An argumentation profile is a description or characterization of argumentation behaviour over 
time as exhibited by an argumentation agent –– an individual or a group, party, or collective 
that makes and takes responsibility for arguments. 
 How can argumentation profiles be of social value?   Argumentation-behaviour  is 
important for democracy: we want to elect people who will not only argue well, but also argue 
openly, fairly, and productively.  Past argumentation-behaviour encapsulated in an 
argumentation profile may be considered a predictor of future argumentation-behaviour. 
 Argumentation profiles may also be a window through which we can come to 
understand an argument agent’s true political attitudes.  Richard Weaver, in his 1952 work, 
The Ethics of Rhetoric (p. 55) wrote that “[a] reasoner reveals his philosophical position by 
the source of arguments which appears most often in his major premise because the major 
premise tells us how he is thinking about the world” and that “a man’s method of argument is 
a truer index in his beliefs than is an explicit profession of principles” (p. 58).  In other words, 
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we can learn something about a person’s political beliefs and deep-seated attitudes by looking 
at the record of his or her argumentation.
2
 
 Weaver maintained that the eighteenth century political theorist, Edmund Burke, 
whom we recall as a conservative, mostly used the argument from circumstance in his 
speeches and writings, a kind of argument more appropriate to expediency and liberal politics 
than to conservatism.  In contrast he associates the argument from genus with Abraham 
Lincoln, a kind of argument usually associated with conservatism and the status quo; yet 
Lincoln is cherished as a pragmatic and liberal politician. 
 So, what we may take from Weaver is that the arguments agents make tells us 
something important, perhaps revealing and surprising about that agent.   Below  Weaver’s 
insight is extended by taking political parties as subjects, not just individuals, and by 
expanding the number of indexes (beyond major premises) that can contribute to 
characterizations of argument agents – to profiles.  The focus is on the profiles that can be 
made of agents engaged in political argumentation, but profiles could also be made of 
argumentation agents in other fields like science, law,
3
 and religion. 
 Some people have identified a male way of conducting argumentation, and found it 
objectionable.  A generalization about the way men argue is implicitly a fragment of an 
argumentation profile of men.  That there are such generalizations is an indication that there is 
a rough, or intuitive, idea of argumentation profiles already at large.  The present proposal 
aims to give shape and character to such profiles. 
                                                 
     
2
 Weaver mentions four kinds of arguments: (i) the argument from genus or definition, (ii) 
similitude arguments, (iii) the argument from consequences, and (iv) the argument from 
circumstance. 
     
3
 See, e.g., Cassel (2012). 
166 
 
 A notable aspect of argumentation profiles is that they do not characterize argument 
agents on the basis of isolated argument behaviour – a particularly ingenious analogy, or an 
atrocious fallacy, for examples – but on their argumentation behaviour over a period of time.  
Thus, the import of profiles is that they will indicate how agents have been disposed to 
engage in argumentation in the past, and how they may be inclined to argue in the future. 
 
3. Concepts put to work 
An argumentation profile of an argument agent should be based on an analysis of the agent’s 
argumentation-behaviour over a period of time and executed in terms of concepts unique to 
the study of argumentation.  Thus, when making profiles of argumentation behaviour in 
political contexts it is not the usual issue-oriented categories we need such as views on the 
economy, education, energy, the environment, and health care.  The concepts needed for 
argumentation profiles will be quite different.  They do not have to do with policies or 
platforms, or party philosophies.  Which concepts in particular will be useful for making 
profiles is something we will have to find out through experimentation, but it is reasonable to 
begin by testing some of the concepts argumentation workers already have to hand. 
 Doug Walton and I have finished one pilot study of the argumentation in political 
campaigns, and we are now engaged in a second one.
4
  Our work is similar to that of William 
Benoit who has studied the argumentation in the nomination acceptance speeches by 
presidential candidates in the United States from 1960 to 1996.   In one study three basic 
functions in the speeches were recognized, which were distinguished as acclaiming, attacking 
and defending.  
                                                 
     
4
 We studied the Ontario provincial election held in September-October 2011 (see Hansen 




Themes that portray the sponsoring candidate or party in a favorable light are acclaims. 
Themes that portray the opposing candidate or party in an unfavorable light are attacks. 
Themes that explicitly respond to a prior attack on the candidate or party are defenses. 
(Benoit 1999, 254) 
Benoit’s leading research question was, “What is the relative frequency of use of the functions 
of acclaiming, attacking and defending?” (P. 253)  He found that the Democratic Party 
nominees engaged in acclaiming slightly more than the Republican party nominee did (77% 
to 68%) but that the roles were reversed when it came to attacking (30% to 23%) as well as 
defending (16% to 3%).   Clearly, Benoit’s interests and approach are consonant with our 
programme of creating argumentation profiles by studying the argumentation behaviour of 
argument agents.   Our approach differs from his, however, in that we focus on arguments as 
the basic of unit of interest. 
   In our first study, Walton and I sketched profiles on the basis of which kinds of 
arguments and dialectical roles were utilized most frequently by the agents.  In our second 
study we are modifying and enlarging our inventory of argument kinds and roles, and adding 
some other categories whose utility we want to test.  We are experimenting to find out which 
factors and categories can contribute to the making of useful argumentation profiles.  The 
following list of concepts is being considered: 
1. Argument kinds: The primary classification tool we have is a list of kinds of arguments, 
also called argument schemes.  The schemes are, roughly, definitions of different kinds of 
arguments.  A comprehensive list of the kinds of arguments that occur in political 
argumentation will help shape a picture of an agent’s inclinations in argumentation.  In our 
first study we used the basic inventory of schemes identified in Walton’s Fundamentals of 
Critical Argumentation (2006), and we will use the same list again, modified in light of what 
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we learned in that study.  The kinds of arguments we identified, in descending order of 
frequency, were these: 
Negative Consequences, Practical Reasoning, Positive Consequences, Argument from 
Sign, Fairness, Direct ad hominem, Inconsistent Commitments, Popular Opinion, 
Analogy, Commitment, Position to Know, Ad Hominem Circumstantial, Misplaced 
Priorities, Authority, Classification, Explanation, Values, Argument from Alternatives, 
Cause to Effect, Correlation to Cause, Sympathy. 
In constructing argumentation profiles, one looks to see which kinds of arguments are 
preferred by the argument agent.  
2. Pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes: It is also possible to classify arguments 
broadly on the basis of the kind of conduit they provide from premises to conclusions.   
Pragma-dialectical theory offers a three-fold classification in this category:  symptomatic 
argumentation, instrumental argumentation, and similarity argumentation (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1992: 94 ff.).  Even though there are only three ‘schemes’ here they have the 
advantage that they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, or at least appear to be so.  
(The same cannot be said for the informal logic schemes: with them it is possible that an 
argument could instance two schemes, and then a decision has to be made about which 
scheme is the better fit to the argument.)   Nevertheless, because there are only three schemes 
in this typology, we can only expect very general information to come from this classification.  
But, as before, one is curious to see if an argument agent prefers one kind of scheme to the 
others. 
3. Aristotle’s pisteis: Aristotle’s three artificial means of persuasion might also give us some 
insight into the argumentation proclivities of agents (See Rhet. 1356a).  We will attempt to 
classify arguments on the basis of whether it is logos (appeal to evidence), ethos (character) or 
pathos (emotion) that is brought to bear.   
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 These first three categories of classification (kinds, schemes, pisteis) have to do with 
the internal nature of the arguments themselves –  they are ways of classifying either the kind 
of reasons brought to bear, or the way that the reasons are related to the conclusion.   It is also 
possible to study the external (relational) properties of arguments in an ongoing political 
discussion, in particular to consider the roles, or functions, of the arguments in the ongoing 
discussions. 
4. Dialectical roles: Argument agents have purposes they want to achieve by the use of their 
arguments and thus the arguments are instrumental to their ends.  Hence, given a context like 
that of a provincial or national election, arguments may be seen as being used for certain 
purposes by the agents in the argument exchanges.  These purposes can be classified and 
accordingly arguments used may be seen as playing a role.   There is no determinate list of 
ends arguers have in using arguments, and so no determinate catalogue of roles has been 
established.  Walton and I felt free to invent a short list of four dialectical roles which we 
noticed recurring in the data of political campaign arguments.   These were the policy-positive 
role (used to defend a statement or policy), the policy-critical role (used to criticize a 
statement or policy), the person-critical role (used to criticize an opponent rather than his/her 
position), and the defensive role (used to deflect criticisms).  After reading Benoit (op. cit.) 
we added a fifth by dividing his category of acclaiming into positive and negative roles, 
allowing us to add a person-positive role.  
 Studying an argument agent’s choice of roles will tell us something not only of 
his/her/ its resources, but also about the possibilities it sees for advancing its cause.   The 
analysis of dialectical roles must, however, be tempered by the following two dialogical 
considerations.  
5. Dialogical roles: Is an argument being used to initiate discussion of an issue, or is it a 
response-argument, made as a reply or alternative to an argument or policy already before the 
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public?  My hunch is that response arguments are more likely to be cast in a negative role 
than arguments that introduce a new topic or policy.  But it is not impossible that a response 
argument has a positive role or that an initiating argument has a negative one.  This is a factor 
to take into consideration when constructing argumentation profiles. 
6. Dialogical position:  Whether an argument agent is the incumbent party or a challenger 
establishes his/her/its dialogical position, is something which may well affect the choice of 
dialectical roles an agent gives to arguments.  My inkling is that an incumbent party is more 
likely to have occasion to use the defensive role, clarifying misinterpretations, and defending 
policies.  Challengers we would expect to be on the attack, being critical of both policies and 
incumbents.  Of course, both sides will likely make arguments in all the roles, but certain 
roles may predominate for an agent during the course of a campaign.  In sum, in constructing 
the argumentation profiles, both the dialogical positions of the agents, and the dialogical roles 
of their arguments, must be taken into consideration.   
 The above concepts present themselves as being of interest to argumentation workers 
who attempt to make argumentation profiles.  To illustrate the kind of analysis we have in 
mind, consider the following example taken from the Alberta provincial election this spring.  
 In this example, the party in power, the Government, is being criticized for proposing 
a new law that would impose “penalties on drivers with a blood-alcohol concentration 
above .05".  In response the Solicitor General made this argument, 
This [law] targets people who habitually drink and drive, . . .  When similar legislation 
has been enacted elsewhere, it has had the effect of reducing the amount of alcohol-
related injuries and fatalities on the road.  (Calgary Herald, 2012.) 
This is an interesting example because it is both clear and complicated.  It is indicative of the 
kinds of challenges our research will face.  It is clear because it immediately told us that 
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because of the presence of the word ‘similar,’ this is an Analogical Argument;  however, both 
the minor  premise and the conclusion are unstated, and so we reconstruct the argument as 
follows (placing the elements added in reconstruction inside square brackets): 
In other jurisdictions, imposing penalties on drivers whose blood alcohol 
concentration exceeds .05 per cent has had the effect of reducing the number of 
alcohol-related injuries and fatalities on the road;   
 [Our jurisdiction, Alberta, is relevantly similar to the other jurisdictions]; 
[So, imposing penalties on drivers whose blood alcohol concentration exceeds .05 per 
cent, will have the effect of reducing the number of alcohol-related injuries and 
fatalities on Alberta roads.] 
The sample also presents a complication since although it is an Argument by Analogy, it is 
also a case of Practical Reasoning: an end is specified as desirable (“ reducing the number of 
alcohol-related injuries and fatalities on Alberta roads”) and a means is proposed (“ imposing 
penalties on drivers whose blood alcohol concentration exceeds .05 per cent”).  We are then 
left with a case in which one argument is an instance of at least two schemes.  If we want to 
have a one-to-one match of arguments with argument kinds, however, we will have to make a 
decision.  In this case, I am inclined to treat this as being an Analogical Argument for the 
reason that in the context of political election campaigns a great many of the interchanges 
concern practical affairs, and therefore what will be of interest from the point of view of the 
empirical study of argumentation is the various ways that politicians encapsulate their 
practical reasonings about how to deal with the matters of concern.  Let us then consider our 
example to be of the kind, Analogical Argument. 
 As an analogical argument our example is an instance of the Pragma-Dialectical 
similarity scheme.  (If one considers it as belonging to the argument kind Practical Reasoning, 
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then it will be an instance of the causal argumentation scheme.)  The argument is best 
classified as an instance of the logos means of persuasion since there is no appeal to either 
character or emotion in view.  The dialectical role of the argument is to defend a policy; the 
dialogical role is that of response, and the dialogical position is that of the incumbent.  
 
4. Illustration 
Elaine Cassel has ‘profiled’ the argumentation behaviour of members of the United States 
Supreme Court during the recent hearings about Obama-care.  She found, through looking at 
their argumentation behaviour, that some of the judges showed empathy and compassion for 
poor people, some were of even temperament, some showed an authoritarian approach to 
legislation, some kept their politics out of their argumentation and stuck to legal arguments, 
some remained aloof from the fray.  Cassel claims to have learned something about the judges 
by studying their argumentation (see Cassel 2012).    
 Suppose we obtained the following result for three parties in a given election:  
Priority rankings Party A Party B Party C 




direct ad hominem; 
misplaced priorities 
Fairness;  
Analogy;     
Sympathy 
PD SCHEMES instrumental Symptomatic similarity 
PISTEIS Ethos Logos pathos 
DIALECTICAL ROLE  policy +;   person +; 
defensive 
person – ; policy +; 
policy – 




DIALOGICAL ROLE response; initiator initiator; response initiator; response 
DIALOGICAL 
POSITION 
Incumbent Challenger challenger 
  
 What might we say about these results?  We might venture these thumbnail sketches: 
Party A: Problem-solution oriented but balanced with considerations of fairness; depends on 
credibility of agent; stresses the advantages of own policies and leadership; corrects 
misinterpretations and deflects criticism. 
Party B: Depicts incumbent party as having bad policies, and attacks character of its members; 
wants to establish alternative goals; sees policies of government as indication of corruption; 
appeals to statistics and public opinion; puts priority on criticizing opponents over promoting 
own policies; initiates lines of discussion (criticism) more so than responding to the ideas of 
others, indicating an attempt to control the discussion. 
Party C: Primarily concerned with social justice; makes case by drawing comparisons to other 
more vivid injustices; appeals to sympathy of electorate; initiates lines of argument stressing 
value of its own policies and is somewhat critical of incumbent and other opponent; tries to 
change agenda to discuss its own issues; depicts itself as having a high moral character. 
 Notice that these argumentation profiles are descriptive, not evaluative.  Some 
argumentation workers would go further and, from a distant point of view, evaluate the 
arguments and argumentation of each of the agents, and thus create an evaluative 
argumentation profile of agents.  Christian Kock, for example, urges that the argumentation of 
politicians should be evaluated from the point of view of whether it meets the needs of the 
voting public in its quest to make an informed decision at the ballot box (Kock 2011, 14).  
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However, until the methodology of making argumentation profiles is better developed it may 
be advisable not to take a position on the quality of individual agents’ argumentative 
behaviour because that can be interpreted as partisanship and sink our scientific aspirations.  
Instead we should lay out our findings in vivid and accessible detail, letting the public make 
of it what it will.   My anticipation is that, properly packaged, we can catch its eye. 
  
5. Summary 
I began by suggesting that one way in which argumentation scholars could distinguish their 
work from that of their colleagues, and show their usefulness to society, was to construct 
argumentation profiles of politicians’ behaviour during election campaigns.  I have suggested 
some of the concepts that could be the building blocks of such profiles.  Why are such profiles 
of value? 
A. Value to voters.  Voters may want to take profiles into consideration when making their 
decisions at the ballot box: not only do we want to support politicians who advocate policies 
we approve of, we also want to elect people who will conduct themselves in an intellectually 
capable and responsibly manner if they are elected.  Profiles can be an indicator of future 
argumentation behaviour.  
B. Value to political parties.  Political parties will be interested in their own profile as well as 
those of their opponents.  This is especially so if the public takes the view that they want their 
politicians to behave in an intellectually responsible manner, they will want to know how they 
can improve their own profile and how they can take advantage of their opponents’ 
weaknesses as revealed in their profiles. 
C. Value to argumentation workers.  Profiles of parties (or individual politicians) can be 
tailored for consumption in the public media, e.g., newspapers, radio, television, blogs, etc., 
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either during a campaign or shortly afterwards, as long as public interest endures.  This is a 
way to bring the work of argumentation workers to the attention of the public. Walton and I 
have done this.
5
  To this end one will find using the broader more intuitive categories like the 
dialectical roles, most suitable.  In general, the greater public doesn’t care to distinguish three 
kinds of ad hominem arguments. 
 
6. Externalities 
Argumentation profiles can contribute directly to the quality of political life by providing 
information that is vital to political parties who are argument agents, and to citizens who must 
evaluate those parties.  There are, in addition, a number of spin-offs, or externalities, of doing 
argumentation profiles that can be felt within the academy. 
D. Inter-disciplinary cooperation.  Argumentation workers need the cooperation of at least 
three other fields in order to make argumentation profiles sound and valuable.  (1) These 
profiles will profit from being supplemented with communication factors which take into 
account other components: tone of voice, posture, choice of language, etc; hence, 
coordination with communication workers with complementary interests will make the 
argumentation profiles more valuable.  (2) Our analyses can be enriched by the participation 
of social psychologists, people who study personality, group behaviour, and social cognition.  
(3) Creating profiles of political behaviour invites participation and cooperation with 
colleagues in political studies.  We should engage the cooperation of workers from these other 
disciplines, but keep the argumentation profile as the central, unifying component. 
E. Concept testing.  What argumentation theorists themselves should find valuable about this 
kind of study is that it allows them to test their concepts.  This is especially so for the list of 
                                                 
     
5
 See Hansen and Walton (2012a). 
176 
 
informal-logic argument schemes and the dialectical roles.  Whereas text books look for 
arguments they can use to illustrate schemes, we look for a list of schemes that will be 
adequate to the identification and classification of all the arguments in a given field of 
discourse.  What is optimal here?  We need a balance between what is useful and manageable.   
This means that the list of argument kinds (schemes) should be comprehensive enough to 
allow classification of all the arguments found in the discourse, but it should not be so fine-
grained that it will introduce minute distinctions that have little or no consequence for the 
making of argumentation profiles. 
F. Student participation.  Student participation in gathering, classifying and analysing the 
arguments used in the creation of the profiles is important for at least two reasons.  The one 
has to do with the user-efficiency of the concepts and methods of informal logic.  If these 
cannot be used by university students at the upper undergraduate level, or the beginning 
graduate level, then we have lost sight of an important goal of informal logic viz., to provide 
tools of analysis and evaluation useful to the public in general.  In gathering the information 
needed for making the profiles, we can observe how well our students do with the materials 
we provide for them to work with, and make adjustments as needed  The other reason to have 
student involvement in the making of the profiles is to stimulate interest in election campaigns 
among young people.  Only 38 per cent of the 18-24 age group voted in the 2011 federal 
election in Canada.  (Edmonton Journal,  2012) 
 This completes my case for seeking the involvement of fellow argumentation workers 
in the study of political campaigns, and the value of making argumentation profiles. 
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Rhetoric of the Crisis. Polish parliamentarian debates on the future of the EU 
Agnieszka Kampka, Warsaw University of Life Sciences - SGGW 
 
Summary 
The analysis of the Polish parliamentary debates on the Euro zone crisis indicates in what ways politicians use 
metaphors to construct the situational definitions. The paper shows the common area of the three notions of the 
rhetorical situation, definition of the situation and the persuasive definition. It serves to answer the question, 
what factors influence the way of presenting the given aspects of reality in the public speeches. The examples of 
the metaphors used in the debates are recalled in the context of the functions that similes may play in the 
political discourse. 
 
Key words: metaphor, rhetorical situation, crisis, parliamentary debates 
 
Democracy assumes that people may disagree both as to the ends and the means of 
action. Tough social situations, such as an economic crisis and increasing discord in meta-
state institutions make differences and conflicting views more evident and visible. There are 
different ideas in the society as to the ways of solving problems. In addition, the differences 
are also present in the definitions of the problems. Therefore a debate is a key issue in a 
democracy. Differences of opinion result often from a different understanding of reality, since 
we consider its fragments in different contexts and have disparate criteria of evaluating the 
actions we took. 
  However, if democracy assumes a drive for agreement, for finding a satisfactory 
solution for all – it is necessary to present one’s point of view in a clear fashion as well as a 
proposed course of action. It is mandatory to define a situation as a starting point, as well as 
detail the conditions and give a name to that which is going on or is about to happen. In order 
to prove that signing of a fiscal pact is a good solution can be done only after we have 
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demonstrated that the situation requires signing of such a pact. Political action largely 
depends on the ability to provide meaning to significant people, events or processes.  
 The following analysis of the parliamentary debates is an attempt to answer a question 
in what way a specific rhetorical device – a metaphor – is used by politicians when they 
define the situation. The objective of the analysis contains the selected debates concerning the 
economic crisis and the Future of the European Union, which were held in the Polish Seym in 
the years 2008-2011. The research question concerns first of all the functionality of the 
metaphor in the political discourse, as well as its usefulness in the main task a politician faces 
i.e. imposing on others their own interpretation of events, and the understanding of facts and 
processes.
45
 The economic crisis forces politicians to make quick decisions in a situation of 
many unknowns. Political leaders today – as Giandomenico Majone (1992) rightly said – can 
only utilize arguments in favor of competing hypotheses rather than hard data. Therefore, an 
important question to pose in the analysis of political rhetoric concerns the tools used for 
constructing a definition of the situation. How can politicians justify their choice of one of the 
future hypothetical scenarios? How do they argue that the interpretation of reality which they 
propose is correct, and thus their decisions also are appropriate? One of the tools used for this 
is a metaphor. Analysis of metaphors used in political discourse have repeatedly shown that 
they can serve for constructing political myths, can be a part of argumentative strategies 
(Charteris-Black 2005), and the expression of an adopted model of the world (Lakoff  2004). 
The question is whether they may also serve as an indicator of ritualization of political debate? 
Dispute can be described as a "ritual chaos" (Czyzewski et al. 1997). It is a type of discussion, 
where despite sharp expressions, all roles and arguments are known and remain unchanged. It 
is thus difficult to speak of a real debate, rather  than a ceremonial skirmish. 
                                                 
45
 The quotations appearing in the text were taken from the stenographic records found in the webpage of the 
Polish Seym, www.sejm.gov.pl 
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What is the situation definition? What are its components and what impact does it 
have on the rhetoric strategy of the speaker? – these are the questions that define the structure 
of the first part of the investigation. The second part is concentrated on the features of the 
metaphors  that make them effective in the political discourse. Eventually there are examples 
of concrete metaphors used by Polish politicians while describing the Euro zone crisis. 
 
1. How is the situation defined? 
 The competition of various definitions of situations is the crux of political action in the 
democratic system. Parties and politicians convince citizens that their interpretation of events 
is accurate and if the diagnosis is right then the remedy they propose is also correct. Defining 
the situation is the first step in a successful persuasion exercise. We are not concerned solely 
with the recognition of the factual circumstances of the speech. What is more important is the 
significance that the speaker or the audience attributes to the circumstances. 
 Rhetoric analysis of the public discourse or the public debate always requires very 
good knowledge of the context. As we read in Theaetetus: “Whatever each city judges to be 
just and fine, these things in fact are just and fine for it, so long as it holds these opinions” 
(Plato, Theaetetus 167 c 4-5). That sentence indicates the significance of the situation 
definition in political rhetoric. “There is nothing more elusive than an obvious fact” Sherlock 
Holmes used to say and it has to be admitted that it is absolutely true in reference to political 
life. Explaining what it is that we see, and what is the name of the things going on, thus 
imposing one’s own definition of the situation on other participants of the public life, is one 
of the key activities of politicians. When we think of the term of situation definition and refer 
it to a concrete rhetorical situation a number of necessary elements have to be considered. In 
rhetoric and social sciences there are three concepts which seem to be mutually 
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complementing each other. These are: rhetorical situation, definition of situation and 
persuasive definition. 
What shall we consider a rhetorical situation? In the most concise approach we mean 
the context in which a given utterance is presented and received. “Not the rhetor and not 
persuasive intent, but the situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity” Lloyd 
Bitzer explains (1999: 220). It is the situation that defines the way of speaking. Who the 
speaker is, what social role he/she plays, the nature of the audience and the time and place –  
those are the factors construing the rhetorical situation. Thus when we speak of rhetorical 
situation, we mean specific historic circumstances. In the analyzed debates that context was 
out of necessity created by the economic crisis, that hit the Euro zone, decisions that the 
leaders of the EU states took, aiming at the reduction of the effects of the crisis and the 
necessity to define what actions the Polish government should have taken (or already has 
taken) considering the circumstances. Of no lesser importance there was the arrangement of 
the Polish political scene, as well as the interests and needs of the political parties. Also the 
level of support they received from the voters as well as the timeframe for the elections. The 
analyzed debates took place in different timeframes: in the middle of the Seym’s term, several 
months before its completion but still before the official beginning of the election campaign 
as well as in the beginning of the new term. It seems natural that the debates become more 
heated the closer the date of the elections. Similarly the first sessions of the new parliament 
are rich in lively discussions, since our envoys (or new political groups) are eager to present 
themselves as active and significant political forces. The debates which were analyzed were 
not particularly exciting. There were several factors responsible for it. First, direct effects of 
the crisis were not yet particularly felt by the Poles. True, there was already present a general 
awareness of the crisis, but particularly dramatic situations were absent and thus did not 
provide the material for emotionally loaded narratives or moving examples. Secondly, Poles 
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are generally in favor of the EU, supporting further deepening of the integration process. 
Some later studies showed that the opinion was divided as far as the commitment of Poland in 
the aid to the crisis stricken countries (CBOS 2012), but the debates took place at the time, 
when the information on the fiscal pact just began to appear in the public debate. That is the 
time when the public opinion on the subject started to coalesce. That obviously created an 
opportunity for the politicians – a skillful definition of the situation would allow that 
interpretation to appear in the media and then in the public opinion. And – it is a third 
important factor – the Union issues do not seem to be the main bone of content in the Polish 
political scene. The concepts of Poland’s role in the EU do not constitute the basis for 
differentiation of the political parties. As it is well known, political rhetoric is the most 
spectacular only when it is strongly related to the identity of the given party (Kampka 2009). 
Rhetorical situation it is actually all that is contained in the mutual relations between 
the speaker, the audience, the topic of the speech and the circumstances of its delivery. The 
rhetoric is “essentially-related-to-situation”, as Bitzer explains. Rhetorical situation is also 
closely connected with interaction ritual (Goffman 1967). The speech is the response to the 
situation; rhetoric “changes reality through the mediation of thought and action” (Bitzer 1999: 
219). 
The analyzed debates present undoubtedly the cases of exigence – the economic crisis 
requires fast decision making, the MPs demand from the government full information on the 
actions taken and the effect of it is the debate called: current information. The place in which 
the concrete opinions are expressed influences what is being spoken as well as the way it is 
spoken. The plenary sessions of the Seym, radio and TV transmission of the debates, the 
attention of the media – all those elements influence the rhetoric choices of the speakers. 
Some of the most influential factors are related to the social roles performed by the 
broadcasters. Political rhetoric is highly ritualized, and, as a result – the verbal behaviors are 
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quite predictable. If the head of the government speaks, most certainly he will concentrate on 
proving that the decisions of the cabinet are justified, while the representative of the 
opposition will focus on arguing that they are not.     
The next important notion we discuss is the definition of the situation, a term used by 
a sociologist, William Thomas. It is a sort of mutual agreement that all participants of the 
interaction have adopted. That sociological definition of the situation is close to the 
suggestions of Kenneth Burke, for whom the function of rhetoric is exactly an appropriate 
naming or defining  of what the given situation is (Burke 1969: 206). The speaker (sender) 
uses rhetoric in order to select, from the surrounding plethora of objects, principles, and 
events the ones whose properties  correspond to meanings he/she would like to focus on. The 
objective of fitting  properties and meanings together is to make the listener accept the 
understanding of the situation presented by the speaker. We can see it in this simple example. 
We have an apple vendor, who advertises them to the customers. On a hot day he speaks of 
their juicy nature and how they can quench the thirst. A young mother is being persuaded that 
the apples contain lots of vitamins and that they are very healthy. To an elderly gentleman the 
vendor praises their softness and to the housewife he recommends his apples as the best kind 
for the apple pie. Apples have also many other features – they are round, red or yellow, have a 
soft or tough skin, they are sweet or sour – but rhetoric is the matter of choice. Situation 
definition turns out to be a negotiation of mutually accepted meanings important for the both 
parties in the communication situation. The matter is similar in the case of the economic crisis. 
It does not matter then if the prime minister has a good rapport with his ministers and plays 
ball with them, but what matters is his ability to make decisions quickly and accurately. 
Action is possible only when we have interpreted the situation and have defined what it really 
is so that we will be able to behave accordingly. Meeting a group of people in the street we 
make an instant decision as to the fact that those are tourists who lost their way and ask for 
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help in finding their way to the city center, or a gang of sports fans willing to express their 
anger for their team’s defeat. Definition of the situation turns out to be one of the basic human 
activities in social contacts. 
From the vantage point of the political rhetoric it is particularly important to consider 
the consequences of the adopted definition. Independently of the fact of whether the situation 
definition is true, the effects of its adoption are always true. If we interpret the behavior of a 
young man approaching us in the street as a threat, we will start running regardless of the fact 
that he wanted only to ask us what time it was. 
Let us check how it works in a political situation. On April 10, 2010 Poland 
experienced a trauma of a great magnitude – the presidential plane crashed in Smolensk in 
Russia. Almost a hundred of the most important persons in the country perished, including the 
president and his wife, generals, MPs, high level state officials and representatives of many 
institutions and organizations. The interpretation of this event still splits the Polish society and 
the political scene. In the public discourse two totally different narratives are present. The first 
assumes that the catastrophe was an ordinary airplane crash, the causes of which are being 
investigated by a special commission. According to the other definition of the situation that 
tragedy had been planned and it was an assault against President Kaczynski. The 
consequences of adopting one of the versions result in definite type of behavior. People, who 
are convinced that it was an assault see the present president and prime minister as traitors, 
who want to push the truth under the carpet. In effect they organize protests and 
demonstrations demanding full exposure of the truth. 
And thus in the case of the interactive definition of the situation words create the 
circumstances. The situation is the effect of the words used. What was uttered produces 
concrete deeds which change reality. And though it might seem that the two terms rhetoric 
situation and the situation definition exclude each other, in the language of politics they are 
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complementary. A speaking politician expresses specific words on the one hand because he 
must utter them (he is a prime minister or the leader of the opposition etc.) but on the other 
hand he utters them because he wants to achieve something, to influence the audience. 
The third important concept we want to discuss is the persuasive definition. It is a type 
of a definition, which provides a presentation of the case that is the most advantageous to the 
sender (Walton 2007: 275). Charles Stevenson was the one who developed that notion by 
paying attention to the specific emotional and descriptive dimensions of words. In the 
persuasive definition we focus on the emotional effect that the given word produces. Hence 
precious are the metaphors here, which have the ability to invoke emotional associations. 
Naturally we may ponder the effectiveness of identifying the persuasive definitions, since 
strong arguments can be mustered in favor of the view that all definitions are persuasive. 
They are always biased, after all, since they depend on the choice of which species properties 
we will define as distinctive. Both Cicero (1942: II, 109) and Quintilian (2005: VII, 3, 15-18) 
stated that since the use of the definition serves a definite purpose, in consequence it is always 
partial to a degree, and since its objective, first of all, is to convince the listeners, it must 
contain some emotional and narrative elements. It is the common sense that provides the 
liminal condition here. It is worth remembering that Cicero wrote about three means of 
persuasion; that what matters is 1. That we prove that what we defend is true, 2. That we 
convince those that are listening to us, 3. That we direct their emotions in a way that supports 
our cause, ”the proof of our allegations, the winning of our hearers’ favor, and the rousing of 
their feelings to whatever impulse our cause may require” (Cicero 1942: II, 1152). And the 
use of emotions is a key factor in identifying a given definition as a persuasive one.   
Persuasive definitions used in the language of politics bring with them extremely 
important legal or financial consequences. The change of the definition in the law results in 
the change of the qualification of the deed, as it is shown in the case of analysis of the term of 
186 
 
rape (Zarefski 2006) or wetland (Schiappa 2003). Therefore persuasive definitions should not 
be treated as unimportant language tricks, since they are one of the most powerful instruments 
of politics (Walton 2007:281). In addition those definitions span bridges between facts and 
values. In the case of the persuasive definition words happen to be the effects of the speaker’s 
intention, their objective is therefore the change of the situation through the transformation of 
the receivers’ attitudes. 
Summing up then, in the rhetorical situation words are the effects of circumstances, it 
is the situation that influences the rhetorical choices of the speaker. In the interactive 
definition of the situation to the contrary – it is words, i.e. the naming of the reality, that is the 
cause of the new situation created. It is worth remembering that the way of perceiving the 
reality and its interpretation does not happen out of nowhere. There are also present 
situational conditionings. They depend on the identity of individuals and social roles 
performed by them as well as on the time and place, they also depend on the receivers. A 
person lurking by the window with a sack on his back may be interpreted as Santa Claus, if he 
is seen in December by a four-year-old through his room’s window, or as a thief if in another 
season he is seen by a janitor in a storage area. It is evident that in spite of the apparent 
contradiction both terms, the rhetorical situation and the definition of the situation, have 
something in common. Similarly we can find a common element in the persuasive definition. 
While it is formulated it must take under consideration the circumstances, which might 
facilitate or hinder the acceptance of that definition by the receivers.   
And thus, in order to analyze the definition of the situation, which politicians construe 
in their pronouncements, it is necessary to consider all three discussed terms in their scope of 
meanings, since the phenomenon we are discussing is located exactly in the field common to 




2. What is a metaphor in politics 
Actors participating in the public debate use metaphors in order to illustrate ideas and 
views. It is possible to speak of the double role of the metaphors depending on to whom they 
are addressed. Metaphors, on the one hand, are a sort of identification signs, pointers that 
allow for an instant recognition of the sender and at the same time construct the sense of the 
group’s community (Charteris-Black 2005: 205). Similar to the graffiti on the walls which 
point out who rules the district, metaphors used by a given political milieu provide clear 
signals of the unity of their attitudes to the members. On the other hand the metaphor 
addressed to the external world serves as a visible and convincing presentation of a given 
topic. Naturally most often the same metaphor performs both functions simultaneously. The 
debate on the exposé by Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz can serve as an example 
here. He assumed power in 2005 on behalf of the Law and Justice party (PiS), which 
proclaimed the need of fundamental renewal of the Polish public life. He used a metaphor of 
the state as a gambling table, where politics, businessmen, special services functionaries and 
gangsters play bridge. The metaphor turned out to be catchy and other politicians and 
journalists used it often. For the supporters of the party it was a clear cut brief of the program 
– it is necessary to overthrow the table and return to the concept of the common good, when 
political activity is a service and not a dirty play aiming at promoting private interests at the 
expense of the citizens and damaging to the state. This simple image was supposed to 
convince those hesitant ones to accept the definition of the situation, i.e. the diagnosis of the 
condition of the state according to PiS. Metaphor is a convenient tool in political polemics, 
since it is difficult to deny or to undermine it. In the example above the opposition had 
embarked on such an attempt – it used the same metaphor to convince the voters that although 
the players change the table still stands and the proclaimed renewal of the state is just a 
188 
 
pretense. The above example clearly indicates how important a role the metaphor plays as an 
aid in defining the situation.   
Rhetoric analyses may be seen as a test in what way we persuade others by means of 
symbols, as well as how symbols influence people (Schiappa 2003: 3). Metaphor is a specific 
carrier of symbolic meaning, therefore in the studied political utterances it is treated as an 
element of the argument and not the embellishment (ornatus). Therefore the analysis of the 
metaphors used by politicians must respond to the same questions we answer when we try to 
define the situation. Thus it concerns all the issues covered in the theory of stasis (Lausberg 
2002: 67-87). We are talking about the issues concerning the identity of the participants of a 
given debate. It also concerns the limitations presented by the given rhetoric genre.  
It is worth pointing out that in the case of economic crisis and the future of the EU the 
classic questions of status coniecturalis, definitivus, qualitatis (i.e.: is it there? what is it? 
what is it like?) bring in many potential answers. Moreover in contemporary politics we often 
deal with the phenomenon defined by the ancients in reference to the court trial. We mean a 
status finitionis, which is an attempt to find a name for  what has happened (Cicero 1993: De 
inv. I, 8, 10). The correspondence between a thing and a word is an important issue in the 
public discourse. Contemporary law provides sanctions for unsubstantiated use of certain 
terms. Therefore sometimes the use of a metaphor may be an attempt to avoid penal 
responsibility. Calling the prime minister a pitiful clown is quite a different matter than 
presenting a picturesque image of a circus, in which an ignorant clown usurped the place of a 
director, even if the only possible interpretation of that image is the recognition that the state 
is the circus.  
 A metaphor is a complex phenomenon. We may view it both as a linguistic 
phenomenon, as well as a cognitive one (the thriving practice of cognitive analysis of the 
metaphors is a proof). We may study its emotional dimension but also its socio-cultural 
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ramifications. We may analyze in what way a metaphor corresponds to a given fragment of 
reality or follow the merging of separate fields, by means of which it is possible to explain 
something what is new through a reference to something already known, or we may have a 
revealing look at something already well known but presented in a different than usual light 
due to the metaphor. A metaphor is a main supportive frame of the communique since it is 
able to structure ideas. It is also a very useful tool in constructing persuasive definitions, since 
it exposes or conceals selected contents (Charteris-Black 2005; Cameron and Maslen 2010, 
Musolff and Zinken 2009). In this connection it is worth remembering that in the case of 
political rhetoric quite often we deal with a situation in which a new, initially effective 
metaphor loses quickly its persuasive thrust and by overuse becomes sterile and thus of 
negligible cognitive and visual value, as such cases were analyzed  convincingly by Michael 
Biling and Katie MacMillan (2005).    
In the debates I have chosen I was interested in the metaphors playing important roles 
in arguments of  both sides of the conflict regardless of the degree of the metaphor ‘s 
complexity. Additionally the devices used by the politicians I treat as intentional actions 
rather than as an expression of subconsciously coded cultural patterns or ideological schemata. 
Naturally it is necessary to consider the fact that such factors as political orientation, 
biography or upbringing influence stylistic and cognitive choices made by politicians. It is 
also worth considering that in political rhetoric it is usually more important who listens than 
who speaks. Biblical analogies in the mouth of the conservative politician may be closer to 
the imagination and value system of his potential voters than himself. Therefore the cognitive 
approach attempting to answer the question what a given metaphor changes in the way of 
thinking is useful first of all in the studies of communication effects. Hence, in the cases 
referred to below it matters more to find the connection between the image used and its place 




3. How to define crisis? 
 In analyzed debates the participants were representatives of the parliamentarian clubs 
of the most important Polish parties. The coalition government is made up of the two parties; 
Citizens’ Platform (PO) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). The first one is the center liberal 
party universally associated (although not necessarily reflecting the actual facts) with young, 
entrepreneurial citizens, rather than with wealthier urban inhabitants. PSL is a traditional 
agrarian party. Law and Justice (PiS) the largest opposition party, a conservative rightist party, 
in conventional wisdom (again not necessarily squared with the truth) representing the 
interests of the losers in the Polish transformation, inhabitants of the poorer regions of the 
country. Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) or the Palikot Movement (RP) did not play any 
significant role in the analyzed debates, since they are pro-EU parties, supporting the 
European policy of the government. The main line of contest runs between PO and PiS. Both 
parties, sharing the same roots in the Solidarity movement and formerly planning to form a 
coalition, at present are locked in a dire conflict, both in the policy program areas as well as at 
the personal level (Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, is a twin brother of the late 
President, and he is accusing the government of the incompetent carrying out of the 
investigation of the Smolensk plane crash). PiS, although generally supportive of the EU, 
perceives Poland’s role in the EU differently than PO does.  
 From the parliamentarian enunciations metaphors referring directly to the crisis or the 
EU have been selected. In the analyzed material metaphorical descriptions of the EU of an 
unequivocally positive kind appeared only twice. The prime Minister spoke of “a great, 
beautiful European adventure”, while Robert Biedroń, one of the opposition MPs (in the pro-
Union Palikot Movement), explained that “the European Union is a mutual dream not of 500 
million Euro but it is a dream of 500 million Europeans”. 
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As far as depicting the crisis is concerned, metaphors presenting the economic crisis as 
a natural catastrophe appear more frequently in the government’s rhetoric. The opposition, 
however, focuses on the presentation of the Euro zone crisis as a faulty edifice. It has, quite 
naturally, a very simple justification. Presenting the crisis as a turmoil, a flood, a storm or a 
quake the government explains that the events which the European countries are battling now 
are as equally unexpected and unexplainable as the climatic phenomena. The role of the 
authorities is to counteract the negative effects of those conditions. It is worth remembering, 
that the metaphor style concerning the wide range of natural disasters or diseases is an 
important element of the political rhetoric, particularly in the cases of strong ideological 
contests – there is often talk of the flood, fire, fever or pestilence. To a large extent it was 
used by President Truman at the time of the Cold War (Ivie 1999). The objective is always to 
build up the tension and the exploitation of emotions. The threat perspective produces 
reactions different than the usual ones, among them greater than usual license for quick 
decision making by the rulers. It is then easy to give up regular democratic procedures of 
debate, justifying it with the necessity of an immediate response. Such mechanism could be 
observed after 09.11, mainly in the USA. The opposition metaphors suggest, on the other 
hand, that there is somebody responsible for the crisis, it is possible to point out an 
incompetent architect, hence the images of “a poorly constructed edifice, of the European 
home erected on quicksand”. This last image, evoking the evangelical parable in the mouth of 
the rightist envoy assumes an additional meaning, since the audience (and particularly 
supporters of the party) are used to the opinion that the EU is an institution whose activities 
are far from the conservative or Christian values, and often openly hostile to them. 
 The metaphor of the EU as a home is used also by the government side, which is 
explaining that implementation the opposition’s vision would put Poland in a cul-de-sac, or 
will remain in the anteroom and in the draft. The metaphor of the common home, household, 
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marriage is universally used in the discourse on the EU (Musolff 2006). The metaphor of the 
EU as a home according to Paul Chilton and Mikhai Ilyin (1993) has been started by Michail 
Gorbachov with the statement made in the mid-80s about the common European home in the 
context of mutual responsibility of the states for Europe.  
Let us have a look at the metaphors used in the debates. Different metaphors imply 
different ways of dealing with things, Norman Fairclough comments (1989: 120). If the 
problem rests in the faulty foundations of the building, it needs general renovation. If the 
problem rests with an incoming tornado, escape might be the only rational action. Naturally in 
the analyzed cases those two solutions did not materialize since, as I said, the metaphors did 
not serve as ways of looking for solutions but as the method of identifying the culprits. 
Simultaneously that example indicates another important feature of the metaphors – their 
customary character. Almost each metaphoric image may be used in many different ways. 
Let’s return to the image of the state as a building. We may pay attention to the foundation of 
values, on which the state is posited or stress the open door for immigrants (Fairclough 
1989:120). The choice of a given aspect depends on the situation and the sender’s intention. 
One of the more frequent images is the one of a boat/ship. All parties accepting the Union 
politics of the government use this metaphor although they use it in many different ways. EU 
may be a “navy ship”, which cruises in the stormy sea and it should be aware of other ships in 
the ocean - such as America or Asia. Poland may be “a ship” which is sailing “steadily” in 
“the rough seas”. Those are pretty standard descriptions of the economic crisis, rough seas is a 
classic image presenting a difficult situation, uncertain, very challenging particularly as the 
speed and accuracy of decision making is concerned.  
Finally it can be said of the EU that we are “all in one boat. In this boat we will either 
make it or we will all drown, and there is still a group of candidates waiting in the wharf, 
many countries, not only Croatia, but also the Western Balkans”. This picture serves the 
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purpose of justifying the sense of solidarity, which all Union countries displayed, and which 
finds its expression in the financial assistance obligations. Those examples prove the 
universality and the repetitiveness of political images in general. In research on the metaphors 
in German politics and media debates in the years 1989-1990 the words of similar meaning 
ranges have been compared, i.e. to boat and ship. Used in metaphorical expressions they 
evidently service different aspects of events. The ship appears in references to complex 
economic projects, the reference is made to the ship sailing in rough seas. While the boat is 
used in two contexts. Firstly, as an illustration of the expression – “to be in one boat”, which 
means the mutuality of interests, and the other one – that metaphor appears in the reference to 
the newcomers – the country is like a boat; we have limited space and there may not be room 
for all (Zinken 2006). 
In Polish debates the image of a ship appeared in one more context: Poland may be a 
ship but so could any other country, since the most important thing is that in “the captain’s 
bridge there stands” a leader of the political party supported by the citizens. The topos of a 
ship has been developed through centuries in the European culture – at its early beginning 
there is the Biblical Noah’s Ark, thanks to it humanity survived the deluge, as well as the 
New Testament’s Peter’s boat, whose rumple is firmly held by the succession of the popes. In 
the Renaissance literature there were frequent juxtapositions of the serene farmer’s life versus 
the dangerous and risk-laden life of a sailor, crossing the rough seas. In the Polish literature 
the motif of a motherland as a mighty ship had been extremely popular with the call for all 
hands on deck cooperating for keeping its due course, while during the partitions and the loss 
of independence the image transforms into a vision of a sinking vessel. In one of the 
discussed debates Prime Minister Tusk used that metaphor as a means of political fight. “The 
leader of the opposition woke up and shows courage in TV spots (…) You know what, 
president Kaczynski, I ‘ve seen many brave men in spots and ads (…) but the leader of the 
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political formation is required to stand fast on the captain’s bridge when citizens handed him 
the right and a chance of exercising power”. As it appears the position on the bridge has to be 
seen as a counter to the fake courage that can be demonstrated in the political ad. Juxtaposing 
something true and fake is a permanent rhetorical device used by politicians. 
The next example of contradicting reality and appearance can be found in the 
metaphor of a remedy. The economic crisis and turmoil in the EU are treated as a disease that 
has to be cured. The opposition speaks of harmful effects of the drugs used so far, i.e. the 
rescue measures adopted by the European leaders. The Prime Minister treats the opposition’s 
ideas with disdain: “You want to look for prescriptions, you want to help , so go and look for 
them there where they can be found in order to use the remedy to fight the disease, and not 
simply because somebody had an idea. We cannot afford to use fake instruments”. The career 
of the word true in the political discourse is still another matter well presented particularly by 
the language of the propaganda researchers (Klemperer 1992, Głowiński 1991).  
We often deal with the image of a feast, sitting at the same table. Contrary to the 
appearances it is a complex metaphor. The government speaks of the danger of transformation 
of the Union into an exclusive club for the wealthiest, and explains that it is not evident to 
every member state, that all countries should sit at the same table – some believe that the 
functional criterion must be the membership in the Euro zone. In this approach sitting at the 
table does not necessarily mean a feast but rather the possibility of participating in the 
negotiation. An elaborate image presented by one of the envoys of the opposition, it refers to 
the perception of the EU as the source of luxury and welfare. 
The MP explained that to lend money to the International Monetary Fund from the 
budget reserve was like “paying insurance fee for a house in which we do not live, in order to 
relieve wealthier neighbors, because we will participate in the decision making on the menu 
of their dinner and maybe we will deliver some produce from our garden and will have the 
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honor to clean the table after that”. In those sentences there is contained the attitude towards 
the EU characteristic of many milleaux. On the one hand the Union seems to be something 
desirable and good (after all those are the wealthy neighbors), but on the other hand as 
something unjust, harmful and hungry for costs and funding. In spite of the irony in this 
imagery there rings an echo of the subordinate position of our country. 
The only way to deny a metaphor is to find a new interpretation of the same image. It 
is attempted by a later speech of the parliamentarian of the ruling coalition who, referring to 
the above mentioned sentences, said: “MP Żyżyński helped himself with the following 
metaphor: why should we insure the house from fire if we do not live in it? But it happens. If 
the houses are located next to each other, it may be proven that buying insurance on the house 
next to us might be prudent, because being adjacent when it goes on fire my house may burn 
down, too”. It is clearly visible how subtly the initial metaphor is transformed in order to 
serve the new objectives. First there was a talk of a dinner not a fire. If contributing to the 
meal of the wealthier neighbors seems absurd then paying for the fire insurance, which might 
also threaten us, does not seem to be so senseless any longer. The well known principle 
operates here – the perspective of our own benefits changes the sense of the whole situation. 
One of the oppositionist parliamentarians opposing the definition of the situation proposed by 
the government explained that “It is not one table and one menu”, while another MP 
criticizing the government’s activities during the Polish presidency maintained that Poland 
proved itself only as a hostess arranging for “meals, meetings and hotels”.  
The imagery which connects the Union politics with feasting seems to be well 
established in the imagination of the Poles. The roots of those metaphors can be found in a 
symbolism of power, which is of very ancient provenience. Since the times of organized 
social groups the privilege of those in power was their access to food. Wealth and power, 
since times immemorial, regardless of the period and cultural model, were always 
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demonstrated, inter alia, by festive meals, what still finds its echo in ceremonial dinners or 
suppers held by the heads of state to honor the invited guests. Thus power in the everyday 
imagery is related to the access to economic privilege. It is demonstrated in the colloquial 
idiom, that a person aspiring to the high office “elbows oneself to the feeding place”.  
There is still vivid – originating in the Polish People Republic period – a 
commonplace notion of the wealthy West, although polling research shows that migrations 
significantly modified the image of the European – from quite an attractive creature he/she 
becomes slowly “a human being like myself.” 
Another element of the EU image is its financing source potential. It is characteristic 
that the public opinion polls systematically indicate that those who perceive their material 
situation as a good one are more satisfied with the EU membership. The use of the Union’s 
financial aid is seen as one of the greatest benefits of the integration. A majority of the Poles 
are in favor of the EU, and place a lot of trust in it and its institutions – 74% of the Poles 
declare trust in the EU, although they have relatively scant knowledge of its institution at the 
same time (CBOS 2009). Maybe a following principle is in operation here – I trust the one 
who brings benefits to me and if everything goes well, I do not need to go into the details of 
the operation. The Euro zone crisis and the fiscal pact draft indicate the fallacy of that 
approach. We must still remember that the addressees of the public speeches are the people 
for whom the Union is still a certain abstract being.  
The opposition, according to its basic argumentative strategy, proclaiming that the 
government’s activities led/ are leading to the partial loss of sovereignty, is using the 
metaphor of a client or sidekick. Poland – as the audience should read that image – gives up 
its role as an active player, an important actor in the international scene, and the aspirations of 
the rulers are limited to the winning of favors from the powerful patron. 
197 
 
Polish politicians also use typical imagery concerning movement. The economy is a 
living organism which can “get winded”, or it may “slow down”, and venture capital can “get 
rampant”. Also the metaphor depicting the EU as a vehicle is connected with movement. The 
vehicle must be “prevented from skidding”, therefore Poland should act as a “driver of change” 
and not as “a brakeman”. The brakeman – he is a popular character in the Polish political 
discourse, most frequently the president is accused of being one when he vetoes the bills. 
It is worth pondering on the source domains of the heretofore mentioned metaphors. 
Generally they are closer to the everyday (or even closer – the physical) experience than more 
abstract target domains. Both the Union and the crisis are the abstract notions. Hence the 
metaphors used by politicians serve cognitive purposes to a large degree; they help to 
establish a certain structure, as it happens to be in the analyzed case – the rather ill-defined 
crisis. The metaphors of the building, of a natural disaster or a feast are naturally much closer 
to the everyday experience of the audiences. The only exception is the metaphor of the 
boat/ship – navigation is not a commonplace in Poland, but the familiar nature of this activity 
is the result of the linguistic idiom. As I have mentioned already, the topos of the motherland 
as a boat/ship is one of those most often used in Polish literature, which is the basis of school 
education, therefore those images are immediately recognized as such. For the same reason 
the analyzed metaphors are the conventional ones, the use of which is well grounded in the 
language (Kovecses 2011:194). Their conventional nature to a certain degree limits the 
rhetoric choices of the speakers. The language community often imposes the way in which the 
given matter is discussed (the case of the boat/ship metaphor is a good example). 
Undoubtedly the choice of the metaphor is related to a large degree with the ideological 
embedding of the given political party. Brock et al. indicate, using American politics as a 
reference, how the ideological profile of the person influences the rhetorical choice strategy 
(Brock 2005, 85n). In reference to the Polish conditions it makes sense to recall three 
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examples. Conservatives use an idealistic perspective, making reference to the individual’s 
character or the acting person. The elements of such a strategy we can find both in the 
opposition politicians’ enunciations (PiS) as well as in the ruling coalition. Liberals in their 
arguments often refer to situational factors; action is determined by the circumstances. Such 
arguments appear in the speeches of PO envoys. And finally the radicals point to the 
structural conditions. In the analyzed debates it is assumed that the source of the crisis rests in 
the systemic weakness of the EU and the capitalist economy. 
 
4. Unused potential? 
Summing up, metaphors used in the analyzed debates belong to the standard imagery 
repeatedly appearing in the political discourse. None of them have become so influential that 
it would dominate the debate. Nevertheless they constitute a part of the argumentative tactics 
and serve the purpose of intensifying the message. They are not constitutive, however, of the 
argument itself, and do not explain something that is totally unknown. They perform an 
illustrative function instead – in the cases of more elaborate images. Most of the analyzed 
examples cannot be defined as rhetorical figures in the full sense of the word, although 
undoubtedly they are metaphorical expressions. It is still in accordance with Cicero’s 
explanations, who by connecting the particular value of metaphors with their sensualism, i.e. 
making references to specific senses (first of all the sight), explained that sometimes it 
suffices to use a word to activate a given sense (Cicero 1942: III, 161). Due to that the 
message is much clearer. Quintilian explains that the use of metaphors is particularly 
applicable when the metaphorical word is better, more expressive or more decent than the 
accurate one (Quintilianus 2005: VIII, 6, 5-6). In the analyzed debates the MPs most often 
used the simile due to its expressiveness. It is worth remembering though, the qualification 
that the value of the metaphor (as well as all other figures) depends on its functionality.  
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Let us ponder the criteria of the metaphor’s effectiveness, since it is the metaphor 
which imposes the interpretation on others that is the most desirable for the politicians. Such a 
metaphor should meet some conditions, nevertheless. It is good if it can appear in the 
beginning of the pronouncement and should not be too complex. Too many details make the 
picture less clear. It should also provide a fresh look on things, or a new solution, but at the 
same time refer to the everyday experiences of the audience. The New Testament 
presentations of God’s Kingdom may serve as examples here. When Christ speaks of the 
vineyard, sheep or the olive tree in the parables, he uses images extremely close to and well 
known in the experience of his listeners. And at the same time those metaphors serve to give 
the human mind real and acceptable shape for the transcendental concepts.  
In the analyzed debates, it seems, politicians do not use the full persuasive potential of 
the metaphors. They use them somehow unawares (to the extent that in the parliamentary 
debates we deal with a non-reflexive use of any construct…). None of the recalled examples 
was a spring for a further debate. In particular, the economic crisis did not spur the politicians 
to the creative use of the language. However, it is beyond doubt that metaphors used by 
politicians function as instruments in constructing the situation definitions, which are 
connected with the whole argumentative strategy of the party. As it is evident, metaphors may 
perform many functions in political discourse. First of all they serve the purpose of 
simplifying the abstract and complex issues in order to make them comprehensible for the 
public. Metaphors help in formulating an expression worth quoting (sound-bite). They 
produce humorous effects. Their generalizing and equivocal nature is very useful (Semino 
2008: 84). In the analyzed debates the cognitive role seems to be the primary one. Images 
were used to facilitate comprehension of difficult decisions, and also provide the vision of the 
alternative to the indefinite future. 
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The metaphor is used to build the definition of the situation; it helps policy-makers to 
justify an undertaken action. Selection of a particular image association that politicians want 
to impose on the public depends on a variety of factors that make up the rhetorical situation: 
The time of occurrence, roles played by the politician, current image, collective identity of the 
party’s members and supporters. One of the most important is undoubtedly the position of the 
party on the political scene. The main differences in the choice of metaphors are not 
associated with the ideological axis (e.g. left-right as Lakoff  [2002] described), but rather the 
axis of the government and the opposition. 
Strength of the metaphor is based on surprise, ability to show a new perspective. In the 
debates which have been analyzed not only were the metaphors conventional, but it was also 
easy to predict who and at what point uses them. So what is their true task? It seems that the 
key role of metaphor is one of a rhetorical prop in the ceremonial dispute. 
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The Political Discourse on Croatia’s EU Accession: a Rhetorical Analysis of the 
Presentation of the European Union among Supporters and Opponents of the EU 
Gabrijela Kišiček, University of Zagreb 
 
Summary 
This article describes salient argumentation strategies used in speeches of members of the political majority in 
support of Croatian EU membership as well as and those who opposed it. The analysis includes the usage of 
ideologically marked words, expressive terms with emotional value, and figures of speech, particularly metaphor. 
Corpora for this research were political speeches broadcast on television and radio collected over a period of 3 
months, including the most important political figures of the previous and the present government as well as 
representatives of “Europhobes,” such as leaders of right wing political parties and civil organizations.  The main 
goal of the analysis is to determine what kinds of arguments are frequently used, which fallacies are most 
frequent, and what are the differences and similarities in rhetorical means and argumentative strategies between 
two opposed sides? Analysis showed very weak argumentation and frequent use of appeals to emotions, 
especially appeal to fear, for both supporters and opponents to EU.  
Key words: argumentation, fallacies, political discourse, Europhobes, Europhiles 
 
1. Introduction 
Croatia, which was formerly part of the Republic of Yugoslavia, gained independence in 1991. 
In 2003 it applied for membership in the European Union and in early 2004 the European 
Commission recommended Croatia be granted candidate country status. By mid-2004 the 
European Council granted Croatia's application for candidate status. Membership negotiations 
officially started in October 2005. They were concluded on June 30th 2011 and followig the 




The negotiation process between Croatia and the EU has been the longest in EU 
history, and was complicated for various political reasons, amongst them the extradition of 
Croatian citizens (in particular, certain individuals who had been Generals in the Croatian 
army during the war 1991-1995) to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. The EU 
required the Croatian government to cooperate with the court as a necessary condition for a 
continuation of the negotiation process. On one occasion, the EU postponed the 
commencement of negotiations because the Croatian government’s effort to capture a fugitive 
Croatian general was deemed insufficient. Another reason for the lengthy duration of the 
negotiations was the Croatia-Slovenia border dispute which resulted in Slovenia blocking 
Croatia’s EU accession for 10 months. Political issues such as the above have had a deep 
impact on the perception of the EU among Croatian citizens. Ultimately, a referendum was 
held on January 22
nd
 2012 which resulted in 66% of the voters being in favor of Croatia 
joining the European Union.  
This paper analyzes political speeches of both supporters and opponents of Croatian 
membership in the EU. The majority of Croatian political parties supported  EU membership. 
The opponents were radical right wing parties and right extremists so far not elected to 
parliament, as well as other representatives of civil organizations. Political analysts widely 
agreed that the public debate about an EU membership was insufficient and that the period 
between the finalization of the negotiation process and the referendum was too short for an 
exchange of opinions between EU opponents and supporters. Moreover, opponents 
complained about a lack of media coverage with respect to their own efforts to raise 
arguments against Croatia joining the EU. Although outnumbered in parliament, Europhobes 
organized meetings and gatherings in public places which received media coverage and thus 
provided data for this research.  
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2. Materials and methods 
 
For the purpose of this research, we used political speeches broadcast on three national 
Croatian television channels (HRT, RTL, Nova TV), as well as political statements and 
interviews in two daily newspapers (Jutarnji list, Večernji list) over a period of 3 months 
(June and December 2011, and January 2012). Data were selected on the basis of political 
relevance and media presence (i.e., the speeches of the most important political figures in 
Croatia including the president Ivo Josipović, the former and the current prime minister, 
Jadranka Kosor and Zoran Milanović, respectively, as well as the former and the current 
minister of foreign affairs, Gordan Jandroković and Vesna Pusić (all four of whom can be 
regarded as EU supporters). Opponents of EU included leaders of right wing parties Daniel 
Srb and Ruža Tomašić, as well as activists, and representatives of civil organizations, for 
instance Roko Šikić, Željko Sačić, Marko Francisković etc.).  
The analysis conducted in this paper was based, on the one hand, on Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) which encourages the critical study of discourse within its discursive-
historical context of production (van Dijk, 2001) and, on the other, on rhetorical analysis 
which aims at extending CDA beyond lexico-grammatical analysis by introducing an 
argumentation component.  
The study of political discourse in the terms of language analysis was conducted for 
the first time after World War II when linguists tried to understand and explain the roles and 
importance of language and communication in totalitarian regimes and their propaganda. 
They demonstrated how political discourse is determined by society in what may be termed “a 
social practice” (see Wodak and Meyer, 2012: 17).  
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Our method is similar to that used for analyzing the discourse of proponents and 
opponents of the Iraq war (Sahlane, 2012) which also combined CDA and rhetorical 
argumentation analysis.  
Critical discourse analysis included the examination of vocabulary, especially the 
usage of ideologically marked words (e.g. Euroslavia), the usage of expressive words with 
emotional value (e.g. national consciousness, independence), and figures of speech, especially 
metaphors (such as tunnel of darkness or the light at the end of the tunnel). The rhetorical 
analysis was primarily oriented to rhetorical argumentation and aimed at tracing differences 
and similarities in the means of persuasion used by opponents and supporters of Croatia’s EU 
membership.  
Tindale (2004: 20) explains rhetorical argumentation:  
 
“Rhetorical argumentation draws features from the rhetorical tradition and mixes them 
with newer innovations. For the core of what the tradition provides, another Aristotelian triad 
is useful: that organization of the rhetorical that distinguishes ethos, pathos and logos. The 
processes of rhetorical argumentation meld together these three bringing into relief and 
inextricably wedding to one another in the argumentative situation, the arguer, audience and 
“argument”. To understand the argumentation is to understand the interactions of these 
components; to evaluate argumentation is to do the same.” 
 
Based on previous research on a similar topic (Sahlane, 2012), we assumed that 
appeals to emotion, especially the appeal to fear (argumentum ad metum) and pity (ad 
misericordiam)—would be frequent. Johnson (2000) has emphasized that in order to be 
effective, the rhetoric used in mass media needs to take human emotions, in particular fear 
and pity, into account. O` Keefe (1996) mentions these in relation to persuasion short cuts.  
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Appeals to fear and pity work as persuasive arguments using the dual process model of 
persuasion. “According to this model there are two routes of persuasion, a central and 
peripheral route. The central route requires an elaboration of the rational argumentation in the 
mass of evidence in a case. But appeals to fear and pity offer a short cut to a mass audience by 
suggesting a peripheral route.” (cited after Walton, 2007: 128) 
 
Put generally, we assumed that ethos and pathos will be dominant modes of 
persuasion. Here, pathos is broadly defined in the Aristotelian tradition as a means of 
“creating a certain disposition in the audience” (1991: 301) and, while common in forensic 
oratory, it is “also at home in deliberative oratory” (Carey, 1996: 405). According to 
Aristotelian scholarship, as a means of persuasion ethos is more common in deliberative 
oratory, since a credible and trustworthy character of a politician is important in persuading an 
audience, and thus in creating a public opinion.    
The combination of CDA, rhetorical argumentation analysis and persuasion 
techniques—or so we assumed—yields a more complete picture of that part of Croatian 
political discourse that deals with the question of EU membership.  
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis (lexico-grammatical analysis and figures of speech) 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis distinguishes among the experiential, the relational and 
the expressive value of words. For the purpose of this research, the most interesting and 
important were the expressive values of words because, as Fairclough (1989: 119) puts it: 
“they are always the central concern for those interested in persuasive language.” Since 
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differences between Europhobes and Europhiles are, at least in part, ideological, the 
expressive value is important insofar as “differences between discourse types in the 
expressive values of words are again ideologically significant” (1989: 119).  
Our analysis supports the claim that the choice of words in the speeches of both 
Europhobes and Europhiles is ideologically motivated in a way that is consistent with the 
differences characteristic of right wing and left wing parties. According to the Lexicon of 
Basic Political Terms (Prpić: 1994) the dominant feature of left-wing parties is liberalism. 
Prpić (1994) defines liberalism as a political philosophy which takes freedom to be the main 
criterion for the evaluation of social institutions. Key terms of liberalism are freedom, 
individualism, equality, social justice, and democracy. On the other hand, a dominant feature 
of the right is conservatism, for which terms such as legality, sovereignty, and nationalism are 
key. Since Europhobes are represented by right wing parties and conservative civil 
organizations, the expressive value of words is manifested through terms such as national 
identity, national consciousness, national treason, independence, national interests etc. The 
main characteristic of Europhobes’ value of words is aggressiveness, and an anticipation of 
“bad” consequences manifested through strong words like death, tears, grave, slavery, 
humiliation, danger etc. Europhiles likewise anticipate the future, but expect stability, better 
life, investments, better education and a higher standard of living.  
The main difference between Europhobes and Europhiles, as traced through the choice 
of words and the choice of metaphors, is that Europhiles are turning towards the future, while 
Europhobes are expressing their attitudes (implicitly and explicitly) by turning to the past (in 
particular to Croatia’s history). For Europhiles, a new age is coming, and Croatia is given a 
new opportunity; for Europhobes, Croatia is about to enter Euroslavia (i.e., is to be enslaved 
by the EU) and is thus looking for a new master. Such differences are at times even more 
explicit. Europhiles say: vote for the future; Europhobes emphasize: we have to turn to history 
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to learn how to preserve our national identity. Interestingly, Europhiles use terms such as 
family, children and grandchildren more often, which again evidences their orientation to the 
future, while Europhobes remember the casualties of the past war, and the generals in prison.  
 
Table 1 List of expressive words 
 
Europhobes Europhiles 
By entering Euroslavia Croatia will lose 
independence (D. Srb, HSP) 
Signing the most important document in 
Croatian history (I. Josipović, president) 
We need to wake up our national 
consciousness (D. Srb, HSP) 
This [i.e. not becoming a EU member], of 
course, would be catastrophic for Croatia  
(V. Pusić, minister of foreign affairs) 
The referendum is an act of national 
treason 
This is a historic day for Croatia (I. 
Josipović, president) 
The Common Agricultural Policy is 
nothing but a scam which is going to 
chase the Croatian milkman to grave  
Croatia has a historic chance (Z. 
Milanović, prime minister)  
Exploitation will result in Croatian tears A new age is dawning for Croatia (I. 
Josipović, president) 
The EU is union of enslaved countries  We are witnesses of a historic event (J. 
Kosor, HDZ, former prime minister) 
Absurd and humiliating results of poll 
which demonstrate that the people of 
Croatia have no idea what the EU means 
(P. Macut, HSP) 
It was a great honor to work for Croatia 
for the past two years and to reach this 
historic success (J. Kosor, HDZ, former 
prime minister) 
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Croatia is going to get a new master (I. 
Vekić, former minister of internal affairs) 
By becoming a member Croatia is 
returning to its cultural and historic roots 
(I. Josipović, president) 
They say that we are filthy Balkans who 
oppose the shine of the EU 
(representative of civil organization) 
 
It would be irresponsible to miss this 
opportunity for our children and 
grandchildren (I. Josipović, president) 
Simple people are going to bear all the 
weight of the economic crisis (L. Iličić 
representative of civil organization 
HRAST) 
We are going to be the central part of 
Europe (N. Vidošević, president of HGK) 
The referendum about joining the EU is a 
humiliation of democracy (L. Iličić, 
representative of civil organization 
HRAST) 
The EU is a community of values and that 
is what Croatia shares with it and what 
Croatia believes in (H. Marušić, assistant 
of forgein affairs minister) 
EU funds are nothing but fraud (R. Šikić, 
representative of civil organization “I 
love Croatia”) 
We have to believe in ourselves, have 
confidence and decide for the EU 
because it is the most elite club in the 
world (A. Plenković, state secretary for 
European integrations)   
In the EU, we will become a bunch of 
people without identity (M. 
Francisković), representative of civil 
organization “Be brave”) 
Vote for the future of your country. You 
may not like me, but you have to like 
your life. People, it is our life that is in 
question (V. Pusić, foreign affairs 
minister) 
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Entering the EU brings danger and a lack 
of perspective (M. Bošnjak, 
representative of civil organization “EU – 
No, thank you”) 
The EU means stability, investments, 
higher standards in defending human 
rights and a better life for our families (V. 
Pusić, foreign affairs minister) 
The EU is not fulfilling its promises (R. 
Šikić, representative of civil organization 
“I love Croatia”)  
Croatia is becoming an important part of 
the most influential Union in international 
politics (A. Plenković, state secretary for 
European integrations) 
We must fight the ideology of 
consumerism (B. Lukšić, representative 
of civil organization “Truth about EU”) 
We have reached a historic dream of the 
Croatian people (G. Jandroković, former 
foreign affairs minister) 
They are selling national interests to 
imperialists such as the USA (M. 
Francisković, representative of civil 
organization “Be brave”) 
Croatia is fulfilling its goal by becoming 
a member of EU, and that is happiness 
and good life (Z. Milanović, prime 
minister)  
 
Differences between supporters and opponents of the EU are reflected in the figures of speech, 
especially metaphor. Figurative language in political discourse has been of great interest for 
many scholars, regardless of the differences in their approaches. For instance, Norrick (2001: 
78) uses a semantic approach, and attempts to demonstrate how an analysis of figures of 
speech in specific discourse contexts can contribute to our understanding of figurative 
language. Proponents of Conceptual Metaphor Theory such as Grady et al. (1999) hold that 
the metaphorical meaning occurs in conceptual predication (some A is conceptualized in 
terms of B) when source and target domains are different. Although much of the research on 
hyperbole, tautology and paradox has been undertaken within semantic theory, metaphor has 
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often been of central interest in CDA. CDA considers metaphor as the most important figure 
of speech because of its connection to ideology. Fairclough (1989: 119) concludes that “any 
aspect of experience can be represented in terms of any number of metaphors, and it is the 
relationship between alternative metaphors that is of particular interest (...) for different 
metaphors have different ideological attachments.”  
Analysis of metaphors used in political speeches shows differences between 
Europhobes and Europhiles being reflected in the source of a metaphor. For Europhobes, the 
source of a metaphor is often the Book of Genesis, Christianity and history in general. The 
European Union is compared with the Tower of Babel which, according to the Book of 
Genesis, had been built by Noah’s descendants (who spoke a single language) “with its top in 
the heavens.” This, in turn, angered God and, as a punishment, he confused their languages. 
Further, supporters of the EU are considered to be non-baptized beasts, human sacrifices on 
altars are made, etc. The conservative point of view is manifested through an unwillingness to 
be multicultural, to accept differences (we are going to depend on some maharajas), and the 
European Union is seen as a dungeon and a tunnel of darkness. Europhiles are oriented to the 
future and to liberal, progressive attitudes which are reflected in metaphors grounded in 
growth, progress, and change (Croatia is opening its doors, Croatia is a fertile ground). The 
EU is seen as the light at the end of the tunnel, and the most elite club in the world. For 
Europhobes, Croatian citizens will be slaves (again, returning to the past) and for Europhiles 
they will be creators of the European destiny (something new, challenging). 
 
Table 2 Metaphors in speeches of Europhobes and Europhiles  
Europhobes Europhiles 
If Croatia decides to become a member of 
the EU in this referendum, then this will 
The path toward the European Union was 
covered with thorns (J. Kosor, HDZ, 
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be the victory of non baptized beasts and 
viscious thieves (I. Vekić, former minister 
internal affairs)  
former prime minister) 
Croatia is entering the tunnel of darkness 
(D. Srb, HSP) 
By becoming a member, Croatia is 
returning to its cultural and historic roots 
(I. Josipović, president) 
Croatians will be slaves in the EU (R. 
Tomašić, HSP – AS) 
We can finally see the light at the end of 
the tunnel (J. Kosor, HDZ, former prime 
minister) 
Croatia cannot and must not sacrifice its 
best people on the altar of the EU (H. 
Hitrec, representative of civil 
organization HRAST) 
Croatian citizens will be creators of 
Europe’s destiny (V. Pusić, foreign affair 
minister) 
Croatia needs to understand that games 
are played in Bruxelles (M. Tuđman, 
HIP)  
The claim that the EU is a third 
Yugoslavia is an example of political 
blindness (V. Pusić, foreign affair 
minister) 
The EU is the Tower of Babel (M. 
Francisković, representative of civil 
organization “Be brave”) 
Croatia is not giving up its independence, 
Croatia is investing its independence in 
Europe (I. Josipović, president) 
The EU is the dungeon for Croatian 
people (M. Francisković, representative 
of civil organization “Be brave”) 
Croatia is opening the doors of Europe 
for all other countries in the region (J. 
Kosor, HDZ, former prime minister) 
They want to surrender our Croatia into 
the hands of big masters (R. Šikić, 
By entering the EU, Croatia is coming 
back home (J. Kosor, HDZ, former prime 
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representative of civil organization “I 
love Croatia”) 
minister) 
We are going to depend on some 
maharajas (R. Šikić, representative of 
civil organization “I love Croatia”) 
Giving up on the EU is giving up on 
ourselves (I. Antičević-Marinović, SDP) 
We will come to the situation that, 
through financial occupation, we will be 
left bare foot on the soil of our own 
country (M. Francisković, representative 
of civil organization “Be brave”) 
We started the negotiation process when 
the EU was experiencing its first tsunami, 
when France and the Netherlands said 
NO to further expansion (A. Plenković, 
state secretary for European integrations)   
We have to turn to history to learn how to 
preserve our identity (M. Francisković, 
representative of civil organization “Be 
brave”) 
Croatia is a fertile ground which is not 
used enough ( N. Vidošević president of 
HGK) 
People who are not identifying 
themselves with the EU are victims of 
intellectual violence (N. Raspudić, 
political commentator) 
Today we are in front of the door, but 
tomorrow we will be inside, voting (H. 
Marušić, assistant of foreign affair 
minister) 
Europhiles are blind with healthy eyes in 
their head (A. Milardović, professor of 
political sciences) 
We have to believe in ourselves, have 
confidence and decide for the EU, 
because it is the most elite club in the 




Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has demonstrated that ideological differences between 
Europhobes and Europhiles are manifested in their respective expressions, and that both sides 
use expressive and ideologically marked terms to persuade, or to sustain a belief already held 
by, their audience. As Fairclough (1989: 152) emphasizes: “Just as even a single sentence has 
traditionally been seen to imply a whole language, so a single discourse implies a whole 
society.” 
 
3.2. Rhetorical argumentation analysis  
Rhetorical analysis introduces the argument component into the speeches of 
Europhobes and Europhiles. Our main goal was to examine the nature of arguments, to 
evaluate them as weak or strong, good or fallacious arguments. Despite some differences in 
the preferred argument types between opponents and supporters, the similarities are obvious.  
As was pointed out above, emotional appeals were dominant, especially the appeal to 
fear (loss of sovereignty if Croatia becomes a member of EU or economical collapse if it 
doesn’t). More traditional logical and epistemological analyses regularly presuppose a strict, 
and ultimately a normative, separation of reason and emotion. Standardly, appeals to fear or 
pity are considered means of audience exploitation and manipulation, and are therefore 
considered fallacious. However, contemporary scholarship especially in the rhetorical 
tradition of argument analysis suggests a more nuanced understanding, and indeed provides 
some justification for the use of emotions in argumentation, especially in political discourse 
and the mass media.  
For Walton (1992: 68) for instance, once one departs from the paradigm equating 
good arguments with deductively valid forms of inference, one finds numerous legitimate 
contexts for emotional appeals in argumentation such that appeals to emotion may be more 
generally recognized as legitimate arguments under the right conditions. McClurg (1992) 
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argues that such appeals are not always fallacious, especially not in democratic societies 
where political action rightly depends on persuasion, and persuasion in turn depends on 
rhetoric. Based on Walton (2007: 131), the appeal to fear is currently recognized within social 
sciences as a distinct argument scheme, used by those in the business of changing public 
opinion and attitudes through mass media. Although some empirical investigations in the 
social sciences have claimed to demonstrate the effectiveness of this type or argumentation 
scheme, Trip and Devenport (1988) submit that such arguments are ultimately negative 
insofar as they sustain inaction, and thus the status quo, while positive arguments work better 
to persuade an audience to take action. Arguments that appeal to fear are typically used in 
issues of health and safety. However, legitimate or not, argumentation cannot be based 
dominantly or solely on appeal to fear. A complete absence of rational reasoning makes the 
argumentation weak and represents a short-cut solution to a complex question.  
 
Table 3 Appeal to fear in argumentation 
Europhobes Europhiles 
If Croatia becomes a member of the EU 
without consulting its people, the 
demonstrations in Greece and on Wall 
Street are going to be a “piece of cake” 
compared to Croatia (I. Vekić, former 
minister internal affairs) 
If we miss this chance, the alternative is a 
Western Balkan. Our standard [of living] 
will decrease. We will suffer. (J. Radoš, 
HNS)  
We have had bad experiences in joining 
big unions. Disintegration of such unions 
always ends in bloodshed and Croatia is 
always a part of it. It has happened with 
I don`t want to be cruel, but if we do not 
become a member of EU there won’t be 
any pensions. (V. Pusić, HNS)  
 218 
Yugoslavia, Austro-Hungarian empire 
(D. Srb, HSP)  
The EU is going to exploit our natural 
resources, take our water—which is 
going to be worthier than oil in a few 
years—and we are going to be left with 
nothing (M. Francisković,  representative 
of civil organization “Be brave”) 
Without the EU our credit rating is going 
to fall, and there will be no economic 
prospect for us. (V. Pusić, HNS) 
Croatia is going to be stepped upon all 
over, and we are going to be a worthless 
European province (M. Bošnjak, 
representative of civil organization “EU – 
No, thank you”) 
There is no other alternative for Croatia, 
we can only stay in the Balkan (Z. 
Milanović, prime minister) 
 
Arguments presented in the speeches of both supporters and opponents to the EU were weak, 
fallacious and regularly overlooked other alternatives (The EU is the only possible solution 
according to supporters of the EU; otherwise we are going to suffer, be poor, without 
pensions and prospect. If we become an EU member, we are going to lose our independence, 
language and identity, according to EU opponets.) It is not implausible that appeals to fear 
may have caused a negative attitude toward the EU referendum in general; less than 50% of 
Croatian citizens voted in the referendum. Appeals to fear then were a dominant 
argumentation strategy for both Europhobes and Europhiles, which in turn caused the 
disapproval of many human rights activists. Željko Puhovski, one of the founders and 
presidents of the Croatian Helsinki Committee concluded at the end of the referendum: “This 
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is a good result for the EU. It is a shame that it was not reached in democratic way.”(Večernji 
list, January 23 2012) 
 
3.2.1. Preferred types of argument in the speeches of Europhiles 
 
Argumentation in the speeches of Europhobes and Europhiles showed some 
differences in the choice of arguments. Supporters of the EU (such as the Prime Minister, 
government members and the president) frequently used the argument from expert opinion 
which is a species of the argument from authority. Rieke & Sillars (2000: 123) explain that 
“even persons of high credibility frequently use the credibility of others to argue a claim. In 
argument from authority you argue that a claim is justified because it is held by a credible 
person.” Willard (1990) claims that public decision-makers are inescapably dependent on 
authoritative testimony from experts. “The public decision-maker’s dependence on authority 
is most apparent when we consider that most decisions are inferences drawn from facts or, 
more accurately, drawn from testimony interpreting facts” (1990: 12). 
Authorities who were frequently cited, paraphrased or just referred to included:  
1. Paul Vandoren, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic 
of Croatia who is referred to when explaining job opportunities in EU in the speeches of the 
minister of foreign affairs Vesna Pusić. 
2. Stefan Fuele, Commissioner responsible for enlargement and European neighborhood 
policy who announced the end of the negotiation process; he was referred to in the speech of J. 
Kosor when arguing for new economic opportunities Croatia is going to get when becoming a 
member of European Union. 
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3. Jose Manuel Barosso, President of the European Commission whose words “this is a 
victory moment for all Croatian citizens” after Croatia signed the ascension treaty were cited 
in the speech of president Josipović who promised a higher standard of living.   
4. Berndt Posselt, a German representative in the European Parliament who was 
paraphrased in Jadranka Kosor’s speech as saying that Croatia had the most difficult 
requirements to become a member and by fulfilling them she becomes the most valuable 
member of EU. 
 
Statements of European representatives were used to support the position of the 
Europhiles on how important it is for Croatia to become a member, how successful the 
negotiation process was (implying that Croatia satisfied many of the EU’s criteria, and 
therefore improved on its extant laws, judicial system, human rights etc.) and how important 
and welcome Croatia is in the European Union.  
As Walton (2006: 87) writes: “The appeal to expert opinion is based on the 
assumption that the source is alleged to be in a position to know about a subject because he or 
she has expert knowledge of that subject. Appeal to expert opinion should, in most typical 
cases, at any rate, be seen as a plausible but defeasible form of argumentation.”  
Similarly, Wagemans (2011: 331) writes about the assessment of argumentation from expert 
opinion which is characterized as “argumentation that renders an opinion (more) acceptable 
by claiming that the opinion is asserted by an expert.” 
In analyzed speeches, the argument from expert opinion is easily defeasible because of 
the biases of EU representatives. Their knowledge and expertise on EU affairs are not in 
question, because the cited authorities are highly positioned representatives with experience in 
politics. The question, rather, is exactly how biased those authorities are. They are certainly 
not neutral and objective, since they were involved in the negotiation process, and impartiality 
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may be viewed as necessary characteristics of authority. From an epistemological perspective, 
arguments from expert opinion are a weak part of the Europhile’s argumentation since, as 
Walton emphasized: “Using the appeal to expert opinion as an argument should not be seen as 
a substitute for getting factual evidence by scientific methods of data collection” (2006:  
88). 
Epistemologically stronger arguments by Europhiles were found in speeches citing 
facts, statistics and examples which they frequently used to point out the benefits of EU 
membership. Their claims that a better life, a higher living standard and more job 
opportunities would follow from joining the EU were sometimes supported by facts. For 
instance, the minister of foreign affairs Vesna Pusić, in an interview for the television show 
“EU 28” (which specifically addressed questions on Croatian EU ascension), explained what 
the EU means for Croatian citizens:  
 
“[…] more money in EU development funds than ever before in the Croatian budget and 
development projects are what makes for new employment and a stronger economy. We will 
get 3.5 billion Euros in the first two years of membership, 373 million Euros for Agriculture. 
Every Croatian citizen will be free to move and work in all the countries of the EU, students 
will be able to study abroad. Custom duties and limitations on goods and capital movement 
will be eliminated.” 
 
Although, the possibility of funding becoming available for Croatia is a good 
argument from consequences, what it lacks is warrant. For instance, the alleged connection 
between custom duties and a higher standard of living is not explained in the above example. 
In the same interview, V. Pusić talks about a better judiciary system:  
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“When becoming a member of the EU, the courts are not going to be something that give you 
stomach aches, courts are going to help you, be at your service.” 
 
Further on, she claims:  
 
“The biggest benefit is stability of the state and institutions.  In the EU people will not have to 
fear for their heritage, for their property, for their lives. The EU provides a guarantee for long 
term stability, and living in a community which is stable is the biggest benefit of all.” 
 
Her speech is, strictly speaking, an example of circular reasoning; traditionally know 
as petitio principii (i.e., the claim to be supported is presupposed). It this case stability in 
Croatia is supported with stability of the EU (which is a slightly different claim, and could be 
supported independently).  
Another characteristic of Europhile argumentation is the frequent use of arguments 
based on popular opinion (ad populum). Although classical logical analyses regularly 
consider an argumentum ad populum to be fallacious, Freeman (2005) writes that such 
arguments are often assumed to be reasonable, or to have at least some standing, especially in 
democratic political system and political argumentation. Herbst (1993) conducted research on 
how opinion polling shapes politics and states that many arguments in both the political and 
the private sphere are based on premises that express what public opinion is supposed to be. 
Walton (2006) concludes it is important that arguments are evaluated in each particular case. 
If so, then the arguments based on popular opinion in the speeches of the Europhiles are in 
most cases fallacious. For instance, the former Prime Minister J. Kosor’s statement: “It is 
important to learn how to function inside EU and live by the rules which are good for 500 
million Europeans,” implies: ‘if it is good for 500 million people, it will be good for us’ 
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which may be considered to be fallacious. It is plausible that, because of Croatian historical, 
political, economical or geographical characteristics, perception or acceptance of some 
political rules is going to be debatable.  
The claim that Croatia achieved a good agreement with the EU during the negotiation 
process has also been supported by the number of people who worked on that project. J. 
Kosor’s argument that “More than 3000 people in Croatia worked on the EU project for more 
than 6 years, closed 35 chapters, met a requirement for more than 400 criteria” is again 
fallacious, in the sense that the number of people and amount of time is not a guarantee of 
quality (though it may defeasibly indicate such quality). 
3.2.2. Preferred types of argument in the speeches of Europhobes 
 
Europhobes, which were mostly represented by activists and representatives of civil 
organizations, participated in political talk shows and organized protests, arguing that Croatia 
should say NO on the referendum for EU ascension. The main characteristic of their speeches 
was the frequent use of argumentum ad hominem which can be considered as the main 
difference in the argumentation between opponents and supporters of the EU. In contrast, 
Europhiles almost never attacked their opponent’s character.  
Copi and Cohen (1990: 97) explain ad hominem as follows:  
 
 
“It is very common in rough-and-tumble argument to disparage the character of the opponents, 
to deny their intelligence or reasonableness, to question their integrity and so on. But the 
personal character of an individual is logically irrelevant to the truth or falsehood of what that 
person says, or the correctness or incorrectness of that person’s argument.”  
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Contemporary research in argumentation theory, however, recognizes that there is a 
“good” argumentum ad hominem:  
 
“A good ad hominem bases a claim on premises that show that someone is in some 
way unreliable. The version of ad hominem we call an ‘argument against authority’ argues 
that a person is not a reliable authority and should not, therefore, be taken seriously. (...) It is 
important to distinguish ad hominem attacks that discredit a person’s position because of their 
character from attacks on the person alone. The latter is often called an abusive ad hominem 
because it does little more than hurl abuse.” (Groarke and Tindale, 2013: 320)   
 
Therefore, argumentum ad hominem is not always fallacious; it might be considered 
as a legitimate argument which is “relevant to the conclusion of the argument when the person 
in question is supposed to be an expert” (Mizrahi, 2010: 438). However, in our case study the 
arguments used by opponents to the EU are instances of the abusive ad hominem, and so 
logically irrelevant for a critical discussion. They are instances of what Woods calls 
“slanging.” “Slanging is a rhetorical device, as old as the hills. Its objective is to expose, 
embarrass, ridicule, mock, calumniate or humiliate one’s opponent, typically with the intent 
of rattling him dialectically” (Woods, 2007: 109).  
Our analysis of speakers protesting against the EU evidences the usage of a number of 
abusive ad hominem arguments.  
 
 
Table 4 Use of abusive ad hominem arguments 
Example of ad hominem argument Speaker 
Who is leading us to Europe? Sons of Dražen Keleminec (representative of the 
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those who were once for Yugoslavia, for 
Tito, for communism, who were against 
Croatia. The father of Ivo Josipović was a 
well known communist, Radimir Čačić is 
a communist child, Zoran Milanović’s 
grandfather was a partisan. 
radical right wing party A-HSP) 
Who represented Croatia in the EU 
Parliament in signing the treaty....Bebić, 
Pusić, Pupovac and the rest of the traitors 
of our country 
Dražen Keleminec (representative of 
radical right wing party A-HSP) 
Everyone who believes in the EU is 
crazy. They were brain-washed.  
Ivan Pernar (representative of a civil 
organization “Coalition for changes”) 
When minister Linić said that our wallets 
will be full in the EU – believe me, he 
was thinking of his own wallet, not yours 
or mine.  
Ivan Pernar (representative of a civil 
organization “Coalition for changes”) 
Members of our government are traitors 
who spit on our history, who turned their 
backs on our generals, villains who rule 
in our country  
Željko Sačić (representative of the 
council “No to EU) 
Those who support the EU are naive and 
have the logic of a small child.  
Marko Francisković (representative of a 
civil organization “Be brave”) 
They are cheaters and their campaign is 
nothing but fraud.  
Roko Šikić (representative of civil 
organization “I love Croatia”) 
All of them who are supporting the EU Natko Kovačević (representative of civil 
 226 
will be judged and processed by the 
Croatian people because they are traitors.  
organization “Justice”) 
Our miserable, worthless politicians 
brought us here, on the verge of disaster. 
Željko Sačić (representative of the 
council “No to EU) 
Jadranka Kosor and Ivo Josipović talk 
about a historic event. They are historic 
traitors. 
Josip Miljak (HČSP) 
Communists that are now our 
government scare us with the Balkan. 
They married Serbian women, they sleep 
with them and scare us with Balkan?! 
Josip Miljak (HČSP) 
Our politicians are not people, they are 
rats.  
Ivan Pernar (representative of civil 
organization “Coalition for changes”) 
 
Examples such as the above show that the abusive argumentum ad hominem occurs 
with some frequency in the speeches of Europhobes. Discrediting politicians who support the 
EU appears to be the main argumentative strategy. However, they are rarely attacking their 
opponent’s expertise and political competence (this holds especially for the newly elected 
government). As mentioned above, supporting and opposing the EU has ideological grounds 
in the Croatian political discourse. The source of this dispute is the 1990s war between Serbia 
(more precisely, the Yugoslav communist army) and Croatia. Thus, history and a person’s 
ethnic origin are the main bases for abusive versions of the argumentum ad hominem.  
Apart from an appeal to fear and the abusive argumentum ad hominem, the other most 
common form of argumentation used by Europhobes is based on an appeal to pity.  
Aggressive presentation and appeal to pity often go hand in hand. Walton (1997: 135) writes:  
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“[T]he problem is that in many cases appeals to pity are weak and poorly substantiated as 
logical inferences, yet pressed forward in an aggressive and emotionally powerful 
presentation that is designed to overwhelm the critical judgment of the respondent”.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in their speeches Europhobes often refer to the war in Croatia in 
the 1990s, to Croatian generals who are charged at the The Hague court, and to injustice 
during their prosecution, to the city of Vukovar and to the thousands of Croatian citizens who 
lost their lives during the war. The Europhobes hold that in this context, the European Union 
is to blame for war (“The EU was on the Chetnik’s side during the war” – N. Kovačević, 
representative of civil organization “Justice”), the EU is responsible for bringing the generals 
to The Hague, where the Croatian government abandoned them and, in the opinion of the 
Europhobes, gave independence to the “godless creation called EU which wants to turn us 
into the slaves” (Europhobes protest on the Zagreb’s main square, January 12
th
 2012 reported 
on all Croatian national televisions). 
In general, Europhobes offered very weak argumentation. Sometimes it was even 
absurd, including many contradictions, and appeals to emotions. A good example of such 
absurd claims, weak argumentation and an aggressive presentation is provided by Davor 
Pavuna, a Croatian scientist and Europhobe. In the political discussion presented on Croatian 
television, he claimed that Croatia has no chance for prosperity in the EU because it has a 
population of only 5 million people (his opponent gave him an example of small countries 
which are successful and big countries which are not, concluding that the size of the 
population is not significant for the prosperity of a country). Further on, when asked about 
alternatives to the EU, he responded:  “The alternative to the EU is Croatization of the planet” 
which, according to him, is possible insofar as Croats currently live in 40 different countries 
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all over the world. So, on the one hand, there are not enough Croatians to succeed in the EU, 
while a “Croatization of the planet” is claimed to be possible. Because of the obvious 
contradictions and the absurdity of the idea of a “Croatization of the planet,” this speaker was 
not taken seriously, and his argumentation soon came to be seen as rationally unacceptable.    
A similar answer to the frequently asked question “What is the alternative to the EU” 
was provided by Gordan Masnjak, a representative of the civil organization “No to EU” who 
addressed a Croatian audience with the answer “the alternative are all of you!” 
Often represented by speakers with an aggressive presentation, the Europhobes’ 
absurd claims and weak argumentation did not enjoy a strong credibility in the Croatian 
public sphere. The weakest point of their argumentation, and thus one of the reasons why the 
Europhiles appeal to fear was more effective, consisted in not being able to answer the 
question on the alternative to the EU. Answers such as “the alternative are the Croatian people; 
the alternative is a Croatization of planet; the alternative is Croatia becoming like Switzerland” 
were neither persuasive nor convincing. The risk of an economic collapse and a poor credit 
rating (as consequences of remaining outside of the EU) was regarded as the more plausible 
consequence of non-EU membership than the loss of identity and independence.   
 
4. Conclusion 
Political discourse analysis in Croatia regarding the question of EU ascension included 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which focused on the usage of expressive and 
ideologically marked words and figures of speech, as well as a Rhetorical Analysis which 
aimed at discovering the means of persuasion and preferred argumentation strategies in the 
speeches of the supporters and opponents of EU.  
The argumentation analysis proceeded descriptively, and aimed at identifying the 
strength and validity of the arguments in the speeches of Europhobes and Europhiles. 
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Europhobes claimed that Croatian citizens should vote NO on the referendum, while 
Europhiles claimed that they have to say YES. Argumentation for the claims of both sides 
was based on appeal to emotions, especially the appeal to fear (rather than more rational 
forms of reasoning). Europhobes stated that becoming a member of the EU meant a loss of 
independence and sovereignty; this emotional effect appears to have been intensified by 
mentioning the war which Croatia has led to gain its independence after the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. Using the comparison between Yugoslavia and the EU, they predicted another 
war for Croatia—which plausibly amounted to the strongest appeal to fear available in this 
context. Europhiles on the other hand compared Croatia with other Balkan countries, and 
predicted poverty and isolation as consequences of not becoming an EU member. Appeals to 
fear were accompanied by expressive and ideologically marked words such as Euroslavia, 
slavery and humiliation on the one hand, and a historic chance and a new age on the other.  
The main difference between the argumentation of Europhobes and Europhiles was 
the use of the abusive argumentum and hominem, often found in the speeches of Europhobes 
but rarely used by Europhiles. The strategy of attacking an opponent’s credibility, thus his or 
her ethos, was dominant but was deemed fallacious in this study. After all, such attacks were 
normally not directed at the opponent’s competence, and were normally not corroborated with 
facts or supported by examples. Rather, such attacks were aimed at offending them on a 
national basis, by referring to their ethnic or political origin (e.g., coming from a Serbian or 
communist family); in other cases these attacks were straightforward assault such as calling 
them liars, rats, traitors etc.  
Europhiles used the argument from authority to support their claims on job 
opportunities, funding possibilities, the political importance of Croatia etc. Arguments from 
authority were in this study deemed to be not very strong, considering the subjectivity and 
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bias of the cited politicians; however, they were frequently corroborated by facts and 
examples.   
Persuasion through reference to the ethos of the speaker may be expected in political 
discourse where a trustworthy character is important. We believe that this had a significant 
influence on the result of the referendum (which resulted in a 64% vote pro EU membership). 
Representatives of Europhiles included members of the former government, the president 
(who was the most popular Croatian politician) and members of the new government (which 
won the elections one month before the referendum). Europhobes enjoyed a rather poor 
credibility because they were not unified, nor organized, but scattered across several small 
parties or organizations, and were often represented by extremists known to the public for 
their unpopular, intolerant nationalistic attitudes.  
In conclusion, this analysis supports the claim that the Croatian political discourse on 
the issue of EU ascension paid insufficient attention to logos, i.e., rational reasoning, as a way 
of supporting claims and persuading audiences in the public sphere.  
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Rhetoric ― Martial Art or the Art of Winning the Soul by Discourse? 
Language of Politicians vs. Ethos, Pathos and Logos 
Joanna Szczepańska-Włoch, Jagiellonian University 
Martial art. 
The art of winning the soul by discourse (Plato). 
A collection of stones piled with the aim of laying a mosaic. The style of the mosaic depends 
on the intentions of the craftsman, the time he lives in; thus everyone leaves his individual 
mark (Lichański). 
The application of reason to imagination “for the better moving of the will” (Bacon). 
 
Summary 
“All men (…) up to a certain point, endeavour to criticise or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to 
accuse” (Aristotle, 1959: 3). Hence politicians cannot do otherwise and “rhetoric as a technique of argument (...) 
rather than of ornamentation”, one of the oldest surviving disciplines (Dixon, 1971: 14), whose insights and rules 
still possess the capacity to adjust to the ideological and social change (Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 3), is to 
forward the achievement of the goals politicians work towards. In this study an attempt is made to depict the 
persuasive dialogue in the functional language, i.e. the language of politicians in the Polish political arena. Prior 
to that, structuring the content of the article, a theoretical background and methodology are proposed based on 
The Art of Rhetoric by Aristotle (1959). Three kinds of proofs, means of persuasion or structural principles by 
virtue of which the goal is attained, i.e. ethos, pathos and logos, are addressed. In the part to follow we will 
analyse several models of arguments which prevail in the political speeches as well as various means of 
rendering ethos and pathos. 
Key words: language of politicians, inventio, ethos, pathos, logos 
 
1. Introduction 
Classical rhetoricians defined rhetoric as ars bene dicendi, the art of speaking well, the art 
or skill conveying bene aesthetic beauty and ethical value in dicendi oral and written texts 
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(Wilczek, 2009: 8). Plato perceived it as the art of leading (“alluring” or “beguiling” – Asmus, 
1986: 156) the soul by means of words – seeing in it its deceptive nature, while Gorgias called 
it “a means of fascination, peculiar psychagogia, spiritual seduction with a magical effect” 
(Kucz, 2009: 18), holding “the power to effect ‘most divine’ deeds” (Asmus, 1986: 156). 
Aristotle (1959: 15) referred to rhetoric as the “the faculty of discovering the possible means 
of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever”. He argued that rhetoric served “the 
function of no other of the arts, each of which was able to instruct and persuade in its own 
special subject”. Rhetoric was not so much to persuade as to find “the existing means of 
persuasion” (Aristotle, 1959: 13). This belief also “removes rhetoric from the realm of the 
haphazard and the fanciful” (Dixon, 1971: 14), the charge which was often filed by the 
Aristotle’s opponents. 
Aristotle (1959: 3) in his definition of rhetoric compares rhetoric to dialectic, saying it is 
its “counterpart (…) for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the 
cognizance of all men and not confined to any special science”. He explicates that “all men 
(…) up to a certain point, endeavour to criticise or uphold an argument, to defend themselves 
or to accuse”. However, it needs to be emphasised that some do it accidently, while others do 
so habitually. We can infer that some do not possess any knowledge of the art of rhetoric, 
while others grasped the insights and use it to their advantage. The above-mentioned 
definition applies to the language of politicians, who sometimes appear to criticise or support 
an argument, or attempt to refute it, or defend it or accuse their opponents of some error in 
reasoning. It cannot, however, escape our attention that in the contemporary language of 
politics, public relations play a prominent role. Thus the arcane art of how to address the 
public is becoming or has already become an indispensable and required skill for every 
politician wishing to achieve success, even if doing so amounts to blurring his/her real 
positions. “Rhetoric as a technique of argument (...) rather than of ornamentation” (Dixon, 
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1971: 14) is to forward its achievement. Even if it constitutes one of the oldest surviving 
disciplines, its insights and rules still possess the capacity to adjust to the ideological and 
social change (Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 3). 
 
2. Data presentation 
 
The persuasive dialogue in functional language, i.e. the language of politicians, constitutes 
the central focus of this article. The Art of Rhetoric by Aristotle (1959), in turn, serves as the 
theoretical background structuring the content of the article. Three kinds of proofs (ethos, 
pathos and logos) are discussed, followed by the elaboration of various models of 
argumentation. 
The ultimate success of the persuasive dialogue is subject to the language chosen to fit in 
with the subject of the interaction, the social context and the audience. Not only the persuader 
but also the persuadee needs to be involved, for the dialogic interaction entails reciprocal 
participation and involvement. In the material examined we will concentrate on the pragmatic 
and linguistic techniques the persuader uses so as to influence the audience. The material 
comprises two presidential debates held on 27th and 30th June 2010, between two candidates: 
Jarosław Kaczyński, representing Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice), and Bronisław 
Komorowski, the candidate of Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform). The data for the 
analysis come from the website of Gazeta Wyborcza: http://wyborcza.pl/. All the extracts 
have been translated by the author of the article. 
 




Cicero (1948: I. 142, quoted in Dixon, 1971: 24) presents a process of rhetorical 
composition, in which the orator “must first hit upon what to say; then manage and marshal 
his discoveries, not merely in orderly fashion, but with a discriminating eye for the exact 
weight of each argument; next go on to array them in the adornments of style; after that keep 
them guarded in his memory; and in the end deliver them with effect and charm”. The above-
mentioned explication can be transferred into skills which consist of “five phases/stages” 
(Lichański, 2007: 87; Wilczek, 2009: 9-10): invention (inventio), arrangement or disposition 
(dispositio), style (elocutio), memory (memoria) and delivery (actio). Our attention, though, 
will be attached only to the first stage of the classical composition, namely inventio. 
 
3.1  Inventio 
Invention, being the skill of finding and collecting material, includes: proof, topics, and 
commonplaces (Dixon, 1971: 24; Lichański, 2007: 96). Proof, according to Aristotle (1959: 
15), can be inartificial or artificial, the latter denotes the invention of the speaker, the former 
the evidence of the law court (Dixon, 1971: 24). In turn, the artificial proof is subdivided into 
ethos, pathos and logos. 
These three kinds of proofs, means of persuasion or structural principles by virtue of 
which the goal is attained denote: ethos “the moral character of the speaker” (persuasion 
through personality and stance), pathos “putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind” 
(persuasion through the arousal of emotion), and logos “the speech itself, in so far as it proves 






Aristotle (1959) in defining ethos as depending upon “moral character” stresses that it is 
the “moral character” of the orator that represents the most influential means of proof when 
persuading the audience. He explains that to persuade by means of perceived “moral character” 
the orator needs to deliver a speech in such a manner that the audience will find him/her 
worthy of confidence. Following Robert and Susan Cockcroft (2005) ethos will be divided 
into personality and stance. 
Personality is rendered as the power to win trust and confidence in the audience, impress 
them with individuality. Trust, as Garver (1994: 132-138) and Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 
16) stress, comprises “moral strength (arête), benevolence (eunoia)”, “constructive 
competence or the ability to offer shrewd, practical but principled advice (phronesis)”. As to 
the individuality, it translates into differentiating such traits of character that would best suit 
the audience and the topic. What also affects the persuadee is the level of the individual 
engagement of the persuader, the higher the level appears to be, the more compelling the 
persuasion. 
Stance equals the persuader’s viewpoint, vantage point, the issue which rests upon the 
source of the process of interaction, for the success of the exchange cannot be guaranteed in 
its absence. Stance is inherently interactive, and evinces group values, yet, it is entirely 
contingent upon the persuader. 
The assessment and confidence of the audience placed in the persuader will be 
substantially dependent on the persuader’s stance, along with the personality and image. The 
persuader, on the other hand, must be attentive, observe, adjust to the needs of the audience, 
establish empathy with the audience. Lynette Hunter (1984, quoted in Cockcroft and 
Cockcroft, 2005: 31) asserts that what matters is not the topic someone relies on, but the 
manner with which they do so. The persuader can assume either a firm, rigid and authoritative 
stance; an indecisive and flexible one; or suppress it before disclosing it later. The stance may 
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take the form of a structured and ordered process of interaction or a disorganised and 
uncontrollable one. Nevertheless, as Quintilian (1920) upholds, no fixed rules are to be found 
that can facilitate persuasion. Still, pragmatism, adaptability and flexibility in one’s stance are 
requisite in order that success is guaranteed. Human capability of choosing the rhetorical 
language facilitating persuasion cannot be excluded as well. 
Hunter (1984, quoted in Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 32) also discriminates between 
positive and negative rhetoric, the former explicates the persuader’s stance as the interaction 
progresses, depicting shifts in stance; the latter conceals the values and the standpoint. The 
part the audience plays is equally significant. The audience must discern the stance, spot the 
strategy and evaluate its principles. For, as Hunter (ibid.) maintains, there is nothing worse 
than naiveté of the audience since it results in the audience surrendering to the imposed stance. 
 
3.1.2 Ethos – Patterns of behaviour adopted by the persuader 
Coming back to the persuader’s stance, we shall propose a few patterns of behaviour s/he 
can exhibit. To begin with, the persuader can prioritise a stance such that the audience 
perceives the benefits for themselves (positive face, Involvement Strategy (Scollon and 
Scollon 1995)), seeks approval, the positive self-image (Brown and Levinson 1987; Kasper 
1994; Scollon and Scollon 1995; Fairclough 1989/2001; Fairclough 1992/2008). The other 
pattern relies on the opposite assumption, i.e. the persuader being in the privileged or 
empowered position threatens the audience with the exclusion of the benefits, hence plays on 
the emotions, pathos, of the audience (negative face – the want of self-determination, the 
claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction). Tactics described above 
reflect the concept of saving or threatening face rooted in Brown and Levinson’s theory
46
. 
                                                 
46
 For details on the aspect of face with reference to the language of politicians, see Szczepańska-Włoch (2010). 
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As a subsequent tactic worth drawing our attention to, the persuader may adopt lies on the 
belief that “being yourself” does not entail success. Customarily, the persuader needs to 
implement intuition and calculation in displaying his/her stance, determine how much of self, 
image and personality to propose so that it will not discourage a prospective listener. Too 
personal or too impersonal a stance can be equally counter-effective (Hunter 1984). 
Likewise, humour can serve as a tactic deployed by the persuader. It conveys either 
a release of tension, acts as a reflection of a non-serious stance, or an embodiment of the 
persuader’s personality, being the consequence of his/her conviction. Lastly, it can also 
function as a gun that cons the audience into falsehood, ergo yields dubious benefits. 
Changing sides by the persuader and his/her willingness to admit it openly constitutes 
a strategy which, if managed skilfully, can bring a desirable effect. Nonetheless, it appears to 
be risky and requires a considerable skill. For the inconsistency of stance can exert an adverse 
impact and lead to the feeling of distrust on the part of the audience (ibid.). 
Stance and personality are realised by basic features of language that, as Cockcroft and 
Cockcroft (2005: 38) suggest, “lay the foundations of meaning and human contact”. The 
dialectic of persuasion is to be grounded in three functions propounded by Halliday (1973), i.e. 
ideational (ideas about the real world), interpersonal (social relationships), and textual 
(realisation of language choices). All the functions enumerated must be fulfilled so that the 
persuasive character of ethos is communicated. The first one ‒ ideational, say, can be realised 
by making use of the language depicting the persuadees’s experience; the second one – 
interpersonal – by the use of modal verbs (expressing possibility, uncertainty, criticism, 
expectation, etc.), and personal pronouns (showing distance); the textual function ‒ by virtue 




To illustrate the above points and to see how politicians realise ethos, two extracts from 
the presidential debate held on 27th June 2010 are presented. In the first extract Jarosław 
Kaczyński (a leader of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) responds to the question on the equality of 
opportunities between regions in Poland: 
 
(1) We have two conceptions in Poland. One, in short, is called the conception of 
motor force and it is the conception of concentrating resources in those regions of 
the country in which we can already encounter a substantial level of prosperity, in 
addition, it has been estimated that the above-mentioned level of prosperity will 
later spread over other regions of our homeland. And there is the conception of 
the balanced development, of which I am a loyal supporter and which I developed 
when I was the Prime Minister. It is the conception of a special support for those 
regions of Poland, which suffer – through no fault of theirs in general, most often 
through no fault of theirs – a certain backwardness. It was articulated by an 
algorithm of the implementation of the European funds, very beneficial for the 
least favoured voivodeships [a voivodeship – a Polish administrative district 
equivalent to a province―ftn. JSW], in particular those in the east, as well as 
special programmes, which we managed to win for those voivodeships in Brussels. 
In short, we are of the opinion that a ‘good’ development of Poland is equivalent to 
a balanced development, and it is essentially in the interest of all of us. For the 
reason that nowhere in the world the development via those so-called motor forces 
– it has its scholarly name I will not allude to – brought desirable effects, islands of 
prosperity and the ocean of stagnation were established, or such spheres where the 
reverse process took place, where they were getting poorer. In short, it would be 
better if we do not try to implement that conception, I refer to it because the 
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present government has proposed such sorts of plans under such scholarly terms. 
Those are the plans which are not compatible with what is going on in Poland, 
since it is not that those metropolises are developing so rapidly in Poland, and, 
I repeat, that conception has not been checked anywhere in the world. Here our 
standpoint is firm, my standpoint is univocal, as the President of the Republic of 
Poland, I will do everything to make Poland develop in a balanced manner. 
 
After a brief introduction of two concepts of the economic reform of Poland, Jarosław 
Kaczyński openly presents his firm standpoint in saying “I am a loyal supporter”, via the use 
of the first person singular pronoun “I” he emphasises his view. Only twice does he use “I”, in 
the exordium and peroratio stages of the speech, to open and close his composition, with the 
aim of demonstrating his rigid stance (interpersonal function). By contrast, in the course of 
his speech Kaczyński repeats the first person plural pronoun “we” four times, thus he 
identifies with his party and reflects their values, or wishes to “get closer” to the audience and 
warm (improve) his image (Fairclough 1989/2001). Kaczyński also repeats the phrase: 
“through no fault of theirs in general, most often through no fault of theirs”, to claim common 
ground with the audience (ideational function), or rather prospective voters, i.e. the 
inhabitants of the disadvantaged regions, the reason being to win their votes. By referring to 
the “so-called motor force” and “scholarly term”, he depreciates the government’s policy, 
moreover, with a derogatory tone. Further, he claims common ground with the people, 
distances himself from the world of science, often perceived as foreign to the average citizen 
of the country
47
. Subsequently, he refutes the opponent’s idea by displaying its uselessness. 
He concludes his speech by confirming his stance. 
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 It needs to be emphasised that politicians appear to juggle that strategy; depending on the aim they strive to 
achieve they either distance themselves from the world of science or show their affiliation with it. 
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In the second excerpt Bronisław Komorowski (a candidate of Platforma Obywatelska 
for the presidential seat), being interviewed about the problem of legalization of homosexual 
relationships, declares: 
 
(2) So, there is a question whether a new law should be established. For in accordance 
with the Polish law, in effect at present, there is a possibility for inheriting, there is 
a possibility for medical care for all the people living in such relationships, which 
are not marriages, except for a few cases concerning, among others, adoption 
rights I cannot imagine that in Poland such a bill can ever be brought forward to 
the president’s office, since it is something different to create possibilities for 
living together and taking care of each other, and inheriting, and it is something 
different to go in the direction of mechanisms, or regulations, which concern 
a sphere, or a traditional model of family. I suppose that it is rather a fancy 
question, because I don’t expect that such a legislative initiative is probable in the 
nearest future, it is rather being talked about in quite narrow circles. One should be 
decent towards everyone, we should not be too inquisitive about the private lives 
of others, but we can also solve problems of people living in such relationships 
decently, in accordance with the law currently in effect. If it turned out that 
something is missing, that some mechanisms require polishing up, that, for 
example, there is no easy access to medical care, when somebody goes to hospital, 
so such a bill should be enforced in the name of political decency. But we 
shouldn’t mix it with a problem of marriage, adoption or other situations of that 




The question posed by the interviewer appears to be somewhat controversial, 
especially for a politician representing a right-wing and centre-right-wing party. Nevertheless, 
even if Komorowski evades answering the question, he does not conceal his standpoint. Later, 
we can decipher that he is in favour of a traditional family model, though, it is expressed 
covertly (ideational function). He makes use of hedges of casual conversation, such as “I 
suppose”, modal verbs: “can”, negative form of “can” – “cannot”, “should”, a conditional 
structure to avoid answering (textual function). He does so in the face of an oncoming election 
and in order not to discourage a part of his electorate. Komorowski’s lexical choice, the use of 
colloquial or humorous words, e.g. “fancy” (in Polish wydumany denoting something 
“unlikely, improbable, fake” (Słownik Języka Polskiego), or “trivial, made-up, far-fetched” 
(Słownik Synonimów)) or a not very complex syntax, as well as an impersonal style also serve 
to create his positive image (interpersonal function). The aforementioned factors contribute to 
the adaptability and flexibility of the candidate, factors which guarantee success in 
the political discourse, which in turn is persuasive in its nature. 
To recapitulate, Quintilian maintains that “no man can be a good orator unless he is 
a good man” (Non posse oratorem esse nisi virum bonum – Quintilian, 1907: 416 [12,1,1], 
quoted in Kucz, 2009: 31). Plato (1973: 83), on the other hand, holds that the persuader is an 
“expert in rhetorical subtlety”, equipped with the knowledge of speech cohesion and 
coherence (structure of the speech) enabling to offer proof, but without any insight into and 
consideration of truthfulness or real knowledge of the subject. Which perception appears to be 
closer to the contemporary definition of the persuader-politician? With the power of PR 
prevailing in the public eye, shaping the ethos of every celebrity in such a manner that by 
means of distinctiveness s/he becomes persuasive, losing the real meaning on the way, the 
answer is: the latter. Today, Aristotelian ethos is substituted for a highly powerful “image” 
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exerting a considerable effect on the persuasive language, the success of which is often 
founded on the image (dress, speech), and political charisma (voice, language, or appearance). 
 
3.1.3 Pathos 
Pathos is equivalent to persuasion through an emotion that is roused (Aristotle, 1959: 17), 
thus the orator by virtue of “a certain frame of mind” entices the audience. The persuader will 
intentionally use an emotional appeal, which many a time constitutes a source of distrust of 
rhetoric, owing to “its association with insincerity, irrationality and rabble-rousing” 
(Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 55). It seems that there is no other way but to employ 
emotions to manipulate the audience. After all, as Damasio (1999, quoted in Cockcroft and 
Cockcroft, 2005: 55) holds “humans cannot think properly unless, as a prior condition, they 
feel”. Downes (2000, in Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005: 55) adds that what we feel mirrors 
what we think by means of semiotic systems, i.e. verbal and non-verbal signs. Nonetheless, it 
should be propounded that emotions can obscure the view, preventing people from gaining a 
broader and a true perspective on the issues raised, and when out of control can threaten and 
discourage the audience. 
Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 57) propose two kinds of emotions: universal and 
contingent. The former reflects emotions common to humanity (e.g. joy, anger, fear), the 
latter emotions as socially conditioned manifestation (e.g. pride, contempt, indignation, guilt). 
Both are culture-specific, context-dependent, historically-bound and central to persuasive 
rhetoric. Both are present in literary and functional persuasion, though universal emotion is 
often associated with literary persuasion or formal discourse (Nash, 1989). 
The use of pathos by the orator will in a substantial manner depend on the agreement 
between the persuader, the topic and the audience in a socially structured context. 
Notwithstanding, it is within the ability of the speaker or writer that s/he adjusts the language 
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to match the topic raised and to appeal to the audience. Therefore it is language that plays 
a vital role in the persuasive discourse. It is also via language that the standpoint, the 
prejudices the persuader holds are unveiled. Ergo at this point we return to the 
interdependence of thought, feeling, and language (and its social context)
48
. 
Following Cicero and Quintilian (1920), vivid and graphic language appears to be 
a persuasive factor, enabling the actualisation of emotions. The above-mentioned authors use 
energeia and fantasia to influence the hearer, energeia renders clarity, fantasia imagination. 
A subsequent factor carrying a highly persuasive aim, somewhat different than the above one, 
is the use of abstract concepts, such as honour, patriotism, or justice. The orator making use 
of the cited concepts may move the audience substantially by alluding to the topics they 
regard highly. Such a strategy resorts to the individual strongly-held beliefs and values, which 
assure the audience of the truthfulness of the persuader and arouse greater confidence in him. 
Again, we revert to the pragmatic concept of face, in the aforesaid example we can perceive 
positive face realised by claiming common ground, the approval of each other, shared wants 
and shared knowledge, and reciprocity of obligations (Brown and Levinson 1987: 62). 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that playing on pathos can either facilitate the 
understanding of a logical argument, helping to acknowledge it, or obscure the logical 
judgement of an argument advanced by the persuader. The persuader wishing to be effective 
in the art of persuasion must acquire all skills indispensable in influencing the audience, 
should monitor the response, converge with beliefs and convictions of the audience, reverse 
his own standpoint, if required. It becomes clear that the persuader must acquire 
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 At this point I wish to draw our attention to the significance of language and its social context in the process of 
discourse analysis. I advocate a view that language does not exist in isolation. Fairclough (1989/2001, 
1992/2008) in his framework for the textual analysis of discourse or critical discourse analysis explicates that no 
analysis is reliable without careful examination of three dimensions: textual, discursive and social. Van Dijk 
(1998), in turn, stresses that language users in a communicative act rely on social acts, participate in a form of 
dialogue, which cannot be isolated from social and cultural context. Finally, Bourdieu (2008) highlights that 
language does not exist for its own sake, language is determined by the relation it bears with the speakers who 




psycholinguistic knowledge, i.e. the complexities of the human character, so as to rate the 
responses of the audience and shape them effectively. All the ploys stated above are realised 
by means of language, which occupies a paramount role. Pathos is actualised with the help of 
argument and repetition, together with stylistic structures, such as antithesis, metaphors and 
rhythmic patterns, syntactic structures, i.e. fronting, word order, interrogatives, and lexis, i.e. 
vivid and descriptive adjectives (Nash, 1989; Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005). 
The following passage is taken from the presidential debate held on 27th June 2010, 
Bronisław Komorowski responds to the question on the separation of state and church, as well 
as financing in vitro fertilization: 
 
(3) Ladies and gentleman, not only do I understand a problem of paternity, but also, 
simply, raised five children. Five times did I experience happiness of being 
a parent, a father, and I am the last person who would wish to deprive young 
marriages or couples of hope, chances, and there are twenty per cent of couples in 
Poland, who cannot have children. (…). But we cannot deprive others of that hope. 
The issues concerning a system of faith, or an ethical one – here everyone needs to 
take decisions in his own conscience whether to employ such method, regarding it 
as effective, or not. Personally, I was, am and will be a supporter of the conciliar 
principle in effect between the church and the state, namely mutual respect, respect 
for the autonomy of the church by the state and the state by the church (…). But 
the compromise is of high importance, the compromise which was arrived at while 
working on the anti-abortion law, which allows specific exceptions connected also 
to human life, but it is utterly the law protecting life. I was, am and will always be 
an advocate of life, I have experienced happiness five times, life of my own 
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children, welcoming lives of my own children, I will not deny anybody the right to 
happiness. 
 
Bearing in mind the theoretical background on pathos explicated above, we can enumerate 
a number of ploys to which Bronisław Komorowski resorts, the first being the use of abstract 
concepts, e.g. happiness, hope, faith, conscience, ethics, religion. By evoking abstract 
categorization, Komorowski appeals to the emotions of the audience reflecting their values, 
aspirations and experience, the concept of positive face is also brought into play. He is aware 
of the fact that by alluding to the concepts the audience prizes greatly, he will win their votes. 
Moreover, he places himself in the position of an expert owing to the experience he has 
gained, making himself worthy of being trusted. Komorowski is sure of his opinion and 
voices it firmly. Nevertheless, finding some space for a compromise he, conversely, displays 
openness and flexibility. In the field of the stylistic and syntactic structures we can also spot 
some examples, i.e. rhythmic patterns, emphatic structures and repetition. 
 
3.1.4 Logos 
Logos denotes “reasoned discourse”, argument from reason. According to Aristotle (1959: 
17), logos relates to “the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove”. Persuasion 
“by speech itself” can be achieved only if “the true” or “apparently true” can be extracted 
from the ways of persuasion within the particular subject. Paul A. Rahe (2008: 23) adds that 
logos “makes it possible (…) to perceive and make clear to others through reasoned discourse 
the difference between what is advantageous and what is harmful, between what is just and 




Logos is composed of an issue lying at the heart of a debate which needs to be identified, 
arguments which will support the issue addressed, the structure of thought which underpins 
the arguments, coherence and logical value. 
Prior to examining which classes of arguments the speakers or writers employ in the 
persuasive process of the genre under investigation, we shall elaborate on their types. 
Aristotle (1959: 265) distinguishes three classes of arguments which need to be applied by the 
orators, firstly, the topic of the possible and impossible, secondly, that a thing will happen or 
has happened, thirdly, the topic of magnitude. The possible explicates that of two contrary 
things one is possible, so is the other one; analogically, if of two similar things, one is 
possible, so is the other one (an argument a fortiori). The possible, therefore, constitutes the 
source of arguments for the impossible being the opposite of what has been said about the 
possible. As to a thing that will happen or has happened, Aristotle (1959: 173-273) maintains 
that if a foundation is laid to believe or if a certain premise has been made that something has 
happened or will happen, then something will most probably have happened. Finally, topos of 
magnitude, Aristotle (ibid.) holds that all men use extenuation and amplification 
(exaggeration of both great and small things) in deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or 
defending, for “the particular has more authority than the general”. Not only can the topics of 
argument stimulate the persuader’s mind, but also structure the persuasive discourse, enabling 
the speaker/writer to make use of all available means, which consequently serve the speaker 
in preparing his/her compositions. Nevertheless, topics, if applied too scrupulously, can 
deprive a composition of its originality and inventiveness. 
Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005: 83-107), in turn, provide us with ten models of argument, 
as they call them, substituting topoi with models, meaning “adaptable, flexible concepts”, 
offering “systematic and organising methods of ‘thinking through’ a topic, and of selecting 
and organising the most effective arguments”. The models of argument which will be 
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discussed are as follows: definition, cause and effect, similarity, oppositional, degree, 
testimony, genus/species, part/whole, associational, and root meaning. 
The definition model of argument implies that the speaker or writer makes use of the 
general category so as to move to the unique feature of a point discussed. Thus, in a 
persuasive discourse every definition might incite a counter-definition. The cause and effect 
model embodies an integral part of a persuasive process, both in literary and functional 
discourse, although it takes a different form in each of them. In the language of politicians, 
which is our central focus, it is effect-centred, since the said ploy seems to be more 
convincing. Nonetheless, it is not devoid of predicaments (e.g. oversimplification, 
disproportion etc.) Cockcroft and Cockcroft (ibid.) identify three processes of cause and 
effect, the first being a simple cause producing a simple effect, the second a complex cause 
producing a simple effect, the last one a complex cause producing a complex effect. We need 
to accentuate that the cause and effect model is grounded in the dialectical process. 
Comparison and parallelism emerge to be the key issues of the similarity model of argument. 
The oppositional model, on the other hand, depicts contradictory motifs. We can enumerate 
a few sub-varieties of the model: contraries, contradictions, privatives and relatives. 
Similarly to the cause and effect model, the aforementioned model of argument is present in 
a dialectical process, involving two-way interaction, not infrequent in the language of 
politicians, in which one thread of thinking is adopted ruling out at the same time the other 
one. Such an argument lies at the basis of provocation. The degree model of argument 
constitutes the third common topos referred to in political rhetoric by Aristotle, together with 
the similarity and oppositional models. It rests upon constant dynamics, desirability of a goal, 
instrumental means of achieving it (ibid.). The subsequent type, i.e. the testimony model, is 
founded on the credibility of a witness, as a consequence it is considered as one of the 
weakest topics. The testimony model is to be encountered in television broadcasts, notably 
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political interviews, for its declarative function, in which the political figures display their 
loyalty and support for a particular standpoint or a political party or offers certain instruction, 
hence it often acts as an ideological weapon. The genus/species type of argument carries an 
interactional function, in which the speakers after initiating a discussion, making a statement, 
refute each other’s arguments, moving from genus to species, or further to sub-species. The 
part/whole model appears to correspond to the previous model of argument. What 
differentiates it from the former is that the genus/species can exist separately, while parts and 
wholes are co-dependent. In the associational model the hearer is manipulated by false logical 
and ethical assumptions. The above argument can be sub-divided into subject/adjunct (a 
quality, condition of a subject being its basis), lifestyle/status (an argument, the basis of which 
being lifestyle/status), place/function (place/function taking the role of a premise), or 
time/activity (an argument reflecting people’s expectations and social rituals) association 
models of argument (ibid.). Lastly, the root meaning category of argument typifies one of the 
most manipulative models of argument, the persuader changes the received meaning of 
a word used and searches for the hidden or alternative meaning. 
 
3.1.5 Models of argument versus language of politicians 
After having examined two presidential debates held on 27th and 30th June 2010, we can 
come to a number of conclusions. Firstly, there are several models of argument which prevail 
in the political speeches – namely, cause and effect, degree, genus and species, associational 
and oppositional (of dialectical nature); the rationale being its persuasive and emotive 
functions, as well as vivid distinctiveness in the values and standpoint the politicians have 
adopted. Secondly, the remaining models are either too sophisticated and would require 
greater expertise or are not beneficial enough to be used in the political discourse. Lastly, the 
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choice of arguments is highly dependent on loyalty and ideology of a politician, the party s/he 
adheres to determines a line of attack he pursues. 
Let us now provide a few examples of the above-mentioned models: 
1/ definition model of argument, in which a generalisation is narrowed down into a precise 
meaning:  
(4) Jarosław Kaczyński: (…) privatization, as I have already said, conveys an 
introduction of entirely different rules of the game. A private hospital will have a possibility to 
sign an agreement with the National Fund, though it will not be required, and there is 
every likelihood that such a situation will take place that people belonging to a low 
income group will simply not have an easy access to treatment, at least in their 
towns/cities. 
 
2/ cause and effect model of argument, Bronisław Komorowski by means of a conditional 
sentence explicates that the effect of a fall of a standard of living will be emigration to Great 
Britain – a simple effect produced by a simple cause; in the second example granted that 
liberal ideology is challenged, Poland will become a more prosperous country – seemingly
49
 a 
simple effect of a simple cause: 
(5) Bronisław Komorowski: If the standard of living is improved, nobody will go to 
Great Britain. 
(6) Jarosław Kaczyński: (…) only when we reject liberal ideology (…) only then will 
we bring about development of Poland. 
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 I deliberately use the word “seemingly” for the argument is simple only in wording. 
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3/ similarity model of argument – the following example rests upon parallelism of the process, 
the speaker’s understanding of a problem is linked to his memory-based schemata, that is the 
speaker’s experience: 
(7) Bronisław Komorowski: Ladies and gentleman, not only do I understand 
a problem of paternity, but I also, simply, raised five children. 
 
4/ oppositional model of argument – the example below is grounded in a dialectical process, 
involving two-way interaction between two participants. Jarosław Kaczyński responds to the 
question on equal opportunities between Poland A and B. He firmly states that such a division 
is present in Poland; at the same time he provides solutions to the problem. In turn, Bronisław 
Komorowski denies that the division exists (the argument Bronisław Komorowski employed 
might have been borrowed from Barak Obama’s 2004 Democratic Convention Keynote 
speech in which he said that “There are no red states. There are no blue states. There is only 
the United States of America”, the speech that earned Barak Obama widespread and well-
deserved recognition with respect to successful rhetoric): 
(8) Bronisław Komorowski: There is one Poland, there is neither Poland A nor B, nor 
C nor D. There is no north, south, west or east Poland. There is one Poland and we 
need to take care of it, and the government does it. 
 
5/ degree model of argument – both examples are founded on the qualitative aspect of 
argument saying that one thing is better/cheaper, etc. than another one: 
(9) Bronisław Komorowski: It is important for the professional army, such is always 
better (…) 




6/ testimony model of argument – considered one of the weakest of topoi, however, in the 
political discourse it may be used as an ideological weapon. In the example to follow, the 
interviewee instructs the audience how to act, he also accentuates his stance by the use of 
anaphora: 
(11) Jarosław Kaczyński: It is an old teaching of Giedroyć, it is an old teaching of 
Józef Piłsudski, we should make use of it and we should all go this way. 
 
7/ genus/species model of argument – the following dialectical model of argument is based on 
the pattern: genus to species, species to sub-species, etc. By way of illustration, Bronisław 
Komorowski makes an assumption, in turn Jarosław Kaczyński counters this assumption with 
a subsequent example, the procedure further continues. In the example to follow we can also 
spot aitiologia (a rhetorical figure (trope), in which the same speaker asks and later answers a 
question posed), a ploy popular in  political rhetoric: 
(12) Bronisław Komorowski: Facts are on our side: is there half a billion for the 
University of Rzeszów? Yes, there is. Is there an improvement of an algorithm 
calculating money for health sector? Yes, there is. You took it away, we will give 
it and that’s the difference. There is no point in alluding to theories, of one kind or 
another, facts are unrelenting (undeniable) Mr Chairman, and that’s all, full stop.  
Jarosław Kaczyński: I also have some time, so I will say: half a billion is much 
less than, for example, twelve billion for Gęsicka’s plans. Well, Mr Speaker, you 
won’t escape from it. 
Bronisław Komorowski: Well, Mr Chairman, you can promise twelve billion, but 
you didn’t give a penny, but we will give half a billion. 




8/ part/whole model of argument – in which the part represents the whole, in the example 
below, the speaker enumerates consequences of an economic crisis pertaining to supply 
estimates and public expenditure, which represent parts of a larger whole: 
(13) Bronisław Komorowski: The Italians cut clerks’ salaries, pensions (…) 
 
9/ associational model of argument – it provokes the user to make false logical assumptions, 
as may be the case of the example to follow: 
(14) Jarosław Kaczyński: (…) contrary to what the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
that government claims, so I presume so does Mr Speaker (…) 
 
10/ root meaning model of argument – characteristic of manipulation, the interviewee 
deliberately searches for an alternative meaning of a word to manipulate. In the context 
mentioned the speaker uses the word: “report” sarcastically, for it was uttered by the brother 
of his opponent after he won the election in 2005, in the form: I report that the task has been 
completed (originally the statement was not used to display complete dependence, which this 
word may denote, but to express contentment resulting from victory). Bronisław 
Komorowski, however, attempts to distort the meaning by referring to it literally since he 
wishes to show that he is an independent politician: 
(15) Bronisław Komorowski: (…) I will not file a report to the Prime Minister (…) 
 
4. Conclusion 
In every discourse where persuasion is the primary goal we observe the co-existence of 
the structural principles: ethos, pathos and logos. The type of interaction, personality, stance, 
as well as emotional appeal may determine the choice of arguments. Conversely, the choice of 
arguments may reflect the influence arguments exert on emotions and standpoint adopted by 
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the persuader. The process is simultaneous. Quintilian (quoted in Dixon, 1971: 25) 
maintained that every aspect of speech enhances character: the tone reveals the orator’s good 
will towards the audience, the ordering of arguments reflects his/her intelligence and sense of 
values, while the feelings expressed embody the goodness of his/her heart. Ergo the orator 
should be able to comprehend psychology, know the values of the audience and respond to 
them effectively and truthfully. 
Tactics employed by the speaker include postulating the irrelevance of the opponent’s 
argument, by showing its ambiguity, inconsistency or preposterousness. In effective 
persuasion the issue, the arguments and their relevance must stand in line since an attentive 
hearer will perceive any incoherence and lack of cohesion upon which they are grounded. 
Correspondingly, the more the persuader understands his audience, the more s/he will be 
compelling. 
According to classical rhetoric, all the arguments are or can be polar opposites, 
“either/or”, hence they can limit a free mind. The composition, structurally controlled, 
systematised and classified, may cramp a free development of ideas. Aristotelian rhetoric 
offers a form of argument, not a compromise, agony being its aim (Dixon, 197; Budzyńska-
Daca, 2008). The language of politics appears to draw interest from that rhetoric, in which it 
has inexorably settled, for the aim of the political discourse is tantamount to that of rhetoric, 
even if it has, in the opinion of its opponents, become morally suspect, “the art of the purple 
passage and the debating trick, language masquerading as thought” (Dixon, 1971: 1-2, 70), 
language used so as to “influence, persuade, perhaps to exhort and instruct”, language used to 
manipulate, language requiring consummate skills.  
In sum, on one hand, we can defend a position adopted by Cap (2005, 2006, quoted in 
Skowrońska, 2010), who upholds that “skilful use of language is not only an asset, but a must 
in legitimization” of politics, “broadly defined as the ultimate goal sought by politicians”. On 
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the other one, following Chilton (2004: 23), we can accept the assumption that every political 
speaker needs to “imbue their utterances with evidence, authority and truth”. According to 
Aristotle, word has to be bound with being, as a remedy for abuse and manipulation within 
human cognition (Stefańczyk, 2000, quoted in Kucz, 2009: 22). The question arises: does 
anybody attach any importance to actions in the era of power of mass media? Do actions 
speak louder than words? Highly debatable. A word is the weapon in Plato’s rhetoric, 
something you use to fight with the opponent’s view, or rather with him/her in person, 
something you apply to defend, refute or maintain the stance adopted, something fulfilling 
a conative function, finally, something lying on the brink of manipulation. Ergo does rhetoric 
render martial art or the art of winning the soul by discourse? Both, depending on the 
perspective we adopt or, more probable, on the goal a politician wishes to achieve. 
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The Analysis of Insulting Practices - Sticks and Stones in the Croatian Parliament 
Alma Vančura, University of Osijek & Diana Tomić, University of Zagreb 
 
“It’s interesting how people cling to insults or what they think is an insult. “ (House M.D., 
S07/E15) 
Summary 
The aim of this paper is to study the forms and functions of insults in the Croatian Parliament and compare them 
with recorded instances of insults found in the British and the Swedish parliaments. The corpus for analysis 
includes transcripts of two sessions of the 6th Parliamentary assembly and 5 randomly selected sessions from 
each of the previous assemblies. The corpus includes Aktualno prijepodne (i.e. Question time) as well. Levels of 
analysis are: forms of (un)parliamentary polarization, mitigation strategies and identification of convergence 
(between a group of like-minded politicians) and divergence (between opposing groups) by usage of insults and 
derogatory terms. Reactions to the insults were analyzed as part of the identification process, as it was noted that 
the Members of Parliament (MPs) were often offended by the insult and wanted to comment on it, even when the 
insult was not personally addressed to them. 
The results show, as expected, that the MPs of the Croatian Parliament are polarized. The offensive expressions 
are based on pathos in first Assemblies, while later change to ethos-oriented logos, mainly trying to discredit the 
MPs' credibility, with occurrences of ad hominem arguments. The preferred mitigation strategies are attribution 
transfer, followed by formulation of insults as questions rather than statements. Unification of politicians is 
purely along the party-line and is shown through forms of address, the procedures to respond to offensive 
phrases, labeling and stereotypes. 
Key words: insults, insulting practices, Croatian parliament, mitigating strategies, logos, 





This paper provides an insight into the insulting practices found in the Croatian 
Parliament compared with the recorded instances of British and Swedish parliaments (Illie, 
2001, 2004, 2010a, 2010b). It also offers some explanation to the underlying workings of the 
insult initiator and insult target.  
In everyday life individuals sometimes tend to express their opinions of politicians in the 
form of insults. When speaking privately, people can say more or less whatever they want 
without any consequences, but what happens when one is using offensive, derogatory or 
disparaging terms publicly? More oppressive societies have insult laws (Walden, 2002: 207) 
which “regulate freedom of expression and enforce laws that punish the criticism of the 
government officials and institutions“. In their basis, these laws are very rigid, oppressive and 
prevent freedom of speech and opinion. On the other side, democratic societies take pride in 
the possibility of an individual publicly saying whatever s/he chooses. Nonetheless, even such 
societies have something to regulate offensive public discourse, and that is criminal 
defamation law (Walden, 2002) which protects a person when his/her reputation is threatened 
by falsely asserting a fact. Therefore, when speaking publicly, especially when one’s 
conversation is being broadcast or documented, individuals need to think in advance of how 
and to whom they are going to address their insult, as there are consequences to their speech 
acts. However, what happens when an insult is done in the parliament by the Member of 
Parliament (MP)? Do the same rules apply? Is it normal to expect and assume that, beside the 
proscribed rules of conduct in the Parliament, working in such an environment and at such a 
distinguished position will immediately bring a higher moral code and values of conduct of its 






Studying insults, especially those done by the MPs can give an insight into “social and 
cultural systems of moral values'' (Ilie, 2004: 45), ideology behind the insult, party affiliation, 
balance of power between the opposing sides/parties, power (not only power granted by 
“institutional status“ (Ilie, 2001: 236), but  power seen as “ ‘interactional skill and 
process’“ (2001 :236), i.e. the power obtained through interaction with other MPs, and finally, 
language style of an individual MP. Diachronic analysis of unparliamentary discursive 
practices during different parliament sessions can reveal the possible change of 
institutionalized language as well as  indicate the degree of development of a national 
parliamentary discourse and, implicitly, of democracy itself. Cross-cultural studies (Ilie, 2001, 
2004, 2010a, 2010b), like this one, show forms and functions of insults in different cultures, 
the direction of parliamentary discourse in connection with the political/social climate, and 
can serve as a possible guideline of conduct for the future elected government officials. 
 
1.3. Research questions 
How do MPs gain desired discursive power and, implicitly, more influence with the wider 
audience? Do insults play an important role in attention-getting? What is perceived as an 
insult by MPs and what triggers a response? Do the MPs respond to the insults?  Are insults 
party –line, wing-line or individually oriented?  How do insulting practices change over time, 
if they do? Which types of parliamentary insulting strategies are preferred and dispreferred in 
Croatian debates in comparison to British and Swedish ones?  Does the change in insulting 
practice show development of parliamentary discourse, its participants and, implicitly, of 





1.4. Historical overview 
The Croatian Parliament (Hrvatski Sabor), 22 years since its foundation, is significantly 
younger when compared with the other parliaments in similar studies. The modern British 
Parliament, one of the oldest continuous representative assemblies in the world, was formed 
in 1707 but has its traditions set way back into the 13th century
50
 and the Swedish one 
(Riksdag), established in 1917, has roots found in 1453
51
. The modern Croatian Parliament 
was formed in 1990 and although its origins can be traced back into the 13th century, geo-
political changes in Croatia from that period onwards make this historical continuity 
irrelevant for this research. Although the representative body can be treated as a fairly new 
phenomenon in Croatia, the same cannot be said for the profession of politician. Specifically, 
a number of representatives in the Croatian Parliament had significant political functions in 
the political institutions of Yugoslavia and consequently more experience in public speaking 
than other MPs in the newly formed Croatian Parliament in the nineties. However, 
communism and democracy do not share the same political discourse practice. Therefore, 
possible in/experience of politicians in political discourse and its correlation with success of 
getting across ideas/views will be left for some future studies.  
After the Croatian War of Independence and the formation of the modern Croatian 
Parliament in 1990, the predominant numbers of seats were mostly won by the moderate 
right-wing party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union). According to Čular (2001) the Croatian 
party system consists of 7 larger parties: HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), SDP (Social 
Democratic Party), HNS (Croatian Peoples Party), HSLS (Croatian Social Liberal Party), 
HSS (Croatian Peasant Party), IDS (Istrian Democratic Assembly) and HSP (Croatian Party 








of the Right). Although the number of parties has changed over time, the two most influential 
parties from that time onwards are the already mentioned HDZ and SDP (Social Democratic 
Party), which is a moderate left-wing party. Although both parties place themselves around 
the centre, Croatian people perceive them as more predominantly left and right (Banković –
Mandić, 2007). 
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Insults and culture 
Different cultures use abusive language in a variety of ways and in different areas of life. 
Brown and Levinson (1987) claimed that politeness is a universal concept, but also that some 
cultures may be characterized as negative politeness cultures and others as positive politeness 
cultures. Although Spencer-Oatey (2002 qtd. in Hickey and Stewart 2005) disputes this 
approach saying it is susceptible to ethnocentrism, everyone who is familiar with the situation 
in Croatia can confirm that Croatian society is quite ethnocentric, especially because of the 
Croatian War of Independence that made Croatians quite sensitive to their own national 
identity. Even though tradition makes up an important part of Croatian everyday life, polite 
forms of address have changed as they have been much more rigid in the past than they are 
nowadays (Marot, 2005). This could be the result of a merger between previously strictly 
separated forms of written and spoken politeness, or “multifunctionality“
52
 (Silić, 2006:36) of 
language in different contexts of public communication, which is shaped by different 
functional styles (Silić, 2006). The same dichotomy has been noted in Italian political 
language (Galli de’ Paratesi, 2009; Held, 2005). As in Italy, written politeness in Croatia is 
still much more formal and rigid than the more spoken-oriented style, characterized by more 
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simplified syntactic patterns, less complex vocabulary and direct language, all “with the aim 
of realizing spontaneity“ (Galli de’ Paratesi, 2009: 138). As a result, the public “has learned 
not to be surprised any more at expressions that were once confined to dialect and lower 
registers, typical of extremely familiar and highly informal situations“
53
 (Galli de’ Paratesi, 
2009: 140). With this gradual erosion of respect for institutional conduct, it is only natural to 
expect the common usage of verbal transgressions in the Croatian Parliament, as they 
represent one of the basic expressions of  a linguistic substandard. 
 
2.2.Insults as unparliamentary language 
The unparliamentary language was defined and described extensively in the work of Ilie 
(2001, 2004), who says that those are “subversive transgressions of the institutional 
boundaries of parliamentary language use and practices“ (2001: 259). One is immediately 
aware that the context of argumentation (Tindale, 2007), beside being multi-layered, varied 
and complex, is extremely important for the analysis of these transgressions. Richards (1938 
qtd. in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 2008:124) stresses that “it is always the context that 
gives a word its meaning, and it is only through the context that we can discover what the 
word does“.  Irvine (1993: 110) specifies that “insult is a communicative effect constructed in 
interaction“, which presupposes a context of some kind. On the other hand, whether or not 
something is going to be perceived as an insult and bring about any kind of response relies 
heavily on the affective characteristics of the insult target. This is what J. L. Austin (1975) 
calls illocutionary force of an utterance, where in order to properly understand the message 
the listener needs to understand the intention of the speaker and what he meant, how the 
words spoken were used, or how the utterance was to be taken or ought to have been taken. 
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As Ilie (2001: 237-238) says “words are not insulting in themselves, but rather that it is their 
underlying conceptualisations which are perceived as offensive“. These underlying 
conceptualizations mostly derive from a linguistic base, but we believe that insult 
categorization also strongly relies on an extralinguistic base, i.e. paralinguistic cues. Thus, it 
is both the emotional characteristic of the insult target/s, as well as the emotionality of the 
insult initiator that are indispensable for understanding an utterance. “The more emotional an 
utterance is, the more significant the role of the intonation, while at the same time the 
importance of lexical (linguistic) material diminishes“
54
 (Vuletić, 1980: 35). Finally, we can 
conclude that insults are defined through both linguistic and paralinguistic cues. 
When used in Parliament, insults represent deviations from the norm in a highly normative 
context where MPs’ conduct is controlled by the speaker and the proscribed rules, i.e. 
Standing Orders of the Croatian Parliament, Code of Conduct, and Code of Ethics for Civil 
Servants
55
. Parliament sessions provide a highly competitive context and political discourse 
“involves cooperation as well as conflict“ (Chilton, 2004: 198). These parlamentary 
divergences quite often turn into debates which can be defined as “institutionalised 
deliberation ritual that starts with a basic assumption on the part of the debators concerning 
the desirability of deliberating and taking action in order to bring about certain agreed upon 
changes in society“ (Ilie, 2001:242). Debates that are held in the parliament are commonly 
known to be adversarial, and MPs try to show their power by attacking and counter-attacking 
each other, so it is of no surprise that they will use unparliamentary language. Face – 
threatening acts include requesting, advising, refusing or criticizing and reflect “social-power 
structures“ (Held, 2005: 294) and quite often evolve into insults or are perceived as insults. 
Insults serve to undermine MPs’ credibility or a party’s institutional trustworthiness and 
consequentially, serve to enhance the ethos of the insult initiator and shatter the opposing 
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party's reliability. Ethos is seen in the Aristotelian tradition (Habinek, 2005), where proofs, in 




The examined corpus consists of transcripts of two sessions of the 6th Parliamentary 
term and 5 randomly selected sessions from each of the previous Parliamentary terms as well 
as Question time (Aktualno prijepodne), randomly chosen from the 1992-2011 period. The 
sessions were: fourth session in the Second Term (November 1992), 22
nd
 session from the 
Third Term (November 1997), 36
th
 session from the Fourth Term (September, 2003), 17
th
 




 session from the Sixth Term 
(April, October 2011). One session, i.e. debates about different proceedings, lasts on average 
12-14 hours, so altogether about 70 hours of material have been analyzed.  
 
3.2. Criteria  
The criteria that was used for insult selection was either content-based or response-type 
based because, as previously discussed, context and illocutionary force of an utterance play an 
important role in defining what can be perceived as an insult. If the insult was response-based, 
it was observed whether it was by an addressee, party-member or the speaker or whether 
paralinguistic cues were used. No response to an insult was signaled by the MP going back to 






The corpus was analyzed in the following way. First, the recorded sessions were watched 
and then the part of MPs’ speech or debate evaluated as an insult was transcribed. The 
analysis of data was based on Ilie's (2004) framework of interface between rhetoric, discourse 
analysis and cognitive linguistics. Firstly, a discourse theory perspective with foundations in 
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980 qtd. in Ilie 2004) cognitive schemata theory was applied. It 
explains that the human process of understanding is done through image-schematic structures 
which are “rooted in preconceptual embodiment patterns“ (2004: 49) and which thus reveal 
“inferential processes and implied meanings that are derived in the course of institutional 
confrontation“ (2004: 49). Secondly, parliamentary transgressions were analyzed based on the 
classical Aristotelian rhetorical framework (Habinek, 2005) where the insults, insult initiator/s 
and insult target/s are observed through types of categories the orator uses in his discourse (in 
our case insulting strategy) for his insult to come through. Logos oriented insults focus on the 
rational use of language and the reasoning stems from the language itself. Ethos oriented 
insults appeal to the insult initiator or insult target character or moral qualities, and pathos 
oriented are those that are based on emotion, feelings of the audience “that can change the 
ways that people affect their judgments“(Jaffe, 2010: 338).  
Levels of analysis included, on the one hand direct insulting strategies mostly done 
through fallacies like ad hominem, antiphrasis, guilt by association types of arguments and 
which serve to establish either in-group identity or polarization. On the other hand, indirect 
insulting strategies were analyzed, which were achieved through rhetorical (rhetorical 
questions, sarcasm, irony) or pragmatic (juxtaposition of opposite notions, insults formed as 
questions, attribution transfer strategy) devices. All the aforementioned levels of analysis 
were then placed according to Ilie’s (2004) division into layers of (un)parliamentary 




identity and inter-group dissent 4.3., expanded by diachronic aspect of parliamentary 
discourse.  
Furthermore, we have compared insults in the Croatian Parliament with the recorded 
instances of British and Swedish Parliaments (Ilie, 2004, 2009, 2010a) to see whether they 
vary in forms and functions and to identify culture-specific correlations between them. 
Finally, to get a deeper insight of the possible temporal change of parliamentary discourse 
in Croatia, we have observed different sessions through a period of time in order to get a 
diachronic perspective that would show the possible development in the deliberative genre 
(Habinek 2005, Ilie, 2004).  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 Results show that Croatian MPs use different insulting strategies to establish the 
trustworthiness of their party and their own credibility i.e. their “(rhetorical ethos), primarily 
by displaying consistency between their statements and their actions“ (Ilie, 2009:72) as 
opposed to other MPs, representing other parties.  
In spite of political and organizational differences between Swedish, British and Croatian 
Parliaments, we can say that they display some common features, such as tendency of MPs to 
exchange rude remarks in heated debates which are then kept under control by the Speaker. 
The possibility of comparison lies in the fact that “rudeness seems to be a universally 
occurring phenomenon“(Ilie, 2004: 51) and that basic rhetoric patterns and insulting strategies 
are shared by the MPs of the previously mentioned institutions.  
 
4.1.  Direct insulting strategies: (un)parliamentary polarization 
Croatian MPs show similar strategies in debates to British MPs in the sense that they both 




minimize disagreement as is the case with the Swedish MPs. The political polarization is 
based on party membership, which can be supported by the fact that no instance of an MP 
insulting another MP that belongs to his/her party has been documented. However, 
polarization in terms of political orientation is quite common and depends solely on the 
coalition formed during a particular term. Direct insults, even in the forms of address are quite 
frequent and the etiquette sometimes presents a good opportunity for a direct insult, as the 
following examples will show
56
: 
(1) B, A. (SDP): Moje pitanje će biti upućeno predsjednici Vlade RH, predsjednici 
HDZ-a, bivšoj potpredsjednici Vlade i ministrici branitelja, bivšoj potpredsjednici 
Hrvatskog sabora, bivšoj predsjednici HDZ-a Grada Zagreba i bivšoj najbližoj 
suradnici i prijateljici gospodina Ive Sanadera gospođi Jadranki Kosor. A ono 
glasi: znate li koliko radnika u Hrvatskoj radi, a ne prima plaću? (6 saziv/23 
sjednica, Aktualno prijepodne, 6. travnja 2011.) 
 
 A. B. (SocDem) I will address my question to Croatian Prime Minister, the 
president of CDU, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Veteran Affairs, 
former Deputy Speaker, former President of HDZ’s Zagreb Branch, and former 
closest associate and friend of Mr. I. Sanader: Mrs. Jadranka Kosor. And the 
question is: do you know how many workers in Croatia do not receive a salary?     
(Term 6/ session 23, Question time, 6 April, 2011) 
This example precisely shows how insults are context-based, as it seems like there is no harm 
in an MP enumerating all of the ex-Prime Minister's (PM) titles. The context in which these 
forms of address were perceived and interpreted as insulting was instigated by the Prime 
Minister’s reaction during the Question time in which she often warned other MPs who spoke 
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before A. B. to use the proper forms to address her, for instance when they forgot to say Prime 
Minister before her name. This example shows how irony and playful tone can disguise the 
MP's hostile and scornful attitude, but also how paralinguistic cues can be essential for insult 
recognition, since the whole form of address is purely ironic. It also displays guilt by 
association type of ad hominem (Tindale, 2007), with the attempt to discredit the PM by 
closely associating her in the penultimate and the last form of address to the ex-prime minister, 
who was at the time awaiting trial for a corruption scandal. The insult assumes that any ‘guilt’ 
that characterizes the former PM can be transferred to the insult target (PM at the time) as 
well. 
(2) J, Ž. (SDP): Moje pitanje je namijenjeno osobno odabranoj nasljednici Ive 
Sanadera na mjesto predsjednice Vlade, gospođi Kosor. Gospođo Kosor možete li 
nam reći kako se u Hrvatskoj može preživjeti sa 2 tisuće kuna plaće ili mirovine? 
(6/23, Aktualno prijepodne, 6.travanj 2011) 
 
(3) K, J. (Premijerka): Gospodine predsjedniče, budući da ovo nije pitanje nego samo 
nastojanje da se uvrijedi, ja, naravno, to je poznato javnosti koja poznaje Ustav 
Republike Hrvatske i hrvatske zakone da ja nisam nasljednica jer ovo nije 
monarhija, pa onda ja ne mogu biti nasljednica. (...) Ja ću vam na ovo pitanje koje 
to nije odgovoriti, objasnite vi meni gospodine Jovanoviću kako se može ljetovati 
za 7 kuna i je li se pri tom platio ili se nije pri tom platio PDV? (6/23, Aktualno 
prijepodne 6.travnja 2011.) 
 
Ž. J. (SocDem): My question is for the personally selected successor of Ivo 




how can you survive with a two thousand kuna salary or pension in Croatia? (6/23, 
Question time, 6 April, 2011) 
 
J.K. (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, since this is not a question as it is an attempt 
to insult, I, of course, it is known to the public who knows the Constitution of the 
Republic of Croatia and Croatian laws, that I am not the successor, because this is 
not a monarchy, and then I cannot be the successor. (...) I will give an answer to 
this question, although it is actually not a question at all, please explain, Mr. 
Jovanović, how can one spend their holidays paying for it 7 kuna and in doing so, 
has one paid or has one not paid VAT? (6/23, Question time, 6 April, 2011) 
 
 In the example (2) we can again see the same ironical form and guilt by association type of 
ad hominem in the form of address as in the example (1). Prime Minister Kosor’s answer to 
the question, which she clearly perceives as an insult, is an example of circumstantial ad 
hominem attack, also known as the tu quoque (you too) (Krabbe and Walton, 1993; Walton, 
1998; Tindale, 2007) type of argument, which Croatian MPs use quite often. It represents a 
case where the critic replies to a previous ad hominem attack by saying that the insult initiator 
is the same as the insult target and therefore cannot be accountable for delivering the criticism 
in the first place. It can also, according to Krabbe and Walton (1993: 82), serve as “a sign of a 
shift to a quarrel’, which is what the Prime Minister (3) tried to achieve, as she promptly 
reacted to an accusation with a counter-accusation. At the same time, in her counter attack, 
instead of you she is using the indefinite pronoun one, which is marked for non-specificity. 
This strategy is called defocalization (Haverkate, 1992: 516) which is “a distancing technique 




of affairs described“ and is often found in the Croatian parliament when MPs try to mitigate 
assertive force of their accusations or insults. 
Like their British colleagues, Croatian MPs demonstrate constant parliamentary 
transgressions directed towards opposite political parties i.e. political rather than rhetorical 
polarization (Ilie, 2004: 56). This type of polarization is based solely on party membership, 
and not on the ideology. The relationship between political camps shifts according to the 
coalition formed and according to the power-shift. 
 
4.1.1. Diachronic aspect of (un)parliamentary polarization 
As for the types of polarization, Croatian unparliamentary language has undergone a 
significant diachronic change. In the Second Term (1992-1995), insulting acts were primarily 
pathos-oriented, just like the British ones (Ilie, 2004), which in the Croatian case can be 
explained with the political and social situation (Croatian sovereignty, homeland security, 
neighboring country at war, war and post-war situation in Croatia, refugees etc.) at the time. 
Chilton (2004) claims that political discourse has specific connections to the emotional 
centers of the brain and that “some politically relevant feelings, such as territorial belonging 
and identity (‘home’), love of family, fear of intruders and unknown people (...) might have 
an innate basis and be stimulated automatically in the political use of language“ (2004: 204), 
which was especially perceptible in the terms following the Croatian independence.  The 
dominant party at the time was CDU, right-wing party, with the predominant number of seats 
won (85, as compared to the second largest, 14 won by CSLP) and most of the insults at the 
time were pathos-oriented, group-identity oriented, with colorful metaphors, ad personam 
attacks and rhetorical questions, meaning you are either with us (Croats) or against us, i.e. 
pro-Serbian, which is a typical example of non sequitur. A lot of insults were generally 




personally drawn. Most of the MPs used pathos to construct their insult by appealing to the 
general public, emphasizing what the wider audience was thinking and/or wanting to hear. 
The example that follows shows the usage of ad hominem arguments and rhetorical questions 
for a pathos-oriented strategy: 
(4) Đ, Š. (HDZ): I dalje, predlažem da se ukine smiješni zakon o oprostu četnicima! 
To je smiješni zakon! Gospodo, cijela se Europa smije Hrvatskoj da je oprostila 
nekakovim snagama koje vrše genocid, etnocid, memoricid nad hrvatskim narodom 
jednako katoličke i muslimanske vjeroispovijesti, a da ovaj Sabor nije imao 
hrabrosti, a ja bih rekao ni pameti, da kaže s kim je to Hrvatska u ratu. Ja se pitam 
tko vodi pregovore sa državom koja nije pristala niti na primirje?! Pa, što smo mi, 
jesmo li mi dječji vrtić ili smo Hrvatski parlament? (...) I, nemojte se ljutiti na 
mene vi, moji stranački kolege, jer Hrvatska demokratska zajednica je stvorena da 
oslobodi hrvatski narod, a ne da se cjenka sa cincarima! (2/4, 4. studeni 1992.) 
 
Đ, Š. (CDU): I propose to abolish the ridiculous Amnesty Act for Chetniks! This 
law is ridiculous! Gentlemen, the whole of Europe is laughing at Croatia for 
forgiving so called forces which perform genocide, ethnocide, memorycide against 
the Croatian people, equally those of Catholic and Muslim faith, and that this 
Parliament has not had the courage, and I would say neither the brains, to say who 
is it that Croatia is in war with. I wonder who is negotiating with the state that has 
agreed not even to a treaty?! Well, what are we, are we a nursery school or 
Croatian Parliament? (...) And, do not get mad at me, you, my party colleagues, 
because I believe that Croatian Democratic Union was created to liberate 




Almost 20 year later, MPs in the Sixth Term (2008 - 2011) made a radical shift and started 
using strategies closer to their Swedish colleagues, having much more “ethos-oriented logos 
“ (Ilie, 2004:56), especially since the debates in the 24
th
 session preceded election time. These 
insults are based on the argumentation that lies on the common presumption “that the quality 
of an act reveals the quality of the person responsible for it“ (Perelman and Olbrechts – 
Tyteca, 2008:70). Insults directed towards the target's ethos try to discredit the MP's personal 
qualities, gaining the attention of a multiple audience (Ilie, 2010b)  and stirring an emotional 
reaction out of the political adversary (Ilie, 2004). These insults try to show that as a public 
person, an MP represents a particular party and ideology, and is also responsible for 
implementing its policies in a particular constituency and for promoting and acting in 
accordance with particular moral values and social norms. “At the same time, an MP is also a 
citizen and a private person. On account of these multiple roles, all of which can be made 
public to a certain extent, the institutional targets of insults are often more vulnerable, and 
consequently much easier to harm“ (Ilie, 2001: 348).  
The following example covers exactly these two roles of one MP, his multiple roles, taken 
as possible grounds for insulting his incompetence in entrepreneurial and managerial skills as 
an ex and future Minister. 
(5) S, Đ. (HDZ): O čemu se radi, gospodine ministre Popijač vas ću pitati. Naime, radi 
se o jednom bivšem ministru iz hvala Bogu bivše koalicijske vlasti od 2000. do 
2003. koji se obilato koristio svojim ministarskim mandatom i sklapao poslove u 
vrijednosti od 132 milijuna. No nije pitanje vezano uz to, pitanje je vezano 
nedavno on na radiju, televiziji grmi, grmi, grmi, borit ćemo se, mi kad dođemo mi 
ćemo radnicima, plaće se ne isplaćuju, a što se dešava? Upravo njegovih 17 tvrtki 
za koje je on interesno vezan, ne papirnato nego su one njegove, prenesao je, ne 




plaću, a on licemjerno laže ljudima u oči i kaže da će se boriti protiv toga. Borit će 
se za nešto drugo, to je istina. Gospodine ministre, lijepo vas molim, što ćete 
učiniti i sa ostalim radnicima koje ovakvi tajkuni izrabljuju na razini robova ih 
drže, ne isplaćuju im plaću? (6/23, Aktualno prijepodne, 6. travnja 2011.) 
 
S, Đ. (CDU): I will ask you, Minister Popijač, what is it all about. The question is 
about a former Minister who was part of, thank God, the former Coalition 
Government from 2000 to 2003, who had liberally used his ministerial mandate 
and mantled jobs valued at 132 million kunas. My question does not address that 
issue, but is related to his recent media appearance, where he shouts and storms, 
we will fight, when we come (to power) the workers will be paid. Wages are not 
paid, and what is happening? His 17 companies for which he is bound by interest, 
not only on paper, do not pay wages to their workers. We are talking about 1000 
workers who do not receive a salary, while he is being a hypocrite and blatantly 
lying to their faces and saying he will fight against it. He will fight for something 
else, that is for sure. Minister, I kindly ask you, what will you do with other 
workers who are being exploited in a slave-like manner, and who are not being 
paid? (6/23, Question time, April 6, 2011) 
Here, we have several strategies being intertwined to use this ethos- oriented logos. The 
MP is using antonomasia, in order to avoid revealing the proper name of the insult target, but 
anyone who was even remotely familiar with the situation knew who s/he was referring to. 
Another strategy the MP chose to use was praeteritio, by actually first incriminating the insult 
target and then asserting that this is not part of the question and that it is not relevant. We can 




that are again answered by the MP herself. Finally, juxtaposition of opposite notions, such as 
corruption, lying vs. morals, is constantly emphasized throughout the question. 
 
4.2.(Un)parliamentary mitigation strategies in the Croatian parliament 
Every MP knows that there are rules of conduct that should be obeyed in the Parliament. 
In order to avoid institutional sanctions Croatian MPs often resort to mitigation strategies. 
Fraser (1980 qtd. in Haverkate 1992: 505) says that mitigation serves to disguise the intention 
of the speaker for the purpose of reducing “unwelcome effects of his/her performing a certain 
kind of speech act“. The most common mitigation strategies are very similar to those found in 
both British and Swedish parliaments (Ilie, 2004) such as a) attribution transfer strategy, b) 
juxtaposition of opposite notions and c) the formulation of insults as questions rather than as 
statements. 
4.2.1. Attribution transfer strategy 
Ilie (2004: 59) defines it as usage of “indirect attribution strategies in order to avoid taking 
direct responsibility for using derogatory qualifiers to characterise someone“. Basically, what 
the MPs do is they transfer the negative qualifier to the target’s acts or statements rather than 
directly insulting the person. The following examples show how Croatian MPs transfer the 
insult to some abstract notion (procedure) instead of directly insulting another MP or his/her 
party: 
 
(6) N, D. (HSLS): (...) Ukoliko zakonom propisani postupak procjene utjecaja na 
okoliš nije zadovoljavajući, (...) potrebno ga je dopuniti, a ne propisivati paralelan 





N, D. (SocLib): (...) If legally prescribed procedure on the environmental impact 
assessment is not satisfactory, (...), it is necessary to supplement it, and not to 
prescribe a parallel procedure that will, as the existing one, primarily serve for 
money laundering (...). (4/36, September 3, 2003) 
It is obvious that it is not the procedure, but the people behind it (and implicitly, the ruling 
party) that the MP is trying to disqualify. Another instance of attribution transfer strategy, 
commonly used by the Croatian MPs, is non- specific reference to the insult target (also see 
example (5)). Unlike the former example, where the insult initiator is trying to mitigate 
his/her insult through insulting the target’s acts or statements or some abstract notion, in the 
following example the initiator avoids directly mentioning the insult target’s name, and 
instead uses a description of his actions. It is more than clear who the MP is referring to, but 
nowhere in the whole process does s/he name the person in question and therefore s/he can 
distance her/himself from the direct derogatory attribution: 
(7) B, D. (HSLS): Dame i gospodo, ako ste osoba protiv koje je podnijeto desetak 
kaznenih prijava, ako sami u svojim intervjuima dajete izjave koje ukazuju da ste i 
sami počinili, osim tih prijava kaznena djela, što je vama učiniti? Otići na jahtu, 
predsjednika države, to je inovacija. Ili na topovnjaču. Ispovjediti se bez pokore, 
dobiti razrješenje. I ne samo to, nego još i sklopiti posao i još sklopiti posao u 
drugoj zemlji, a hrvatska politika šuti, političke stranke šute, mediji o tome govore, 
ali Ministarstvo pravosuđa se ne očituje o toj strani s etičkog i političkog gledišta 
(...). (4/36, 4. rujna 2003.) 
 
B, D. (SocLib): Ladies and gentlemen, if you are a person against whom a dozen 
criminal charges have been filed, if you alone in your interviews give statements 




what would you do? Go to the President’s yacht, well, that’s a new one. Or on the 
gunboat. Confess without repentance, get absolution. Not only that, but still be 
able to make a deal and do business in another country, and all the while, Croatian 
politics is silent, the political parties are silent, the media talk about it, but the 
Ministry of Justice does not give any statements about this from either an ethical or 
political standpoint (...). (4/36, September 4, 2003) 
 
4.2.2.  The formulation of insults as questions rather than as statements 
Another recurring mitigation strategy of Croatian MPs is to use questions rather than 
statements. They serve to introduce “ready-made assumptions and prejudicial ideas“  (Ilie, 
2004:59). Quite often they are in the form of repetitious Wh-questions, which are often 
rhetorical because the answer is obvious, insulting or incriminating. 
 
(8) K, M. (HSLS): Hoće li temeljem ovoga zakona kazneno odgovarati primjerice 
Brodogradilište Viktor Lenac i donedavni predsjednik uprave gospodin Vrhovnik 
zbog obmanjivanja Vlade o poslovnim rezultatima te tvrtke? Pa je onda obmanuta 
Vlada toj tvrtki izdala 60 milijuna ili 60-tak milijuna dolara državnih jamstava. 
Hoće li odgovarati Riječka banka? Hoće li primjerice odgovarati Hrvatski fond za 
privatizaciju koji je evidentno zlouporabom ovlasti recimo gospodinu Štroku 
omogućio vlasništvo nad Otokom života? Ili će pak ovaj zakon pogoditi neke 
sitnije ribe i ribice koje ne plivaju u onom pravcu koji se vladajućima sviđa (4/36, 





K, M. (SocLib): Will, for example, shipyard Viktor Lenac and its, till recent CEO 
Mr. Vrhovnik, be held criminally liable due to misleading the Government about 
the business results of the company? And then that misled government issued 60 
million, or 60-odd million dollars of government loan guarantees to that company. 
Will Riječka banka be held accountable? Will, for instance, Croatian Privatisation 
Fund, also be accountable, which by abuse of authority enabled Mr. Štrok to 
become a proprietor of Island of Life? Or will this legislation catch some smaller 
fish and fishes that do not swim in the direction suitable to the ruling party? (4/36, 
September 4, 2003) 
This is an example of an insult in the form of multiple, multi-layered wh-questions. We 
can argue that they are fallacious, as they contain more questions piled together in an 
apparently single question (Ilie, 2004), which could be read as an attempt to show the 
corruption and lack of good judgment of the ruling party. Moreover, they function more as 
rhetorical questions than the real ones, as the MP provides a scornful answer to them at the 
end. Questions in the example contain repetition (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2008), 
precisely anaphora (will be held accountable), which serves to accentuate a point and 
increase the “feeling of presence“ (2008: 175) of arguments. Repetition is one of the surest 
and easiest ways to make arguments more pronounced and less surprising, and this is exactly 
what the MP tried to achieve.  
(9) K, D. (IDS): Da li ste tome pritvoreniku iz Salzburga, da ne kažem kriminalcu, 
kako ga predstavljaju mediji, ijednom rekli gospodine Sanaderu, prijatelju, druže, 
kamaradu, gospodine, ekscelencijo, pretjerali ste, dosta toga. Nije valjda da niste 
mogli naslutiti kamo ide njegova samovolja. (...) ali ministri znali su u 90% 




90%  radio mimo zakona, a svega 10% valjda u skladu sa zakonom. (6/24, 28. 
rujna 2011.) 
 
K, D. (IstrianDem): Have you ever said to this detainee from Salzburg, I will not 
use the word criminal, as the media call him, Mr. Sanader,  friend, comrade, 
compadre, Sir, Your Excellency, you have gone too far, it’s enough. Is it possible 
that you could not have guessed where his autocracy was leading. (...) but the 
ministers knew in 90% of the cases what was actually going on in the government, 
with the man who was, as the media claim, 90% of the time working on the other 
side of the law, and only 10%, I suppose,  in accordance with the law. (6/24, 
September 28, 2011) 
This example shows ad hominem attacks and irony in the form of rhetorical question, but it 
also displays a brilliant usage of the deictic device called hedge (Lakoff, 1972). The MP first 
uses an ad hominem attack to say that the former Prime Minister is a criminal, but then uses 
the mitigating effect of the hedge, in this case the media, to avoid making the impression that 
he is personally responsible for the assessment, and thus modifies the force of the insult so 
that he cannot be accountable for something someone else said. This example also displays 
the usage of etiquette and forms of address as an opportunity to insult (see also example (1)). 
The rhetorical figure of irony stems from ridicule that is, according to Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (2008: 207), “often achieved through clever deductions drawn from what 
one is trying to criticize“. Here, the MP is criticizing and trying to insult the leading party 





4.2.3. Juxtaposition of opposite notions: Democracy, morality vs. communism, 
corruption, lying 
 
Croatian MPs use juxtapositions of opposite notions as a possible mitigation strategy. This 
is usually done by using the rhetorical figure of antithesis which has two contrasting ideas 
intentionally juxtaposed. Demetrius (Dean Anderson Jr., 2000: 21) says that “the use of 
antithesis makes the speaker both gravis and ornatus“, i.e. important, serious, and his speech 
elegant and ornate. 




 Term), the notion that was used as a way of 
mitigating an insulting strategy was democracy vs. communism/old habits. In the terms that 
followed, these notions were mainly used by the right-wing parties when they wanted to 
accuse the Left of preferring the previous system more. Later on, morality vs. corruption 
came up in face-threatening acts. It is of no surprise, since MPs' vulnerability can easily be 
enhanced by attacking the MPs’ ethos through his/her wrongdoings, i.e. lying, cheating and 
corruption. These notions at first seem different from respect vs. contempt used by British and 
Swedish MPs (Ilie, 2004), but implicitly they are the same, since it is known that people who 
are corrupt and lie deserve contempt, as opposed to those who are honorable, fair and deserve 
respect. The following example shows the constant juxtaposition of these notions: 
(10) C, Z. ( HDZ):   Kako ćete postaviti tu moralnu dvojbu i prozivati ljude koji nisu 
htjeli stati [na vašu stranu] na temelju tih vaših nemoralnih postupaka u politici jer 
jedno govorite drugo radite, a s druge strane optužite Hrvatsku demokratsku 
zajednicu da bi trebala biti u takvim situacijama moralna i prepustiti vama 
političku vlast (...). Pa prema tome, budimo realni, vi koji stvarate jednu areolu 
tobožnje demokratičnosti. Tko bi u tom slučaju trebao dobiti mjesto predsjednika 





C, Z. (CDU): How do you plan to set up this moral dilemma and single out people 
who would not choose [your side] on the basis of these immoral actions in politics, 
because you say one thing and do another, and on the other hand, you accuse 
Croatian Democratic Union and say that in such situations it should behave 
morally and give you the political power (...). Therefore, let's be realistic, you who 
try to create a halo of the so-called democracy. In that case, who should be made a 
president of the assembly or a mayor? (3/22, November 5, 1997) 
 
According to Aristotle (qtd. in Demetrius 1902: 267) “the merit of an antithetical style is 
that it brings contraries into emphatic juxtaposition“. These notions are paired in order to 
create, in this case, an ethical dilemma between two moral imperatives out of which only one 
is preferable. The opposition serves to emphasise and further accentuate the difference 
between these two notions. The example carries an underlying message that a party that is 
immoral does not deserve to be in power. MPs use corruption, cheating, lying, and immoral 
actions to discredit and insult the opposing MPs or their parties. 
 
4.3. In-group identity and inter-group dissent 
 
Croatian group identification depends solely on the party or coalition formed and is not 
based on the similarities or differences in the interpretation of socio-political events. It also 
purely depends on the individual’s political identity and how much does s/he feel like a part 
of the group. The goal of these insults is to weaken the authority of the adversaries, whether 




to which they belong, and, conversely, what we think of the group predisposes us to a 
particular impression of those who form it“ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2008: 322).  
Insults to show in-group identity are often expressed by using irony (see also examples (1), 
(2), (7), (9)). It is a rhetorical figure where “one seeks to convey the opposite of what one 
actually says“ (Dumarsais qtd. in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2008: 207) and the 
application of the same device is antiphrasis, which is a deliberate ironic use of inadequate 
illustration by reference to qualifications. These qualifications are assigned to a person and 
represent a generally accepted statement illustrated by someone’s behaviour (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2008). The following example shows how an MP is displaying her/his in-
group membership by using a deliberately inadequate illustration to ironically insult the other 
group (ruling party): 
(11) H, M.  (SDP):  Samo je vama uspjelo poći za rukom da broj za nezaposlenost raste 
i ljeti. To zaista treba znati i to je zaista odlična realizacija programa 
gospodarskog oporavka.  I tako danas imamo 300 tisuća nezaposlenih upravo 
zahvaljujući vašoj sposobnosti.  Vjerujemo da će građani tu vašu sposobnost 
nagraditi na sljedećim izborima (6 /24, 28. rujna 2011.) 
 
H. M.  (SocDem): Only you have succeeded in having unemployment rates 
increasing even during the summer. It is really not easy to pull it off and that’s a 
really great realization of the economic recovery program. And so today we have 
300 thousand unemployed thanks to your competence. We believe that the citizens 








The line between criticisms, accusations, and disparaging, derogatory terms perceived as 
insults is very fuzzy and sometimes difficult to establish. Insults are achieved via both 
linguistic and extralingusitic cues and are contextually defined. Most of the time, insults made 
by the Croatian MPs serve to interact with other interlocutors and reaffirm the party position 
represented by a particular MP, at the same time undermining the insult target and 
consequentially the party represented by this particular MP. They also serve as attention-
getters, in which case the insult is “usually directed for the benefit of an on-looking audience 
and with the intent to strengthen the silencer’s own position“ (Tindale, 2007:90). The 
audience that the insult initiator has in mind is often wider than the one in the session hall and 
we could define it as “a third party consisting of the spectators“ (Eemeren and Grootendorst, 
2004: 178) i.e. reporters, journalists, and constituency members (Ilie, 2010b). 
There are various cues for insult recognition, usually ad hominem/ad personam attacks, 
notions such as corruption, lies, morale, irony and sarcasm, forms of address, rhetorical 
questions, together with the expressive force of the insult instigator and the conception of 
what an insult is by the MP her/himself. Many of the insults are done in the form of rectifying 
the incorrect statement, when MPs have a right to correct a statement previously discussed. 
Responses to insults are individual, sometimes it is the addressee that responds and sometimes 
someone else (Speaker, other MP of the same party). MPs often use the response to an insult 
to make an insult themselves or shift the topic of discussion. 
MPs position themselves only along the party lines. This shows that the possible common 
ideology behind the same-wing parties does not play any significant role in the Croatian 
Parliament. The frequency of insult initiators is purely individual and there are certain MPs 
who use unparliamentary language more often than others, which basically serves to promote 




difference between insult initiator/s or target/s, which can be linked to Kišiček’s (2008) 
research, which showed that there were no significant differences between female and male 
rhetoric in politics.   
Preferred insulting strategies are pathos and ethos-oriented insults to show political 
polarization, juxtaposition of opposite notions such as democracy vs. communism, morality vs. 
corruption/lies; insults as (rhetorical) questions, attribution transfer strategy, defocalization, 
irony and sarcasm. 
Over time, insulting practices in the Croatian Parliament have changed from pathos-
oriented logos to ethos-oriented logos. Notions used for mitigation strategies have also 
changed from more abstract (democracy) to more specific (corruption, bribe, lies) ones. The 
usage of unparliamentary language was prompted by the introduction of spoken and lower 
registers into a highly institutionalized place, which opened up new possibilities for linguistic 
expression.  
Croatian MPs show similar insulting and mitigation strategies as both British and Swedish 
colleagues. Still, we must conclude that, when compared in closer detail, they behave more 
like the British MPs, i.e. they display a “confrontation-seeking tendency“ (Ilie, 2004:54), 
polarization which is more political than rhetorical, balance between terms of respect and 




 Terms Croatian MPs 
behave more like the British MPs using pathos-oriented insults and in later terms more like 
their Swedish counterparts, using ethos-oriented insults (Ilie, 2004), by attacking the other 
MPs’ personal values and acts and discrediting their credibility. 
On many occasions, there have been instances of very harsh and rude insults by the 
Croatian MPs that have been discussed even in the news (e.g. that women are known to be  
good in bed, but not in places where intelligence is necessary), but they were not part of our 




and more direct and used with less constraints than before. Whether the common usage of 
insults promotes democracy and shows development of parliamentary discourse remains open. 
We believe that is important to be verbally polite “in order to maintain harmonious, efficient 
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Taking Judges Seriously 
Argumentation and Rhetoric in Legal Decisions 
Maurizio Manzin, Research Centre on Legal Methodology (CERMEG), University of Trento 
Summary 
Logical evidence in legal reasoning is one of the most important criteria for evaluating the soundness and legal 
congruence of Courts’ decisions. In Italy such a principle has been fixed in art. 360.1.5 CPC (the Italian Civil 
Procedure Code), art. 606.1.e CPP (the Italian Criminal Procedure Code) and by a number of judgments by the 
Supreme Court. Logical proof in Courts’ opinions is usually related to the paradigm of “legal syllogism”: a 
practical syllogism whose major premise is given by the statute law and whose minor one is given by the facts 
under judgment. In this article I argue that the premises of legal syllogisms are not precisely given, but rather 
built, thanks to an linked process of (rhetorical) argumentation. Such process can be divided into gradual steps, 
each of them logically reliable: my aim is to outline a preliminary description of these phases as capable of being 
conceptualized and improved upon by the judge and to furnish a reliable scheme for Supreme Court judges, 
allowing them to check the logical consistency of lower Courts’ opinions. My aim is to provide lawyers and 
prosecutors with some recommendations which may help them to achieve effective argumentation. 
Key words: legal argumentation, legal language, legal reasoning, legal syllogism, rhetoric 
 
Logic and the law in the main Italian legal sources 
 
What does logic have to do with legal decisions?  Answering this question implies 
describing the nature of legal reasoning, because we need to establish whether the reliability 
of the decisions in trials depends upon some formal schemes of deduction or if it concerns 
other modalities of evidence. 
A rapid overview of some sources of Italian legal system will provide some previous 
guidelines for dealing with the question. In particular, one must refer to the Italian codes of 
Civil (CPC) and Criminal (CPP) procedure. Art. 360.1.5 CPC assumes that a judgment is 
invalid if the reasoning relating to a crucial and controversial fact is “lacking”, “insufficient” 




judgment is invalid if the argument is “lacking or clearly illogical”
57
. Briefly, according to 
Italian codified law, decisions must be considered invalid when the argument is “insufficient”, 
“contradictory” or “clearly illogical” and consequently judges are asked to know what logical 
consistency clearly is and whether it is sufficient or not. Consistency which does not appear to 
be perfectly coherent logically (such as, for instance, in Tarski, 1994), since the Legislator 
mentions the contradiction as one kind of bad argument alongside others (i. e. insufficiency 
and clear illogicality), not treating it as the only possible one. So we must conclude that for 
serious judges – and namely the ones in the Italian Supreme Court (s.c. Corte di Cassazione) 
– the problems are the following: 
1. to determine when a legal argument is contradictory; 
2. to determine when it is clearly illogical (but not necessarily contradictory); 
3. to determine when it is insufficient; 
4. to determine when there is no argument at all (lacking). 
All these commitments imply precise viewpoints on logic and argumentative sufficiency on 
the judges’ part. A very difficult task, it must be conceded, for which no  codified rules are 
provided and leaving perhaps too  much space for free will and responsibility. Are Italian 
judges (especially those in higher Courts) prepared to do that? 
The modern formalistic heritage 
 
The fact is that Italian legal culture has been influenced for a very long time by a 
formalistic model of reasoning, dating back to the ideas of thinkers like Charles-Louis de 
Montesquieu (La Brède 1689 - Paris 1755) and Cesare Beccaria (Milan, 1738 - 1794): authors 
who adopted a basic presupposition about the paradigm of certainty in knowledge. They 
thought that no interpretation should be admitted in legal decisions, because such a practice by 
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judges would lead to unpredictability and arbitrariness, whereas citizens have the right to 
know exactly what to do or not to do and what consequences they risk in doing or not doing 
something (Beccaria, 1982; Montesquieu, 1994). According to such a conviction, the right 
thing would be to have clear and durable written norms, similar to the axioms of the formal 
sciences and established by an effective authority (the souverain: a king or a parliament). 
With norms like these, the judge’s task would consist exclusively in recognizing when a fact 
is relevant as a species of the normative genus: a truly logical operation of “deduction” from a 
general and unambiguous list of obligatory behaviours and sanctions. This is the so-called 
“legal syllogism” which I am going to describe in more detail in this article. But for the 
moment let us pause a moment, and ask what idea of “logic” is in step with such a model of 
reasoning (for an overview on logic in history: Blanché & Dubucs, 1996; Varzi et al., 2004). 
We usually say that something is “logical” either when it is strongly linked to one or more 
premises, or when it is part of an ordered scheme. In the former sense we admit for instance 
that having determined that all black birds are (named) ravens, if we find a black bird it must 
logically be (named as) a raven; in the latter sense we can, for instance, say that just because 
yesterday was Monday today must logically be Tuesday, having previously established (or 
accepted) a scheme of consequence about the series of the (names of the) days. In other 
words, “logic” means that a certain conclusion – (the name) raven or (the name) Tuesday – is 
obligatory because some premises have been established or at least accepted by participants in 
the discourse. 
The formula of such an argument can be expressed in the most general terms as if P then Q. 
It implies (at least) that:  
1. one or more premises (P) do exist in the discourse before the argument; 
2. this or these premises are clearly understood as P and not as other than P by 




3. this or these premises are accepted by participants in the discourse; 
4. one and only one connection can be found between P and Q, avoiding arguments 
like if P then Q or other then Q. 
From the modern point of view (the one of Montesquieu and Beccaria) argument if P then 
Q can be guaranteed by the immutability of the premises (P=P) according to the basic 
principle of identity. We must imagine a closed circle of reasoning in which all possible Qs 
(such as raven or Tuesday) are ab initio part of the genre P (such as black birds or week). The 
closure of this circle depends on the impossibility of disputing the existence of the premises 
(pt. 1 in the list above), their univocal comprehension (pt. 2), their acceptance (pt. 3), the 
existence of one and only one possible connection with Q (pt. 4). Obviously, this is a very 
hard set of conditions to achieve in contexts which are neither formal nor monological (and 
the trial is just one of these, being linguistically unformalised and dialogical in structure), 
although authors like Montesquieu and Beccaria maintained that legal science must deal with 
the sciences par excellence, such as mathematics or physics. 
 
3. A classical meaning of logic   
But is this the only possible way to say that something is “logical”? If we look at classical 
thought we can find a different point of view, according to which “logic” means “belonging to 
logos”
58
: an original activity (not created by men’s thinking but rather anticipating it) allowing 
men’s speeches to name the things with a variety of words (difference), obtaining however a 
unity of sense (identity). A “divine” power for Heraclitus and later Plato; the revelation of the 
Being for Aristotle, who wrote: “Being is said  in many ways” (Metaph.  2, 1003a 32-33). So 
“logic” in a classical perspective does not mean compulsory in one and only one way, because 
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there are many ways at men’s disposal: many methods are provided for seeking the unity of 
sense among the multiplicity of situations. The classical account is essentially dynamic, 
whereas the modern one is static (more similar to the Ephesian philosophies: on this recently, 
Puppo, 2012). Perelman would have probably said that while classical thought tends to 
argumentation, the modern and Cartesian one prefers demonstration (Manzin, 2004, 2012a).  
These two tours d’esprit about logic are supported by two different metaphysics or 
conceptions of Being: for Plato and Aristotle, Being is “discontinuous”, while for Cartesius or 
Hume it is “continuous”  
(i.e. coherent in every part of itself, either from an  analytical or empirical point of view: see 
Manzin, 2008, 2009). In order to avoid the thaumazein, every single thing must be linked to 
the other, with no vacuum in the middle.  The goal of modern logic, and particularly of formal 
logic, is “to study such links not in order to explain their nature, but rather and above all to 
make a concise catalogue of few and simple rules with them” (Lolli: 1991, 13); the advantage 
of this choice is evident, it is a practical one: knowing in advance the conclusions on the 
exclusive ground of knowing the causal relations. 
Thanks to Boole and Frege, modern logic will finally conduct reasoning to artificial 
languages and to “mathematization” (Agazzi & Vassallo, 1998: 33-45). 
. The legal syllogism 
 
When we speak about logic in legal decisions are we assuming that legal reasoning is also 
a matter of discourses? In that case, it depends simply on what sort of logic we are talking 
about. For modern logic, the more certain a decision must be, the more it must avoid 
discursive forms, because the judge, as Montesquieu argued, must play the unique role of 
loudspeaker of the written norms. He/she is “la bouche de la loi” (the mouth of the law), but 




where thaumazein can occur at any moment. We can never forget that the modern ideology of 
legal positivism is founded upon a double (axiomatic) presupposition: the completeness and 
univocity of the legal system itself. On the contrary, discourses in the real world are never 
complete or univocal (Endicott, 2003; Luzzati, 1990; Paganini, 2008; Puppo, 2011, 2012). 
Although such a presupposition is no longer professed by most legal positivists, a large 
proportion of lawyers and judges are still convinced that legal reasoning is basically a 
“subsumption”, that is, a logical deduction from a normative major premise and a factual 
(descriptive) minor one. There are, indeed, different discourses from the legal point of view: 
depending on the speaking subject (the Legislator, the judge, the positive law scholar, the 
prosecutor, the lawyer etc.), on the context (before, during or outside the trial), on the issue 
(norms, principles, judicial proceedings etc.).  
I am now going to consider the judge’s discourse in detail, in so far as it is directed at 
arriving at a legal decision. My aim is to show that the so-called “legal syllogism”, 
masquerading as a formal scheme of reasoning independent from interpretation, is conversely, 
by its own nature argumentative. To do so, I will start by considering the formula of the 
syllogism as follows (Alexy, 1978; Rotolo, 2001; Bernal, 2013): 
 
Major Premise:  (1) x(Px → MQx) 
Minor Premise: (2) Pa 
Conclusion:  (3) MQa   (1) (2) 
 
To be a legal syllogism (which is a kind of “practical syllogism”) such a logical operation 
must have the following structure: 
 
1. (Normative) Major Premise: a general rule connecting a sanction to a course of 




features of the type of offence), then the sanction Q (such as, for instance, 
detention) must be applied to x. In a general and informal way: people having 
committed P must be submitted to measure Q. 
2. (Factual) Minor Premise: a concrete event which has happened to someone. 
Premise (2) states that a specific legal case a is P since it has the same features  as 
x. In a general and informal way: B has committed P. 
3.  Conclusion or “subsumption”: a necessary inference. Since, according to minor 
premise (2), a is P, the rule expressed in major premise (1) applies to a: then Q 
must be valid for a. In a general and informal way: B must be subject to the 
measure Q. 
 
According to the founders of modern legal positivism the judge charged with deciding the 
case (we are referring particularly to trials in Civil Law systems) already has the elements for 
finding both the normative major premise (the codified law in the hierarchy of legal sources) 
and the minor one (the rules of evidence). His/her task is hence “to subsume the latter under 
the former” in order to logically obtain the conclusion. A totally “automatic” task, as stressed 
by Montesquieu and Beccaria. 
 
5. Some problems relating to the syllogistic model 
 
This logical scheme of inference isn’t wrong in itself, but it counts only as a final operation 
in which all elements have been previously determined. Indeed, if we look at the judicial 
context in the real world, we can easily realize that the judge at the beginning of his/her 




“exists” only as a set of potential meanings related to some statements written in (what has 
been recognised as) the books of law. 
So the judge has first of all to choose one or more normative statements from the books 
and, in the second case, also a combination  between them (it is not unusual in fact that more 
than one statement could satisfy the judge’s search for a normative qualification of the 
reported behaviour of S and, consequently, that more than one combination could be possible 
within different statements); secondly he/she must interpret the legal statements according to 
grammar, syntax and lexis: an operation allowing the judge to detect a significance for legal 
statements relating to the concrete situation of the circularity between the judge 
himself/herself, the case and the system of normative sources, which is possible only within 
the framework of the pragmatic referents. Only after such a complex procedure as this can the 
(serious) judge establish a (still provisional) major premise for his/her final decision.  
Of course during the phases of the interpretative process, many criteria can be proposed to 
justify the choice of the legal statement(s), their possible combination and even the pragmatic 
referents: the trial is a place of dialogue and controversy, and different actors are there 
precisely for providing a number of criteria to identify the normative genre which the disputed 
behaviour of S should be traced back to. That is why I say that the major premise of the so-
called “legal syllogism” is not given, but must be found following a typical argumentative 
process. For this reason, this phase of legal reasoning cannot be defined as formal under any 
respect, nor can the reasoning itself be taken as being “ automatic” (i. e. without choice ). 
  Believing that the major premise of the syllogism was immediately available to the judge, 
modern legal formalists have focused their attention on the minor one that, arising from events 
which had occurred in the past had to be discovered by the judge through the rules of evidence 
(Taruffo, 2009). Such an operation – the description of a “fact” – is seemingly similar to an 




least more probably) happened and answer the question: did B commit or not commit P?, just 
as a scientist has to explain the modalities of a specific event (e.g. is the hole in the ozone 
layer responsible for global warming, or not?). This account tends to look at the trial as a sort 
of “neutral” laboratory, where the more scientific the approach to the judgment, the more the 
decision itself will be guaranteed (Manzin, 2004).  
The fact is that the rules of evidence are quite different from empirical procedures, though 
they sometimes make use of scientific tools. First of all, they are rules in the sense that they 
prescribe what, when and how such tools can be legitimately used (whereas from this point of 
view, scientists are much more,  although not totally, free); secondly, the legitimation of 
evidence does not necessarily depend on its efficacy (while the effectiveness of technical 
instruments is essential in empirical proof); thirdly, the most widely-used “instrument” for 
obtaining evidence – the witness – would normally be  unacceptable from a strictly scientific 
viewpoint: what medical journal, for example, would publish an article about a crucial 
scientific discovery resting only upon   the  testimony of a few witnesses? 
Scientific contexts and legal ones 
 
 Upon reflection, I am quite convinced that there is a fundamental difference between 
scientific contexts (either formal or empirical) and legal ones.  
 A scientific context is:  
i. monological  
ii. linguistically artificial  
iii. moving from hypothesis and axioms stipulated in advance.  
On the contrary, a legal context is:  
i'. dialogical (as the trial’s structure clearly shows)  




iii'. moving from various possible starting points (topoi). 
 At any point in the debate, legal actors can advance a particular point of view about 
normative interpretation, factual description, or logical connection. Each of them can choose 
from an open set of opinions the one(s) that is (are) thought to be effective for building a 
reasonable and persuasive discourse: a truly argumentative task performed by lawyers, the 
prosecutor (in a criminal trial), mediators, and even expert witnesses and witnesses, all giving 
the judge a variety of interpretations, descriptions and inferences as possible premises (1) and 
(2), and conclusions (3), for his/her reasoning. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the legal conclusion reached by the judge has the power 
to oblige someone to do or to suffer something. The judge must decide and his/her decision 
must be applied (subjective and objective obligation)  by reason of his/her normative 
authority, and not only as a result of the logical  consistency or the empirical evidence of 
his/her reasoning – a fundamental difference from authority in science, which is based mainly 
upon coherence and verifiability. 
In conclusion, since legal argumentation is not a matter of science, we could    conclude 
that it simply has to do with the legitimate power of the judge (“auctoritas non veritas facit 
legem”: Scarpelli, 1984). But this cannot be sustained, because a mere expression of power, 
even if authorized by the law, cannot properly be an argumentation; on the contrary, from an 
argumentative point of view, it is a fallacy (see for instance argumentum ad baculum or ad 
metum). This is also the reason why a number of constitutional principles and rules preserve 
the reasonableness of legal judgments (as set by before quoted arts. 360 CPC and 606 CPP). 
The will of the judge certainly plays a central role in legal decisions, but the domain involving 
an exercise of will cannot be the only one in which either general or individual rules are 




The next question is: how to obtain a reasonable argument in legal context, which is not a 
merely scientific one? A typically methodological question indeed. 
 
7. Rhetoric and the law 
 
A logic suitable for a context that is dialogical, controversial, linguistically vague and 
governed-by-commonplaces – such as the legal one – must face a number of problematic 
issues, which are unfamiliar to the procedures of formal logic (Eemeren et al., 1996).  
First of all, in a polemical dialogue monitored by an impartial “third party” (the judge or 
the jury), actors struggle to draw the decision-maker’s attention. Consequently, they need 
some strategies for giving their discourses an attractive appeal. Especially in the initial phase 
of argumentation, actors should provide aesthetic and emotional means through their attitude 
(actio) and speech (elocutio) in order to strike the audience: a logic of pathos in which both 
body and language are involved to prepare further reasoning and to invite listeners to 
appreciate the actor’s own argument (protrepticon) (on the role of pathos in language and 
argumentation: Plantin, 2011). 
Such concern for material and linguistic tactics for eliciting pathos should not be limited to 
the very first steps of argumentation
59
, for we should not forget that a legal context remains 
dialogical and controversial from the beginning to the end; so actors must be on their guard at 
every moment, if they want to avoid audience inattention or emotional vacuums (Manzin, 
2010). 
The aesthetic aspect of argumentation, being a peculiar connotation of rhetoric, came to be 
considered dominant especially during the modern age, when formal procedures of reasoning 
increasingly acquired a condition of exclusivity in Western thought. But from a broader (and 
                                                 
59
 As maintained for instance by F. Cavalla, according to whom the sole purpose of aesthetic in rhetorical 




classical) point of view, material and linguistic strategies for emotional persuasion are only 
one part of the rhetorical argumentation, even if an important one. In fact, in the classical and 
holistic account, the means of knowledge are not limited to a purely abstract dimension 
(reason in the Cartesian meaning of the word), because they deal with the totality of human 
being: logos (language-thinking), pathos (body and emotions) and ethos (will).  
Other features of rhetorical argumentation are those given by the capabilities of making a 
discourse easy to understand (by using linguistic means such as metaphors, examples, figures, 
evocative words or phrases etc.) and rationally approvable (by using commonplaces [topoi] 
widely shared and/or based on experts’ opinion [memoria], arranged in a certain order 
[dispositio], assisted by empirical evidences [causae] etc.). This phase of argumentation is 
especially devoted to the creation of effective grounds for legal reasoning: the actors want to 
suggest to the judge a way of building normative and factual premises, along with a logic 
connection between them. 
The last part of rhetorical work is dedicated to the confutation of the opponent’s argument 
(confutatio). This engagement is typically dialectical: the actor must show the audience that 
all (or at least some) of the adversary’s premises are based on unacceptable (or at least less 
acceptable) grounds or that even if they may be acceptable, they are badly connected (and 
consequently the conclusion is unacceptable). Such conduct could seem extremely conflicting 
and socially dangerous to some scholars of legal sociology, but it is not, because counter-
argumentation should be regarded from every perspective as a sort of “public 
acknowledgement” of the adversary’s full dignity to stand in front of his/her rival as a peer. 
What else, in fact, is the counter-arguer going to do, if not treat his/her opponent as real and 
effective, critically analyzing his/her discourse, if only for the purpose of showing how wrong 
it is? 





The dialectical level of legal argumentation is performed in the trial not only by the 
debating parties but also by the judge, in order to check their premises and conclusions. When 
balancing the two “legal syllogisms” advanced by the parties, the judge is definitely charged 
with choosing among a variety of logic elements (standpoints, values, interpretations, 
descriptions etc.) which cannot remain – partially or totally – together.  
It is at such a stage that the (serious) judge looks at the arguments at stake and 
contemplates how to build his/her own reasoning. A complex operation which can be 
accomplished in accordance with either, or even partially both, of the parties’ proposals, in a 
way that I am going to consider shortly. At this point in his/her decisional process, the judge’s 
choice depends on a series of logical moves that I will try to summarize as follows (supposing 
the judge asking him/herself a progressive set of questions): 
1. plausibility check: to what extent are the standpoints of the parties really 
authoritative?   
To establish its standpoint each party has adopted one or more starting points validated 
by common or expert beliefs, based on shared values, arranged in a certain order of 
importance, assisted by a certain degree of evidence etc. It is clear that points like these 
aim at being more than simple opinions (doxai): they aspire to be the most plausible 
ones (endoxa) (Cavalla, 1992). So the task of the judge will be to check if in fact they 
are so (are they really shared? by whom? still today? in the way specified by the 
arguer? etc.). 
2. coherence check: are the starting points in each party’s discourse logically 
connected with one another? Is the conclusion of the discourse consistent with its 




It might be the case that the standpoint is predicated upon solid opinions (endoxa), but 
that these opinions are linked together in a wrong or questionable way, so that the 
conclusion is not correct or at least not the only one possible.  
3. dialectical check: which discourse, compared to the other, is more consistent?  
As I have noted previously, this argumentative stage is the most complex of all. The 
judge, having previously ascertained the consistency of each party’s argument 
(plausibility and coherence checks), must now compare their force.  It is clear that 
every discourse has been constructed upon constant reciprocal confrontation; every 
opinion has been submitted to the opponent’s objections. The simultaneous presence of 
opposing arguments obliges the judge to ask him/herself a number of questions: how 
many points in the opposing discourses (S1 vs S2) are authoritative and how 
authoritative are they? Which of them is more pertinent to the case under discussion? 
Are the conclusions in S1 and S2 clearly connected to their own starting points? Are 
they coherent with all the starting points or only with some of them? Are there any 
common points in S1 and S2? Would it be possible to connect the points in each party’s 
argument in a different way? Would it be possible to connect points arising out of the 
different discourses, S1 and S2? As noted before, at the concluding steps of his/her 
reasoning the judge might choose S1, S2 or even something else: a “legal syllogism” 
partially different from the ones put forward by the parties (e.g. accepting the 
normative qualification advanced by the prosecutor but not the measure of punishment, 
having also accepted some lawyer’s arguments on the seriousness of the crime). 
4. building premises for the  “legal syllogism”60: what standpoint is reasonably 
acceptable?  
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 In a previous article (in Italian) I described step #4 as an “enthymematic inference” and step #5 as 
“[conclusion of] legal syllogism” (Manzin, 2012c: 74-75). I want to clarify now that since the inference 




At the end of the dialectical check the judge has the precise elements required for the 
justification of (1) and (2). In other words, he/she can build the premises for the unique 
“legal syllogism” authorized by the law, premises that must be clearly indicated in the 
written reasoning of the decision, in order to easily allow a further check by higher 
Courts, practical jurists and scholars of jurisprudence. We can properly say that from 
now onwards the judge is no longer a critical listener to the parties’ discourses and an 
evaluator of their soundness: he/she is becoming now a sort of “third speaking person” 
having his/her own discourse (S3), even if it is built with elements dialectically taken 
from S1 and S2. S3 is neither S1 nor S2; compared to them, its content is the following: 
(the syllogism proposed by) S1 is right; or (the syllogism proposed by) S2 is right; or, in 
an intermediary way, something (but not all) is right either in (the syllogism proposed 
by) S1 or S2. 
5. enthymematic inference: given (1) and (2), then…?  
The last move of legal argumentation links together the premises which have been built 
by the judge in the above mentioned ways: according to one of the parties’ proposals or 
in a particular combination of both. In any case, because it starts from an evaluation (or 
rather a set of evaluations) of the standpoints expressed in S1 and S2, the judge’s 
inference cannot ever be defined as a mere “copy” of the one or of the other. In 
addition, S3 is performative in nature and such a condition integrates (not replaces!) its 
logical position. Content of (3) concludes the “legal syllogism” and makes the 
judgment argumentatively forceful, providing a kind of deduction (enthymema) to the 
legal reasoning.  
Here it is a diagram summarising S3: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and the drawing of the conclusion, scheduled respectively under #4 and #5. For this reason I prefer to distinguish 




Normative (de iure) Descriptive (de facto) Practical/Legal 
x(Px → MQx) Pa 
 
MQa 
The judge – after checks 
#1, 2, 3 and 4 – chooses 
the normative proposals in 
S1 or S2, or partially both 
The judge – after checks 
#1, 2, 3 and 4 – chooses 
the descriptive proposals 
in S1 or S2, or partially 
both 
The judge 
enthymematically infers  a 
practical conclusion from 
premises built in #4 
 
 
9. What is legal truth? 
 
The conclusion (3) of the legal reasoning – at the same time argumentative (rhetorical) and 
performative – has a status usually defined as “legal truth”. I have tried so far to explain how 
legal evidence is not only a matter of “subsumption” among supposedly given data (legal 
norms and facts): the task of the judge is much more complicated, implying interpretation and 
evaluation of arguments. We can say that “a proposition of law is true” (Patterson, 1996) only 
after determining, by an argumentative analysis of the parties’ discourses opposed in the 
controversy, a set of meanings related to the normative and factual statements.  
The rhetorical (not formal) nature of legal reasoning would seem to have little to do with 
the concept of truth, whose fundamental connotation should be the one of undeniability.  Thus 
a proposition of law like (3) should be more exactly described as probable or plausible and 
not true in the proper sense. Regarding such a question (which of course can be discussed here 
only very briefly) I believe that two main issues are at stake: (a) what does probable mean and 




(a) The first issue dates back to the “great division” between demonstration and 
argumentation as addressed especially by Chaïm Perelman, according to whom a proposition 
ascertained by formal or empirical science is undeniable, whereas argumentation gains only 
disputable conclusions (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958; contra Manzin, 2012a). As I 
have said before, the field of science is characterized by linguistic and contextual conditions 
which are different from the ones in a trial: the former allow conclusions to be inferred that 
are true because they are coherent with the formal or empirical premises of the demonstration 
(which have been conventionally established before the logical operation of deduction or 
induction and never put in doubt during the operation itself). Legal argumentation, on the 
contrary, works with language that is vague and constantly under question. For this reason 
Perelman argued that argumentative conclusions were probable and not certain, maintaining 
that a demonstration, proceeding from undisputed premises, finishes with an indisputable 
conclusion, while an argumentation, proceeding from disputable premises, ends with a 
disputable conclusion. Basically, Perelman believed that the conclusion of a syllogism had the 
same status as its premises: true, probable, wrong, etc. But let us consider the conclusions of a 
syllogism such as all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal. Is it a 
demonstration or an argumentation? According to Perelman and many others, it depends on 
the nature of the premises. In medical sciences, for instance, the mortality of all human beings 
is established from the outset and no longer in dispute, so the syllogism would be right. But in 
human sciences the mortality of a man/woman can be related to the memory of his/her 
behavior, depending on the agreement about it; in this case the syllogism could be wrong if, 
for instance, Socrates was thought to be immortal as a philosopher since his thinking is still 
alive.  
In conclusion: certainty on one side (that of formal and empirical science), plausibility on 




1959). But is it really so? From the logical point of view, the syllogism in my example is 
always valid if the conclusion is coherent to its premises. By this I mean, if you have accepted 
a certain definition of “mortality”, “Socrates”, “man” etc., and as far as such definitions are 
not disputed, then the conclusion itself, if correctly inferred (in this case by modus ponens), 
cannot be refuted because it simply has no incontrovertible alternatives. In other terms, it is 
true. Truth is therefore a matter of the impossibility of contradiction, regardless of the nature 
of the premises (either formalised or unformalised), and a proposition of law is true insofar as 
no reasonable argument can deny the selected topoi and the logical connection between them 
 
(Manzin, 2011, 2012c).  
(b) The second issue has metaphysical implications, dealing with the question of “Being 
and time”. According to an underlying Cartesianism, scholars of legal sciences and practical 
jurists often distinguish a so-called factual (or historical or material) truth from the legal one 
obtained at the end of the trial. Some of them skeptically maintain that the former is 
inaccessible; some others consider the latter as a sort of gradual approach to “what really 
happened”
61
. This kind of legal pessimism/optimism, broadly diffused among lawyers, judges 
and simple citizens, implicitly or explicitly presumes that a factual truth does exist 
“somewhere” in unchangeable conditions (like A=A) and that the purpose of the trial is to (try 
to) describe A using the means given by law and human knowledge. No doubt that the 
purpose of the judgment is to furnish normative descriptions of “something” like A, but such 
“something”, since it happened in the past, never properly exists within the space-time context 
of the judgment.  In other words, A remains always and only hypothetical, because no further 
perspective points are provided in a space-and-time-free condition to verify the 
correspondence A=A. Then, when we talk of “true” or “false”, such a definition should be 
correctly related to the description of the event under judgment, not to the event itself, which 
                                                 
61




is inconceivable outside our knowledge of it in a different space-time. Indeed, what “truth” 
could a fact in itself have? The one deriving from a sort of self-evidence? – If so, our 
reasoning should suffer a fallacious regressus ad infinitum. Is it then a sort of transcendental 
status? – We could affirm that only by accepting some prescriptive assertions: a matter of will, 
in such case, not of reason. Finally, is it the result of an empirical proof? – Contemporary 
physics recognises very well that empirical observations always modify the object of the 
experiment. 
In conclusion: there is no “factual” or “historical” or “material” truth which we can talk 
about at the end of the trial (and, I would guess, everywhere) but the truth of rhetorical 
arguments built around some normative and factual hypothesis, in a way and to the extent that 
such arguments were coherent and, thus, undeniable. 
Why legal truths are truths 
 
The above-mentioned “legal pessimists/optimists” could presume at this point of my article 
that argumentative (rhetorical) truth is actually a very weak one, depending on the consistency 
of standpoints whose places and connections can be put in doubt at any time. I might agree 
with them, but my question is: what, then, is a strong(er) truth? If it were demonstrable, as in 
Perelman’s opinion, it should be a truth granted by the coherence between formal or empirical 
premises and the conclusion. From this point of view, the only difference between 
demonstration and argumentation should be the one regarding the nature of scientific 
monologue, which is conventional and linguistically artificial, compared to the nature of 
argumentative dialogue, which is unconventional and linguistically vague, but no other 
difference could be found. Both demonstrative and rhetorical truths are truth because and to 
the extent that they are undeniable (i.e. a logical alternative does not exist). If you have 




without being contradicted. When ruled by coherence, rhetorical argumentation is definitely 
not a “weaker” kind of reasoning than scientific demonstration, but only a type which is 
especially suited to unformalised and controversial contexts.  
Of course, in scientific demonstration (monological) truth remains undisputed as long as 
convention is maintained, while in rhetorical argumentation (dialogical) it must be defended 
every time it is attacked by the interlocutors. But such a difference has nothing to do with the 
strength of the truth– it has to do, if anything, with its duration. In abstract and very general 
contexts (such as for instance, in mathematics) premises and methods usually last a long time 
before meeting criticism; in concrete and particular ones (such as for instance, in public 
contexts like law or politics) it is not unusual to encounter objections at every step. So what 
follows? Do we really think (as Montesquieu and Beccaria did) that the absolute reduction of 
concrete to abstract – of practice to theory – would be the best way of reasoning in law? I 
believe that history itself has already reached a judgment about that. 
 
11. Some conclusions 
 
Having offered (although very briefly) a short account of argumentative logic and legal 
truth
62
, I shall try now to answer the questions I posed at the beginning of my article. My 
essential aim was to point out how logic could help the (serious) judge decide on the case, 
knowing that his/her commitment to logical consistency is also provided for under statute law 
(see in Italy arts. 360.1.5 CPC and 606.1.e CPP). 
I would like to emphasize once again that if logic can help legal decisions (avoiding the 
reduction of trial to a mere act of legitimate power) it can do so only by building and 
connecting the argumentative premises in iure et in facto, not by formalizing the legal 
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reasoning into a “subsumption”. Hence logic in law implies, from the judge’s perspective, a 
process of selection from the parties’ discourses and a final multiple checks in the sense 
clarified by the diagram at the end of Section 8.  
Points in opposite arguments S1 or S2 will be discarded when incoherent in themselves or 
between each other, either because referents framing the interpretation are changed or for 
connections are wrongly made. Let us consider the following diagram: 
S1 or S2 Premise (1) Premise (2) Conclusion (3) Qualification 
Referent R means a means b S possible 
Referent R’ means c means d ≠S possible 
Ronnection x(Px →MQx) Pa MQa correct 
Connection x(Px →MQx) Pd MQa incorrect 
 
Conclusions of arguments could be =S or ≠S, depending on the proposed interpretative 
framing (referent R or R’); it could happen, however, that premises in the same argument 
were intended at a certain point of the reasoning as “a” (under referent R) and at another point 
as “c” (under referent R’), leading to an incorrect conclusion. In fact, once having accepted 
premises (1) and (2) in some sense (“a” and “b” or “c” and “d”), the inference is compulsory: 
=S in the former case, ≠S in the latter. For the same reason, if premise (1) is constructed under 
referent R (and means “a”), you cannot connect it to a premise (2) meaning “d” (referent 
R’≠R): in such case too conclusion MQa would be logically incorrect – and lawfully invalid. 
As can be seen, most of this procedure is governed by the rule of non-contradiction, 
expressly mentioned in art. 360.1.5 CPC (“contradictory argument” as a motivation for the 
invalidity of a judgment). But its complexity also makes it clear that legal reasoning might be 




example, we could have a conclusion inferred from incomplete premises (i.e. where some 
places are lacking). See the following, 
 
if (b, c, d) then (1); if (1) and (2), then (3)  
now (b, c) then (1); if (1) and (2), then (3); now (3) = incorrect 
 
In this case, the argument is not “lacking” in the strict sense of the word (as maintained by 
both the cited arts. in CPC and CPP) but, more exactly, “insufficient” (as in 360.1.5 CPC). 
In conclusion, I hope that these few guidelines on legal argumentation – inspired by, but not 
limited to, the statements set out in the Italian codes of Civil and Criminal procedure – could 
help (serious) judges in their justification in cases
63
. At the same time, I assume that a clear 
cognition of rhetoric in legal reasoning could enable (serious) lawyers to argue in a more 
effective way in trials, that is to say, in a way that is more persuasive for the audience and 
more logically suitable for the judge. 
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Debate as an Educational Tool: Is Polarization a Debate side effect? 
Manuele De Conti, University of Padua 
 
Summary 
Competitive debate is a challenging educational tool for argumentation. As the empirical research 
proves, debating improves learning, critical thinking and verbal and non-verbal communication skills, among 
others. Nonetheless, many scholars criticize it for one of its alleged and detrimental impacts: polarization. Indeed, 
listening to them, polarization would lead to bias assimilation, close-mindedness, dichotomization and 
disagreement and conflict escalating attitudes, polarization would appear as a debate “side effect” and debate 
itself as a detrimental educational tool. Therefore, the purposes of this survey will be (i) to show that polarization 
is neither a necessary nor a likely consequence of debating, (ii) to argue that even when polarization occurs bias 
assimilation, close-mindedness, dichotomization and disagreement and conflict escalating attitudes, do not 
necessarily follow, and (iii) to stress the mistakes these detractors commit. Finally, polarization will lose its “side 
effect” color and debating will be recognized as an effective and organic tool for argumentation education. 
 
Keywords: competitive debate, polarization, argumentation education 
 
1. Debate and competitive debate: framework and definition 
Debate is a particular type of dialogue. Theoretically, dialogue means a process of 
communication between at least two people that occurs through a series of back and forth 
messages also considered as organized steps toward fulfilling a goal (Walton, 1992, 1998, 
2006). A dialogue is genuinely communicative: the units of dialogue are primarily speech acts, 
and these communicative acts are sent out by participants in reply to other messages (Walton, 
1992). Therefore, a dialogue can be more straightforwardly defined as a sequence of 
exchanges of messages or speech acts between two (or more) participants (Walton, 1998, 
2006, 2008; cf. Fuentes & Santibáñez, 2011). The most elementary illustration of a dialogue is 




Rules and goals are other important components of dialogue. Rules define the types of 
messages allowed at each move, the turn taking, and what counts as a successful sequence of 
messages in fulfilling the goal. The goal in contrast is the final state toward which the 
sequence of moves progresses. There are two types of goals: collective and individual. A 
collective goal refers to the goal pursued by a particular type of dialogue. Some examples of 
collective goals are the following: to resolve a difference of opinion, to reach an informed 
basis for action, to reveal a deeper conflict, or to transfer knowledge. Individual goals, on the 
other hand, are the goals individuals pursue in order to realize the collective goal of the type 
of dialogue they are engaged in. Some examples of individual goals are to persuade one party 
of the correctness of a particular proposition, to obtain or give advice on a problem, to 
verbally strike at and humiliate an opponent, or to obtain information (Walton, 1992, 2006). 
Several identifiable types of dialogue exist based on this framework. A pedagogical 
type of dialogue stems from an initial situation where one party is ignorant and involves the 
collective goal of transferring knowledge. Diversely, negotiation occurs in the context of a 
conflict of interest with settlement as the collective goal. Lastly, persuasion dialogue or 
critical discussion emerges from a difference of opinion with the aim of resolving the 
disagreement as a collective goal (Walton, 1992, 1996).  
Debate is a type of dialogue, too. Its context is adversarial, and both parties aim to 
persuade a third party, i.e., the audience or the judge, by making the strongest argument for 
their side. In addition, debate is strictly regulated by rules of procedure that determine when 
and how long each arguer may speak. When the debate ends, the audience, either one or more 
judges or another type of referee, determine by voting which side had the better argument 
(Snider, 2008; Walton, 2008).  
Some scholars do not recognize these debate rules, also called debate format, to be the 




defending arguments relevant to the issue debated (Branham, 1991: 22). However, in this 
paper we consider both rules and advancing, disputing and defending arguments relevantly to 
the issue debated, the main features of the debate and elements of the definition of debate 
itself. Indeed, if we do not consider rules as a fundamental aspect of debate, debate would not 
differ from other types of dialogue. Furthermore, if we do not consider arguing relevantly to 
the issue as a fundamental aspect of debate, debate could be confused with the eristic dialogue 
as some scholars seems to do (Cf. Walton, 1992): when debaters, as well discussion partners, 
turn eristic, they violate the norm of the model, letting the interaction deteriorate in a different 
kind of exchange (Jørgensen, 1998: 439). 
Therefore, in this paper, debate will be considered a strictly ruled type of competitive 
(Wood and Goodnight, 1994) dialogue where opposing parties try to win their opponents, by 
persuading the audience, the judges or the referees, i.e. the decision makers, through 
advancing, disputing and defending arguments relevant to the issue being debated (Branham, 
1991: 22). The benefits of debate as a type of dialogue are, among others, to enable parties to 
make wise decisions (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978), to facilitate spreading of information 
(Walton, 1992), to test different points of view (Brimble and Pritchard, 2003) and to 
determine how changes should occur (Snider, 2008). 
Following this framework, the so-called academic debate (Freely, 1961), competitive 
debate (Hensley & Carlin, 1994), and classroom debate (Snider & Schnurer, 2002), among 
other designations (from now on, all known as competitive debate), differ from the general 
definition of debate. Unlike forensic, public, political, or parliamentary debate, competitive 
debate is rigorously conducted under the direction of an educational institution for the purpose 
of providing educational opportunities for its students (Freely, 1961). 
 




Many positive impacts of competitive debate exist for students. For our purposes, we 
will focus just on three of them: learning (Combs and Bourne, 1994; Scott, 2008; Vo & 
Morris, 1996), critical thinking and argumentation (Allen et al., 1999; Colbert, 1995; Korcok, 
1997), and verbal and non-verbal communication (Inoue & Nakano, 2004). 
School or academic debate occurs on controversial issues. Performing research to find 
material to advocate pro or contra positions facilitates the ability to understand issues, as 
shown by the five-year study of Combs and Bourne (1994). According to their survey, 
students participating in their business administration courses considered competitive debate a 
better learning tool than standard lectures. Of those students, 88.9% declared competitive 
debate better than standard lectures for gaining an understanding of the various positions on 
issues, and furthermore, 77.5% of them thought that they learned more than if they had 
attended a normal class. These results were corroborated by Han Vo and Richard Morris’s 
survey (1996). Three out of four students in Vo and Morris’s economy course considered 
debate helpful in understanding the course material and in developing a more realistic idea of 
the economy. In addition, the same outcome was recently reported by Sophia Scott for a 
Science, Technology and Society course (2008).  
Debating as a method for learning has been adopted in many disciplines, including 
economics (Vo & Morris, 1996), business administration (Combs & Bourne, 1994), 
psychology (Moeller, 1985; O'Kon & Sutz, 2005), sociology (Scott, 2008), philosophy 
(Nicolli & Cattani, 2008), geography (Estaville, 2001), chemistry (Streitberger, 1988), 
statistics (Shatz, 1985), and nutrition (Magnus, 2000), only to mention a few. However, few 
of the research studies mentioned involved statistical analysis, and even for those that did 
(Combs & Bourne, 1994; Scott, 2008; Vo & Morris, 1996), the investigation was limited to 
students’ perceptions. In conclusion, without doubting these outcomes, it seems appropriate to 




Indeed, multiple choice testing, which was used in the survey of Green and Klug (1990), and 
mixed methods research, like that conducted by Duffin (2006), led to the conclusion that 
classrooms that make heavy use of debate have greater improvement with respect to students’ 
understanding of the material than other classes, as well as the conclusion that competitive 
debate itself, adopted directly as an assessment tool in schools, might help the scientific 
community to strengthen its results.  
Critical thinking and argumentation skills are the other benefits of debate that are often 
stressed. Semlak and Shields (1977), using judges’ reports, revealed how students with debate 
training had significantly higher scores in analysis than students with only public speaking 
training. Furthermore, Colbert (1995), in considering the objections of Hill (1993) and 
indirectly those of Greenstreet (1993), proved with a meta-analysis that debaters score better 
than non-debaters in critical thinking. In addition, Colbert argued that the Watson-Glaser 
Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA), the questionnaire adopted by the surveys he reviewed, 
was one of the best tools developed thus far for critical thinking, in spite of its flaws (Ennis, 
1958, 2009). In conclusion, Colbert, as Korcok did (1997), tried to promote cooperation 
among scholars for methodologically more valid surveys.  
Improvements in critical thinking and argumentation skills were also confirmed by 
another exhaustive meta-analysis. After having reviewed 17 empirical research studies on 
communication, Allen et al. (1999) concluded that “regardless of the specific measure used to 
assess critical thinking, the type of design employed, or the specific type of communication 
skills training taught, critical thinking improved as a result of training in communication skills. 
[…] Participation in forensic demonstrated the largest improvement in critical thinking score 
whether considering longitudinal or cross-sectional designs” (ibidem: 27). 
Recently, an Italian pre- and post- text analysis study has been done (Turchi, et. al., 




the perception only of both teachers (Cf. Martens, 2007) and students (Scott, 2008), and in 
addition, critical thinking in the classroom setting is still actively promoted (Oros, 2007). 
Nonetheless, more empirical surveys on the relationship between debate and critical thinking 
are necessary to transcend the meta-analyses conducted by Colbert (1995), Korcok (1997), 
and Allen et al. (1999) (Cf. Bellon, 2000; Broda-Bahm, 2002). 
In conclusion, improvement of verbal and non-verbal communication is the last impact 
of debate on students we consider in this brief review. The study of Semlak and Shields 
(1977), previously presented, explains the situation best: not only do debaters score better in 
analysis, but also they perform better than public speaking students in organization and 
communication of the message. Furthermore, according to the research by Williams, McGee, 
and Worth (2001), as well as by Littlefield (2001), students perceive the improved ability to 
speak and communicate as the most common benefit of debate. This same outcome also 
emerged from a broader survey (Inoue & Nakano, 2004) that provided an intercultural point 
of view. 
 
2. Polarization as a debate “side effect” 
Among the several debate impacts on students some are considered highly negative. 
Polarization is one of them. Polarization means moving in the direction of the initial tendency 
or attitude (Petty and Wegener, 1998) strengthening the original position (Sears et al., 1964) 
or becoming more entrenched in it (Lord et al., 1979). Polarization seems to be linked to bias 
assimilation or confirmation bias (ibid.), i.e. the inclination to give weight only to evidence 
that is consistent with the hypothesis in question (Risen and Gilovich, 2007), and seems due 
to the cognitive engagement with the topic (Lao and Kuhn, 1996). Indeed, polarization may 
occur when a party believes in a particular opinion (Lao and Kuhn, 1996; Pomerantz et al., 




(Budesheim and Lundquist, 1999; Lao and Kuhn, 1996; Sears et al., 1964), and with aging 
(Kuhn et al., 1997).  
Polarization mostly occurs in the debate setting. Sears et al. (1964) recognized that the 
debate audience’s confidence in previous opinions was strengthened after having watched a 
debate. Lao and Kuhn (1996) and Budesheim and Lundquist (1999) showed that debaters also 
polarize, and our exploratory survey on 63 debaters confirmed this result. The exception was 
when debaters advocated for a position opposite to their personal belief, in which case their 
confidence in their opinion weakened significantly (De Conti, in press; cf. Budesheim & 
Lundquist, 1999; Green & Klug, 1990). 
The trouble with polarization is that it seems to trigger bias assimilation or 
confirmation bias (Lord et al., 1979; Nickerson, 1998; Sears et al., 1964), dichotomization — 
i.e. “radicalizing a polarity by emphasizing the incompatibility of the poles and the 
inexistence of intermediate alternatives by stressing the obvious character of the dichotomy as 
well as of the pole that ought to be preferred” (Dascal, 2008: 34; cf. Dascal and Knoll, 2011) 
— and escalate conflict and disagreement attitudes, as Glasl (1997), Pruitt and Kim (2004) 
and Kennedy and Pronin (2008) attest.  
These negative outcomes help us to make explicit the reasoning behind many scholars 
who discard debate. If debate leads to polarization and polarization leads to bias assimilation, 
dichotomization or disagreement and conflict escalating attitudes, then debate is a detrimental 
educational tool. Johnson and Johnson (1994) consider debate as a context where 
“competitors tend to avoid communicating with each other, misperceive each other’s position 
and motivations, be suspicious of each other, deny the legitimacy of others’ needs and 
feelings, and see the situation only from their own perspective” (ibidem: 118) concluding that 
debate promotes closed-mindedness or refusing to incorporate any opponent’s arguments into 




since debaters “want to win the argument […] they must go for the most gross and dramatic 
statements they can muster. They will not concede an opponent’s point, even if they can see 
its validity because that would weaken their position” (ibidem: 261). Furthermore, Westbrook 
(2002) although he conceded that some debaters in nineteenth-century colleges and debate 
societies could have reexamined their position on dominant values, concluded that debating 
did not influence debaters to resist hegemonic ideologies because they were arguing for 
victory, instead of inquiring for the truth. 
In addition, Andrews (1995) considered the Hegelian dialectic structuring the debate 
as a simplification for the mind and of the mind and Tumposky (2004) argued that “Debate 
can oversimplify and misrepresent the nature of knowledge. By setting up issues as 
dichotomies, debate reinforces a Western bias toward dualism and ignores the multiplicity of 
perspectives inherent in many issues” (ibidem: 53-54). Moreover, Barnard (1937) considered 
debate as developing in an over-aggressive and combative manner that results in a bellicose 
attitude, and again, Tannen sees debate as agonistic in nature where agonism means “an 
automatic warlike stance” and “agonistic response” means “a kind of programmed 
contentiousness – a prepatterned, unthinking use of fighting to accomplish goals that do not 
necessarily require it” (Tannen, 1999: 10). Therefore, these conclusions, influenced these 
scholars to consider debate an unsuitable tool for education in a multilingual, multicultural, 
and economically diverse society (ibid.), as Hyde and Bineham (2000) also argue. 
All these features played a significant role in making competitive debate appear like a 
disdained tool belonging to the so often rejected and considered harmful adversary paradigm 
(Cf. Menkel-Meadow, 1996; Moulton, 1983; Tannen, 1999, 2002). 
 




The purpose of this paper is not to rebut the arguments against the adversary paradigm, 
which has been done by some scholars already, who effectively argued in favor of the 
adversary paradigm with a special focus on competitive debate (Cattani 2005; Foster, 2004). 
We simply wish to say that substituting debating with role playing so as to avoid antagonism, 
for example, will lead to too much focus on perspective taking at the expense of 
argumentation and its associated benefits. 
 Indeed, Mitchell (2000) himself, after praising role-playing over debating, recognized 
that “since arguments advanced in role-play simulations involve highly subjective identity 
interpretations, it would be difficult indeed for teachers to develop evalutative criteria that 
would judge radically different student performances fairly” (ibidem: 136). Otherwise, debate 
“adversaries present arguments in the voice of omniscient commentators, delivering [an] 
overarching assessment of issues that ‘clash’ directly with positions staked out by opponents” 
(ibidem: 148).  
In addition, even if not directly, psychological and educational science research 
supports the benefits of the adversary paradigm too. For example, Sears (1966) proved that in 
a mock trial setting subjects familiar with neither side’s arguments seek a nonpartisan two-
sided presentation. Although this choice was made as an economical way of comparing the 
virtues of the two alternatives and arriving at a reasonable preference, it was preferred over 
one-sided partisan argument. Furthermore, Turner et al., (2010) showed that people seek out 
counter-attitudinal information mostly when they are confident in their arguments and 
forewarned to interact with someone with opposite views. Therefore, on the contrary, the 
purpose of this paper is to show that polarization is not a debate “side effect”, to reject the 
reasoning concluding that debate is a detrimental tool because it leads to polarization. 
Nonetheless, it is of the most importance to stress that debating is neither necessarily 




position than their personal beliefs, the confidence in such opinions weakens significantly (De 
Conti, in press; cf. Budesheim and Lundquist, 1999; Green and Klug, 1990). This means that 
debaters de-polarize, implying that they move in the opposite direction rather than the initial 
view or attitude (Petty and Wegener, 1998). Therefore, after considering the above arguments 
it can be concluded that some debaters polarize. However this is neither necessary nor likely 
in a long period. Many debate formats, such as the Lincoln-Douglas and more generally all 
Switch-Side Debates require students to debate several times, both for and against, about the 
same issue (Lewis and Wiese, 2000; Muir, 1993). In such instances, a tendency to moderate 
radicalization occurs because people have to support positions opposite to their opinion 
(Huckfeldt et al., 2004). Moreover, it is always possible to adopt procedures specifically 
developed to prevent polarization. For example, the 5’R model (Williams, 2010) suggests 
Reading research articles representing different points of view on each issue, Rapping the 
articles with the debate group and with the instructor, wRiting an essay on the core 
disagreement across the two opposing arguments recognizing bias and persuasive strategies 
and evaluating the empirical merit of the data, Reporting or having a debate and finally, 
Repeating or having another debate on the same motion, some months later. In conclusion, as 
William proved, the 5’R model helped nearly 33% of the students to change their attitude, a 
greater outcome than that documented by other studies on debate (ibidem; cf. Landrum, 1991). 
Therefore, after having reviewed some research it can be concluded that debating is neither 
necessarily nor likely to leads to polarization. 
The question arises whether, whenever polarization occurs, it is necessary that bias 
assimilation, close-mindedness, dichotomization and disagreement, and conflict escalating 
attitudes will follow. The answer to this question is negative: it is not necessary.  
 




Walton (1992) and Blair (1988) argue that not all bias is harmful; there is nothing 
inherently wrong about partisan argumentation “which takes up only one side of an issue in 
contentious dialogue with an opposed advocate of a differing point of view” (Walton, 1992: 
155). Indeed, having a position on an issue is different from having a censurable bias which 
means that the argument is never really open to the risk of loss. Censurable bias or “bad” bias, 
i.e. bias that is open to criticism (Blair, 1988), is a fault called hardened bias (Walton, 1992: 
157). Therefore, advocating a position does not necessarily mean being biased in a harmful 
way. Even more relevant to this point is that, as Nickerson (1998) argues, there is a huge 
difference in building a case deliberately and consciously instead of engaging in case-building 
without being aware of doing so. The first type of case-building is illustrated by what 
attorneys and debaters do, namely to confirm a particular position. Otherwise, the second type 
of case-building is a less explicit and a less conscious process. This is what psychologists 
refer to as the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998: 175-176). What seems really important for 
education is that the difference between case-building and evidence-weighing must be explicit 
(Narveson, 1980). 
Accordingly, even dogmatism if moderate can play an important role and not to be 
considered harmful. Popper himself regarded a little dogmatism, even a little obstinacy, to be 
useful in avoiding the premature rejection of a hypothesis (Popper, 1972): “a degree of 
conservatism plays a stabilizing role in science and guards the field against uncritical 
acceptance of so-called discoveries that fail to stand the test of time” (Nickerson, 1998: 207). 
For this reason and in the light of the rules (Wood and Goodnight, 1994) and game (Snider, 
1983, 1984) features of competitive debate, that require for actively and consciously building 
a case (Nickerson, 1998), and in the light of the previous empirical research that attests to the 




1997) for example, leading students to avoid fallacies because judges can penalize them, it 
could be concluded that debate does not necessarily lead to hardened bias or confirmation bias. 
Moreover, debate does not necessarily lead to hardened bias or confirmation bias 
because the debate format can be adapted to avoid such consequences. Fuentes and 
Santibáñez (2011) strongly suggest adding a third team in the debate match, so as to facilitate 
understanding between adversaries. Quite often competitors do not refer to what the 
opponents established as a reason for their point of view. Consequently, a third team 
appointed to introduce into the debate the omitted information or the motion’s core arguments, 
can help mitigating bias assimilation and off topic debates. 
 
3.2. Rejecting close-mindedness as debating outcomes 
Close-mindedness and dichotomization do not necessarily result from debating. 
Authorities argued that considering the issues regardless of prejudices (Alden, 1900) and 
developing the attitude to examine and compare opinions before reaching a reasoned decision 
(Branham, 1991) are attributed to debate practice and the elements of open-mindedness, 
namely being receptive to new and different ideas (Johnson and Johnson, 2000). These 
benefits suggest that debate is an effective tool in preparing for a more thorough evaluation of 
the different points of view and their reasons. Even the philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill 
(1992) and Karl Popper (1962), recognized these benefits of debate practice; although, they 
were referring to less formalized debates than competitive ones. As we have already hinted, 
these benefits are also supported by previously presented empirical results as, for example 
learning and understanding issues (Duffin, 2006; Scott, 2008). Furthermore, competitive 
debate promotes understanding of counter-attitudinal points of view. Tjosvold and Johnson 
(1977) and Tjosvold et al. (1980) assert that the presence of controversy promotes a greater 




Bonomo et al. (2010) claim that debate promotes tolerancia critica, namely acceptance of 
others without devaluing one’s own ideas and convictions. This last outcome was empirically 
proved by Rogers and Rennels (in press) in a 13-year-longitudinal survey. In their research 
Rogers and Rennels conclude that “debaters were significantly more likely to display 
understanding and cultural tolerance than those who were not trained in competitive debate”. 
As an ultimate proof, Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984), after having taken into account the 
less than optimal evaluation of counter-attitudinal evidence, by people who hold strong 
opinions (Lord, et al., 1979), showed that either direct instruction or indirectly making 
opposing possibilities more salient actions that could be taken by coaches themselves, 
promotes impartiality (ibidem: 1239).  Hence, close-mindedness does not necessary result 
from debate practice. 
 
3.3. Discounting dichotomization as a debating impact 
The outcomes previously mentioned favor the case against dichotomization too. De-
dichotomization means “showing that the opposition between the poles can be constructed as 
less logically binding than a contradiction, thus allowing for intermediate alternatives; 
actually developing or exemplifying such alternatives” (Dascal, 2008: 35). Therefore, if 
competitive debate is considered also as a game (Snider, 1983, 1984) and not the way in 
which people should relate with one another all the time, and, as we noticed before, 
competitive debate leads to understanding issues and people significantly deeper (Combs and 
Bourne, 1994; Duffin, 2006; Rogers and Rennels, in press; Scott, 2008; Vo and Morris, 1996), 
de-dichotomization, rather dichotomization, is more likely to occur. 
In addition, de-dichotomization is not only pointed out by reasoning and surveys. It 
can be also attained by specific guidelines. For example, multisided debates were born due to 




can be answered by a spectrum of answers (Snider and Schnurer, 2002). To clarify how this 
kind of debate works: 
Consider a debate about what the United Nations stance should be concerning the 
nation of Iraq. One side of the debate might represent a hard-line stance that advocated 
strict sanctions and a vigorous bombing campaign to get the Iraqi people to rebel 
against Saddam Hussein. A second side might advocate humanitarian assistance to 
help rebuild the shattered infrastructure of Iraq and feed starving children. Yet, a third 
position might represent a decided “hands-off” approach, arguing that the best thing 
that the UN could do would be to leave Iraq alone (Snider and Schnurer, 2002: 75). 
Another example could be choosing a motion such as “Who has the most pride (or prejudice) 
in Austen’s novel?” rather than “Elizabeth Bennett has more pride (or prejudice) than Darcy 
in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice”. Rephrasing the motion following this suggestion will 
split up the classroom into more groups allowing a multisided debate (Mareli, 2011). 
Furthermore, it is always possible to refrain from choosing and rewarding a “winning” 
team by leaving the debate open to structural alteration, such as open dialogue or to adopt 
debate formats that allow direct questioning among debaters, as the cross examination format 
allows. Undoubtedly, these debate formats can allow students to perceive, address and work 
with the contingency and relativity of their arguments (Mareli, 2011) avoiding 
dichotomization. 
 
3.4. Dismissing disagreement and conflict escalating attitudes as necessary debating results 
The cases against bias assimilation, close-mindedness and dichotomization lead us 
directly to our last point; escalating disagreement and conflict attitudes. To escalate means to 
increase rapidly or to make something more intense and serious; although, sometimes, this 




participants (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). As Glasl (1982; 1997) declares, debate and polemic 
involve polarization in thinking, feelings and will, and they lead to the use of verbal violence 
and gain recognition by speaking to an audience, namely addressing a third party rather than 
the other party. Indeed, Kennedy and Pronin (2008) proved that the more we disagree with 
someone the more we tend to have the perception that those who disagree with us are biased. 
This undesirable outcome has, among its consequences, become more and more aggressive.  
However, competing activities are not necessarily linked to aggressiveness. As Pruitt 
and Kim (2004) pointed out, competing activities sometimes inhibit aggression. Moderate 
heat could provoke aggression, but severe heat could result in flight, if the situation allows it. 
Similarly, the best way to stop angry children from crying is to divert their attention to a 
pleasurable competing activity. Nonetheless, and most importantly, it is always possible to 
avoid using verbal aggression or not to allow the conflict to escalate to a more dangerous 
behavior.  
Glasl gives some tested suggestions on avoiding harsh debate or conflict escalation, 
which are: concentrating on the disputed core issues, avoiding violence in communication, 
recognizing unfair debating tactics. Hence, as it clearly appears, these suggestions require 
fundamental skills in debating, as every complete debate book proves (Huber and Snider, 
2005; Trapp et al., 2005; Wood and Goodnight, 1994). Moreover, Kennedy and Pronin (2008) 
argue that increasing efforts to achieve an accurate understanding of the world is a promising 
intervention to avoid disagreement and conflict escalation. But again, this is exactly what 
debate and debate preparation lead to, as the surveys on learning attest.  
In conclusion, Infante et al. (1984) showed that argumentative people are less 
aggressive than non-argumentative ones. Swift and Vourvoulias (2006) also pointed out that 
argumentative people have more satisfying relationships and Mezuk (2009) proved that 




times less likely to drop out of high school than those who did not participate in debates. Such 
an outcome implies that, since competitive debate leads to a diminishing school drop out rate, 
it diminishes criminal behavior because dropouts are more likely to engage in criminal 
activities than students and educated people (Blomberg et al., 2012; Kimberly et al. 2012; 
Moretti, 2005). 
As a result, from what has been argued so far, it is only reasonable to conclude that 
bias assimilation, close-mindedness, dichotomization and conflict or disagreement escalating 
attitudes do not necessarily result from debate and polarization. Therefore, polarization is not 
a necessary “side effect” of debate even if some of the negative consequences mentioned so 
far are likely to occur in some debaters when training or judging are inadequate (Cox and 
Adam, 1993; Ehninger, 1952; Friedley, 1983; Hinck, 2003; Stepp, 1990; Thomas and Hart, 
1983; Wood and Rowland-Morin, 1989).  
 
4. Detractors mistakes 
As previously shown, polarization is neither a necessary nor a likely consequence of 
competitive debating even if it sometimes occurs among debaters. Nonetheless, we have also 
seen that, even if polarization occurs, it does not necessarily lead to bias assimilation, close-
mindedness, dichotomization and disagreement and conflict escalating attitudes. Therefore, if 
the reasoning and proof brought in favor of these propositions are compelling, debate 
detractors must have made mistakes in determining that debate is detrimental. 
One of these mistakes is hasty generalization. Hasty generalization happens when a 
conclusion is drawn before enough evidence is found (Groarke and Tindale, 2008: 282) or 
when we conclude too much on too little evidence (Tindale, 2007: 150). Quite often 
competitive debate is deemed detrimental just because other categories of debate have 




transferred to competitive debate (Tannen, 1988, 2002), negative features in debates influence 
the idea of competitive debate (Moulton, 1983, Tannen, 2002) and the negative features of a 
highly competitive debate (Cf. Ehninger, 1952; Ulrich, 1986b) are extended to competitive 
debate in toto (Johnson and Johnson, 1994; Tannen, 1988, 2002).  
Actually, hasty generalization occurs regardless whether negative and positive types of 
debate are distinguished. For example, Tannen argues that neither debating nor all oppositions 
are evil. In her, The Argument Culture, she clearly states, “In a word, the type of opposition I 
am questioning is what I call ‘agonism’”, namely an automatic warlike stance (Tannen, 1999: 
10), and “The message of this book is not, ‘Let’s stop arguing and be nice to each other.’ 
Quite the contrary, the message is, ‘Let’s look more closely at the effect of the ritualized 
opposition, so we can have the real arguments.’ The opposite of argument culture is not being 
‘nice’ and avoiding conflict; it is finding constructive ways of arguing, debating, and 
confronting conflict” (ibidem: 6). However, the whole book seems to be an invective against 
every kind of debate. Indeed, in The Argument Culture, as in her other papers on this topic (Cf. 
Tannen, 2000, 2002), Tannen herself does not seem to talk about positive types of opposition, 
or even about positive aspects of debate, except in the conclusion where she states: “I’m 
moving away from a narrow view of debate, we need not give up conflict and criticism 
altogether. Quite the contrary, we can develop more varied – and more constructive – ways of 
expressing opposition and negotiating disagreement” (ibidem: 298). Thus, either debate is evil 
or debate and some types of opposition are positive. However, no examples of positive 
debates and types of opposition are advanced. Hence, from her framework, that debate is evil 
can be seen in many of her writings vehemently detracting from debating
64
. Indeed, it is 
difficult to understand how competitive debate should be distinguished from agonism and 
how, in her framework, debating could play a positive role. Consequently, even if some 
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prerequisites protecting premises from attack are presented (see Fogelin & Sinott-Armstrong, 
1997, p. 42), there is still room for hasty generation; unless further justifications/clarifications 
are given by the author. 
Some other scholars seem to commit a different mistake than hasty generalization. The 
way debaters behave in a debating match is considered an impact of debate practice, namely a 
procedural effect with an educational impact. For example, Johnson and Johnson (1994) 
depict a debater as denying “the legitimacy of others’ needs and feelings, and see the situation 
only from their own perspective” (ibidem: 118) or as “unwilling to make concession to the 
opponent’s viewpoint, and close-mindedly refuse to incorporate any of it into their own 
position” (Johnson and Johnson, 2000: 3-22). However, what Johnson and Johnson point out 
in these quotations are not debate impacts. They are talking about the prescribed sets of 
behavior characterized by the debating match because of the rules of the match itself, i.e. 
debate role behavior. In fact, developing an issue from only one’s own point of view, 
ignoring others’ perspectives and avoiding making risky concessions for oneself are 
legitimate behaviors in debating matches. Nonetheless, this does not mean that a debater 
behaves in this manner, on all occasions. It would mean coming to the conclusion that a 
judoka usually fights people just because in competitions he or she struggles violently with an 
opponent.  
Confusing procedural effects, i.e. role behavior, with educational impacts is mostly 
committed by cooperative learning supporters. These supporters sometimes seem to suggest 
that cooperative types of dialogue are better than competitive types on the basis that, at the 
end of the match, cooperative types of dialogue motivate students to agree instead of 
disagreeing. For example, Johnson and Johnson (2000) conclude that debaters refuse to 
incorporate any opponent’s point of view into their own position, and Felton et. al. (2009) are 




that acknowledge opposing viewpoints. However, as pointed out before, these outcomes must 
be recognized as debate or deliberative roles rather than dwelling on their educational impact. 
Likewise, from an argumentative point of view, agreement cannot be considered as the 
criteria of distinguishing sound arguments from bad ones. It is always possible for two parties 
to reach an agreement using fallacious arguments because reaching an agreement could be a 
simple, or the expected way, of getting good marks in school. 
A similar misinterpretation seems to be committed by Walton (1995) when he 
confuses debate’s accidental features with the essence of debate or the ideal debate, i.e. debate 
hypothetical optimum. He declares that, “debaters can score good points and can win over a 
judge or audience successfully even while using bad or fallacious arguments”. However, if 
debate exhibits some features of the eristic dialogue it does not mean that the debate is or 
should be performed as an eristic dialogue, as Walton seems to suggest (1994, 2008). Instead, 
in competitive debate the judge is in a position to reward effective argumentative techniques 
and to discourage the use of poor arguments (Ulrich, 1986a). In addition, the purposes often 
cited as overall goals of judging are to promote the educational aspects of academic debate, to 
promote fairness in the activity and to establish a favorable atmosphere for quality 
competition in debates (ibidem: 2). The achievement of these goals cannot be compared with 
allowing poor or fallacious arguments to flourish. Moreover, even if a debate team could win 
a match using fallacious arguments, reaching an agreement in a critical discussion type of 
dialogue does not avoid the same critique. It is always possible that, in a critical discussion, 
an agreement or persuasion is reached based on fallacious arguments if parties do not 
recognize such arguments as fallacious. Nonetheless, critical discussions are not considered 
eristic. 
The last mistake emphasized seems to imply another conceptual confusion: debate 




and Tumposky (2004) suggest that considering the dialectic structure of debate a 
simplification seems to imply that debaters simplify issues. However, this is a mistake. As we 
have seen before, debaters understand issues better, and when they are preparing for debates, 
they acknowledge problematic issues. Therefore, it is likely that, this kind of mistake ensues 
from a recurrent misconception, which is considering competitive debate only as a strictly 
ruled type of competitive dialogue (Wood and Goodnight, 1994). Even if this definition is 
correct from a strictly theoretical point of view, from a pedagogical and practical perspective 
it is not exhaustive. In fact, debate also encompasses information seeking dialogue, where 
each debater looks for and shares information with teammates; critical discussion, where 
teammates explore issues together; negotiation, where teammates try to reach an agreement 
on organizational matters; and deliberation, where, for example, teammates have to decide 
which arguments to bring into the debate (Cf. Backer, 2010). Recognizing the need for a 
wider set of skills for debating than those strictly related to the match reveals how complete a 
tool debate is and how important cultivating all the skills associated with debate is for 
argumentation education. Additionally, promoting this idea of academic debate will help 
scholars to give a clearer idea of debate itself and its impacts. This will strengthen debate 
from oversimplification by those who consider debate just a way of making a prejudice more 
sound (Cf. Bono de, 1985). This is also a challenge that future researchers should face. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Debate is not detrimental. It is neither necessary nor likely that it leads to polarization. 
Debaters who advocate a counter-attitudinal side do not polarize but de-polarize, and debaters’ 
de-polarization could be promoted by making debaters shift side many times, or by adopting 
appropriate procedures as the 5’R model describes. Also among those who polarize, debate 




escalating conflict attitudes. Thus, polarization is not a necessary “side effect” of debate even 
if some of the negative consequences mentioned so far could occur in some debaters when 
training or judging is inadequate. 
Nonetheless, important suggestions on unpleasant features or consequences such as 
eristic, exaggerate agonism, and issues simplification must be kept in mind. As educators, it is 
always important to make every effort to avoid such undesired consequences. Moreover, 
outcomes that stress other types of dialogue having greater positive impact than debate, as a 
more active search for information outside the class (Johnson and Johnson, 1985) or more 
evidence quotation (Felton et al. 2009), must be considered with open-mindedness and 
curiosity. They could suggest we consider debate from a wider and more complex perspective, 
and to develop the appropriate training. Indeed, team members preparing for competitive 
debate also engage in negotiation, when they organize for effective cooperation, in 
information-seeking dialogue, when they share information, in critical discussion, when they 
develop and test cases, in deliberation, when they choose strategy for the debate match, and 
finally in debate. From this perspective, debate could be seen as a complete tool for 
argumentation education because it provides a wide set of argumentative dialogues to work 
with and it assures, at the same time, the fundamental ingredient of argumentation itself: 
disagreement and confrontation (Jackson, 2002; Marttunen, 1992). As Willard (1988) 
suggests, disagreement is not a problem, but a value in itself; if we let it flourish, if we 
tolerate it and if we correctly manage it, we avoid conformity, we do not compromise 
democracy and we do not lose our liberty. 
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Teaching the writing of argumentative genre through imitatio: A solid basis for the 
‘beginner’ writers 
Fotini Egglezou, Athens 
 
Summary 
This paper concerns the contribution of imitatio to the argumentative writing of twenty three 11-years old 
students of an elementary school (case-study) in the context of a socially constructed classroom. Through the 
lecture, listening, analysis and explicit teaching of the argumentative topics and stylistic figures found in a 
hybrid literary-argumentative text, students were conduced to the mimesis and genesis of multiple persuasive 
arguments.  Imitatio seemed to influence positively the student’s argumentative writing. The qualitative analysis 
of the final written argumentative texts showed a better awareness of the argumentative genre.  Also, the 
quantification of data revealed an increased use of the argumentative topics of relations (cause-effect, antithesis) 
and of the figure of rhetorical questions.  
Key words: imitation, argumentative writing, genre, elementary school 
1. Introduction 
Diachronically and interdisciplinarilyy the act of mimeisthai [μιμεῑσθαι /mimisthe], the 
notion of imitation, consists of a pivotal but, also, diversified, disputed or ‘elusive’ term 
(Fanner and Arrington, 1993:13) in many cognitive fields. Either as the representation of the 
real world in art and literature or as the deliberate imitation of various social behaviors and 
even more as pedagogical practice, imitatio or mimesis obtained fervent theoretical supporters 
as well as bitter enemies who tried either to reveal or to underestimate its value.  
2. Historic roots of imitatio in rhetorical pedagogy 
2.1 The ancient theoretical pedigree 
Sophistic rhetoric identifies imitation as a necessary factor of the development of 





As regards Plato and Aristotle, they both accept the contribution of imitation to 
learning even if they don’t perceive it as an emulating practice (Corbett, 1971:243). For Plato, 
the positive or negative evaluation of imitation depends on its role in the acquisition of the 
ideal truth. Finally, he approves its use as a medium capable of educating the Republic’s 
future, ideal citizens (Plato, 1937; Tate, 1932:161).  
In Phaedrus Socrates presents an analogous bilateral attitude towards it. On the one 
hand, he applies the art of imitation by offering a more accurate version of Lysias’ speech and 
he accepts, explicitly, the existence of ideal models of orators. On the other hand, he advises 
Phaedrus not to imitate entirely a speech which contains bad examples of what he considers as 
true rhetoric (Plato, 1993, 278b 4-5:201, 264e 5-7).  
As with Aristotle, he recognizes that through imitation, as an inherent impulse, ‘a kind’ 
of learning is realized (μανθάνειν τί συμβαίνει / manthanein ti symvainei), accompanied with 
a certain feeling of pleasure which derives from the syllogism that the object of imitation is 
identified with the prototype (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, x-xi, 1371b:176). McKeon holds the 
opinion that Aristotle doesn’t invoke the imitation of prior orators (1936:27) despite 
Aristotle’s lessons about arguments from example and about exemplar heros  - both as models 
praiseworthy to be imitated.   
The history of the vigorous support of imitation as a method of acquiring rhetorical 
excellence has begun. It is accepted that Isocrates first highlighted its guaranteed role in the 
successful practice of philosophy. In his Against the Sophists, he attributes to the teacher - 
consequently to himself - the obligation to function as a model for his students in order to 
help them “…appear more florid and graceful” (Cagarin, 2000:65). Also, in the theoretical 
framework of Isocrates’ paideia, imitation should be practiced, equally, at three levels; at the 




exercises of various kinds of discourse that Isocrates inserted imitation in the field of writing 
because of its close relation to exercitatio (practice) (Fleming, 2003:109; Kinneavy, 1984:74).  
2.2 Greco-Roman conceptions of imitatio 
In the Rhetorica ad Herennium, imitatio is viewed as an independent training method 
and as an important aid for achieving rhetorical proficiency combined with ars (theory) and 
exercitatio (practice) (II, ii, 3). In his turn, Cicero shares the above ideas and he reinforces 
Isocrates’ previous concepts about the immeasurable value of carefully selected models of 
creative imitation (Muckelbauer, 2003:69). As Antonius, he doesn’t avoid proving his 
argument using the example of Sulpicius and the positive influence received by the imitation 
of his contemporary model, Crassus. All the same, Cicero highlights that the deliberate 
selection of a model - even an actor’s model - must be strictly accompanied by the exclusive 
and exhaustive imitation of its ‘marvelous characteristics’. Also, he emphasizes its pivotal 
role in the acquisition and transmission of a certain style (elocutio) (De Oratore, II, xxii, 
92:159; xxiii:160).  
Longinus, following Cicero, recognizes that the elevation of the poetic style is due to 
the imitation of major, prior models. Imitatio is conceived as an emulative practice which 
honors the imitators even if their talent is not comparable to the models (Longinus, 1999, 
XIII:71,73). Analogous ideas about style and imitation are also found in other treatises like 
Demetrius’, On Style and Dionysius’ of Halicarnassus, On Imitation. The author of the latter, 
fragmentally saved treatment, encourages the imitation of older attic authors in order to 
elevate the style of the writers of his era. Examining the nature, the models and the process of 
imitation, Dionysius credits it, equally, with procedural and psychological features subtly 
interwoven (Demetrius, 1902:22; McKeon, 1936:28; Clark, 1951:13).   




Beyond any doubt, Quintilian inserts imitation as a crucial pedagogical practice in the 
educational history of Roman Provincial, Medieval and Renaissance schools. For Quintilian, 
the training of students in declamatio requires, first, the conscious imitation of excellent 
models, cautiously selected by the teacher of literature, the grammaticus. It is by imitating ‘a 
stock of words, a variety of figures and the art of composition’ that students will be led on the 
desirable route of the personal inventio and the intended facilitas (Institutes of Oratory, X, ii, 
1:334-5, Murphy, 1996:584). On the other hand, Quintilian admits the finite power of 
imitative practice (X, ii, 8:335). Its educational energy becomes acceptable due to the possible 
generative and creative results which it may incur to students. Imitation is not considered to 
be a passive process but, rather, an agonistic one. The ‘ideal’ orator is challenged to reason 
and to emulate the offered models through the addition of personal elements and the 
substitution or deletion of existent features of the proposed discourse or style. In this sense, 
imitation acts as an incentive force which stimulates the cognitive, aesthetic, functional and 
linguistic choices of the imitator.    
In the medieval period, Saint Augustine seems to draw upon Quintilian’s teachings. 
He couples imitation, as a rhetorical method of cultivating the expression of discourse (modus 
preferendi), with Christian ideas. He explicitly suggests that for future preachers the imitation 
of prior models like the holy scriptures are a safe way of acquiring eloquence and wisdom 
(Saint Augustin, 1958:154-5).  
Similar Greco-Roman ideas about imitation can be easily detected in the era of 
English Renaissance education. In the influential work of Wilson (1560), The Arte of 
Rhetorique, the author admits the necessity of ‘following the waies of wifemen’, by taking 
‘…fome colour of them…’ (p.5). Imitation is recognized as an undeniable method of learning 
to speak and write eloquently, since the model of the literate man represented the person ‘who 




2.4 The period of the crisis 
The methodic and systematic commitment of Erasmus to copiousness is considered to 
be a representative example of Tudor’s educational trend.  For Erasmus, the passionate 
practice of imitative exercises for the achievement of various educational purposes focuses, 
especially, on students’ moral training (Desiderius, 1978:682-3). Unfortunately, his effort 
can’t be paralleled with Plutarch’s example. By presenting both the Lives of honest and bad 
men – as mimetic poles or as models to avoid – Plutarch aimed at the formation of virtuous 
characters (Duff, 2002). On the contrary, Erasmus intended to students’ ethical indoctrination 
according to current Christian demands influencing in a catalytic way the imitative pedagogy 
of his era.  The semantic distortion of the term imitatio is a consequence of the alteration to 
classical principles of its practice by Erasmus. (Erdmann, 1993:3, 10) 
This seems to start the ongoing crisis of imitatio in pedagogy and, especially, in the 
field of writing. The passage of the 18
th
 century may be characterized as a dark page in its 
history. Scholars ascribe the decline to two main reasons. First, imitation is interpreted as a 
sterile and passive act of copying stripped of all positive, assimilative characteristics. 
Especially, in the writing domain rhetorical pedagogy and, consequently, imitation, are 
considered to be responsible for a mechanistic, predetermined and skill-based mode of writing. 
Second, the Romantic movement, obsessed by the principle of personal genius, fights against 
the commonly shared characteristics of imitative elaboration and production (Welch, 
1986:167; Knoblauch & Brannon, 1984:80; Starkey, 1974). In addition, Sullivan (1989) 
accuses imitation of lacking the desirable scientism that should characterize every educational 
practice. In contrast with the process theories of writing, imitatio insults the teacher’s 
scholarship. Fanner and Arrington (1993) point out the importance of the new, negative 
theoretical orientation towards imitation insofar as it results in its long-lasting marginalization 




Despite the downfall of imitatio in England, pedagogical practices in America in the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century still reflect its classical principles as a mean for developing 
students’ knowledge and mental discipline. An interesting approach of the theoretical 
conversion towards imitation after the American Civil War is presented by Wilson (2003), 
who correlates it with racial politics. He supports the deliberate redefinition of the term in 
pedagogy to be a constraint on the threat of black imitation of the ‘dominant systems of white 
power’ (p. 89). 
2.5 The modern look at imitation 
During the 20
th
 century the value of imitation remains disputable. Perplexity may be 
the term that best describes the state of whoever seeks to research the issue. On the one hand, 
imitation finds theoretical refuge in structural and post-modern literary theories which seem to 
encourage the use of imitatio in the teaching of writing (Minock, 1995:492). Bakhtinian 
notions such as heteroglossia, polyphony and dialogism presuppose the incessant interaction, 
the uninterrupted dialogue with another’s utterances (Bakhtin, 1986). Structuralists like 
Kristeva  and Barthes (1981) invoke, implicitly, the   act of imitation  through the notion of 
intertextuality, since every text is paralleled with a ‘mosaic’ made by the ‘absorption and 
transformation’ of others (Kristeva, 1986:37). Genette (1997), also, admits its importance and 
talks, explicitly, about ‘mimotexts’ (pp. 75, 81). For post-moderns, such as Derrida (1988), a 
linguistic sign, oral or written, acquires its identity as such due to its capacity for being 
iterated, replicated.  
On the other hand, the process theories of writing consist of the main theoretical 
adversary of imitation. For Berlin (1988) the development of cognitive rhetoric changed the 
whole picture of writing and, consequently, influenced the imitative practice. Apparently, the 
ascendant criticism of imitation in the 1980’s  is not incidental. It is, exactly, the date of birth 




elements as the task environment, the writer’s long-term memory and the writing processes. 
The three writing actions of the continuously expanded model, planning, translating and 
reviewing, consist of an onslaught on product theories that emphasize the role of ‘assisted’ 
imitation in learning and in writing development (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1981; Flower et 
al., 1986; Gee, 1997:25; Pincas, 1982:24). 
Notwithstanding their expansion, process theories didn’t remain impervious to 
criticism (Horowitz, 1986). Since 1990 the development of genre-based approaches seem to 
dissent from viewing writing, only, as an ‘unconscious process’ between the writer and his 
unreachable inner world (Swales, 1990; Tribble, 1996; Badger and White, 2000:155). 
Teaching writing via genre-approaches serves not only for learning particular ‘patterns of 
forms’ but, mainly, as Miller (1984) points out, for participating ‘in the actions of a 
community’ (p. 165).  In this theoretical framework, imitation is accepted, even partially, as a 
useful pedagogical means to the development of writing. Genre based models of writing 
propose strategies which include the modeling of the target-genre and the analysis of the 
organization of textual patterns for teaching literacy and writing (Cope and Kalantzis, 1993; 
Devitt et al., 2003; Beaufort, 2007:178). Such actions recall the classic activities of 
progymnasmata as the reading aloud of the text, textual analysis and transliteration. Similar 
techniques are used in modern workshops of creative writing, while the practice of imitation 
in writing is already inserted in the curriculum of teachers in Denmark (Fleming, 2003, Geist, 
2004:170).  
 The long pedagogical tradition of imitation influenced the two-fold aim of this paper. 
First, the theoretical and diachronic review of its practice attempted to gain a deeper 
comprehension of the way that could, still, facilitate the modern rhetorical pedagogy.  Second, 
it is examined whether its practice could still facilitate students’ familiarity with 




teachings as well as to modern instructive practices. Moreover, it challenges the repetition (or 
imitation!) of similar efforts in the future.  
3. Purpose of the research 
The purpose of the research was the examination of the influence of imitation on a random 
sample of beginner students in the field of argumentative writing in a Greek primary school. 
Emphasis was placed on its use in order to foster students’ argumentative capacities in writing, 
and especially, in the inventio of arguments due to the development of topics.     
4. Materials and methods 
4.1 Theory and methodology  
The following research describes a classroom intervention with 23 pupils, 11-years old, in 
the fifth (5
th
 ) grade of a public primary school in Alimos, an urban zone of Athens. The 
experimental group consisted of 14 boys and 9 girls who shared an homogeneous middle class 
social back-ground.  
The experimental group had no previous training experience in argumentative writing. 
During the intervention the researcher acted as a participant observer trying to direct the 
instruction of the proposed text-model and to observe students’ reactions. 
The intervention was influenced by the socio-cultural theory of learning and by the 
principles of mediated and rhetorical pedagogy (Bazerman, 2009:283). According to Vygotsky 
imitation consists of a necessary process of ‘stepping from something one knows to something new’. 
Coupled with instruction, imitation activates latent qualities in order to advance students’ learning in 
the zone of proximal development and tο transfer them to the potential level of their cognitive 
development (Vygotsky, 1962:103; Vygotsky, 1978:87).  
Also, according to the socio-cultural theory, learning may be achieved due to the scaffolding 




approach of literacy the use of texts may contribute positively to students’ development of written 
competence (Fterniati and Spinthourakis, 2005/2006).  
Based on Pike’s (1959) metaphor of particle, wave and field, we tried to find out 
which were the scaffolding effects of the analysis and explicit instruction of some common 
topics and stylistic patterns, found in an extract of a literary text (particle) through imitation, 
first, to a student’s argumentative letter of the same content in order to create the necessary 
prior knowledge in written argumentation (wave) and, second, to a free written argumentative 
letter (field). 
The corpus of data was composed: a) by transcripts from audio-taped instruction in the 
classroom and b) by students’ individual pre- (Text A) and post-tests (Text B and Text C) in 
the form of informal argumentative letters. The writing of the texts was carried out before 
(Text A) and after (Text A, Text B) the lecture and the analysis of the text-model. The effects 
of imitation in students’ writing were analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms 
(triangulation of data) in order to provide validity and reliability to the research. The 
qualitative analysis was based on Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of critical discourse 
analysis which examines both features of grammar or vocabulary as well as features of the 
textual organization and the appearance of genres in the produced texts. (Fairclough, 
1995:188-9; Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000:448). The quantitative analysis used two 
statistical tests: a) the Friedman and b) the Wilcoxon test. The category system was identified 
as reliable because of the calculation of Cohen’s Kappa coefficient for two raters (Cohen 
1960). Alpha values of 0,907, 0,832 and 0,881 were obtained for the observations regarding 
the existence of arguments of cause and effect in the student’s written texts A, B and C 
correspondingly. A high statistical significance of Kappa for the Text A was noticed (overall 
k=0,907 p<0,001). Therefore, there was evidence that the observation system used by the 




4.2 Materials development and teaching intervention  
The intervention was carried out for a total of six didactic hours of 45 minutes in a 
period of 7 days. The steps followed were:  
a) First, the free writing of an informal, exhortative letter (Text A) to the mayor of the 
town. By using arguments, students asked him not to permit the cutting of a tree for the 
construction of a new apartment building in the neighborhood (one didactic hour). The 
requested text form of a letter was considered the most appropriate, since ars dictaminis  
integrates elements of oral and written rhetoric, and also it can be an answer to an implicit, 
underlying controversy, well-hidden beneath its structure (East, 1968:242). The text A served 
as a basic criterion of students’ initial writing and as a point of reference in comparison with 
the two following texts.  
b) The next two days the reading and the analysis of an extract with analogous 
content
65
 followed (three didactic hours). The extract, written in dialogic form, was taken 
from the novel My friend, the filbert tree
66
 (1982:72-3).  
The selection of the text satisfied the basic criteria of an exemplum for linguistic, 
stylistic, literary and active (ethical) imitation as proposed by Lausberg (1998:13; 
Papadopoulou, 1999:49). The comprehensible language, the vivacity of expression, the 
content explaining ecological and citizenship issues and the use of common topics and sub-
topics made it appropriate for the research. In short, the text provided the space for the 
connection of rhetorical and social features necessary for learning the argumentative genre. 
At a first level, the lecture of the text-model offered an alternative approach to the 
examined issue and provoked in students an ‘inner dialogue’, relative to the post-hoc 
                                                 
65 A little boy, Doros, saves Fundu (the tree) who is in danger, from the constructor, the bulldozer, the mechanic and the chopper. from the 
constructor, the bulldozer, the mechanic, the chopping 
66 The book of Angeliki Varela was chosen to represent Greece at the international competition of books for children, and it was awarded one 
of the three “Honourable Mentions” from the International Award, JANUSZ KORCAC in 1985.  






performance of their writing and to the genre’s learning (Stables, 2003:9-10; Spencer, 
1982:43; Myers, 1983:15). According to Winterowd ‘you learn to write by (usually) 
unconscious imitation of what you read’ (1975:117-8). 
The text was read twice: a) A read-aloud lecture was carried out by the researcher. 
Then, a genre analysis of the segment was made by following the lebovean model (Labov, 
1972) of questions about: a) the abstract (what was the text about?), b) the orientation (who 
participated? where? for what?), c) the complicating action (what will happen after the 
interview?), d) the evaluation (why do you think this segment was interesting?), e) the result 
(what do you think that will be the result of the interview taken?). The segment, as a form of 
discursive interaction, was correlated with the social event that caused it, while the aims of the 
‘strategic action’ of the heroes (f.e. justification of an opinion, persuasion) were emphasized 
(Fairclough, 2003:65, 70-1).  
b) Then, in an independent reading level, students underlined the arguments presented in 
the text. The arguments provided, were characteristic examples of two main categories of 
common topics and sub-topics as presented in the taxonomy of Corbett and Connors 
(1999:87):  
a) The common topic of comparison (similarity, difference of degree). For example:  
-  “We are attached to trees!” she told me. “We look alike. They live and respire like 
us”. (similarity / metaphor) and  
b) the common topic of relationship (cause and effect, antecedent and con-sequence, 
antithesis/contraries). For example:  
- “Standing by trees, men should make the sign of cross, because trees inspire carbon 
dioxide and breathe out oxygen”. (cause and effect) 
-  If someone wanted to cut down your filbert-tree what would you do? I asked George.  




Students focused their attention on the above organizational patterns and the analysis of 
their structure, based on the assumption that knowledge of common topics may facilitate the 
production of arguments on any future given subject (Zompetti, 2006:22). Accepting the idea 
that topics may provide an argumentative classification, the above topics were modeled on the 
blackboard as petals of a flower. Each petal represented a different argumentative locus, a 
different kind of thought which could help students in generating more arguments to support 
their opinion.  
Furthermore, during the text analysis students searched for the main stylistic features used 
by the author, such as metaphors and rhetorical questions. Scholars propose that such an effort 
improves students’ personal linguistic and stylistic expression as well as their syntactic 
competence (D’ Angelo, 1973). For example:  
- “A tree is a breathe of life”. (metaphor) 
- “Mister Mayor, I learnt that a Dutch airline offered to Athens forty thousands tulips. 
And you, can’t you offer not even a tree to neighborhood’s children?” (antithesis 
expressed in a form of rhetorical question) 
c) The writing of a second letter (Text B) to the mayor with the same theme followed (one 
didactic hour). The change of the dialogic extract in a letter-form was an attempt to give a 
more dynamic character to the imitative practice similar to the classical rhetorical exercise of 
paraphrase or, in intertextuality terms, to the strategy of adaptation of the original text 
(Sanders, 2006:26; Clark, 1951:20).  
d) Three days later, students carried out a similar writing task (Text C) (one didactic hour). 
This time, the theme of the argumentative letter was: You want desperately a pet. Write a 
letter to your mother trying to convince her with your arguments to buy it. The activity 
highlighted the effects of the prior imitative practice, mainly, of the topical invention of 




new writing attempt relative to a different content and context, to a ‘new conceptual intention’ 
(Kelly, 1987:375).  
5. Results  
5.1 Qualitative analysis  
 The students’ first, free written argumentative letter (Text A) revealed the necessity of 
accurate instruction of argumentative writing. First, the prevalence of a written narrative 
schemata became obvious. Five students (N=5, 21,7% in the total sample) didn’t respond to 
the demand of writing a letter. On the contrary, they developed the subject in the only well-
known method, the narration. For example: 
● “It was Friday, the day of the assembly for examining if my beloved tree should be cut 
down. The majority supported the opinion that it should, definitely, be cut down. I had to 
react quickly. The only solution was to send a letter to the mayor. … (Yannis)” 
Emphasis was placed on the chronological organization of personal experiences with 
the beloved tree: 
● “Well, I and my friends we have grown up with that tree. We were 7 years old when 
we played over there. When we were 8 years old we played on the swing and now that we 
have turned 10 years old we have made a tree-house and you want to cut it down. 
(Konstantinos)” 
  Second, students’ writing revealed their limited prior knowledge in developing 
arguments. The mean of the produced arguments was low. The initial letters were very short 
in length, while stylistic elements were scarcely present.  
The majority of written arguments was presented either in the introduction or in the 
conclusion of the texts, while the rest of the letter was, mainly, dedicated to recalling personal 
memories. Even when arguments were given in an explicit form, they usually made part of the 




(i) “I ask you not to cut down my neighbourhood’s tree because I used to play over 
there, to climb and to sit on its branches.” (Minas)  
 In the second text (Text B), students as sensible citizens developed a more accurate 
and extended argumentation in order to support their thesis based on a critical interaction with 
the problem emerged (Terrill, 2011:301). For example:  
● “Resolving this problem is crucial for all the children of our neighborhood, because we are 
the habitants of the zone and you can’t take decisions against our rights.” (Thanos)  
  Two were the main persuasive strategies used: 1) First, the removal of personal 
experiences. Students approached the interests’ of the receiver of their arguments invoking 
either personal motives (i), or  personal experiences (ii), fears and bias (iii) as shown by the 
following examples: 
(i)“All the mayors until now showed an increased interest for the trees of our neighbourhood. 
This is the reason why you should stop cutting the hazel. Do you imagine the consequences of 
your action if it will be repeated and repeated in the future? That’s why we would propose 
you not to be the first mayor who will start this destructive action.” (John)   
 (ii)  “To my opinion this tree shouldn’t be cut down, because we used to play there since we 
were too young as, also, you did when you were a little boy.” (Maria)  
(iii)“Also, if you permit it, the citizens won’t vote for you”  (Theodoris)  
2) Second, students allowed the appearance of passion in their speech, mainly, due to the use 
of the stylistic element of rhetorical questions (iv) invoking further socio-economic 
parameters.  
(ii) “What is more important for you…oxygen or money?” (Helen)  
Also, in the third text (Text C) students used as evidence examples taken either from 
the mythology (i.e. the powerful relationship between Ulysses and his dog) or from the 




5.2 Quantitative analysis 
 The basic criteria of students’ pre- (Text A) and post- tests (Text B and C) quantitative 
analysis with the S.P.S.S. (statistical package for the social sciences) were:  
a) The number of all the written arguments of each text. The argumentative unit consisted of 
one or more sentences which guaranteed the basic structure of the argument (Caccamise, 1987; 
Kellogg, 1990).  
b) The number of arguments based on the topics of: (i) cause and effect, (ii) antithesis, (iii) 
antecedent and consequent (expressed by conditional conjunctions), (iv) similarity and v) 
difference of degree. 
c) The number of stylistic elements. More specifically, a rating scale from 0-2 was created. 
The existence of (i) metaphors (0-1) and of b) rhetorical questions (0-1) was marked. 
d) Text length: counting the words of a text provided a useful analytical device.  
 As an alternative test for the one-way repeated measures ANOVA, the Friedman 
analysis of variance by ranks was used because of the sample size of our research (23 
students). The Friedman test consisted of a non-parametrical test which detected differences 
across multiple test attempts at a significant level of 5%. In our case the attempts were 
represented by the texts A, B and C.  Furthermore, the Wilcoxon’s test was used in order to 
detect which texts contained statistical significant differences. The significance level of 
0.05/3=0,017 was calculated with the Bonferroni adjustment. 
The practice of imitatio was considered as the independent variable of the research 
(YES/NO) (Verma and Mallick, 1999). The total number of the written arguments, the 
number of arguments based on the above mentioned topics, the number of stylistic elements 
and the text length constituted the dependent variables. 
The experimental group produced a higher total mean of written arguments as attested 




increased after the intervention. In the Text B the mean raised (M= 3,65, SD=1,849) as well 
as in the Text C (M=3,70, SD=1,329)  (Figure 1). The analysis showed a significant 
difference among the mean of arguments of texts B and A (p=0,000<0,017) and of texts C and 
A (p=0,000<0,017), while the difference among the texts B and C wasn’t significant.  
 
                       TEXT A                        TEXT B                      TEXT C   
Mean ± SD 1,09 ± 0,900 3,65 ± 1,849
*




 Significant difference among the mean of arguments of texts B and A, p=0,000<0,017  
^
 Significant difference among the mean of arguments of texts C and A, p=0,000<0,017 
 
 
 Fig. 1 Total mean of written arguments in texts A, B and C 
 
 
The produced arguments were mainly based on the topic of relationship as expressed 
by the sub-topics of cause and effect (M=0,52, SD=0,593:Text A, M=1,70, SD=1,222:Text B 
and M=2,04, SD=1,022:Text C) (Figure 3), of antithesis (M=0,13, SD=0,344:Text A, M=0,78, 
SD=0,736:Text B and M=0,78, SD=0,671:Text C) (Figure 2) and of antecedent and 
















 TEXT A TEXT B TEXT C 
Mean ± SD 
Cause and effect 
arguments  
0,52 ± 0,593 1,70 ± 1,222
*




































Mean ± SD  
Antithesis 
arguments 
0,13 ± 0,344 0,78 ± 0,736
×




 Significant difference among the mean of cause-effect arguments of texts B and A, 
p=0,001<0,017  
^
 Significant difference among the mean of cause-effect arguments of texts C and A, 
p=0,000<0,017 
×
 Significant difference among the mean of antithesis arguments of texts B and A, 
p=0,002<0,017  
†
 Significant difference among the mean of antithesis arguments of texts C and A, 
p=0,001<0,017 
 
The difference of cause and effect arguments was significant among texts Β and Α 
(p=0,001<0,017) and among texts C and Α (p=0,000<0,017), while the difference among the 
texts B and C was not statistically significant (p=0,193>0,017). Also, the increase of 
antithesis arguments was statistically significant among texts A and B (p=0,002<0,017) and 
among texts A and C (p=, 001<0,017), but not among the texts B and C (p=, 894>0, 017). 
When it comes to the arguments based on the sub-topic of antecedent and consequent, a 
significant difference was noticed only between the initial Text A (M=0, 13) and the final 
Text C (M=0, 57) (p=0, 013<0.017) in favor of the final text (Text C). On the contrary, no 
significant difference concerning the production of arguments based on the sub-topic of 
similarity and the subtopic of difference was noticed. 
 
 





 Furthermore, the statistical analysis showed a significant increase of the mean of 
stylistic elements (M=0, 4783, SD=0, 51075: Text A, M=1, 6087, SD=1, 49967: Text B and 
M=1, 2609, SD=1, 05388: Text C). A statistically important difference was noticed among 
texts A and B (p=0,003<0,017) and among texts A and C (p=0,004<0,017), while there was 
no important difference among texts B and C. 
The mean of rhetorical questions, to complete the one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA, varied from M=0,13 (SD=0,344:Text A), to M=1,17 (SD=1,154:Text B) and to 
M=1, 04 (SD=0,976:Text C) (Figure 5). It was confirmed that the mean of rhetorical 
questions statistically increased for B and C Texts versus Text A (p=0,000<0,017 among 
Texts A and B, p=0,001<0,017 among Texts A and C), while it was statistically equal 
between the texts B and C. On the contrary, no significant difference concerning the 
production of metaphors as stylistic elements of texts A, B and C was noticed (M=0,35, 
SD=0,49:Text A, M=0,43, SD=0,59:Text B and M=0,22, SD=0,42:Text C, Sig: 0,273>0,05).  
 
 
 TEXT A TEXT B TEXT C 
Mean ± SD 0,13 ± 0,344 1,17 ± 1,154
*




 Significant difference among the mean of rhetorical questions of texts B and A, 
p=0,000<0,017  
^







Fig. 5 Mean of rhetorical questions in the texts A, B, C 
 
Finally, a significant increase in the text length relative to the invention of more arguments 
suitable to the situational context and to the communicative result of persuasion was noticed 
(Figure 6). The mean M=85, 87 words of the text A (SD=42,939), increased to the mean M=140, 
17 words for the text B (SD=55,998) and to the mean M=136 words for the Text C (SD=47,944). 
It was confirmed that the text length statistically increased for B and C Texts against Text A 
(p=0,000<0,017 among Texts A and B, p=0,000<0,017 among Texts A and C) and that it was 
statistically equal between cases B and C. 
 
 TEXT A TEXT B TEXT C 
Mean ± SD 85,87 ± 42,939 140,17 ± 55,998
*




 Significant difference of the text length among the texts B and A, p=0,000<0,017  
^

























Fig. 6 Text length of texts A, B, C 
6. Discussion 
The statistical results affirmed that the practice of imitation stimulated, significantly the 
students’ cognitive, aesthetic, functional and linguistic choices. More precisely, its use 
contributed to the students’ better awareness of the argumentative genre as a bridge between 
familiar and unfamiliar textual genres (Prince, 1989:730).  
The two texts-letters (Texts B and C) accomplished the necessary rhetorical 
interaction among reality, reader and writer according to the demands of the new genre. First, 
there was notice of critical restraint of the knowledge-telling model of writing and of its 
substitution by the model of knowledge-transforming, since students created more logical and 
organized argumentative patterns instead of narrative schemes (Grabe and Kaplan, 1996:125). 
Second, the re-appearance of analogous statistical results in the third text (Text C) revealed a 
successful transfer of the acquired knowledge in a new context reinforcing the view that 
learning through imitation is not a passive and static process.  
Indeed, by imitating the presented argumentative topics and sub-topics, students 
constructed in a more organized way their thought and produced more, accurate and valid 

















1993:238; Nelson, 1970:121, 124; Infante, 1971:128). At the same time, they developed their 
critical thought by discovering supporting reasons for their claims.  Instead of a ‘stultifying 
and inhibiting’ practice, imitation became a liberating and empowering tool for argumentative, 
persuasive writing (Eschholz, 1980:24, Grubber, 1977:491). The increased use of the sub-
topics of cause and effect consisted of a device for the improvement of students’ inductive 
thinking. Multiple possible adequate causes related to potential effects were produced. 
Moreover, the increased use of arguments based on the topic of antecedent and consequent 
revealed a better performance of students’ use of the hypothetical syllogism, while the 
increased use of antithesis arguments led them to a dialectical game with opposite terms and 
ideas in order to empower the validity of the proposed claims.  
Furthermore, the increased use of rhetorical questions, as a stylistic element, may be 
related to the interpersonal relations that emerged among the authors and the message’s 
receiver either as a mean of the author’s imposition or as a tool facilitating the social contact 
of the participants. Finally, imitation activated features of the students’ vocabulary which 
remained inert in the beginning of their writing efforts, since a significant increase to the text-
length was noticed (Texts B and C).    
But, according to the classical teachings of Quintilian, imitation isn’t a panacea. 
Despite the more persuasive character of the produced texts, its practice didn’t influence 
either the production of arguments based on the topic of comparison or the use of metaphors. 
More precisely, students showed weakness, especially in the final text (Text C), in the 
invention of arguments based on the sub-topic of difference. Their limited use may be 
ascribed to the subtle differentiation among the topics of difference and of antithesis as well 
as to the acknowledgement of the difficulty of their settling (Corbett and Connors, 1999:97, 




topic of similarity, it may be related to the need for more interactive activities and students’ 
joint participation in classroom (Cameron, 1996).    
7. Conclusion 
To conclude, the statistical results of the research showed that imitation should still serve 
as a useful method of teaching and learning in the field of writing and the acquisition of 
literacy (Murphy, 1990; Mendelson, 2001:289). Its practice in a Greek primary school seemed 
to help the students who lack skills in argumentative writing. More specifically, the students 
improved the form, the style and the content of their texts by releasing latent abilities even 
from the beginning of their efforts (Gorrell, 1987:53; Butler, 2002:26). The successful 
imitation of the argumentative topics concerning cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, 
antithesis, and rhetorical questions led to a variety of results. In particular, students were 
helped towards the production of more elaborated texts, the development of argumentative 
genre awareness and the construction of a solid basis upon which they placed the social 
artifact of argumentation. However, imitation doesn’t exclude the practice of more interactive 
argumentative activities in the classroom. On the contrary, such activities in combination with 
imitation, may extend the acquired argumentative “textual basis”  facilitating students ‘to 
understand what they are doing more deeply, more purposefully and more rhetorically’ 
(Devitt, 2004:202).  
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Challenges of Rhetoric in the Era of ‘Bytes and Likes’ 
 





“Rhetoric is no longer the title of a doctrine and a practice, nor a 
form of cultural memory; it becomes instead something like the 
condition of our existence.” (Bender–Wellbery, 1990: 25) 
 
“How will our rhetorical and media theories need to be re-
worked to account for the interactivity inherent in participatory 





Although defined, traditionally, as the art of persuasion, rhetoric has always tended to outgrow its 
original concern. Its twofold disciplinary nature, of theory and practice (utens-docens as Burke named them), has 
been calling constantly for redefinitions and scientific legitimization. Often, scholars augured or stated the death 
and recognized and announced the rebirth of rhetoric. Anti/Postmodernist theories were seeking new horizons to 
(re)interpret it in a more ‘integrative’ way, introducing it to function as a communicative framework of all 
societal and mediated functions.  
In the era of digital literacy and new media, rhetoric is facing new challenges which urge theoreticians 
to rediscover the hidden capacities of the classical faculty. Contributing to e–rhetoric, netoric, digital and visual 
rhetoric, this paper intends to cast light upon the almost forgotten ‘subdomains’ of rhetoric and endeavours to 
prove its capability to be both the condition and the critical view of (new) media discourse.  
 











In the second media age, the challenges to rhetoric concern mainly the faculty itself. 
The new, semi-virtual, participative publicity media maintains and makes rhetoric enact in the 
way, originally, to which it was entitled. Although the classical “toolbar” of rhetoric needs a 
bit of reconfiguring, rhetoric’s main challenge is to discover its hidden fields and capacities 
which can offer more than the functionalist description of new media discourse. This chapter 
aims at outlining a theoretical framework to interpret classical rhetoric in a new way; to show 
the capaciousness of the ancient discipline; and to highlight those aspects and characteristics 
which relate rhetoric to new media in an organic way. 
 
1. Introduction 
Rhetoric is a great survivor. It has escaped decades – if not centuries – of moral 
resentment, scholarly rejection, and democratic suspicion and remains ready and invigorated 
to re-enter the scholarly landscape and to influence practices of social discourse.  
Undoubtedly, rhetoric has been able to resist the attacks of those who considered it vague; 
superfluous; manipulative; or outdated. With more than 2500 years of disciplinary history, it 
gained considerable stamina to answer new challenges be they social; political; technological; 
or scientific. 
Classical rhetoric derives from the ancient Greek and Roman worlds where it served as 
the universal science of the public sphere in which right acting and right speaking were 
considered one. Although defined as the art of persuasion, it has tended, with persuasive 
public speaking, to outgrow always its original concern. Its genuine communicative, symbolic 




communicatively holistic nature have made rhetoric an interdisciplinary field of interpersonal, 
mediated and public discourse. In the classical tradition, a cultural ideal evolved, that of the 
“politically and socially active polymath” (Halloran, 1994: 332). This cultural ideal, regarded 
as the master of rhetoric, “was the man who had interiorized all that was best in his culture 
and applied this knowledge in public forums (…)” (1994: 331). The existence, of such a 
cultural ideal, suggested a worldview in which “values are coherent and the wisdom of public 
can be fully mastered by one man” (1994: 331). Classical rhetoric was informed by a world of 
the acting community which, clearly, was changed, mostly in the sense of coherence and 
eminence. As the original sociocultural-political context of rhetoric was being reconfigured, 
the discipline had to overcome several existentially critical phases. However, there were two 
eras of rejection which turned out to be almost fatal.  
According to Bender and Wellbery’s (1990) seminal article, both the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism caused this rejection of rhetoric. From the former’s perspective, rhetoric seemed 
empty, blurred, and diffuse. Public discourse had to be freed of its individual interests; 
deprived of rhetorical ambiguity, and magniloquence and passion. For Romanticism, rhetoric 
had become a craft rather than the faculty of the genius, a way of producing rather than 
creating. These two sets of attacks resulted in the rejection of rhetoric’s classical tradition for 
the following reasons: ascendant scientific objectivity with values of transparency and 
neutrality; a new emphasis on individual originality and authorship; liberalism’s displacement 
of republicanism in political theory; the dominance of literacy over orality; and the rise of the 
vernacular language nation state. With the recession of this rejection, rhetoric managed to 
regain its significance. This shift was caused by those phenomena which characterized 
modern, postmodern scientific thinking, and global communicative culture. With the advent 




New spaces of democratic debating called for a global language through which 
epistemological pluralism and individual voices were manifested.  
 Through the capacity to relieve scientific and moral paradoxes of postmodern societies, to 
perform playfulness in communication, and to fulfil global communicative exigencies and 
objectives, rhetoric managed to retrieve its practical and theoretical status amongst disciplines 
of discourse and returned (again) to the contemporary cultural and scientific landscape. 
 
2. Rhetoric 
As Aristotle put it, rhetoric, is “the faculty of observing in any given case the available 
means of persuasion” (1355b). Debated as a science, it was defined as being either a faculty 
or a virtue referred to mainly as art.  However, its verbal persuasive function was accepted 
widely and, with a growing rational suspicion, it was labelled agonistic. In the meanwhile, its 
reduction, to the techniques of elocution, led to the pejorative use of the term rhetoric.  In 
order to escape the inhibiting limitation of rhetoric to the study of persuasive speech and to 
lessen the democratic fears, towards its subjectivity and influential nature, modernist and 
postmodernist copings with rhetoric (see the works of Kenneth Duva Burke; Chäim Perelman; 
Ivor A. Richards; Henry Johnstone Jr.; and Colling G. Brooke) sought new horizons to 
interpret rhetoric in a more integrative way. Thereby, rhetoric was legitimized to function as a 
dimension of communication and its meta-representations.  
Rhetoric’s scope was widened to provide a framework of all symbolic, societal and 
mediated functions. Reboul (1991) pointed to the broadening of modern rhetoric by 
emphasizing its expansion from the verbal to the visual; and from the conscious to the non-
conscious. In designating new directions for rhetoric in everyday life, Nystrand and Duffy 
(2003: ix), assumed that rhetoric ought not to refer to “the classical arts of persuasion, or the 




language to constitute their social realities (…). The discourses, of institutions and popular 
culture, are rhetorical in the sense that they situate us in our worlds: they shape our ideas 
about the ‘way things are’ who we are; where we belong; and guide what we talk about and 
what we say (and don’t say).” Worldwide discussions, of rhetoric, (Burke, 1950, Grassi, 1980, 
Corder, 1985, Hauser 1999, Johnstone, 2007, Skarič, 2007, Mifsud, 2007, Aczél, 2012) 
rediscovered those capacities, of rhetoric, which proved that the classical discipline had more 
to offer than a set of persuasive techniques; a pack of discursive tricks; and disciplined genres 
of mono-logic discourse. 
  
3. Rhetoric and New Media 
 From the turn of the 21st century, rhetorical theory has been challenged strongly by the 
complex system and phenomena of new media. A communicative culture is being formulated 
whose currency is information and which is characterized by permanent connection, publicity, 
and participation. Information and information technologies have created – as theorists claim 
– the attention economy (Goldhaber, 1997, Davenport–Beck, 2001) in which “the wealth of 
information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever is that information 
consumes” (Simon 1971: 40).  It is the human attention which communication and 
information strive to grasp and compete for. This attention economy operates through 
“cognitive capitalism” (Crogan and Kinsley, 2012: 3) and is the natural economy of media-
space (Goldhaber, 1997). Although the attention economy paradigm is being debated with 
perspectives over a new vision of the location economy, whereby one’s location is the scarce 
resource on which new media applications are built, it determines our everyday discursive 
practices when we produce, create, and consume (‘cresume’ or ‘presume’). 
When consuming texts, we screen, scan, and browse and try to be energy-conscious with 




endeavour to eliminate this consciousness and to catch and gain attention. The norms, of 
message formation, were changed in accordance with the challenges of the attention economy. 
Writing little, using micro-style, breaking the rules, and evoking conversation are those 
principles which seem to rule our communicative culture. Participating in new media spaces 
needs new competencies and literacies (Hoechsmann–Poyntz, 2012) in order to be conscious, 
creative, and communicative concerning convergent media usage.  
Originally, European rhetoric was worked out for the discursive practices of the public 
spaces of the polis where people met, shared ideas, and influenced each other strategically in 
the traditional one-to-many relationships. The textual ideal of rhetoric used to be the ‘finished 
and polished’ speech, the formal act of discourse with which someone persuaded many others 
by means of structure, common places, figures of speech, and argumentation. Formal oratory 
was a conservative force preserving the moral and political values, of the past; its function 
was to preserve things as they were. Traditional rhetoric prepared the speaker for winning 
with words: winning the receiver’s soul and will. Offering the canon, rhetoric enabled the 
speaker to invent topics, arrange them hierarchically into structural units, to express them in 
language, and remember texts and perform speeches. The rhetorical model, of this tradition, is 
that of the well-educated man who is trained to express, in one speech, the common wisdom 
of his society.  Consequently, rhetoric is to be about the excellence of the speaker, and about 
the formality of the situation and the speech. However, new media widened and replaced real 
public spaces and fluidized texts. The operation and usage, of new media, blurs the border 
between the roles of the speaker and audience; remediates discourse (visual and verbal) 
constantly and accustoms users to the infiniteness of messages. New media should be 
considered  to be the complex of new textual experiences; new ways of representation,  new 
impressions and experiences of embodiment, new relations between user and technology, new 




and control, and new realizations of identity and social relations (Lister, 2003, Fuery, 2009, 
Miller 2011). ‘New media’ is a convergent notion of convergent and digital media 
technologies consisting of the computer, the internet, the mobile phone, social media, digital 
television, and so on. In media-lingo, new media’s most frequently used characteristics are 
digital, interactive, hyper-textual, and virtual. Digital as it is, rhetoric, of the new media’s 
discursive practice , was called, also, digital rhetoric.  
Kathleen Welch argued (1999: 104) that electric rhetoric is “an emergent consciousness or 
mentalité within discourse communities, is the new merger of the written and the oral, both 
now newly empowered and reconstructed by electricity and both dependent on print literacy. 
Electronic technologies have led to electronic consciousness, an awareness or mentalité that 
now changes literacy but in no way diminishes it.” Screen generations, with that 
consciousness, form new codes of interactions and interfaces mark new common ways of 
getting into contact. A new (virtual) subjectivity and inter-subjectivity
67
 emerges. Rhetoric is 
gaining new characteristics which feature mediated text production and non-linear 
consumption.  
Firstly, there is no clear border between the speaker and the audience; the continuous 
exchanging of roles enables the person to be both speaker and listener, to be both writer and 
reader; and, in the same rhetorical situation, to be, concurrently, both communicator and 
receiver. In the public domain, texts are not objects; by representing, talking, and constituting 
relationships, they are themselves, public. This means not only that the speaker is acting 
constantly as an audience but, also, that the result, of that simultaneous, multi-identical 
communication, is the interaction within and with texts. Interactivity penetrated the rhetorical 
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 “Computer screen and television screen coexist as centers of familial activity. In this kind of private space, the 
household member can delve into the computer screen by visiting websites, by associatively surfing locations , 
by shopping, by entering a synchronous chat room or MUD (a multi-user domain, in which the digitally literate 
person can assume various personae), by reading and/or posting to an asynchronous list serve (or by reading 
only, a move that has been named "lurking"), and by many other activities with CD-ROMs. Many people have 
reported the experience in their digital households and HUTs (or their offices or cyberhall cafes) of subjectively 
going elsewhere on the computer, of interacting subjectively with the machine in a way that increases and/or 




situation, the role of the sender and the text which is open to modification, being un-finished, 
fluid, and trans-medial. New media discourse suggests informality, a characteristic which is 
unfamiliar with traditional rhetorical practices. As Judith T. Irvine (1979: 776-779) suggested, 
formality is due to increased code structuring, the consistency of choices, and the invocation, 
of the positional, rather than the personal identities and the emergence of a central situational 
focus. Formal speech and communication imposes special rules of style and delivery on the 
speaker and deals with important activities and central figures in them (Kennedy, 1997).  
However, the interactivity and permanence, of new media communication, stir up the 
situational borders of formality, lessen the importance of rules and positions, and boost the 
significance of personal identities and side involvements.  
New media’s basic characteristics changed, also, the way ethos, pathos and logos could 
operate. As Gurak (2009) claimed, speed – combined with reach – was a predominant feature 
which had a dramatic impact on the content and practice of communication. A significant 
shift, from invention to delivery (distribution), can be detected in digital practice. Speed 
enhances the need to distribute on the speaker’s side and the desire to find on the consumer’s 
side. The register has become blended, and communication is more repetitive and redundant.  
Now, the intention, to persuade specific audiences, is less important than the ability to reach 
many audiences. In connection with the changes, the traditional one-to-many configuration 
was modified into many-to-many relationships to enable users to have a democratic reach. 
Multiple identities, formed by the possibilities and spaces of the digital environment, 
de/reformed the digital speaker’s ethos. Anonymity evokes not only tendencies like masking, 
flaming, and contingency but, also, altruism in communication. The logic (and arrangement), 
of texts, is different, also, from that of the traditional canon and of the culture of print. In 
hypermedia, the cause-effect logic was replaced by an associational one.  In parallel, 




network-associational. In electrical rhetoric, the process replaces the product,,consequently, 
the speaker creates an information environment in which the user chooses the line or path.  
Digital rhetoric testifies that, with the advent of new media, new modes of rhetorical 
operations have to be implemented. Nevertheless, it draws attention mainly to the changes 
with which rhetoric has to cope and does not focus on the very rhetorical nature of new media. 
With the rediscovery of the spatial, visual, procedural and aural nature of rhetoric, an original 
connection can be detected between rhetoric and new media and, therefore, the ‘challenges of 
bytes and likes’ are answered.  Although they provide rhetoric with a (new) media perspective, 
the spatial, visual, procedural and aural dimensions, of the rhetorical discipline, have been 
shadowed for a long time. The following sections cast light on these domains in order to 
introduce an integrative redefinition of rhetoric. 
 
4. Visual Rhetoric 
Until the 1970’s, rhetoric was conceived almost solely as the study of verbal discourse. 
The spirited inquiry, into the rhetorical study of images, started with scholars such as Kenneth 
Burke (1950) or Douglas Ehninger (1972) whose definitions, of rhetoric, did not privilege 
verbal symbols and which were sufficiently broad to include the visual. They considered 
rhetoric to be the use and study of symbols and addressed symbolically not as exclusively 
verbal. Through these approaches, a deeper understanding, of the influences and operations of 
the rhetorical object (product), could be developed.  Had the natural affinity, between the 
visual image and rhetoric, not been discovered, the process of the expansion of rhetoric to 
encompass the visual, could have been disrupted easily and stopped by the “vociferous 
objections” (Foss, 2005: 142) of language-centred interpretations. Current definitions of the 
discipline tend to support the development of visual rhetoric; this suggests an easier fit 




Visual rhetoric, as a subdomain of the classical discipline, endeavoured to purport 
rhetorical literacy, for the visual, and to provide a framework to interpret and produce visual 
artefacts rhetorically. In rhetoric, the visual perspective indicated, also, the emerging 
recognition of the significance of images in human understanding, discursive practices, and 
media communication. On defining visual rhetoric, scholars distinguished between at least 
two meanings. One conceptualized visual rhetoric as a communicative artefact, a product, 
made of images and visual symbols (analogously to a speech), whilst the other understood it 
to be an analytical tool with which the creation and performing of communication, by visual 
symbols, could be examined (Foss, 2004). Although this dualistic view of visual rhetoric 
reflects rhetoric as a practice and rhetoric as a theory, it is not sensitive enough to the possible 
tripartite division of rhetoric. This assumes that rhetoric is either a product (a multimodal 
‘speech’), a procedure (mechanism), or a process (communication). Following the latter 
division, we conceive visual rhetoric either as a product to address public, a persuasive, visual 
representation, or a procedure, logic to experience and to see and form pictures, images, or a 
process with which we interpret the world around us (Ott-Dickinson, 2009). 
As a product, visual rhetoric is the counterpart of verbal rhetoric, namely, the rhetoric of 
persuasive speeches. To put it simply, we replace the verbal with the visual and apply the 
strategies of rhetoric to produce and analyse persuasive, influential messages. Commercials, 
campaign spots, and billboard pictures are the kind of visual, or visual-verbal messages which 
address the public and are structured rhetorically in order to achieve the planned reaction. 
However, this functional refiguring of the classical discipline and its adaptation to the visual 
domain, is not without obstacles. Traditionally, rhetoric, used for verbal interactions, feels 
non-socialized within the field of images when it comes to the analysis of their persuasive 
power. Forcing the terminology once worked out for speech to function satisfactorily with the 




and pictures. Nevertheless, in the context of vigorous debates about visual argument and 
persuasion this functional view preserved its legitimacy to regard pictures and moving images 
as rhetorical products.  
In the second view, visual rhetoric is a process and it facilitates the perspective of those 
‘non-traditional’ theorists
68
 of rhetoric who state that there is a shift from rhetoric as product 
(and composition) to rhetoric as a process, and call it the rhetoric of everyday life. By this 
they primarily mean the “rhetorical character and dynamics of language in mundane contexts” 
(Nystrand–Duffy, 2003: viii); the realization, of which leads to the identification of the 
rhetorical character of literacy development, which shapes the location and meaning of 
everyday life.  Albeit in terms of language, this view differentiates rhetoric as a process 
clearly from rhetoric as a product.  However, we integrate images into this paradigm by 
stating that, as a process, visual rhetoric means the rhetorical character and dynamics of 
images in the contexts of everyday life. As a process, visual rhetoric is a vision of culture, a 
constitutive interaction between culture and subjectivity, and a continuous enactment of their 
multiple relationships.  Here, visualizing is considered to be the grounding for reality, a 
container of memory, a dimension of everyday existence by which we refract continuously 
and rhetorically our understanding of the world and ourselves within it. In this sense, 
visualizing does not represent, but creates experience by relating, through images, the person 
to the concrete situation. It is more a constitutive part of subjectivity, identity, and culture 
than an effect of the eye. It is contextual, spatial, and material (Ott–Dickinson, 2009: 396-
398). Flickr and YouTube photos, shared on Facebook, are characteristic examples, of this 
visualizing, and of the visual rhetoric as the process of everyday life. As a process, visual 
rhetoric provides a perspective of media communication, which reflects both image-reading 
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and reshaping, and which develops complex visual competencies within the constituted social 
world.  
The approach of visual rhetoric as a procedure suggests that images are underlying forms 
of our thinking and that the pictures are created as a visual mode comprising visual logic and 
intelligence. As a procedure, visual rhetoric is about the logic of seeing and about visual 
thinking as a procedure of rhetorical practices. In this view, procedure is conceived as the 
logic of constitution and deconstruction. Visual logic is based on studies of perception and 
cognition to which Rudolf Arnheim’s seminal contribution (1969) was determinative. 
Cognitive scientists agreed that seeing was creative; it was selective; spatial; and contextual. 
Creative means that seeing is a subjective way of reconstruction affected by personal beliefs 
and cultural contexts. Seeing is more of a production governed by aesthetic factors of images 
(e.g. light; form; texture) than consumption. Seeing is selective because of the zooming 
application of our glances; gazes; and looks.  Therefore, we select image-parts and filter out 
others depending on inner needs and outer factors.  Whilst linguistic signs are temporal, visual 
signs are arranged spatially; this allows the viewer to perceive several images simultaneously 
in a single place.  Then, seeing is spatial and visual logic occupies space. Finally, seeing is 
contextual since it is connected to the cultural, historical context of observation entailing 
values and ideologies of the concrete situation. We add that seeing is, also, figurative since it 
is the resource and the reinforcement of conceptual metaphors and the regulator of the 
rhetorical figures and their envisioning.  As a procedure, visual rhetoric provides rhetoric with 
the literacy of seeing and concurrent cognition: this is what the production or presumption of 







5. Spatial Rhetoric 
In the shadows of the visual or iconic turn, a spatial turn occurs, also. This turn marks the 
fruitful weaving together of the concept of space, place, location, and milieu. Spaces, as 
produced interactively, places as lived inter-relatedly, and newly opened cultural spaces and 
places, are amongst those key ideas which determine scientific thinking about space practices 
and representations of space. These are the ones which reveal the communicative and 
rhetorical horizon of space and place.  
Nevertheless, in rhetorical discussions, space emerges still as a partly enigmatic and often 
vague notion with malleable definitions. Although spatial rhetoric is an accepted term to name 
compositional practices which represent place-experiences, by using two basic presumptions, 
the present apprehension, of spatial rhetoric, introduces a broader interpretation. The first is 
that rhetoric is the creator of cultural space; the second is that rhetorical speeches are built on 
visual and spatial imagery. Following the idea of third space (Bhabha, 1994, Soja, 2009), 
namely, a place where culture is displaced from the interactions and, therefore, a hybrid, 
common identity is created to enter a dialogue and share place and space, the researcher 
proposes that rhetorical communication opens a psycho-geographical location for the 
interactions and offers a discursive place in the context of a spatial experience. Rhetoric forms 
the "constantly shifting and changing milieu of ideas, events, appearances, and meanings" 
(Soja, 1996: 2); a third space is a reflective space from which the actual and practical cultural 
place can be seen. 
If we revisit its disciplinary history, rhetoric’s spatial capacity is unquestionable. The main 
aim of the establishment of rhetoric was to form the building elements and rules which inhabit 
and govern an autonomous discursive sphere apart from – or authentically connected to – 
reality.  In oral communication rhetoric was also a container (Esposito, 2002) where traces of 




rhetoric provided communities and societies with spaces of discourse; this could not be done 
without spatial logic and intelligence in message construction. 
Spatial intelligence, one of Howard Gardner’s multiple intelligences (1993), concerns the 
ability of thinking in three dimensions: having mental imagery, graphic skills, and the 
capacity to reason spatially and imagine actively. From this, it is obvious that spatial 
intelligence is related closely to visual intelligence and visual, hyper-textual new media. 
However, the intelligence for space also includes abilities for less concrete impressions 
including skills for the abstract, for the schematic, and for the mapped. Although visualizing 
governs spatial practices, in order to be understood and answered, space has its specific 
requirements. Conceiving and analysing an argument is less a visual than a spatial experience 
even if exploited in pictures or images, as Venn-diagrams with the overlapping circles may 
prove. Spatial capacities add dimensions to the visual and develop structural hierarchy, 
reasoning, and hyper-textual consumption skills.  
Ancient speakers used their spatial intelligence effectively in remembering their speeches. 
They were architects of their ideas, imagining them either in buildings or in streets, and they 
were landlords of that building to which the audience was invited to visit. The imaginative is 
memorable; in classical rhetoric, the art of memory highlights the way rhetoric performers 
recoded their speeches in pictures, in spaces, and in mental sites from where words and ideas 
could be recalled. With the urge to remember, they worked out the text’s spatial experience, 
enriched by visual impressions. Hence, the rhetorical text was recomposed visually and 
spatially to convey, in a persuasive way, meanings, symbols, and ideas. The discursive sphere 
was created by a visual-spatial thinking about and of words and relationships. Therefore, the 
researcher claims that rhetorical “texts” are messages which have visual and spatial 
characteristics and they recreate images and spaces. Spatial rhetoric enriches media 




forming.  In media, rhetorical penetration helps the realization of new media texts and 
messages as objects and events in the real and intellectual space and supports the development 
of spatially sensitive (multi)media literacy. Hyperlinked texts exploit spatial logic and operate 
with visual force – namely, what spatial rhetoric can contribute relevantly to in description 
and interpretation.  
 
6. Procedural Rhetoric 
In his work on persuasive (digital) games, Ian Bogost introduced a new term of rhetoric 
suggesting: 
the name of procedural rhetoric for the new type of persuasive and expressive practice at 
work (…). Procedurality refers to a way of creating, explaining, or understanding 
processes. And processes define the way things work: the methods, techniques, and logics 
that drive the operation of systems, from mechanical systems like engines to organizational 
systems like high schools to conceptual systems like religious faith. (…) Procedural 
rhetoric, then, is a practice of using processes persuasively. More specifically, procedural 
rhetoric is the practice of persuading through processes in general and computational 
processes in particular. (…) Procedural rhetoric is a technique for making arguments with 
computational systems and for unpacking computational arguments others have created. 
(2010: 2-3) 
Procedural rhetoric is built on procedural logic which has its roots in both graphical 
(depiction of movement, lighting, rhythm of change, collision, etc.) and textual (selection, 
combination, sequencing) operations. It is fed, also, by operational models and their common 
patterns of media usage and interaction (menu; toolbar). Hence, procedural rhetoric uses 
figures of operational, textual and graphic thinking in order to form ideas and draw 




differ from textual, visual and plastic representations. They depict how codes regulate through 
hardware and software systems. 
Although these representations may lead us further from the complex communicative and 
rhetorical phenomena of new media, procedural rhetoric may reveal how media message 
programming and program coding is inherently rhetorical. Procedural rhetoric is an 
invigorating dimension of the classical discipline, in the sense that it connects interface 
strategies with systemic ones and highlights the argumentative capacity of rules and 
regulations.  La Molleindustria’s online games exemplify argumentative procedural rhetoric 
in a spectacular way. As it is announced on the homepage: “Our objective is to investigate the 
persuasive potentials of the medium by subverting mainstream video gaming clichè (and 
possibly have fun in the process).”
69
.  Games, such as the Phone story, lead the player to 
the ”dark side” of consumers’ society, for example, the smart phones, forcing them to realize 
the consequences of only drawing on the process’ rules and regulations.  Consequently, 
procedural rhetoric helps to reveal the meaning of system operations and their cultural 
patterns.  Then, in using toolbars and software and logic, there is the switching on and off 
rhetoric.  Therefore, media rhetoric is supported by a capacity with which systemic, 
operational and graphical coding can be unveiled and elaborated.  
Procedural rhetoric can function as the literacy of system-operations and argumentations, 
which expands visual literacy. More of a rediscovery than an innovation, it identifies 
predominant characteristics of new media technologies and, consequently, is to be taken into 










7. Aural Rhetoric 
Whilst the branch of visual rhetoric was struggling with the 2500-years-long disciplinary 
determination and domination of the verbal, aural rhetoric was strangled into almost total 
silence and scholarly neglect.  Aural discussions are omitted practically from contemporary 
rhetorical theory; rhetoric’s aural dimension seems to be forgotten or unheard.  
Nevertheless, sonority, as a symbolic activity, used to be an inherent part of the rhetorical 
speech. In the classical rhetorical tradition, voicing was discussed with the last rhetorical 
canon of speech (delivery). However, in the first place, there were some treatises which dealt 
with it and suggested that the aural was prior to the textual, determining structural;and 
aesthetic verbal features. In rhetorical performance, the oral/aural mingled with the visual: the 
speaker’s appearance, body postures, and gestures. Aristotle (1403b) said that delivery was   
“a matter of the right management of the voice to express the various emotions-of speaking 
loudly, softly, or between the two; of high, low, or intermediate pitch; of the various rhythms 
that suit various subjects. These are the three things - volume of sound, modulation of pitch, 
and rhythm-that a speaker bears in mind.” The rhetorical speech used to be considered as the 
orchestration of a text serving semantic and pragmatic aims, supporting the speaker’s 
credibility. Even in later centuries, “accento rhetorico” was considered to be the highest virtue 
of the performer, placed above the “accento grammatico” which had no sensitivity to the 
totality of the rhetorical communication.  
Although sound was considered to be of great importance, aural rhetoric has remained a 
less discussed aspect of understanding; interpreting and producing (new) media messages. 
Scott Halbritter (2004: 225) assumed that it was overlooked by media theorists for the 
following reasons: “1. our visually oriented terminology has screened out terminology for 
realizing the aural, 2. the information aural tools support appears, when successfully 




have not traditionally established, nor recognized legitimate aurally rhetorical ends for the 
conventional forms of academic compositions.” 
Neglected as it is, aural rhetoric does not cease to offer an enriched view of new media 
argumentation and persuasion. It highlights the aural dimension of a media-message as a 
rhetorical activity. Whilst audio branding (sonic branding; acoustic branding) has gained 
considerable significance in the field of marketing communication – recognizing and 
revealing the role of sound, melody, and noise in making the message persuasive and 
memorable – the need for aural literacy; ‘auralacy’ is only now awakening. Whilst, within 
new media, for a long time, the internet  was considered to be silent or mute, we are also 
moving in the context of soundscapes. It is aural rhetoric which can provide consumers with 
literacy and competence to understand, interpret, and represent meaningful sound-constructs.  
Hence, aural rhetoric can be apprehended in three ways: 
- As the strategic formation of sounding structures in the multi-media message. Here, 
we consider aural rhetoric as a product, the functions, of which, can be categorized as 
aural genres.  
- As a critical tool to interpret how the aural is related to the visual and verbal. How it 
constitutes the context of drawing conclusions and what meanings it generates. It is 
the phenomenological apprehension, of aural rhetoric, to focus on the reality it creates 
and the signifying processes by which it operates. 
- As an interpretive method to report on what are our culturally patterned soundscapes 
and how they are imposed on us by media (image) events. 
 
Aural rhetoric, conceptualized as either a formation or a method, is best considered the 
special capacity of new media rhetoric, or integrates with the complex visual literacy which 




images and images imbricate aural experience, offering sound arguments to both rhetorical 
and new media theory.  
 
 
Epilogue in Lieu of Conclusions 
 
This theoretical essay pursued the unveiling of those perspectives of rhetoric which its 
most common definitions suppressed for a long time. It sought, also, new dimensions of new 
media understanding through the consideration of visual, spatial, procedural and aural 
rhetorics. Notwithstanding its age, the ancient faculty is invigorated and capable of being 
applied to new media events.  This approach, comprising visual, spatial, procedural and aural 
subdomains beside the verbal, strove to prove that rhetoric was more complex than thought of 
generally. By these dimensions, rhetoric can be seen no longer as alienated from discursive 
practices of digital and interactive new media. On the contrary, a natural resonance is 
manifest.  Therefore, rhetoric answers the challenge of bytes and likes with its readiness to be 
redefined as the condition of multi-media existence and as the theory and practice of new 
media discourse.  
Although much remains to be considered, elaborating on the rhetoric of images, spaces, 
procedures and sounds deepens our general and specific understanding of both the classical 
discipline and new media phenomena.     
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The Cowboys, the Poets, the Professor... – Antonomasia in Croatian Sports Discourse 
Ana Grgić & Davor Nikolić, University of Zagreb 
Summary 
News style (or journalistic style) relies on the frequent use of tropes, especially metaphors and 
metonymies. Previous research concerning Croatian newspapers (Ivas, 2004; Runjić-Stoilova, 2012) showed that 
antonomasia is also a very frequent trope both in the headlines and in the body of journal articles. The aim of our 
research was to further explore types of antonomasia in the sports news sub-style. The corpus consisted of three 
groups of sports news: (1) sports news articles in daily newspapers; (2) articles in specialized sports newspapers 
and magazines; (3) the prime-time sports news in the daily news program of the three Croatian national networks 
(HRT, Nova TV and RTL). 
 Three conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: (1) sports antonomasias mostly substitute names of 
athletes, sports clubs and national selections; (2) metonymic-based antonomasias are most frequently used; (3) 
journalists tend to use antonomasia more frequently in written articles than in television news.  
 
Key words: antonomasia, metaphor, metonymy, rhetoric, sports discourse 
 
1. Introduction 
There is no spoken or written discourse which is purely literal. Following this maxim, 
three equally mindful scholars – the rhetorician, the stylistician and the linguist – could look 
up figures of speech in any discourse. Upon close scrutiny, none of them would fail to find at 
least one figure of speech even in the simplest form of discourse. But from this point forward 
their research would go in different directions. The linguist would treat all figures equally 
(because they are all language products); the stylistician would be interested only in observing 
the intentionally produced figures (since only striking or "deviant" features of discourse are 
those which have stylistic "value"); the classical rhetorician, on the other hand, would be 




strongest effect on the target audience. All of those researchers could concentrate on one 
figure only, or they could analyze a whole group of figures. 
The authors of this paper are rhetoricians and their research concentrated on one figure 
(more precisely, a trope) in one type of discourse. The trope is that of antonomasia which was 
tested on the "battlefield" of sports discourse. Aware of the specific problems of their 
"favorite", the authors tried to avail themselves of linguistics (especially onomastics and 
cognitive linguistics), stylistics as well as cultural theory. 
 
1.1 Between metaphor and metonymy 
Antonomasia is a trope which has two functions. The first one is a substitution of a 
proper name by an appellative, epithet or periphrasis (e.g. the Philosopher for Aristotle, Our 
Beautiful for Croatia or the Queen of Pop for Madonna). This type is called classical or proper 
antonomasia because it was defined in this sense in the classical handbooks of rhetoric (see 
Anderson, 2000; Quintilian, 1959). The second function is a substitution of a certain trait by a 
proper name which has become synonymous with a specific trait (Schumacher for "a fast 
driver", Penelope for "a faithful wife" or Mozart for "an exceptional one, a virtuoso"). This 
type is called Vossian antonomasia, after Gerardus Johannis Vossius, 17
th
 century Dutch 
rhetorician who first described the second function (Lausberg, 1990).
70
  
Defined in the broader sense, antonomasia can be regarded as a trope that relies on the 
processes of appellativization and deappellativization, both common in everyday language 
(Van Langendonck, 2007). In the classical type of antonomasia, appellative words are treated 
as proper ones: they are usually written in capital letters and they are never used alongside the 
name which they substitute. In stark contrast to this, Vossian antonomasia treats proper names 
as if they were common nouns. This is the reason why sometimes the figurative use of a 
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proper name becomes necessary in naming a certain object or process (e.g. the word "boycott" 
originates from the English Captain Charles Boycott, who was socially ostracized by his local 
community in Ireland; the word "pasteurization" is derived from the inventor of this chemical 
process, Louis Pasteur; the flower "dahlia" can be traced to the Swedish botanist Anders Dahl 
etc.). In all of these cases antonomasias transformed to catachreses which are classified as 
eponyms in linguistics. 
There has been a strong tradition of reducing tropes to only four major ones – 
metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony (Burke, 1969). In this tradition antonomasia is 
seen as a part of metonymy or synecdoche (see Lausberg, 1990; Monson, 2003).
71
 The 
structuralist view on tropes is often simplified through Jakobson’s discussion about 
metaphoric/paradigmatic and metonymic/syntagmatic relations (Nerlich, 2005), but the 
similar dichotomic principle can be traced through the works of cognitive linguists (who are 
often deemed opposed to linguistic structuralism). If they ever discuss antonomasia as an 
independent linguistic entity, they are mostly concerned with the classical form which can 
easily be interpreted as metonymy. The Vossian type is rejected as a special form of 
antonomasia and it is simply described as a metaphor (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó, 2001). Other 
authors close to the cognitive linguistic view describe the classical type as metonymic as 
opposed to the metaphoric Vossian type (Holmqvist & Pluciennik, 2010).  
Although this strict binary classification seems valid, there are many examples of 
antonomasia which can be described as a combination of metaphor and metonymy (e.g. the 
Swiss Wizard for Roger Federer, the Giant from Šalata for Ivo Karlović, the basketball 
Mozart for Dražen Petrović, the Croatian Ibiza for the Zrće beach on the island of Pag etc.). 
All of these examples are phrases, consisting of two parts: head and dependent. Head is in 
most cases a common or proper noun (e.g. wizard, giant, Mozart, Ibiza) and dependent is 
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usually an adjective (e.g. Swiss, basketball, Croatian) or a prepositional phrase containing a 
noun (e.g. from Šalata). The head part is always some type of trope (usually a metaphor) 
which all by itself already constitutes antonomasia, but in order to be properly and 
unambiguously understood it requires a non-figurative dependent part. For example, naming 
Ivica Kostelić King or his sister Janica Queen could be easily confused with the same 
figurative substitution for Usain Bolt or Madonna, respectively. Therefore, if we want 
antonomasia to be specific and unambiguous, we must add some kind of dependent which 
will have a strict literal meaning such as snow, of athletics or of pop. 
It is important to note that this combination is not some third possible type of 
antonomasia. All of these examples are classical antonomasias (they substitute proper names), 
but the head part of the phrase is not metonymic and this feature distinguishes them from 
typical examples of the classical type. Furthermore, this combined type often contains proper 
names which are again sometimes used metonymically and sometimes metaphorically. 
Examples like the Swiss Wizzard or the Giant from Šalata contain proper names in the 
dependent part which impart the metonymic "truth" to their metaphoric head parts.  
Conversely, when the head part contains a proper name (the basketball Mozart, the 
Croatian Ibiza), things get even more complex because the head part already constitutes 
Vossian antonomasia.
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 As it is the case with all other "simple" Vossian antonomasias, the 
proper name is reduced to one specific meaning while other connotations or alternate 
meanings are disregarded. An identical process occurs when common nouns are used 
metaphorically (Marković, 2010), so this could be taken as an additional argument for 
denying the recogniton of antonomasia. However, this argument only shows that the 
processes behind the creation of Vossian antonomasia are basically metaphoric. Antonomasia, 
nevertheless, must be treated as a separate trope because it always involves a proper name 
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 This subtype could be described as Vossian antonomasia inside the classical one. News style frequently uses 
this kind of antonomasia because the Vossian element has strong connotations for a specific audience (e. g. the 




which is always treated as a specific linguistic feature (Marković, 2010; Van Langendonck, 
2007).  
 
1.2 Sports discourse and antonomasia 
In order to understand the use of antonomasia in sports discourse, it is necessary to 
point out its figurative characteristics. Sports discourse can be defined as the subtype of news 
(or journalistic) style. This general style frequently uses tropes (especially metaphor and 
metonymy), and the sports news sub-style sometimes seems to be nothing but tropical. One of 
the reasons for using figures and tropes in the type of discourse whose primary function is 
informing may be found in the need to have an emotional impact on the recipient (Runjić-
Stoilova, 2012). 
Antonomasia is used in sports discourse mostly in its first function – it substitutes the 
names of athletes, clubs, national teams, as well as coaches, sports arenas etc. The relatively 
frequent use of antonomasia in sports discourse can certainly be ascribed to the specific 
"problem" of sports news: the same names are very often repeated in the same text. To avoid 
monotony, journalists substitute them with contextual periphrases such as the Club from Split, 
Wenger’s players, the world’s best player or they rely on the established antonomasia or 
"nickname", as it is usually called in everyday language. On the other hand, there is some 
kind of general agreement that the high frequency of stereotypical expressions (so called 
"journalisms") is a negative characteristic of news style. Some authors, nevertheless, find it 
very functional because this automated use of expressions helps the recipients in better 
understanding the message (Runjić-Stoilova, 2012).  
In the previous section we tried to establish the connection between antonomasia and 
both metonymy and metaphor (not strictly through the classical/Vossian antonomasia 




concepts of source and target domain. This methodology was adopted from cognitive 
linguistics, which approaches metaphor and metonymy in a different manner than classical 
rhetoric and stylistics. Cognitive linguistics treats metaphor and metonymy not as figures of 




 Cognitive linguistics makes a distinction between a specific metaphorical expression 
in language (e.g. the modern gladiators for athletes) and the metaphorical concept in our mind 
(SPORT IS FIGHT). General mental concepts thus derive specific linguistic metaphors and 
through these concepts we can better understand certain discourse or even culture (Kövecses, 
2005). As we can see, metaphors in sports discourse are mainly derived from the general 
concept SPORT IS WAR/BATTLE/FIGHT, and, consequently, we have examples like: They left 
their hearts in the arena or The Croatian cavalry swept the French musketeers.  
Metonymies are also an important part of sports discourse and they are mostly derived 
from the following concepts: THE PART FOR THE WHOLE (a fresh pair of legs), THE WHOLE FOR 
THE PART (Croatia scored just before half-time), and OBJECT USED FOR USER (The world’s best 
racquet). 
Traditional rhetoric defines metaphor as a trope which makes a substitution of one 
expression by another on the ground of similarity (using the analogies), whereas metonymies 
make substitutions by association (using causal relationships, spatial or temporal relations, 
part-whole relations
74
 etc.). In short, metonymy is a trope that relies on the contiguity, while 
metaphor relies on similarity. Cognitive linguistics adopted this generalized difference but 
tried to connect metonymy with the concept of "reference point" where one conceptual entity 
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 This concept was introduced in the well-known book Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). For 
further information on cognitive linguistic research concerning metaphor and metonymy see Kövecses, 2002. 
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 Although classical rhetoric connects part-whole relations with synecdoche, we decided to stay in concordance 




provides mental access to another conceptual entity (Krišković and Tominac, 2009; Radden 
and Kövecses, 1999).  
When analyzing conceptual metaphors and metonymies it is important to distinguish 
the source domain (physical entity), from which the cognitive processes transfer the 
similarity/contiguity relations, and the target domain (abstract entity) to which these concepts 
are applied. In the concept SPORT IS FIGHT the targets like athletes or clubs (the conceptual 
target is SPORT) obtain their metaphorical expressions from the source domain concerning 
fights, especially using words with a historical meaning (gladiators, musketeers, cavalry etc.). 
A similar method is used for analyzing metonymies. For example, the target "substitute" uses 
the source/vehicle "reserve bench" because they are connected by the concept CONTAINER FOR 
THE CONTENT, and as a result we get the expression: A good coach is judged by the good 
bench. 
Classical antonomasias created inside sports discourse are not strictly metonymic in 
their origin. Although the context establishes them as an unambiguous substitute for a 
particular proper name, the word or phrase used in substitution are often created through the 
same concepts as metaphors.
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 Metaphoric antonomasias use the general concept SPORT IS 
WAR/BATTLE/FIGHT to derive particular substitutions for athletes, clubs or national teams. The 
sources, therefore, must belong to the physical reality which corresponds to the general 
concept of conflict. When we approach antonomasia in this manner then there is no surprise 
that most "nicknames" belong either to predators (the Eagles, the Barracudas, the Wolves), 
armed conflict "professions" (the Musketeers, the Cowboys, the Gunners) or entities 
connected with aggression and destruction (the Fiery Ones, the Red Devils, La Furia). 
A similar classification can be done for metonymic antonomasias but the general 
concept which is used in their creation can be described as a modified THE PART FOR WHOLE 
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 It is obvious that the uncritical transfer of the metonymy/metaphor relation to the classical/Vossian 
antonomasia dichotomy can be more than just misleading. The origin of classical antonomasia can be found in 




concept. As it will be shown in the research results, there are some typical source/vehicle 
domains which are used in the creation of metonymic sports antonomasias. The most 
important ones are the kit color, the name of the club, the sports emblem or the sponsor. It 
must be emphasized that these relations are easily understood by sports discourse participants 
in the know (authors and readers/spectators/listeners), but for the "outsiders" these relations 
are not so obvious and that is the reason why sometimes they can not recognize particular 
antonomasia. 
  
2. Aims of research and methods  
In order to better understand the role of antonomasia in sports discourse we conducted 
research through which we gathered instances of antonomasia from both written and spoken 
sports discourse. By analyzing the collected examples we tried to answer the three questions: 
1. What is the main target domain of sports antonomasias? 2. Are classical sports 
antonomasias more metonymic or metaphoric in origin? 3. Is there a difference between the 
use of antonomasias in written and in spoken (televised) discourse? 
The analyzed corpus consisted of three groups of sports news: sports news articles in 
the daily newspapers (24 sata, Jutarnji list, Večernji list and Vjesnik); articles in the 
specialized sports newspapers and magazines (Hrvatska košarka, Nogomet and Sportske 
novosti); and the prime-time sports news in the daily news program of the three Croatian 
national networks (HRT – Croatian Radio Television, Nova TV and RTL). All the 
newspapers were published and all the television news was broadcast in the same week: from 
Monday, January 23
rd
, until Sunday, January 29
th 
2012.  
The research focused on the journalistic style and, therefore, we had to exclude quotes 
(made by athletes or coaches) which appeared in the interviews or news reports. All 




Naši su dali gol = Our team (meaning the Croatian national handball team) scored a goal; 
Brazilac = Brazilian (used for Sammir, a football player from Brazil); nogometaši iz Zagreba 
= football players from Zagreb (meaning GNK Dinamo Zagreb players)) were not treated as 
antonomasias.  
  
3. Results and Discussion 
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Using the described methodological approach we gathered a total number of 640 
instances of classical antonomasia and in the ensuing analysis we will refer to this number as 
tokens. Of course, many instances were repeated during the observed week so we needed to 
find out how many different antonomasias appeared in the analyzed corpus. After reducing 
tokens to a single headword (for example antonomasia Bijeli = The Whites (Hajduk F.C.) 
appeared 80 times), we came up with 154 different antonomasias. There were only 3 different 
Vossian antonomasias, which is not so extraordinary because antonomasia occurs primarily in 
its classical form in sports discourse. The instances of Vossian antonomasia were therefore 
not included in the further analysis. 
 After the tokens were reduced to headwords they could be classified according to their 
target domain (name of the athlete, club etc.), source domain (kit color, sponsor, emblem etc.), 
sport and type of antonomasia (metaphoric, metonymic or combined
77
). Secondary 
information was attached to each token concerning the position of the specific token in the 
text (headline or body text). This information was necessary to better understand the specific 
use of antonomasia in sports discourse as it was obvious that in written discourse antonomasia 
occurred frequently in the headlines (especially on the front covers).  
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 Since the examples were collected from the Croatian media, in this paper they will be always presented in 
Croatian with the English translation the first time when they appear. The target of the examples discussed or 
used for illustration will also be explained the first time (unless they were already explained in the Introduction).   
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 We needed to differentiate the combined type from the classical and Vossian since those examples could not 




3.1 Target domains of sports antonomasias 
The question about target domains of sports antonomasia was not difficult to answer. 
After classifying headwords by their target domain, we constructed the following chart with 
twelve categories.  







The categories with the largest number of different antonomasias were club, athlete 
and national team. Examples in these three categories constituted 87% of all the headwords. 
As it is evident from the chart, many categories were represented by only a single example. It 
is somewhat surprising that clubs and national teams are so frequently substituted by 
antonomasia in comparison to individual athletes. However, this is very logical: clubs and 
national teams are durable in contrast to a career of an individual athlete and, consequently, 
their figurative name remains present in the cultural memory. Moreover, absolute 
antonomasias like King of Athletics see their referents change in accordance with the constant 
breaking of records. Yesterday it was Carl Lewis, today it is Ussain Bolt, and tomorrow who 
knows (but there is only one club in Croatia that is always The Whites). 
One might ask how nicknames like Kauboji = the Cowboys (for the Croatian national 
handball team), Vatreni = The Fiery Ones (for the Croatian national football team) or 
Barakude = the Barracudas (for the Croatian national water polo team) can be treated as 
classical antonomasia if the definition requires a substitution of a proper name. It is obvious 
that the Croatian national handball/football/water polo teams are not proper names but one has 
to remember that in sports discourse it is quite normal to substitute the phrase "Croatian 
national sports team" by the proper name Croatia using the metonymic concept THE PART FOR 
THE WHOLE. Therefore, Kauboji, Barakude or Vatreni are antonomasias that substitute the 
proper name Croatia which has already been metonymically used to refer to national sports 
teams representing the Republic of Croatia. 
 
3.2 Metonymic or metaphoric origin  
Although classical antonomasias are used as metonymies because they unambiguously 
refer to the substituted name, their origin is not always metonymic (as it was explained 




created through the metonymic process. The same proportion is kept in the tokens, but the 
other third of both the headwords and tokens differs in the ratio of metaphor-based and 
combined type antonomasias (Chart 3). 
 
Chart 2 Proportion of antonomasias (headwords) 
 






While there are 16% of metaphor-based headwords in the collected list, those 
antonomasias were used more often during the examined week (26%) than those of the 
combined type.
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 There are two possible explanations for this. The first one would be due to 
the economy of language which prevents frequent use of longer or complex expressions and 
favors shorter ones. Metaphorical antonomasias in most cases consist of a single word (e.g. 
Barakude, Furija = Fury (the Spanish national team), Kauboji, Vukovi = Wolves (BC Cibona) 
etc.), whereas those of the combined type by their definition need to be phrases (e.g. Crveni 
vragovi = the Red Devils (Manchester United F.C.), Argentinski čarobnjak = the Argentinean 
Wizard (Lionel Messi), Rukometni Mozart = the Handball Mozart (Ivano Balić), Švicarski 
čarobnjak = the Swiss Wizard (Roger Federer) etc.). 
Second reason for this discrepancy could be found in Chart 4. 
Chart 4 Top 10 antonomasias 
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 Many combined-type instances of antonomasia appeared only once during the week (e.g. Majstori s mora = 
the Masters from the Sea (Hajduk F.C.), Rukometni Jordan = the Handball Jordan (Ivano Balić) or Briljant s 








Here are the top 10 antonomasias
79
 in regard to all the tokens. These 332 instances 
make one half of all the tokens, therefore, it is interesting to look closer at the metaphor-
metonymy ratio. As it was shown in Charts 2 and 3, the metonymically based antonomasias 
are in light gray, metaphor-based in dark gray and combined-type in white. The 
metaphorically created antonomasias (Barakude, Kauboji and Furija) make one third of the 
list, which again shows how a relatively small number of metaphor-based headwords is 
frequently used in sports discourse. These three examples confirm the dominance of the 
concept SPORT IS WAR/BATTLE/FIGHT in the creation of typical metaphorical antonomasias and 
this could be the second explanation of the discrepancy between the headwords and the tokens. 
An interesting coincidence is that these metaphoric antonomasias represent the three typical 
groups (predators, professions, aggressive entities) discussed earlier in the paper. 
Only one individual athlete came into the top 10 and that was the ultimate fighter 
Mirko Filipović, worldwide known as Cro Cop. When we compare this example with the 
other top 10 example Crveni vragovi, it is easy to distinguish strict metonymically based 
antonomasia from that of the combined type. Although both examples are phrases, Cro Cop 
has both a metonymic head and a dependent (Mirko Filipović was indeed member of 
Croatia’s Police Special Forces tactical unit), while Crveni vragovi has a metaphoric head 
(Devils) and a metonymic part (Red) corresponding to the kit color. All phrasal antonomasias 
require both parts in order to become unambiguous substitutions of a certain athlete, club or 
national team. The simple antonomasia Cop is uncertain without its dependent part Cro; on 
the other hand, the "simple" antonomasias Vragovi (Devils) or Crveni (The Reds) could be 
used as sports antonomasias because both parts use metaphorical or metonymical concepts 
typically used in the creation of sports antonomasias. A partial confirmation of this theoretical 
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 We are aware that this is not the list of the most frequent or the most common sports antonomasias in the 
Croatian media. These results largely depend on the matches or tournaments played in the analyzed week. 




possibility is found in the metonymical "nickname" The Reds denoting Liverpool F.C., 
Benfica F.C., and Split F.C., as it is their typical kit color. 
This chart is also suitable for pointing out the most common sources of metonymic 
antonomasias. It is the kit color (The Whites, The Blues), name of the club (Medvjedi = the 
Bears from the name of the hockey club Medveščak
80
) or off-sport profession (Cro Cop). 
Beside these, there are metonymic antonomasias whose source is the club or national team 
emblem (The Hammers (West Ham F.C.), The Eagles (the Serbian national handball team)) or 
the sponsor (The Pharmacists (Bayer Leverkusen F.C. or Slaven Belupo F.C.)).  
We have to mention that there were a few examples whose sources were very 
interesting, for instance Vučica = the She-Wolf (Roma F.C.) and Pjesnici = the Poets (Zagreb 
F.C.). In the first case, the antonomasia’s source is a famous mythological story about Rome’s 
founders Romulus and Remus and the she-wolf which nursed the abandoned twins. The 
reference point for this metonymic antonomasia was therefore directly connected to the home 
town and not to the football club itself. The source of the second antonomasia, Pjesnici, is 
much more complex. The Zagreb F.C. stadium is situated in Kranjčevićeva Street, Silvije 
Strahimir Kranjčević being a famous Croatian 19
th
 century poet. Therefore, Zagreb’s players 
are the Poets. The reference point in this case could be described as double-shifted from the 
target domain. 
  
3.3. Antonomasia in written and in spoken sports discourse 
The third question, the difference in the use of antonomasia in written and in spoken 
sports discourse, was the most difficult to answer. In our corpus of 640 examples only 34 
(around 5%) were collected from TV news. There are several reasons for this disproportion, 
but we are aware that the basic one is the fact that written and spoken sports discourse was not 
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 Name of the club comes from the name of a historical district in the city of Zagreb, and its etymology is 




equally represented in our research. There was no spoken counterpart for the written articles 
in the specialized newspapers and magazines and that is the reason why we had so many more 
examples from written sports discourse. Nevertheless, when we compared daily newspapers 
sports articles and TV sports news about the same topic (for instance, the outcome of a 
handball match), in most cases there was not a single example of antonomasia in the TV 
sports news. Quite the contrary, in almost every written article antonomasia was used at least 
once to substitute a particular name. We were compelled to make a qualitative comparison 
between the two media since there was no ground for quantitative analysis.  
In our opinion, the most important reason for a low frequency of antonomasia in 
spoken articles is a general difference between the two media. The visual stimulus in TV 
news requires less linguistic material – we simply see what is/was happening. This makes the 
use of tropes redundant because sports subjects do not need to be verbalized as often as in 
written discourse (TV news also benefits from name captions which are, for instance, shown 
when an athlete is giving a press statement). 
The other reason is the amount of text in written and in spoken discourse. The sports 
news program on Croatian TV channels usually lasts up to 5 minutes (including four reports 
at least) and it usually provides basic information (the time and place of the event, participants, 
score etc). On the other hand, written sports articles are obliged to provide more extensive 
commentaries beside basic information. This gives written discourse more opportunity to 
repeat the same names.  
Before we conducted the research, we expected to find the same examples in written 
and in spoken discourse (at least the most frequent ones), but to our surprise spoken discourse 
was again antonomastically "poorer". Out of our top 10 most frequent tokens, only 3 appeared 
in both written and spoken discourse and 7 of them were found only in written discourse. This 











These numbers represent tokens in the daily newspapers and TV news. As mentioned 
earlier, we ignored specialized newspapers and magazines because we did not have the 
appropriate specialized sports program. Out of the original 304 top 10 tokens belonging to 
written discourse, only 122 tokens appeared in the daily newspapers. This "loss" is more 
evident when we compare Charts 4 and 5. That is the reason why we kept the same order of 
antonomasias.  
The only instance of antonomasia that appeared more often in spoken than in written 
discourse (21:12) was Kauboji. This antonomasia was so frequently used in the TV news 
because that week (at the European Men’s Handball Championship) the Croatian national 
team beat the French national team in the match that journalists named Rukometni El Classico 
= Handball El Classico. In the semifinal match the Cowboys played against the Eagles and 
this event had wide press coverage not only in sports news. 
The last reason for the disproportion of antonomasias in the two media could be found 
in the function of headlines in newspapers. The headline has a key role as an entrance to the 
text, its function is "to lure" a reader (Ivas 2004: 10). Owing to its position and graphic design, 
the headline will certainly attract attention; if it is figurative, this attraction is amplified. That 
is the main reason why journalists formulate headlines figuratively. Since antonomasia in 
sports discourse has an additional function of identification (journalists use them because their 
recipients will surely recognize the substituted target), it does not come as a surprise that 
exactly every fifth example of written antonomasias appeared in newspaper headlines. The 
cover pages of all the newspapers in our research profusely used antonomasia in the headlines 
and so we can conclude that antonomasia certainly has a big emotional impact on sports 







In our research we tried to answer three questions that concerned the role of 
antonomasia in Croatian sports discourse. The primary targets of classical antonomasias are 
shown to be clubs, athletes and national teams (in that exact order). Two out of three 
headword antonomasias were metonymic in origin, and the same ratio is kept in the tokens. 
Metaphor-based antonomasias are used more often than the combined type because the 
economy of language favors the use of shorter expressions and the combined type is 
necessarily a phrase. The other reason for the more frequent use of metaphorical 
antonomasias can be found in their realization of the general concept SPORT IS CONFLICT 
(using the names of predators, war professions or aggressive entities). The source of 
metonymic antonomasias was in most cases the kit color, the emblem, the name of the club or 
the name of the city the club comes from. The referential point is in most cases very obvious 
although there are some examples which require more sports or even cultural knowledge in 
detecting the connection between the target and the source/vehicle.  
We could not give a straightforward answer whether antonomasias are used more in 
written or in spoken discourse – instead we tried to point out possible reasons why there were 
so many newspaper tokens when compared to those from TV. The general difference between 
the two media obviously generates difference in the use of antonomasia. Television reports 
require less linguistic material because they benefit from the visual stimulus and they usually 
provide their recipients with basic information about sports events. Written sports discourse 
uses the advantage of headlines as attractors and that is the reason why every fifth instance of 
antonomasia appeared there. 
The most important contribution of this research is the affirmation of the role which 
antonomasia has inside sports discourse. It connects journalists and the recipients of sports 




Although many sports antonomasias have transcended their original discourse and have 
become known to the general audience, there are still many more of them which are known 
and used only by true connoisseurs. 
 
References 
Anderson, R. D. A Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms, Leuven: Peeters, 2000. 
Brdar, M. and Brdar-Szabó, R. “Vlastita imena između metonimijske Scile i metaforičke 
Haribde.” Rasprave Instituta za hrvatski jezik i jezikoslovlje. 27, (2001): 31-48. 
Burke, K. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California 
Press, 1969. 
Grgić, A. and Nikolić, D. “Upotreba i prepoznavanje antonomazija – usporedba mlađih i 
starijih govornika.” Govor. 28, no. 1 (2011a): 25-43. 
Grgić, A. and Nikolić, D. “Antonomazija – figura kulturnoga pamćenja.” Fluminensia. 23, no. 
2 (2011b): 129-142. 
Holmqvist, K. i Płuciennik, J. “Princess Antonomasia and the Truth: Two Types of 
Metonymic Relations.” Edited by A. Burkhardt and B. Nerlich. Tropical Truth(s), 373-
381. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2010. 
Ivas, I. “Tropi u novinskim naslovima.” Medijska istraživanja. 10, no. 2 (2004): 9-34. 
Kövecses, Z. Metaphor: A Practical Introduction. New York/Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
Kövecses, Z. Metaphor in Culture – Universality and Variation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Krišković, A. and S. Tominac. “Metonymy Based on Cultural Background Knowledge and 





Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. Metaphors We Live by, Chicago/London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1980. 
Lausberg, H. Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik. Ismanig: Max Hueber Verlag, 1990. 
Marković, I. “O uporabi i značenju imenâ u hrvatskome.” Folia onomastica Croatica. 19, 
(2010): 175-202. 
Monson, D. A. “L’antonomase dans Le Chevalier au lion.” Poétique. 133, (2003): 35-43. 
Nerlich, B. “Metonymy.” Edited by K. Brown. Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 
Vol. 8, Mel-N, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005. 
Quintilian. The Institutio Oratoria III, (Books VII-IX). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1959. 
Radden, G. and  Z. Kövecses. “Towards a Theory of Metonymy.” Edited by K. U. Panther 
and G. Radden. Metonymy in Language and Thought,17-59. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1999. 
Runjić-Stoilova, A. “Retorički tropi u hrvatskim dnevnim novinama.” Zbornik radova 
Filozofskoga fakulteta u Splitu. 4, (in print) 2012.  





Stakeholders in promotional genres. A rhetorical perspective on marketing 
communication 
Sabrina Mazzali-Lurati & Chiara Pollaroli, University of Lugano 
Summary 
This contribution aims at exploring the domain of business communication from a rhetorical perspective. A full 
comprehension of the rhetorical situation – especially of its participants – where a communicative event is 
ascribed, is fundamental in order to produce an effective text. Participants in a rhetorical situation are framed as 
stakeholders: they are interested and favour a successful communicative event in relation to its rhetorical 
situation. 
We will present our rhetorical approach through the example of four texts from the category of promotional 
genres in a commercial realm. Insights into similar analyses of texts belonging to different realms will be briefly 
provided. We will also mention how our rhetorical approach can be useful in educational contexts, such as 
Rhetoric and Composition courses. 
Key words: stakeholder, rhetorical situation, business communication, discourse genre, 
promotional text 
1. Introduction  
This study explores the domain of business communication from a rhetorical viewpoint. At 
the core of our approach is the concept of rhetorical situation (henceforth RS), namely a 
context composed of persons, events, objects, relations, needs and expectations (cf. Bitzer, 
1968) in respect to which a text aims at successfully achieving a given goal. The RS 
configuration has an influence on a text’s contents, structure and style. Therefore, considering 
and understanding the RS is essential in order to produce an effective text. 
Many studies have shown difficulties in defining the RS of promotional genres, 
especially in identifying and characterizing the actors taking part in an advertisement (Atkin 
and Richardson, 2005); some scholars have defined the addresser as a “corporate persona 




Calabrese, 2008: 28). Our approach allows us to describe in detail the participants, their needs 
and influences on the text, thus moving beyond generic references to advertisers and 
consumers and proving a systematic perspective on the text RS. 
The kernel notion to our approach is, together with the notion of genre (as a set of 
prefabricated communicative choices realizing a specific communicative task in a given 
context; cf. Bakhtin 1986 and the relationship he underlines between discourse genres and 
different spheres of human activity), that of stakeholders.  
The notion of stakeholders stems from the domain of corporate communication and 
refers to those people who have a stake in the activity of an enterprise, thus wish that the 
enterprise would succeed and work in their favour. In a similar perspective, we claim that all 
texts written in an enterprise in order to carry out its activity and achieve its goal have 
stakeholders, i.e. persons who have an interest in the communicative success of those texts. 
By describing the stakeholders of a text, it is possible to gain an in-depth understanding of 
actors playing within a given communicative situation and their roles. This notion has been 
applied to the analysis and production of texts written to carry out various organization 
activities and has been successfully integrated in a course on Rhetoric and Composition at the 
University of Lugano. 
In this paper we will show this especially through four promotional genres, which 
have a similar generic goal (i.e. to advertise a product or a service), but different structure and 
style: a press release, a brochure, a print ad and a TV commercial. By applying our model of 
stakeholders, we will be able to shed light on the diverse RSs generating texts. 
Section 2 presents the research gap where this contribution fits in. When adopting a basic 
functional model of communication it is rather difficult to fully characterize a communicative 
event and its participants. The model of context proposed by Rigotti and Rocci (2006) seems 




wish to accomplish their goals. Rhetorical discourse is always bound to a context; its situated 
nature can be well described through Bitzer’s concept of rhetorical situation, which will be 
outlined in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the introduction of the notion of stakeholder. 
This is a kernel notion to our approach since we believe that all texts (either written or 
spoken) are created in order to carry out an organization activity and achieve its goals. To 
better describe the notion of stakeholders and to relate it to those of genre and rhetorical 
situation, in section 5 we take as examples four promotional texts – a press release, a 
brochure, a print ad and a TV commercial. The stakeholders approach is a valuable tool for 
teaching how to produce effective texts which adhere to the exigence of a given rhetorical 
situation. In section 6 we show how it can be used to make students aware of the situated 
character of a text. 
2. The research gap 
As it has been noticed in different works on advertising discourse, in promotional genres a 
difficulty in identifying the participants to a communication (particularly, addressers and 
addressees) is often highlighted. The key question to be answered in order to understand 
advertising discourse appears to be “who is communicating with who?” (Atkin and 
Richardson, 2005: 165). The non-coincidence among those persons who “physically” and 
actually produce the ad, managers who require the ad, and the “voice which speaks in the ad” 
is usually pointed out as a demonstration of the difficulty in identifying an ad’s addresser(s). 
As for instance Corbett and Connors (1999: 3) observe 
In most ads, as in most forms of technical writing, the least prominent of the 
components is the speaker/writer. Who is addressing us in the ad? Most ads are 
composed by the staff of the ad agency that the company or the manufacturer hired. 




is not a particular person; it is usually a corporate persona created by the ad agency 
[…].  
The actors playing the role of addressers in an advertising text are defined as “a corpora 
persona”, a blurred entity whose characteristics are hard to distinguish. Similarly, Corbett and 
Connors (1999: 3) point out difficulties in identifying an ad’s addressee(s). The most 
straightforward answer to the question “whom is the ad addressing?” seems to be “ ‘the reader 
of the ad’, referred to frequently by the second-person pronoun you”. However it appears to 
be unclear who is you: is it an individual or a group of people? For instance, in relation to an 
ad for the Hewlett Packard printer they are commenting, Corbett and Connors observe that  
One possible candidate as an antecedent for the pronoun you is the administrative 
officer of a company that is responsible for purchasing equipment, such as typewriters 
or computers or printers for the workers. In that case, the you stands for a group of 
people. On the other hand, the you may stand for an individual out there who is in the 
market for a color printer. The point is that the audience for most ads is not as easily 
definable as is the audience, for instance, for a nomination speech at a national 
political convention. We just sense that there is somebody out there – preferably 
thousands of people – that the ad-writer wants to persuade to buy something. (Corbett 
and Connors, 1999: 3) 
These difficulties usually emerge when the communicative action of advertising is described 
according to basic functional models of communication, such as (as it is the case in Corbett 
and Connors, 1999) the communication triangle (Figure 1), derived from Kinneavy (1969: 
302, 1971) and referring to Bühler’s and Jakobson’s models of communication:
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Figure 1 – Kinneavy’s (1969: 302) communication triangle 
 
These models are code-centered, focused on a process of coding and decoding (Rigotti and 
Greco, 2006; Rigotti and Rocci, 2006: 163), and do not adequately take into consideration the 
participants and the context in which communication processes are created and live. Rigotti 
and Cigada (2004: 23-56) point out that each communication act is an event, in other words it 
is something that happens and that “touches” us, “moves” us, changes us because we are 
interested in it. Meaning corresponds to this change. Thus, a communication event is not 
simply a relation between a signal and the participants, it is not a process of encoding and 
decoding a message, but it is a continuous process of interpretation of the meaning of the 
message in relation to the whole situation in which the communication event takes place.  
In order to overcome the difficulties in understanding who are the participants in the 
communication process of advertising, a more refined model of the context of communication 
and the communicative situation is needed. Particularly, more refined conceptual tools for the 
description of the relationship between a text, its goal, and task (which, according to the 
tradition of Ancient rhetoric, we call officium – cf. Greco Morasso, 2009: 222 - and which 
                                                                                                                                                        
element constituting the communicative process. Similarities are evident also in respect to Bühler’s (1934) 
communication model: the signal is placed in the middle of a triangle and it establishes relations with a sender, a 
receiver, and an object. Kinneavy himself acknowledges the strong similarity to Jakobson’s and Bühler’s 




relate to the notion of genre – cf. Askehave and Swales, 2001) and the participants in the 
communication are required. 
Rigotti and Rocci’s (2006) model of communicative context (stemming from pragmatic 
theories of verbal communication, particularly from speech act theory; see figure 2) provides 
an adequate conceptual framework. According to these scholars, communication context 
results from the combination of an institutionalized component and an interpersonal one:  
Within the institutionalized component, activity types are seen as resulting from the 
mapping of culturally shared interaction schemes onto an actual interaction field (a 
social reality characterized by shared goals and mutual commitments). As a result of 
the mapping, communicative flows and roles are created. Within the interpersonal 
dimension, we distinguish between a relationship-based personal component and a 
communal component connected with cultural identities. (Rigotti and Rocci, 2006: 155)  
 
Figure 2 – Rigotti and Rocci’s (2006: 171) model of context 
A communicative event such as, for instance, a print ad for training shoes, is composed – in 
its institutional dimension – of an activity type of promoting a pair of training shoes. Within 




the interaction scheme. The personal component of the interpersonal dimension is, in the case 
of a print ad, sterile since it is unusual that potential consumers have had previous personal 
communicative interactions with the company promoting the training shoes; on the contrary, 
the communal component is often strongly present since it hints at shared knowledge and 
experience of advertising within a culture.   
Culturally shared interaction schemes encompass discourse genres, that is, standard 
rhetorical schemes used in order to achieve the goals of a given interaction scheme (Rigotti 




 In our example, the interaction scheme 
of advertising extracts the genre of print ad from the group of discourse genres (billboards, 
TV commercials, flyers, etc.) related to a similar communicative practice. Social roles of the 
interaction field and communicative roles deriving from the implementation of the interaction 
scheme onto the interaction field identify the participants to the communication. From Rigotti 
and Rocci’s model of context it emerges that participants are identified and characterized 
within both the institutional and the interpersonal dimensions. In fact, they are characterized 
by the role and function they have in an organization, by the culture to which they belong, by 
previous interactions they had with other participants and by their personal characteristics and 
attitudes. From this perspective this model highlights that participant’s act in a specific 
context with a specific goal. It is often the case that in order to achieve their goal(s) 
participants write texts. The context itself in which they act directs and constrains the 
production of the text. For instance, an organization which wants to sell its medical products, 
such as the example we are going to present later on in this paper, belongs to a specific 
interaction field (the market of medical products) and, in order to achieve its goal, it activates 
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a certain interaction scheme (that of promotional texts) and it produces a certain number of 
texts belonging to one or more discourse genres (a print ad, a billboard, a brochure, etc.) 
which can help the organization increase the sales of their medical products.  
This model of communication context focuses on the goal to be accomplished and the activity 
to be performed in a specific social environment composed by people, their desires, their 
needs, their culturally shared knowledge, their view of the world, etc. This viewpoint on 
communication events, being then either routine-based or complex, allows us to look at texts 
as contextualized (situated) and subjected to the interpretation of the participants to the event. 
1. The rhetorical situation 
The contextualized and situated nature of text can be better described by referring to the 
concept of rhetorical situation developed by Lloyd Bitzer (1968, 1980). According to Bitzer 
“rhetoric is situational” (1968: 3), i.e. “a particular discourse comes into existence because of 
some specific condition or situation which invites utterance” (1968: 4) and “rhetorical 
discourse comes into existence as a response to situation” (1968: 5), a rhetorical situation, that 
is to “a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly 
invites utterance” (1968: 5). More precisely, the constituents of any rhetorical situation are 
“an exigence – a problem or defect, something other than it should be […] an audience 
capable of being constrained in thought or action in order to effect positive modification of 
the exigence […] a set of constraints capable of influencing the rhetor and an audience” (1980: 
23). Among these constituents, exigence is crucial since we usually react to situations 
according to how we perceive things are and should be (1980: 25); exigence is the element 
which operates the engine of change in communication:  
Exigence is the necessary condition of a rhetorical situation. If there were no exigence, 




hence there would be nothing to require or invite the creation and presentation of 
pragmatic messages. (Bitzer, 1980: 26)  
Human beings perceive defects, obstacles, and imperfections and urge for some change. This 
urgency is felt because of some interests and valuations toward the rhetorical situation. Bitzer 
specifies that the constituents of a rhetorical exigence are both a factual condition and an 
interest relation (1980: 28): factual condition is “any set of things, events, relations, ideas, 
meanings – anything physical or mental – whose existence is (or is thought to be) independent 
of one’s personal subjectivity”; interest is “any appreciation, need, desire, aspiration which, 
when related to factual conditions, accounts for the emergence of motives and purposes” 
(1980: 28). The speaker/writer’s decision to speak/write derives from the exigence (i.e., the 
perception of a factual condition and the existence of an interest related to it) and aims to 
positively modify the exigence through discourse that influence audience’s thought or action. 
This happens quite easily when speaker/writer and audience have the same perception and 
evaluation of the factual condition and the interest composing the exigence.  
It is likely that speaker and audience disagree on one of these two aspects or even on 
both. However, “to the extent that apprehension of factual conditions and the experience of 
interests can be shared” (1980: 30) an exigence can be communicated: “the rhetor, if he 
knows his audience is capable of experiencing the exigence, will awaken it to the reality of 
the exigence by providing a representation of the factual condition that evokes or engages the 
required interest.” (Bitzer, 1980: 31)  
This is what happens in advertising (1980: 31), where the speaker/writer sees a factual 
condition (he offers either a product or a service to clients), perceives an interest in relation to 
it (he wants to sell it), and decides to produce an utterance in order to awaken the addressees’ 
interest for the same factual condition. Once the addressees’ interest is awakened the next step 




exigence (the product or service satisfies a need or a desire) and, as a consequence, a positive 
modification of their exigence to sell the product. 
This is the pivotal exigence at the basis of any promotional texts and it identifies the 
purpose of the text, what the text aims at. It identifies a basic task of promotional genres, their 
officium (i.e., the officium of a text consists in positively modifying the exigence for which the 
text comes into existence) and it is the central constituent of the related rhetorical situation. 
The speaker/writer of the ad is the person who first perceives the exigence and decides 
to speak/write in order to positively change it. This provides us with a first indication for the 
identification of the addresser of advertising messages. The speaker/writer is the company that 
wants to sell the advertised product, independently of the fact that they produce the messages 
themselves or that they charge someone else with producing it. These latter are also actors in 
the production process of the message, but they participate in it with a different role, which 
we will more precisely identify in the following section. It is not even the “voice which 
speaks in the ad”; as Cook (2001: 4) observes, the sender of the advertising message can 
differ from the person who actually speaks it. The latter can correspond both to what the 
tradition of narrative studies (developed by Jameson, 2004a and 2004b within composition 
and business communication) defined as the implied author and the narrator; therefore, it has 
to be distinguished from the actual persons who, with different roles, intervene in the writing 
process of the ad.  
The audience, as Bitzer points out, “must be distinguished from a body of mere 
hearers or readers […] [it] consists only of those persons who are capable of being influenced 
by discourse and of being mediators of change” (1968: 8); “[s]ince the audience must be 
capable of modifying the exigence positively, it follows that listeners incapable of this 
modifying influence will not count as a rhetorical or functional audience” (1980: 23). In this 




remove the speaker/writer’s exigence, i.e. all those who can buy or can be interested in buying 
the product. The rhetorical audience will therefore be different according to the kind of 
advertised product or service; it can be broader or narrower depending on the product. For 
instance, the rhetorical audience for car advertisements comprise all people who have a 
driving license or who need a car as a means of transport (therefore, in some countries, almost 
all adult people), while the rhetorical audience for the Hewlett Packard printer mentioned in 
Corbett and Connors 1999 is narrower and it comprises, for instance, organizations where 
many documents are printed. However, being the advertisement public, all people see it, all 
people can read the message, even if they are not interested and do not perceive the factual 
conditions of buying a Hewlett Packard printer. Even if they are not the target of the 
speaker/writer’s exigence, even if they are not those who can positively modify the exigence 
of the speaker/writer, they are in some ways (with a role that we will more precisely describe 
below) entitled to take part in the communicative action of the advertisement. Cook (2001: 4) 
and, in his line, Atkin and Richardson (2005: 166) speak of addressees and receivers. 
Whatever the terms and categories we can use, these first distinctions show that, besides 
the speaker/writer and the audience, other persons are involved in the rhetorical situation. 
These persons, from Bitzer’s perspective, are sources of constraints that the speaker/writer 
takes into consideration when operating. We name them stakeholders. 
3. Stakeholders of a text 
The notion of stakeholders stems from the domain of corporate communication and refers to 
those people who have a stake in the activity of an organization or institution, thus wish that it 
would succeed and work in their favour. In a similar perspective, we maintain that all texts 
written in an enterprise in order to carry out its activity and achieve its goal have stakeholders, 
i.e. persons who have an interest in the communicative success of the text (Mazzali-Lurati 




text. Thanks to the concept of stakeholders it is possible to gain an in-depth understanding of 
actors playing within a given communicative situation and their different roles. 
We drew the concept from the field of corporate management, where it has been used 
for the first time by Freeman (1984) in relationship to strategic management (Post et al., 2002: 
18). The conventional model of corporate stakeholders includes, beside investors (who are 
traditionally considered the partner of the corporation management, the ones the management 
has to reward and care about – cf. the ownership view of corporation; Post et al., 2002: 12), 
customers and users, also employees, governments, regulatory authorities, unions, joint 
venture partners and alliances, local communities and citizens, private organizations and 
supply chain associates (Post et. al., 2002: 22). 
From the field of corporate management the concept has then been drawn on in the field of 
web design and usability, in order to identify and refer to the “persons who have expectations, 
goals and interests connected to the implementation and success of the site” (Cantoni et al., 
2003: 32; translated by the authors). In web design and usability stakeholders are users, 
clients, decision makers, opinion makers, project managers, product managers, domain and 
content experts, content providers, as well as the development team (Perrone et al., 2005). 
Some of these categories of stakeholders appear to be relevant not only in relationship 
to the corporation, its activity and its website, but also in relationship to the texts that are daily 
and continuously written in the realm of the corporation’s activity. For instance, texts 
produced in the written communication of organizations have clients (someone who asks to 
write the text in order to face a given exigence) and users or customers (the persons who are 
meant to read the texts and to react to it) and, sometimes, have regulatory authorities, that is, 
persons or institutions that elaborate rules (at the level of content and at the level of their 
presentation) the text has to follow and respect. Drawing on a concept from media sociology 




groups that have the power to let information get through channels of communication or to 
block it (Lewin, 1947: 145).
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In line with fundamental pragmatic approaches to verbal communication (cf. Clark 
1996: 14-15), the identification of the stakeholders of a text can be refined by taking into 
consideration the description of the roles of the participants to communication elaborated by 
Goffman (1979). In his work on footing, the Canadian sociologist observed that “[w]hen one 
uses the term ‘speaker’, one often implies that the individual who animates is formulating his 
own text and staking out his own position through it” (Goffman, 1979: 145). However, in 
communication, situations in which the individual who animates the text is different from the 
one who formulates it and from the one who stakes his own position through it are very 
frequent. “Plainly, reciting a fully memorized text or reading aloud from a prepared script 
allows us to animate words we had no hand in formulating, and to express opinions, beliefs, 
and sentiments we do not hold. We can openly speak for someone else and in someone else’s 
words, as we do, say, in reading a deposition or providing a simultaneous translation of a 
speech – the latter an interesting example because so often the original speaker’s words, 
although ones that person commits himself to, are ones that someone else wrote for him” 
(Goffman, 1979: 145-146). In other words, Goffman pointed out that behind the word 
“speaker” three different roles are hidden: the animator (“an individual active in the role of 
utterance production”; 1979: 144), the author (“someone who has selected the sentiments that 
are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded”; 1979: 144) and the principal 
(“Someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose 
beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the words say”; 1979: 144). This is, 
as Atkin and Richardson (2005: 166) already noticed, precisely in respect to advertising, a 
very relevant distinction, that provides a deeper insight about the participants in the 
                                                 
84
 See for instance the role played by the journalist who screens news and press releases for deciding which news 




communication. Similarly, Goffman observed that behind the term “hearer” three different 
roles have to be distinguished: the addressee (the person/s to whom the utterance is addressed; 
McCawley, 1999: 596; cf. Goffman, 1979: 131-133),
85
 the ratified participant (the person/s 
who hold/s an “official status as a ratified participant in the encounter”; Goffman, 1979: 131; 
McCawley, 1999: 596) and the overhearer/bystander (the person/s who follow/s the talk 
unintentionally and inadvertently or  surreptitiously; Goffmann, 1979: 131-132; McCawley, 
1999: 596). Thus, “[t]he ratified hearer in two-person talk is necessarily also the ‘addressed’ 
one, that is, the one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, 
incidentally, he expects to turn over the speaking role” (Goffman, 1979: 132-133), while in 
encounters in which three or more official participants are found, “it will often be feasible for 
the current speaker to address his remarks to the circle as a whole, encompassing all his 
hearers in his glance, according them something like equal status. But, more likely, the 
speaker will, at least during periods of his talk, address his remarks to one listener, so that 
among official hearers one must distinguish the addressed recipient from ‘unaddressed’ ones” 
(Goffman, 1979: 133). And this is a very common situation in communication, as well as 
situations in which bystanders and overhearers are involved:  
[…] much of talk takes place in the visual and aural range of persons who are not 
ratified participants and whose access to the encounter, however minimal, is itself 
perceivable by the official participants. These adventitious participants are 
‘bystanders’. Their presence should be considered the rule, not the exception. In some 
circumstances they can temporarily follow the talk, or catch bits and pieces of it, all 
without much effort or intent, becoming, thus, overhearers. In other circumstances 
they may surreptitiously exploit the accessibility they find they have, thus qualifying 
                                                 
85
 For the description of Goffman’s roles we refer, besides Goffman’s original text, to the same model recovered 




as eavesdroppers, here not dissimilar to those who secretly listen in on conversations 
electronically (Goffman, 1979: 132).  
Combining the original classification of stakeholders developed in the management field, the 
one elaborated from scholars dealing with a websites production, Goffman’s roles of 
participants in communication, adding the category of gatekeeper highlighted by media 
sociology, and applying them to written communication in organizations, we obtain the 
classification of eight different stakeholder roles of a text: the principal, the author, the 
animator, the addressee, the ratified participant, the overhearer/bystander, the gatekeeper, and 
the regulator (table 1). 
In the following, on the basis of an example, we will show that the description of the 
stakeholders of a text according to this classification can clarify and describe in a richer way 
the communicative situation of promotional texts. 
Table 1 – Stakeholders 
Role Description 
Animator Someone who materially writes a text 
by activating a writing technology. 
Author Someone who produces a text 
formulating the content and choosing 
expressive strategies. The author is often 
asked to write a text and to accomplish a 
communicative purpose by a 
commissioner. In an organization it is 
likely to have many authors 
(collaborative writing). 
Principal The principal is the source of the text 
content, expressed opinion, and 
communicative goal. The author must 
realize the principal’s communicative 
goal when writing. The principal is 
responsible, even in legal terms, for the 
text. The principal’s opinion is 
expressed in the text. The principal can 




Addressee The person to whom the text is directly 
and explicitly addressed. 
Ratified participant Someone who the text is not directly 
addressed to but is entitled to take part 
in the communicative event as a right. 
Overhearer/Bystander Someone who can come in contact – 
directly or indirectly – with a text 
without either the principal or the 
author’s knowledge. He is not the 
addressee to whom the principal directs 
the text. Overhearers include opinion 
leaders, who can be affected by the text 
even if they are not addressees. The 
importance of an overhearer varies 
according to the text distribution. 
Gatekeeper Someone who, thanks to his/her role in a 
specific social context, can decide 
whether the text can reach its addressees 
or not. 
Regulator A government or control authority who 
gives norms and regulations for how 
communication should be maintained 
and how texts should be written. It can 
be either a national or independent 
institution. 
 
1. Rhetorical situation of three different promotional genres 
Let us take, as examples, a press release, a brochure, a print ad and a TV commercial 
promoting Xylo Mepha,
 86
 a generic nasal spray for adults and children, marketed by Mepha 
Pharma AG (a Swiss leader manufacturer and wholesaler of generic pharmaceutical products). 
The press release titled “Xylo-Mepha – lo spray nasale senza conservanti”
87
 was published on 
pressportal.ch on October 31
st
 2005 to launch the nasal spray and give information about it; 
the press release was issued by Mepha Pharma AG and Martina Beranek is indicated as the 
person to contact in order to have more information about the launch of the product. The 
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brochure is composed of 6 pages: the front page shows the picture of a woman and a little girl 
smiling at each other and the title “Meglio informati sul raffreddore”
88
, the back page gives 
details about who should use the product (a pack shot of the product is also depicted) and how, 
internal pages give information on what is a cold. The same image of a woman and a little girl 
is employed as the visual of the print ad published on SunStore; the headline reads 
“Raffreddore? Xylo-Mepha Libera il naso in pochi minuti – per ore”
89
 and it is matched with 
the pack shot of the nasal spray. The TV commercial has a problem-solution structure: the 
viewer sees a woman suffering from a cold and the product Xylo-Mepha, the same woman is 
then presented happily playing in the snow with her little girl. In the following sections, firstly 
we characterize the four texts from the point of view of genre, by highlighting the exigence 
they face and by describing the goal they pursue. Secondly, we identify their stakeholders.  
 
In terms of genre 
These four texts are responses to the producer’s exigence of selling the product. The officium 
of all these four texts is to positively modify this exigence by making the rhetorical audience 
aware of the factual condition (the Xylo-Mepha nasal spray) and its interest (all the 
advantages it provides in respect to other nasal sprays), thus awakening in it an exigence (to 
benefit from Xylo-Mepha nasal spray) that pushes to an action (to buy Xylo-Mepha nasal 
spray) capable of modifying the producer’s exigence of selling the product. This is an 
exigence that creates a complex rhetorical situation (Bitzer 1968: 12) and, as it is the case for 
most rhetorical situations in the realm of business communication, a highly structured one 
(Bitzer, 1968: 12), i.e. a rhetorical situation that employs usual and well-known 
communicative practices, for which in the course of time a structured rhetorical response has 
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been elaborated. This structured rhetorical response corresponds to Bakhtinian discourse 
genres.  
Indeed, the whole officium of meeting the exigence of selling the product in the 
activity type of advertising in the field of business is carried out through the activation of 
“culturally shared ‘recipe[s]’” (Rigotti and Rocci, 2006: 173) of advertising a product, an 
interaction scheme that relies on the employment of different textual genres. Each of them 
accomplishes a sub-officium through a given combination of thematic content, style, and 
compositional structure (cf. Bakhtin, 1986: 60) that has proved to be the most adequate to 
reach a specific goal. In our case the sub-officia are to announce the launch of Xylo Mepha on 
the market (the press release), to inform people about how cold develops and Xylo Mepha’s 
positive effects on it (the brochure), to call to the attention the existence and availability of 
Xylo Mepha (the print ad and the TV commercial). 
The complex rhetorical situation described above is broken down into sub-rhetorical 
situations, which differ in respect to the specific officium and the participants involved in the 
communication event, that is in respect to the involved stakeholders. 
In terms of stakeholders 
The press release, on the one side, the brochure, the print ad and the TV commercial, on the 
other side, differ in respect to the addressed rhetorical audience. The addressee of the press 
release (published online on a news portal)
90
 can be identified with both the journalists using 
the portal and all other users of this website (people who plausibly are interested in recent 
news). On the one hand, journalists aim at bringing themselves up to date with recent news 
which they can write articles on, they are also concerned with understanding what kind of 
product Xylo Mepha is and which advantages it has over similar products. Web-users in 
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general, not working as journalists, are also interested in knowing more about the product, but 
they may not have a specific goal concerning this product.
91
 The brochure can be both 
downloaded in pdf format from the organization website and taken in paper version from 
chemists’ (when it is available on the counter), thus addressees are both website users and 
chemist’s clients who need to understand what kind of product Xylo Mepha is and what are 
its advantages over other nasal sprays.
92
 The print ad is published on the magazine SunStore; 
therefore readers of SunStore magazine are the addressees of the print ad, the magazine is 
both sent by mail to Ticinese citizens and available in chemists’. The audience of the TV 
commercial encompasses all TV viewers: everyone watching TV receives the message and 
counts as someone being able to positively modifying the principal’s exigence of selling Xylo 
Mepha. 
In Bitzer’s terms, the speaker/writer of the four texts is Mepha Pharma AG, particularly its 
managers. According to our framework of stakeholders we name this participant in the 
communicative event principal. However, at least in the cases of the print ad and of the TV 
commercial, it is likely that Mepha Pharma AG managers did not produce the text; it is likely 
that the principal commissioned the creation and production of these two texts to a specialized 
advertising agency, which holds the role of author. Besides, the print ad had to be “printed 
somewhere”, namely in some specialized magazines devoted to informing pharmacies’ clients 
on different topics and products related to health and wellness. This brings into play another 
actor, namely the publisher of the magazine, who holds the role of animator of the print ad: 
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 Organizations and corporations are getting used to publishing press releases on web portals or on their 
websites. In such cases, both the wide public and journalists are addressees. However, there still are 
organizations that do not publish their press releases online. Even in this case, though, it is becoming more and 
more usual to address the press release to a public wider than journalists. For instance, some organizations, when 
promoting an event, send their press releases by e-mail not only to journalists, but also to a mailing-list of 
potentially interested people who are likely to assure the public of the event (we can mention i2a istituto 
internazionale di architettura of Vico Morcote, Ticino, as an actual example we dealt with in the course of 
composition described in section 6). Also in this case, the addressees of the press release can be ascribed to 
different categories. 
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 There exist two groups of addressees because the text is released on two different channels. In business 
communication, however, addressees often entail different categories, even when the text is released on a unique 




by launching it on a communicative channel, he “gives voice” to the text.
93
 Equally, the 
animator of the press release is the news portal on which it has been published and the 
animator of the TV commercial is the TV channel which telecasts it.  
People to whom the text is not directly addressed but are entitled to take part into the 
communicative event do not come into play in the press release,
94
 whereas they can be 
identified as participants of the TV commercial and of the brochure’s rhetorical situation. In 
the case of the TV commercial, children count as ratified participants because, on the one 
side, as TV viewers, they take part in the communicative event (they can see and hear the 
message; besides, they are mentioned in the message, both because the text points out that 
Xylo Mepha is available in a specific dosage for children and because part of the visual stages 
a girl playing in the snow with her mother and their dog), but, on the other side, they are not 
directly in a position to positively modify the principal’s exigence. In the case of the brochure, 
ratified participants are health professionals who look through the website for some 
information on health products and health professionals who subscribed to this website and 
received the brochure by mail; they wish to know the product and its advantages better. Again, 
since the brochure is provided on chemists’ counters, it is plausible to think of chemists 
themselves as gatekeepers of the text: they must restock the counter with other brochures 
when all have been taken. No gatekeeper is identified in relation to the press release; in fact, 
journalists open and close gates not to press releases but rather to news and their content (cf. 
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 In Goffman’s examples (which deal with oral discursive practices) the animator offers his voice to the text and 
activates the text by reading it. Accordingly, in the case of written communication, the actual animation of the 
text consists in its reading and therefore the recipient and the other receiving stakeholders play also the role of 
animators. However, in order to be read, the text must be published, visible; the text has to reach its recipients. 
Therefore, in a sense, in the case of written communication, animators are also those who offer the channel and 
who activate it on and through that channel, by publishing and printing it. 
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 However, there exist rhetorical situations of press releases in which this kind of participant is present. We can 
mention again as an example some press releases written by i2a for promoting their expositions. The press 
releases present both the main artist of the exposition and other artists intervening in various exhibitions usually 
held during vernissages and finissages. Since they are mentioned in the texts, the artists become ratified 




note 4 above). Press releases always reach journalists as addressees, subsequently journalists 
can decide whether to write an article on that news or not.
95
 
Apart from rules regulating the compositional structure and style of press releases as 
discourse genres, no regulators in terms of stakeholders are recognized. Interestingly, the 
brochure, the print ad and the TV commercial hint at national norms governing 
advertisements for medical products. According to the Swiss Ordinance on Advertising for 
Medical Products only medical products without doctor’s prescription can be advertised to the 
general public. Ads must not be misleading and must not incite an inappropriate use of the 
product; in a print ad some indication like “This is a medicine. Read carefully the medical 
instructions” must be added, while at the end a TV commercial (which can be telecast only if 
it is approved by Swissmedic, the Swiss agency for authorisation and supervision of 
theraupetic products) must state “This is a medicine. Ask your specialist for advice and read 
the medical instructions”.  
In the rhetorical situations of these four texts no bystander can be identified. As we 
already noticed, the fact that the TV commercial is telecast on a TV channel implies that 
every TV viewer is an addressee or a ratified participant. Similarly, the fact that the press 
release is published on a public website implies that every Internet user is a ratified participant. 
The same can be said for the brochure, which is downloadable from the Mepha website. 
However, even if we consider the other channel of distribution of the brochure (the chemist), 
no bystander emerges: when a person enters the chemist, s/he becomes a chemist’s customer 
and, accordingly, s/he assumes the role of addressee. Similarly, when a person picks up the 
Sunstore magazine at the chemists or takes it in her/his hand at home and browses through it, 
s/he becomes a Sunstore reader and therefore an addressee. 
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 Since more and more frequently organizations publish press releases online, the role of gatekeeper of the 




On the base of the analysis of these four examples, we can provide a more precise description 
of the stakeholders of promotional texts (table 2).  
Table 2 – Stakeholders of texts promoting Xylo Mepha  
Role Description 
Example from texts 
promoting Xylo Mepha 
Animator Someone who materially writes a text 
by activating a writing technology. 
The webmaster of 
pressportal.ch who is asked to 
upload a press release on the 
website. 
Author Someone who produces a text 
formulating the content and choosing 
expressive strategies. The author is often 
asked to write a text and to accomplish a 
communicative purpose by a 
commissioner. In an organization it is 
likely to have many authors 
(collaborative writing). 
An assistant who is asked to 
produce a brochure promoting 
a new product from Mepha 
Pharma AG. He or she is given 
some details about the product 
itself and about where the 
brochure will be distributed.  
Principal The principal is the source of the text 
content, expressed opinion, and 
communicative goal. The author must 
realize the principal’s communicative 
goal when writing. The principal is 
responsible, even in legal terms, for the 
text. The principal’s opinion is 
expressed in the text. The principal can 
also be an institution or an enterprise. 
The director of Mepha Pharma 
AG who asks an advertising 
agency to produce a print ad 
which will promote the new 
Xylo Mepha the organization 
has just made. 
Addressee The person to whom the text is directly 
and explicitly addressed. 
Readers of Sunstore magazine 
where a print ad for Xylo 
Mepha is published. 
Ratified participant 
Someone who the text is not directly 
addressed to but is entitled to take part 
in the communicative event as a right. 
A health professional who 
receives a paper copy of a 
brochure which was mainly 
created for chemists’ clients. 
Overhearer/Bystander Someone who can come in contact – 
directly or indirectly – with a text 
without either the principal or the 
author’s knowledge. He is not the 
addressee to whom the principal directs 
the text. Overhearers include opinion 
leaders, who can be affected by the text 
even if they are not addressees. The 
importance of an overhearer varies 
according to the text distribution. 
A friend of the journalist who 
receives the press release 
promoting a new nasal spray 
who is informed, by the 





Gatekeeper Someone who, thanks to his/her role in a 
specific social context, can decide 
whether the text can reach its addressees 
or not. 
The chemist’s assistant who is 
in charge of restocking the 
counter with brochures and 
who does not do it. 
Regulator A government or control authority who 
gives norms and regulations for how 
communication should be maintained 
and how texts should be written. It can 
be either a national or independent 
institution. 
The Swiss Federal Council 
gives guidelines about how 
medical products must be 
advertised in the Ordinance on 
Advertising for Medical 
Products. For example, only 
non-prescription drugs, such as 
Xylo Mepha, can be advertised 
to the general public. 
 
1. Educational application 
The notion of stakeholders and the classification presented above have been introduced in a 
bachelor course of composition at the Faculty of Communication Sciences of the University 
of Lugano. Concretely, students were asked to write texts of organizational genres (such as 
letters, press releases, reports, proposals, brochures, leaflets, interviews) in order to face 
actual communication needs of actual (local) organizations (which agreed to play the role of 
principals). For instance, some students had to write press releases and the related email cover 
letters for the promotion of expositions by i2a, as well as leaflets and letters for the promotion 
of some of i2a laboratories for kids; other students were asked to produce a sponsoring 
dossier, a magazine and the corresponding email cover letter for promoting Lugano LongLake 
Festival, a summer event organized by the Youths and Events Department of Lugano; other 
students were asked to conceive a new and more effective format for the annual report of the 
Federation of the non-governmental organizations of Italian Switzerland (FOSIT), as well as a 
new brochure for the institutional presentation of the federation and a press kit. 
Before starting the writing of the committed texts, students were asked to 
identify the text’s stakeholders according to the above exposed classification and to 




knowledge, goals, relationship to other stakeholders. The stakeholder’s description 
method was inspired by the methods of audience analysis exposed by Schriver (1997: 
154-162), particularly by the classification-driven analysis and by the intuition-driven 
analysis. The description encompassed the two main dimensions of communication 
context according to Rigotti and Rocci’s (2006) model: the institutional dimension and 
the interpersonal dimension. 
Such a detailed description of stakeholders - and the in-depth understanding of 
the rhetorical situation of texts it allows us to reach - can be a valuable tool for the 
teaching of composition and it provides students with a conceptual tool that sustains 
them in achieving effectiveness in business functional communication. Starting from 
the assumption that a text is effective when it achieves its goal, that is, when it 
positively modifies the exigence from which it stemmed, and considering that one of 
the essential components of a text’s effectiveness is its adequacy to the rhetorical 
situation, a precise and concrete identification of the stakeholders of a text makes 
students aware of the very situated character of each text and helps them in producing 
texts adherent and relevant to the exigence. For instance, a detailed description of the 
stakeholders of the institutional brochure for FOSIT shows that addressees belong to 
different categories with different needs and imposing different requirements on the 
text, which have an impact on the choice of the brochure contents. The addressees are 
Italian Swiss non-governmental organizations which are considering whether to join 
the federation, actual and potential sponsors as well as the media and all the Italian 
Swiss population. It is important for them all to know that the federation exists and 
what it does, which are the affiliated NGOs and which projects are being carried out. 
However, this is not sufficient information either for potential sponsors (who may 




actual financial situation) or for NGOs interested in becoming members of the 
federation (which also want to know who can join it, how and when, and which 
advantages this affiliation would have for them). Besides, the analysis of stakeholders 
outlines that affiliated NGOs are ratified participants of the brochure: they care that 
the image of the federation and of themselves that emerges out of the text corresponds 
to the set of values that leads them and that convinced them to join FOSIT. 
In fact, such a conceptual tool can be useful in order to shape and build into the text the 
implied writer and the implied reader (Jameson 2004a, 2004b). As Jameson (2004a) points 
out, the implied writer and reader do not coincide with the live writer and reader, but they are 
a “subset of the whole, complex person” (392). “The whole, live human being who writes is 
never exactly the same as the writer’s representation of self implied in the text” (Jameson, 
2004b: 231). By becoming aware of the stakeholders of the texts and of the needs, exigencies 
and requirements of those stakeholders (which emerge in the stakeholders’ description), 
students can be supported in eliciting the traits and aspects of concrete and real stakeholders 
that has to be coped with in order to build into the text an adequate implied writer and an 
adequate implied reader. In this perspective, composition exercises such as the following one 
can be developed: students are given the examples we have analyzed above as sources, that is, 
texts from which they can retrieve some useful information about the organization and its 
products.  After describing the rhetorical situation for each text and its stakeholders, students 
are asked to produce, for instance, a letter by a chemist asking to be sent more brochures and 
some other promotional material together with more Xylo Mepha to sell (this letter will be 
sent together with the formal commercial order for more products). In such an exercise 
students will for instance realize that some participants in the communication event of the 
brochure and of the letter they have to write are the same (Mepha Pharma, chemist), but they 




brochure Mepha Pharma is the principal (and maybe also the author) and the chemist is a 
ratified participant as well as a gatekeeper, while in the communication event of the letter 
Mepha Pharma is the addressee and the chemist is the principal (while students play the role 
of authors). The “situatedness” of each text will therefore emerge: even if the two texts refer 
roughly “to the same thing”, the communication event they realize is different. Besides by 
describing these two stakeholders and, for instance, their usual relationship, students discover 
how to implement the characteristics of real stakeholders in the text, particularly in the 
implied writer and reader. As to our example, for instance, is the relationship between Mepha 
Pharma and the chemist a formal one or a confidential one? And is it usual for chemists to 
require additional brochures or not? Does it often happen that the number of brochures Mepha 
Pharma thought to be sufficient is in fact insufficient? Accordingly, has the letter’s implied 
writer to be someone who is expressing a normal routine-based request to a colleague he is 
used to contacting for lots of big and small problems and questions or someone who is risking 
an unusual request to a corporation with which he usually does not interact? 
4. Conclusion 
In this contribution we have attempted to answer the question ‘who is communicating to 
whom in promotional genres’. Taking examples – a press release, a brochure, a print ad and a 
TV commercial promoting a nasal spray – from the marketing communication domain, we 
have presented our rhetorical approach. Its application to texts belonging to different domains 
has been only briefly described; a wider illustration would be possible (and will be the theme 
of future works), but it is out of the scope of the present paper, which aims at providing an 
illustrative example of the interest of the model of stakeholders of a text. 





All the participants in a communicative event are stakeholders since they are interested 
in the success of the communication taking place. Communication arises for an exigence, 
which is a kernel element in every rhetorical situation. Texts are communicative events 
arising within a specific context in order to adhere to this specific exigence. The context-
bound goal is achieved using communicative tools known as discourse genres, which are 
shared flexible recipes for communication that stakeholders can interpret and produce 
according to their goals.  Texts such as the examples we have presented here show that texts 
with similar goals – that of promoting a product – apply to different rhetorical situations 
where various stakeholders play specific roles. 
Adherence to rhetorical situations and stakeholders is crucial for the communicative success 
of texts in business communication. Therefore, we believe that this approach, especially the 
model of stakeholders, is a valuable tool not only for understanding a text but also for 
teaching how to produce effective texts in organizational and business realms.  
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The Representation and Reception of Paraphrase in Newspaper Headlines 
Anita Runjić-Stoilova & Josip Galić, University of Split 
 
Summary 
Newspaper headlines are specific types of texts in which one or more words announce the following 
article. The basic functions of the headline are to inform the reader and attract his/her attention. In order to 
successfully inform, the headline has to provide answers to one or more basic questions (who, what, where, 
when, why). The headline also has to attract the attention of the reader by the means of figurativeness which 
arises not only from the positional prominence and the graphic features of the headline, but also as a result of 
specific linguistic combination and arrangement of various parts of the message within the whole. 
The paraphrase is a common figure in newspaper headlines. This term signifies a basic rhetorical 
process of statement development, as well as a macro-structural stylistic figure. With regard to discursive basis, 
we differentiate between four types of paraphrase: linguistic, commentary, literary and ludic.  
The purpose of this study was to identify the frequency of ludic paraphrases in daily (Slobodna 
Dalmacija and Vjesnik) and weekly newspapers (Nacional and Globus) as well as to test the knowledge and 
understanding of modified phrases used in the headlines on two groups of selected examinees. The initial 
hypothesis about the differences in the usage of paraphrases between daily and weekly newspapers was 
confirmed. The analysis of percentages of paraphrased headlines recognized by examinees revealed different 
levels of understanding. 
Key words: journalistic discourse, figurativeness, newspaper headlines, paraphrase 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Headline, figurativeness, journalistic discourse 
Newspaper headlines are specific types of texts in which one or more words announce 
the following article. The headline takes the central place in the text: it is graphically 
separated from the text body and often classified in the group of small texts (phrases, proverbs, 




The basic function of the headline is defined in its positional prominence, the purpose 
of which is to attract the reader’s attention and inform the reader about the basic content of the 
text body. The above mentioned functions represent the pragmatic and semantic roles of the 
headline (Iarovici and Amel, 1989) and they form the basic requirements of the journalistic 
style. The semantic role is evident in the text body and the pragmatic role is evident in the 
effect it exerts on the reader. In order to successfully inform, the headline has to provide 
answers to one or more basic questions (who, what, where, when, why). The headline also has 
to attract the attention of the reader through a figurativeness which arises not only from the 
positional prominence and the graphic features of the headlines, but also as a result of distinct 
linguistic choice and specific arrangement of parts of the message within the whole (Tošović, 
2002; Silić, 2006). 
The journalistic style is also known as the hybrid style (Pranjić, 1968: 17) because it 
includes features of other functional styles such as literary, scientific, administrative and 
conversational, according to the type of the newspaper text (news, report, paper, review, 
interview, chronicle...) (Tošović 2002: 242, 250). 
The headline strongly relies on figurativeness - it must adhere to principles of 
language economy and transfer a meaningful message to another person. That message has to 
arouse the interest of the reader (Veselica-Majhut 2006: 753). The construction of newspaper 
headlines changes depending on the type of audience targeted, the historical context, 
generation, gender, age of the reader, etc. The pragmatic and semantic function of the 
headline is to point to an extra-textual reality, thus other texts to which a headline also refers 
become an inter-textual junction or the reader’s connection with the author of the text (Ivas 
2004: 14). The headline’s compact format enables its function as a paraphrase.  
Figurativeness is very important in newspaper headlines. A figurative device is created 




functions (Ivas, 2004). Recognition of figurativeness reveals the reader’s level of education 
and cultural awareness, as well as a capacity for abstract thinking.  In addition, headlining is 
challenging for the reporter because he/she has to keep in mind the audience addressed, 
presume their level of cultural experience and also successfully attract attention, entertain or 
disturb the audience. Even when it is not clearly figurative, the headline takes on this function 
because of its positional prominence in regard to the addressed text. Figurative devices in the 
headline additionally assert its independence from the text body. The headline or newspaper 
article does not necessarily have to employ figurativeness: the frequency or lack of figurative 
language use depends on the type of news and also on the journalist’s style and skill. These 
characteristics generate differences between newspapers. 
The most common type of figurative speech in a headline in addition to metaphor and 
metonymy is paraphrase.  
 
1.2. Paraphrase - the history of the term 
The term paraphrase derives from the Greek word paráphrasis meaning description, 
loose translation. It signifies the fundamental rhetorical process of statement development, 
and functions as a macro-structural stylistic figure. In both cases paraphrase refers to 
rewriting, retelling, reworking of a sentence or statement (Bagić, 2007). 
In the 20
th
 century the term paraphrase became obsolete in language and literature. 
Aestheticians, literary theorists and linguists today often discuss paraphrase with negative 
connotations, defining it as a simplification of serious discourse. A pejorative meaning can 
frequently be found in everyday communication, as we think about paraphrase as chaotic, 
bulky and imprecise commentary (Bagić, 2007). Many linguists have adopted a broader 
definition of paraphrase. They define it as a restatement of a text in another form or in other 




used in linguistics for the result or process of producing alternative versions of a sentence or 
text without changing the meaning. One sentence may have several paraphrases, e. g. The dog 
is eating a bone, A bone is being eaten by the dog, It's the dog who is eating a bone, and so on 
(Crystal, 2003: 336). Most semantic theories would treat all these sentences as having a single 
semantic representation. Linguists use syntactic paraphrase as a major procedure for 
establishing certain types of transformational relations (Crystal, 2003: 336). 
In spite of the neglect of paraphrase in the 20
th
 century, this has not always been the 
case: in ancient Greece and Rome paraphrase was the most important exercise in the 
education of orators, writers and intellectuals. Pupils were asked to reformulate or paraphrase 
a text or a phrase. It was also recommended by the great rhetoricians Quintilian and 
Hermogen. Quintilian described it as the best method for a basic understanding of the text. 
However, he warned against using a paraphrase as a literal translation of the original, but 
rather advised that it should compete with the original in expression of thought (Quintilian, 
1986). Ancient Romans recommended three types of periphrastic reformulation: (1) Latin 
translation of Greek orators, (2) prose paraphrase of Latin poetry and (3) rewriting their own 
texts (Bagić, 2007). Therefore, Greeks and Romans defined paraphrase more as a process of 
statement development than as a macro-structural stylistic figure.  
Quintilian’s definition of paraphrase is also confirmed by some modern-day linguists: 
“telling, describing, formulating thoughts and names with different or clearer words” (Anić, 
2006: 996); it could be said that paraphrase is “modifying the known phrase in a way that it 
remains recognizable but with a new meaning” (Škarić, 2000: 127). Paraphrase can therefore 
appear: (1) as a fundamental rhetorical process of statement development and (2) also as a 
macro-structural stylistic figure. In the first case the meaning of the original is preserved, 
while in the second case the original phrase is usually used as a suitable framework for 




between four types of paraphrase: linguistic, commentary, literary and ludic (Bagić, 2007). 
This paper focuses on the fourth type of paraphrase. The term ludic paraphrase implies the 
intervention into structurally and semantically canonized statements such as proverbs, clichés, 
collocations, titles of books, titles of songs, titles of films, etc.  
 
2. Purpose and hypothesis  
 
Because this research was divided in two parts, there are also several goals and 
hypotheses. In the first part of the research the goals were (1a) to determine the representation 
of paraphrase in daily and weekly newspapers’ headlines and (1b) to determine the frequency 
in the use of paraphrase between daily and weekly newspapers. In the second part of the 
research the goal was (2) to analyze the reception of newspaper headlines between two 
different groups of examinees. 
The hypotheses were divided in two groups, those relating to representation and those 
relating to reception.  The hypotheses related to the representation were the following: (1a) 
the analysis of the corpus will show certain differences in the usage of paraphrase in daily and 
weekly newspapers; (1b) more frequent usage of paraphrases is expected in weekly paper 
headlines due to the dominance of a pragmatic over a semantic function of the headlines; (1c) 
the daily newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija will contain more paraphrases than Vjesnik. These 
two daily papers target very different readerships, which is why there are certain differences 
in the structure of their headlines. Despite its low circulation, Vjesnik
96
 was among the best 
daily papers on the market, singled out in its serious approach to journalism and professional 
treatment of information
97
. However, this research will not focus on an analysis of the 
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 The daily newspaper Vjesnik stopped being published in 2012 after 72 years. 
97
 This is the opinion held by many eminent Croatian experts such as judges of the Supreme court, directors of 





difference between these newspapers on the content level, but rather on the difference 
between quality and popular newspapers – a differentiation common in Anglophone societies 
(Veselica, Majhut, 2006: 455). Therefore, it is presumed that Slobodna Dalmacija, as a 
popular newspaper, will contain more inter-textual games (paraphrases) than a quality paper 
such as Vjesnik. Finally, (1d) the presumption is that, unlike the daily newspapers, weekly 
papers will contain equal frequency of paraphrasing. 
The presumptions of the second part of the research were the following. (2a) There 
will be certain differences between two groups of examinees in the reception of paraphrases. 
The largest differences were expected for buzz words and phrases, which are limited just to 
one generation or social group. Along with this basic assumption, additional differences in the 
reception of paraphrases in relation to gender, level of education and cultural awareness were 
examined. (2b) It is expected that educated examinees, regardless of age and gender, will 





3. Research methodology   
 
Research was conducted in two parts. The representation of paraphrase in newspaper 
headlines was examined in the first part. For this purpose headlines from Croatian daily 
papers (Slobodna Dalmacija and Vjesnik) and weekly newspapers (Nacional and Globus) 
were collected and analyzed. Data were not collected systematically because the goal was not 
to compare the frequency of paraphrases in various papers during the same period. Thirty-one 





copies of each daily paper from August till December 2011, and thirty-one copies of each 
weekly paper from October 2009 till December 2011 were analyzed.  
In the second part of research the reception of paraphrases within two groups of 
examinees was analyzed. There were 80 examinees, 40 younger and 40 older ones. 
Respondents were given a questionnaire with 57 paraphrased headlines from the first part of 
the research. In the first part of the questionnaire basic demographic data were collected (age, 
gender, level of education, profession). Also data about examinees’ cultural awareness 
(reading books and magazines, going to the theatre, doing quizzes) were gathered. For the last 
two questions (general and cultural awareness) respondents were offered scaled answers: rare 
(less than 5), periodically (from 5 to 10), regularly (more than 10). In the second part of the 
questionnaire, the respondents had to suggest the original form of the modified headline, eg. 
for the proverb Through the mud to the stars
98
 / Preko blata do zvijezda
99
 they had to write 
Through the thorns to the stars / Preko trnja do zvijezda. The authors of this paper wanted to 
ascertain the recognition of the original form of the paraphrase which would enable readers to 
have a better reception of the headlines.  
In order to ascertain the degree of the recipients’ recognition and understanding of 
paraphrases in headlines, the questionnaire was given to 80 examinees. The first group 
consisted of 40 undergraduate and graduate students of Croatian Language and Literature at 
the Faculty of Philosophy in Split and their average age was 22. The second group consisted 
of 40 examinees and their average age was 56. In the first group, most of the examinees 
enrolled in undergraduate and graduate programs after completing gymnasium high schools 
(78%). In the second group, examinees with completed high school education were 
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Per aspera ad astra or Ad astra per aspera is a Latin phrase which means any of the following: "Through 
hardships to the stars", "A rough road leads to the stars" or "To the stars through difficulties". The phrase is one 
of many Latin sayings which use the expression Ad astra.  
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Since the examples were collected from Croatian newspaper, they will be always presented both in Croatian 
and English. The meaning of the examples discussed or used for illustration will also be explained the first time 





predominant (63%), while only 37% of examinees only completed a high school education.  
In the first group the women to men ratio was 80:20% and in the second group it was 25:75%. 
 
4. Results and Discussion  
 
4.1. Representation of paraphrase in daily and weekly newspapers  
In the overall corpus of nine thousand eight hundred sixty-six headlines fifty-seven 
headlines with some paraphrastic conversion were found. In the headlines extracted from the 
corpus, journalists arranged known lexical groups – phrases, movie titles, songs, books, lyrics, 
classical proverbs - into new combinations. They modified them to produce an allusion, a 
game between the original and its transformations. 
As it has been expected, the analysis of the representation of paraphrases in daily and 
weekly papers revealed some differences. In the ratio of paraphrased and non-paraphrased 
headlines the results are the following: in daily papers twenty paraphrases were extracted 
from the total number of seven thousand ninety-five headlines, which makes up “only” 0.28% 
of the corpus, while in weekly papers thirty-seven paraphrases were extracted from the total 
number of two thousand seven hundred seventy-one, which makes up 1.34% of the corpus. 
This difference is also confirmed with the measure of frequency defined in the absolute 






Figure1 Percentage of paraphrases in daily and weekly newspapers 
In daily papers twenty paraphrases were found, which amounts to 35% of the total 
number of selected headlines, while thirty-seven paraphrases were found in weekly papers, 
which amounts to 65% of the total number of selected headlines. The results (both in the ratio 
of paraphrased and non-paraphrased headlines and in the absolute number of paraphrased 
headlines) confirmed the hypothesis that weekly papers contain more paraphrases than daily 
papers. The first reason lies in their requirements. The first requirement of daily newspapers 
Slobodna Dalmacija and Vjesnik is to inform the readers. In the headlines this could be 
explained through the dominance of their semantic over pragmatic function and consequently 
the reduced number of paraphrases. On the other hand, weekly newspapers form more casual 
discourse the function of which is to entertain the readers in addition to being of an 
informative character.  
The analysis revealed differences in representation of paraphrase not only in daily 
papers, but also in weekly papers. The measure of frequency in the ratio of paraphrased and 
non-paraphrased headlines showed the following results: twelve paraphrased headlines out of 
a total number of four thousand one hundred eighty-four headlines were found in Slobodna 
Dalmacija, which makes up 0.29% of the corpus and eight paraphrased headlines out of two 
35% 
65% 




thousand nine hundred and eleven headlines were found in Vjesnik, which makes up 0.27% of 
the corpus. Furthermore, twenty-eight paraphrased headlines out of one thousand one hundred 
forty-seven headlines were found in weekly paper Nacional (2.4%), and only nine 
paraphrased headlines out of total number of one thousand six hundred twenty-four headlines 
were found in Globus (0.55%).  
These results are also confirmed by the measure of frequency defined in the absolute 
number of paraphrased headlines.  Twelve out of twenty paraphrases in daily papers were 
found in Slobodna Dalmacija (60%), and eight paraphrases were found in Vjesnik (40%), 
which confirms our previous hypothesis about the difference in addressing readership 
between popular and quality newspapers. A greater difference was found in the usage of 
paraphrase in each weekly newspaper. Twenty-eight out of thirty-seven paraphrases in weekly 
papers were found in Nacional (76%), and nine paraphrases were found in Globus (24%). 
















Figure 2. Representation of paraphrase  Figure 3. Representation of  
in daily newspapers     paraphrase in weekly newspapers 
 
4.2. Reception or recognition of paraphrase in daily and weekly newspapers  
In the second part of the research, slight differences in the understanding of modified 
phrases were revealed between the two groups of examinees. The results represented show 
differences between examinees only on the basis of their age not on their level of education or 
cultural awareness. The older examinees have 45.8% correct answers in relation to attempting 
to answer 68% of the time, while younger examinees have 49.8% of correct answers in 
































 Figure 4 Attempted and accurate reconstructions of headlines by both groups of 
examinees   
More detailed analysis or individual results showed differences in recognizing 
paraphrases due to the respondents’ general and cultural awareness (literacy, general 
culturedness, cultural immersion). The questionnaires revealed that 23% of the student 
population regularly follows cultural events,
100
 and that 57% of them do so occasionally. This  
was not the case with the older population, because they attend cultural events to a much 
lesser degree (or perhaps they were simply more sincere in their answers). Only 7.5% of older 
examinees are regular readers and 58% are occasional readers. The results concerning global 
awareness
101
 of the examinees are somewhat different: both groups of examinees are equally 
well informed by the media (48%). 
Therefore, there were obviously significant individual differences in the degree of 
recognition of the paraphrased original. Just attempting to reconstruct the model informed us 
of the examinee’s ability to recognize the origin of the paraphrased headline: the number of 
recognized sources of headline paraphrases ranged from 26% to 88%. 
 
4.2.1. Different degrees of reception of headlines by younger examinees  
Younger examinees showed different stages of recognition of headlines from the 
corpus. According to the percentage of successful original form reconstruction, results can be 
divided in four groups: 
A.  Maximum degree of recognition in which 75-100% of examinees recognized a group of 15 
paraphrases. This is 26% of the corpus. Here are some examples.
102
 The Dalmatian folk song 
title Šime is back / Vratija se Šime is recognized by 100% of examinees in the headline Drago 
is back / Vratija se Drago. The famous movie title Lassie come home / Lassie se vraća kući 
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 Cultural events include visiting theatre, cinema, museums and so on.  
101
 General awareness refers to internet usage, reading a newspaper, listening to the radio, watching television…  
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was recognized by 98% of examinees in the headline Kobe Bryant come home / Kobe Bryant 
se vraća kući. The old proverbs Pay so you can mock / Plati pa se rugaj and Through the 
thorns to the stars / Preko trnja do zvijezda are recognized by 90% of the examinees in the 
headlines Pay so you can swim / Plati pa se kupaj and Through the mud to the stars / Kroz 
blato do zvijezda. 75% of examinees knew that the headline Spices against humanity / Začini 
protiv čovječnosti comes from the phrase Crimes against Humanity / Zločini protiv 
čovječnosti. 
B. Second degree of recognition in which 50-74% of examinees recognized a group of 16 
paraphrases which makes up 28% of the corpus. For example
103
, examinees recognized the 
movie title Lost in translation / Izgubljeni u prijevodu in the headline Lost in the institution / 
Izgubljeni u zavodu (73%) and the Czech movie My Sweet Little Village / Selo moje malo in 
the headline My sweet nuclear village / Selo moje nuklearno (63%). “Only” 58% of 
examinees recognized Croatian National Tourist Board / Hrvatska turistička zajednica in the 
phrase Croatian National Tourist Deception / Hrvatska turistička obmana. The Latin phrase 
Man is wolf to another man
104
 / Čovjek je čovjeku vuk is identified by 55% of the examinees 
in the headline Croat is a Serb to another Croat / Hrvat je Hrvatu Srbin. 
C. Third degree of recognition in which 25-49% of examinees recognized a group of 12 
paraphrases, which is 21% of the corpus.  E.g. in the headline Mulder without Scully / Mulder 
bez Scully, 43% of examinees recognized the characters Mulder and Scully from TV series 
The X-Files. One of the most famous rallying cries of communism Workers of the world, 
unite! / Proleteri svih zemalja, ujedinite se! was identified by 33% of the respondents in the 
exclamation Croatists and Slavists, unite! / Kroatisti i slavisti, ujedinite se! The James Bond 
movie From Russia with love / Iz Rusije s ljubavlju was also identified by 33% of the 
examinees in the headline To Russia with love / Rusiji s ljubavlju. 
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 For other examples see Appendix 1. 
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D. Minimum degree of recognition in which 0-24% of examinees recognized a group of 14 
paraphrases which makes up 25% of the corpus. For example, the TV commercial slogan for 
the Croatian National Tourist Board The Mediterranean as it once was / Mediteran kakav je 
nekad bio was recognized by only 15% of the examinees in the headline Istria as it once was / 
Istra kakva je nekad bila. No one recognized the movie title Closely watched trains
105
 / 
Strogo kontrolirani vlakovi in the headline Closely watched bulls of arts / Strogo kontrolirani 
bikovi umjetnosti.  
The younger examinees who were unable to identify the original phrase stated their 
own modification of headlines or they connected them to a similar one. We will quote several 
examples. The headline was Sanader
106
 stole my Christmas / Sanader mi je ukrao Božić. 
Examinees recognized the movie How the Grinch Stole Christmas
107
/ Kako je Grinč ukrao 
Božić but mostly suggested a modified version of it - The Grinch Stole my Christmas / Grinč 
je ukrao moj Božić. The second example is the headline Grandma and her Credits are Gone / 
Prošla baba s kreditima, which the examinees identified as Grandma and her 
candies/cookies/eggs are gone / Prošla baba s bombonima/kolačima/jajima. The original 
phrase is Grandma and her cookies are gone
108
 / Prošla baba s kolačima.  
 
4.2.2. Different degrees of reception of newspaper headlines by older examinees 
Older examinees also showed different degrees of the recognition of headlines. The 
corpus can be divided into several groups according to the percentage of successful original 
form reconstruction.  
A. Maximum degree of recognition in which 75-100% of examinees recognized a group 
of 11 paraphrases, which makes up 19% of the corpus.  
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A Czech movie from 1966. Director Jiri Menzel was the recipient of the Academy Award for Best Foreign 
Language Film that year. 
106
 Ivo Sanader, former Croatian Prime Minister, now under investigation for embezzlement. 
107
 It is a children's story by Dr. Seuss, adapted as an animated special in 1966.  
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B. Second degree of recognition in which 50-74% of examinees recognized a group of 15 
paraphrases which makes up 26% of the corpus.  
C. Third degree of recognition in which 25-49% of examinees recognized a group of 11 
paraphrases which makes up 19% of the corpus.  
D. Minimum degree of recognition in which 0-24% of examinees recognized a group of 
14 paraphrases which makes up 25% of the corpus
109
.  
Some individuals from the older group of examinees who were also unable to identify 
the original form of a paraphrase developed their own modifications. For example the 
headline was Through the mud to the stars / Preko blata do zvijezda and the examinees 
identified it as Through the mud to freedom / Preko blata do slobode instead of the proverb 
Through the thorns to the stars / Preko trnja do zvijezda. Another interesting modification 
was for the headline In search of lost innocence / U potrazi za izgubljenom nevinošću. 
Examinees stated the phrase In search of a lost suitcase / U potrazi za izgubljenim kovčegom 
instead of the original book title In Search of lost time
110
/ U potrazi za izgubljenim vremenom. 
For many examples the examinees had broader associations, e.g. the headline The curse of 
Prime Minister Sanader / Sanaderova kletva which is a paraphrased old Croatian curse The 
curse of King Zvonimir
111
 / Zvonimirova kletva. However, the examinees identified the 
headline as Remetinec
112
 or Whoever digs a pit (for another man's feet) shall fall into it 
himself. / Tko pod drugim jamu kopa
113
 or To have and have not
114
 / Dabogda, imao pa 
nemao. 
It has already been said that two groups of examinees can hardly be differentiated on 
the bases of overall results in the understanding of paraphrases. Therefore, our previous 
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 Complete list of paraphrases  see in Appendix 2. 
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 A novel by Marcel Proust. 
111
 900 hundred year-old Croatian legend. The legend says that King Dmitar Zvonimir cursed Croats after they 
killed him such that they would never again have a ruler of their own blood.  
112
 The Croatian jail where the ex-Prime Minister was imprisoned. 
113
 Old Croatian proverb.  
114




hypothesis based on the assumption that age and different cultural backgrounds have no 
influence on paraphrase recognition should be discarded. For example, the younger and older 
groups of examinees displayed very different, and occasionally significantly opposite, levels 
of knowledge and paraphrase recognition, especially when asked to identify movie and song 
titles. The degree of the examinees’ familiarity with the modified headline depends on several 
circumstances. It is known that phraseological in general and paraphrastic groups in particular 
are very dynamic and many paraphrases are short-lived and are quickly replaced by new ones. 
The headlines that were most frequently recognized by examinees were modifications of 
common proverbs, pragmatic formulas, fairytale titles, commercials, famous movies, 
collocation and so on. The headlines that were less frequently identified are actually 
unmodified titles of old movies which the younger generations were unfamiliar with, titles of 
old songs, ancient phrases, international phrases, proverbs… The following examples show 
the great level of difference between the two groups of examinees in recognizing paraphrase 
originals: 98% of the older examinees recognized the title of the song Blue eyes shed tears
115
 / 
Suze liju plave oči in the form Suze Lyon plave oči, while the younger examinees recognized 
it only 50% of the time; the paraphrase Tower neither in socialism nor in capitalism / Čardak 
ni u socijalizmu ni u kapitalizm was identified by 95% of the older examinees as the Serbian 
folk tale Tower neither in heaven nor on earth / Čardak ni na nebu ni na zemlji. Nowadays, 
due to the fact this story is no longer a part of the school curriculum, its recognition was 
significantly lower among the younger examinees, meaning only 25%. A similar result is also 
found in the socialist slogan Proletarians of all countries, unite! / Proleteri svih zemalja, 
ujedinite se! The older examinees recognize it from the paraphrase Kroatisti i slavisti, 
ujedinite se! / Croatists and slavists, unite! 58% of the time, while the younger examinees 
only 33%.  
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There is one example where the results of recognition are higher in the younger 
examinee group: the title of the movie Pirates of the Caribbean / Pirati s Kariba which 
appears in the form Pirates of the river Danube / Pirati s Dunava was recognized by as many 
as 95% of the younger examinees, and by only 70% of the older examinees. Another 
interesting example is the paraphrase Lost in the institute / Izgubljeni u zavodu. The younger 
examinees identified it mostly as Lost in translation / Izgubljeni u prijevodu and the older 





The usage of paraphrases in headlines is a very efficient way of drawing the reader’s 
attention to the content of an article. In addition to hinting at the theme of the article, 
headlines encourage the reader to be an active participant in the interpretation of the text.  
Manipulation of phraseological meaning usually provokes surprise, humor or irony in readers 
and that is why headlines are strong stylistic tools. 
The purpose of this study was to verify the frequency of ludic paraphrases in daily 
(Slobodna Dalmacija and Vjesnik) and weekly newspapers (Nacional and Globus) as well as 
to verify the knowledge and understanding of modified phrases used in headlines.  
The research has confirmed the authors’ presumption that paraphrases appear more 
frequently in weekly than in daily newspapers because of specific rules in discourse formation 
related to the style of a certain author and a weekly or daily newspaper. Daily newspapers are 
focused on informing the reader about everyday events, and in addition weekly newspapers 
have entertainment features as well, manifested in the use of figurative headlines. In general, 




possibility of the use of intentional paraphrase. However, the use of paraphrase does not have 
to undermine the seriousness of the subject. On the contrary, it could reveal the journalist’s 
enormous creativity. 
As it was assumed, there are certain differences between the two daily and two weekly 
papers. The higher frequency of paraphrases in the headlines in Slobodna Dalmacija should 
be observed in the broader context of the existing differences between popular and quality 
newspapers that are addressing different audiences. Unexpected differences appeared in the 
structure of headlines in the political weekly newspapers Globus and Nacional. The higher 
frequency of paraphrases in Nacional could be explained by different ways of addressing the 
same audience. 
It is clear from the research that journalists use all kinds of established groups of 
words (phrases, movie titles, book titles, verses, classical proverbs) which they modify to 
create allusions, games between the speaker and his/her transformation. 
The research also showed that there is only a slight difference in paraphrase reception 
between young and older examinees. The same could be said for the relevance of 
asymmetrical cultural backgrounds, culturedness and the education of the journalists and 
readers as well. As was already presumed, a difference in reception between two generations 
arose from different social circumstances and asymmetrical knowledge. 
In conclusion, the results of the reception of modified phrases showed that the 
examinees displayed different degrees of understanding.  
The number of modified phrases and diversities in readers’ associations are instructive 
not only for linguists who describe and theoretically interpret them but also for the journalists 
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100%:  Drago is back / Šime is back;  
The Mandarin tree isn’t picked / The olive tree isn’t picked; 
98%:  Kobe Bryant come home / Lassie come home;  
95%:  Pirates of the river Danube / Pirates of the Caribbean; 
93%:  Boredom at two pm / Sunday at two pm;  
90%:  Pay so you can swim / Pay so you can mock;  
Through the mud to the stars / Through the thorns to the stars;  
Ante is alone in the world / Pale is alone in the world;  
85%:   End of the elephants / End of the world;  
Nobel Hope Prize, Nobel Prize in Hope / Nobel Peace Prize/in Physics/in chemistry/in 
medicine etc; 
Šeks scandal / Sex scandal;  
80%: All the president’s dribbling / All the president’s men;  
Grain by grain - pleasure is here / Grain by grain - bread is here;  
78% Spices against humanity / Crimes against Humanity;  
Love is in the Balkans / Love is in the countryside; 
73%:  Serbian theorem / Pythagorean/Thales’ theorem;  
I rape you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost / I baptize 
thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; 
Lost in the institute / Lost in translation; 
68%:  Grandma credits are gone / Grandma and her cookies are gone; 
Good spirit of skyscrapers / Good spirit of Zagreb;  
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63%:  My sweet nuclear village / My Sweet Little Village;  
60%: In search of lost innocence / In search of lost time/for lost treasure;  
58%:  Sanader's curse / Zvonimir’s curse;  
Crying and screaming, which means life / Boards that make you live;  
Ready for all! / Ready for the country!;  
Croatian National Tourist deception / Croatian National Tourist Board; 
55%:  Shower of the absurd / Theatre of the absurd;  
Croat is a Serb to another Croat / Man is wolf to another man;  
50%:  The good old corruption / For good old times;  
45%:  A German doesn't believe a Greek / A well-fed man doesn't believe a hungry one;  
43%:  Sanader stole my Christmas / How the Grinch Stole Christmas;  
Mulder without Scully / Mulder and Scully;  
Kosor didn't like them / Hawk didn't like him;  
35%:  To die for the new recession / To die for your country;  
33%:  Croatists and slavists, unite! / Proletarians of all countries, unite!;  
The slaughter of innocent pigs / The slaughter of the innocents;  
To Russia with love / From Russia with love;  
My gunfight with Sanader / Gunfight at the OK corral; 
25%:  Tower neither in socialism nor in capitalism / Tower neither in heaven nor on earth; 
Major railway robbery / The Great Train Robbery; 
18%:  Potemkin farmer / Potemkin villages;  
15%:  The working class doesn’t go to heaven / The working class goes to heaven;  
Istria as it as it once was / The Mediterranean as it once was; 
10%:  It's time for sun to shine on Hajduk / It’s time for me to be at peace with the world; 




When the spies go marching in / When the saints go marching in; 
8%:  Worm in the Big Apple / Worm in the apple;  
0%:  Closely watched bulls of arts / Closely Watched Trains;  
Mausoleum of Croatian heritage / Mausoleum of Croatian kings;  
Olympic screams and silence / Cries and Whispers;  
Going to black / Back in Black;  
Hitler from our beach / Hitler from our street;  
Collective suicide / Lovely collective murder. 
 
 
Appendix 2. List of all paraphrased headlines and the percentage of their understanding by 
older examinees. 
98%:  The Mandarin tree isn’t picked / The olive tree isn’t picked;  
All the president’s dribbling / All the president’s men;  
Grain by grain - pleasure is here / Grain by grain - bread is here;  
95%:  Tower neither in socialism or in capitalism / Tower neither in heaven nor on earth;  
My sweet nuclear village / My Sweet Little Village;  
Nobel Hope Prize, Nobel Prize in Hope / Nobel Peace Prize/in Physics/in chemistry/in 
medicine;  
93%:  Pay so you can swim / Pay so you can mock;  
90%:  Drago is back / Šime is back;  
88%:  Ante is alone in the world / Pale is alone in the world; 
83%:  The good old corruption / For good old times; 
70%:  Pirates of the river Danube / Pirates of the Caribbean;  




Šeks scandal / Sex scandal; 
65%:  Boredom at two pm / Sunday at two pm;  
Croatian National Tourist deception / Croatian National Tourist Board; 
63%:  Spices against humanity / Crimes against Humanity;  
Ready for all! / Ready for the country!;  
60%:  Love is in the Balkans / Love is in the countryside;  
End of the elephants / End of the world;  
58%:  Croatists and slavists, unite! / Proletarians of all countries, unite!;  
55%:  Through the mud to the stars / Through the thorns to the stars;  
53%: Major railway robbery / The Great Train Robbery;  
50%:  German doesn't believe Greek / Well-fed man doesn’t believe a hungry one; 
48%:  I rape you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost / I baptize 
thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost;  
Grandma credits are gone / Grandma and her cookies are gone; 
45%: Serbian theorem / Pythagorean/Thales’ theorem;  
Kosor didn't like them / Hawk didn't like him; 
38%:  When the spies go marching in / When the saints go marching in;   
Potemkin farmer / Potemkin villages;  
My gunfight with Sanader / Gunfight at the OK corral;  
Closely watched bulls of arts / Closely Watched Trains; 
35%:  In search of lost innocence / In search of lost time/for lost treasure; 
30%:  Croat is a Serb to another Croat / Man is wolf to another man;  
23%: Lost in the institute / Lost in translation; 
20%:  Good spirit of skyscrapers / Good spirit of Zagreb;  




18%:  The working class doesn’t go to heaven / The working class goes to heaven;  
The slaughter of innocent pigs / The slaughter of the innocents;  
Hitler from our beach / Hitler from our street;  
15%:  To die for the new recession / To die for your country; 
13%:   Sanader stole my Christmas / How the Grinch Stole Christmas; 
10%:  Istria as it as it once was / The Mediterranean as it once was;  
Olympic screams and silence / Cries and Whispers;  
8%:  Sanader's curse / Zvonimir’s curse;  
5%:  Mulder without Scully / Mulder and Scully;  
Shower of the absurd / Theatre of the absurd;  
The false hope traders / The fake goods traders;  
Collective suicide / Lovely collective murder;   
0%:  Mausoleum of Croatian heritage / Mausoleum of Croatian kings;  
Going to black / Back in Black;  
Worm in the Big Apple / Worm in the apple;  
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